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My research is about the resistance and peacebuilding initiatives of the Peace Community of 
San José de Apartadó (CdPSJA), the Cimitarra River Valley Peasant Association (ACVC), and 
the Carare Worker and Peasant Association (ATCC) in Colombia. These communities were 
created by internally displaced peasants to protect civilians, to challenge the power structures 
that sustain the conflict, and to eventually build peace. My central research question asks 
how an analysis of civil local peace initiatives that resist power networks and structures 
responsible for the prolongation of conflict in Colombia contributes to understanding social 
and political change in war-torn societies.  My research is informed by the ideas and concepts 
of the Italian thinker Antonio Gramsci, in an attempt to offer new perspectives on 
peacebuilding studies. Conceiving of peacebuilding processes as struggles for hegemony, my 
research identifies three key elements based on which peasant communities’ role in building 
peace can be assessed. The transformation of common sense into a critical consciousness, 
the control over space through strategies of war of position, and the building of alternative 
historical blocs all help explain the dynamics of the three communities under study. The 
argument of this thesis is that peasant communities have managed to develop counter-
hegemonic alternatives. But whilst they succeeded in considerably reducing levels of violence 
amid armed conflict, it remains to be seen whether they will be able to contribute to bringing 
about structural change in a post-conflict setting. My research finds that their initiatives are 
likely to be integrated within the government’s model for the post-conflict setting. My 
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My research is about the resistance and peacebuilding initiatives of peasant communities in 
Colombia and their role in building peace.  My interest in this research is firmly rooted in 
practice.  I spent five years in Colombia, four of them working for the non-governmental 
organisation (NGO) Peace Brigades International,1 which provides protective accompaniment 
to human rights defenders and communities of internally displaced people.  This thesis is in 
part a reflection on my time spent working with human rights defenders, indigenous 
communities, Afro-Colombian communities, and peasant communities, and victims of the 
conflict.  I had the opportunity to work with small-scale farming communities, which have 
been internally displaced by both illegal armed groups and the state.  These communities 
were created by internally displaced peasants who decided to join forces in the face of 
extreme violence.  Their goal is to stay on or return to their land.  They are an expression of 
the many land-related conflicts at the heart of Colombia’s problems. Born of the violence 
imposed on them by the armed conflict, the state, and neoliberalism, their efforts represent 
an attempt to protect civilians, to challenge the power structures that sustain the conflict, 
and to eventually build peace.   
The subject of this research could not be timelier. The Colombian government signed 
in September 2016 a peace agreement with what was until last year the oldest guerrilla in 
activity on the Latin American continent.  The Colombian government argues that rural 
communities will be instrumental in implementing the agreement.  This is illustrated by the 
government’s use of the concept of territorial peace, which places rural issues and 
communities at the heart of the peace process and serves as the basis for implementation of 
the agreement.   
This agreement marked the end of a 60-year civil conflict that has left indelible marks 
on Colombia and on its people.  The beginning of the current conflict dates to the mid-1960s, 
when the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)2 and the National Liberation Army 
(ELN) were born.   In addition to the armed conflict, other types of violence linked to the drug 
trade, common crime, and paramilitary groups intensified in the 1980s. This intensification of 
                                                        
1 For more information on Peace Brigades International Colombia, see https://pbicolombia.org/ 





the conflict added to the suffering of Colombian people and to the complexity of the situation.  
The different kinds of violence are now interrelated, and the contemporary dynamics of the 
conflict cannot easily be explained by looking at its root causes.3  It is now estimated that 7.2 
million people have been internally displaced,4 more than 50 000 have disappeared,5 and 
more than 200 000 have died6 as a result of the armed conflict.  Paradoxically, despite all this 
violence, Colombian civil society and human rights organisations are amongst the most 
dynamic in Latin America, if not the most vibrant.  Local resistance has grown and spread all 
over the country within indigenous, Afro-Colombian, peasant, and urban grassroots 
communities, from the Caribbean coast to the Amazon, and from the plains bordering 
Venezuela to the Pacific.  It is therefore legitimate to ask whether this resistance can 
represent a credible force for peace in the post-conflict setting, or whether the situation of 
these subaltern groups will remain the same as the structural causes of the conflict remain 
unchallenged.  This is the interrogation that I explore in this thesis.   
Central research question 
My central research question then asks how an analysis of civil local peace initiatives 
that resist power networks and structures responsible for the prolongation of conflict in 
Colombia contributes to understanding social and political change in war-torn societies.  This 
question was born out of a reflection on my work experience with human rights defenders 
and small-scale farming communities.  It is also the product of a dissatisfaction with how local 
actors and peacebuilding processes have been analysed within the peacebuilding literature, 
as I further explain in the literature review.  Following the logic of my central research 
question, I have identified three key elements that inform my analysis of the role of these 
peasant-community initiatives.  The role of consciousness, the spatial dimension, and the 
model of social transformation that peasant communities put forward are key to 
understanding their initiatives. These elements help me assess their role in building peace, 
both pre- and post-conflict, and inform the following three sub-questions: 
                                                        
3 Pécaut, D. Guerra Contra la Sociedad (Bogotá, Editorial Planeta Colombiana, 2001) 
4 UNHCR. ‘Hoja informativa: Colombia’. (Geneva, United Nations Refugee Agency, 2016) 
5 Grupo de Memoria Histórica. ‘Basta Ya! Colombia: Memorias de guerra y dignidad’ (Bogotá, Imprenta Nacional, 2013). p. 
58. 




• How did peasant communities manage to move from a passive obedience to 
armed actors and the state to resistance (Chapter 3)? 
• How did peasant communities manage to challenge relations of power through 
the establishment of control over space (Chapter 4)? 
• How did peasant communities develop social, economic, and political 
alternatives; build alliances; and link their initiatives to peacebuilding at national 
level (Chapter 5)? 
Contribution to knowledge of the thesis 
Research into the role of these communities in building peace can greatly benefit our 
understanding of the outcome of peacebuilding processes.  While there have been many 
claims about the contributions of civil society to peacebuilding, most of these claims have 
been within a liberal framework of analysis that looked at civil society’s contribution in 
strengthening a Western and liberal model of democracy.7  Most studies or reports on 
initiatives by local communities make normative claims about their role in building peace8, 
but in-depth studies of the role of local communities in building peace and challenging power 
structures that sustain violence and armed conflict are lacking.  While a considerable number 
of peace agreements all over the world have put an end to overt armed conflict, they have 
failed to address its roots causes, as the example of Guatemala illustrates well9.  Similarly, civil 
and non-violent movements have succeeded in throwing over authoritarian regimes, but 
failed to challenge power structures in the long term.  A study into the role of local actors in 
challenging the structures and actors at the root of conflict and violence will give new insights 
into the role of local actors within peacebuilding processes. This is where the main 
                                                        
7 Barnes, C. ‘Civil Society and Peacebuilding: Mapping Functions in Working for Peace’, The International Spectator, 44:1 
(2009) pp. 131–147; Bell, C., O’Rourke, C. The People’s Peace? Peace Agreements, Civil Society, and Participatory Democracy, 
International Political Science Review, 28:3, (2007) pp.293–324; Paffenholz, T. 'Civil Society and Peacebuilding', Working 
Paper (Geneva, The Centre on Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding, Graduate Institute of International and 
Development Studies, 2009). 
8 Alther, G. ‘Colombian peace communities: the role of NGOs in supporting resistance to violence and oppression,’ 
Development in Practice, 16:03–04 (2006) pp.278–291; Arbeláez Rudas, M. ‘Comunidades de Paz del Urabá chocoano, 
Fundamentos jurídicos y vida comunitaria’, Controversia, 177 (Bogotá, CINEP, 2001) pp. 11-40; Belalcázar Valencia, J.G. Las 
comunidades de paz: formas de accion colectiva en resistencia civil al conflicto armado colombiano. Revista Entorno 
Geográfico, 7-8 (Enero/Diciembre 2011) pp.196–209; Burnyeat, G. ‘On a Peak in Darien: Community Peace Initiatives in 
Uraba’, Journal of Human Rights Practice, 5:3 (2013) pp.435–445; Diéz Gómez, A.D. ‘Cuando la neutralidad no existe: Historia 
reciente del Urabá Antioqueño’, Dialéctica Libertadora, 2 (Enero 2009) pp. 47-64. 





contribution to knowledge of this thesis lies.  My thesis makes an original contribution to 
knowledge in the way that it traces the histories and social processes of three peasant 
communities, and the varied strategies they use to develop an agenda of resistance and 
peacebuilding that go beyond their particular interests as peasants and challenge power 
structures and the violence attached to them. Any effort to draw out the significance of these 
processes for a wider understanding of peacebuilding is important to the debate on peace in 
Colombia and elsewhere. My thesis gives empirical depth to the critical peacebuilding 
literature, but also shows the weakness of the latter in not demonstrating how the material 
basis for change is necessary to peace, and the role of social agency in making that possible. 
While I take the literature on peacebuilding as a starting point, my research lies at the 
intersection of three fields of academic study: peacebuilding studies, resistance and non-
violence studies, and Gramscian studies. In this thesis, I contribute to the peacebuilding 
literature by designing a new theoretical framework for the study of the role of local actors 
within peacebuilding processes. To do so, I borrow from the literature on resistance and non-
violence studies and above all from the political theory of Antonio Gramsci.  My thesis is 
therefore informed by the ideas and concepts of the Italian thinker10, and Marxist thoughts 
more generally, as an attempt to bring new perspectives on peacebuilding and statebuilding 
studies. In this regard, this thesis moves away from the peacebuilding literature, and develops 
a framework of analysis based on Gramsci’s political theory, which allows me to address the 
gaps I identified in the literature.  As explained further in Chapter 3, I decided to use Gramsci’s 
political theory to think about Peasant communities’ resistance and peace initiatives as a 
mobilisation of social forces around a particular project (the communities), which has a 
strategic dimension (how to bring about social change) and is intended to realise something 
that does not actually exist (peace).  But Gramsci’s theory of hegemony not only provides me 
with tools to think about the strategies of peasant communities, it also allows me to address 
the broader context of peasant communities’ resistance, and the very hegemonic structures 
and projects they attempt to challenge.  In other words, Gramsci is useful when thinking about 
the working of power within societies, about the nature of state power, and about the 
potential for resistance.  His concept of the integral state, constituted by political society and 
civil society, points to the fact that state power lies in the social and ideological consensus 
                                                        




within which its institutions evolve, and in the ability of one social group to gain or extract the 
consent of other groups and institutionalise this power.  Gramsci’s integral state is useful 
when thinking about the power of the Colombian state and its uneven presence over the 
territory; a state that has never managed to control conflicts emerging within the social 
sphere; a state which is deemed to be weak while its violence has had a tremendous impact 
on society.  Such an approach also draws attention to the lack of hegemony in war-torn 
societies, what Gramsci terms an ‘organic crisis’.  This relates to the lack of cohesion within 
Colombian society, a society that is socially fragmented and politically divided by two parties.  
It also helps explain why democracy has coexisted with extreme violence in Colombia.  The 
restricted character of democracy in Colombia has contributed to the emergence of actors 
who are perceived as ‘external’ to society and are to be excluded: indigenous and Afro-
Colombian people, peasants, workers.  In fact, the power of the state and the maintenance 
of the interest of the dominant groups relies on this exclusion.  Peasants are part of these 
groups.  Violence has in some cases been their means of expression.  For instance, the FARC 
has peasant roots.  But violence is also used as a mean to control peasants.  Finally, Gramsci’s 
concept of passive revolution is useful to explain the outcome of peacebuilding processes, a 
state-led strategy to integrate the demands of subaltern groups without compromising the 
economic structure.  This happened in Colombia in the twentieth century, with the vote of a 
new progressive constitution in 1991, the demobilisation of illegal groups, and human rights 
being enshrined in the constitution.  The social basis of the state and the capitalist and 
neoliberal economic structures, however, remain untouched.  Gramsci’s theory of hegemony 
and its related concepts are about the nature of state power, about how this power is 
exercised, but might also be opposed.  I think that the emphasis on class struggle, on the social 
basis of state power and its exercise, and on the resistance to such power, can bring new 
perspectives on peacebuilding, on the role of local actors therein, and on weak states and 
state formation processes. 
The adoption of a theoretical framework based on Gramsci’s political theory requires 
some explanation about what is at stake in taking on a Gramscian perspective, both regarding 
the use of Gramsci’s concepts in the historical context of 21st century Colombia, and the 
Marxist commitment that comes with it. Indeed, turning to Gramsci to think about civil wars 
and peacebuilding processes might not seem obvious at first, and any employment of 




labour, production, mode of production, or class. In this regard, Adam David Morton warns 
about the twofold danger of divesting ‘Gramsci’s view of historical development of any 
Marxist dialectic’ or entirely disregarding the historical context in which Gramsci developed 
his own thought.11 Thus, Morton advocates for a ‘dual approach’ that ‘promotes treating texts 
as vehicles for the exercise of present preoccupations’.12 My thesis follows Morton’s call for 
‘thinking in a Gramscian’ way about current situations,13 and adopts Gramsci’s understanding 
of power in capitalist societies and peripheral countries. Whilst identify is not reducible to 
class alone, I think that class struggle is key to understanding historical developments. 
However, my thesis does not fully commit to a Marxist philosophy of history, which posits 
that the bourgeois class will be superseded by the proletariat. Within this way of thinking, the 
proletariat is a universal class that is meant to become a modern prince and surpass the 
limitations of the bourgeoisie. I do claim that peasant communities are key to any lasting 
peace and new social system in Colombia, but I limit this claim to the Colombian context, 
given the fact that rural issues are at the roots of the conflict and the key location of these 
communities within this conflict.  
Gramsci developed his political theory by reflecting on societies where peace was the 
norm.  It is therefore legitimate to ask what the limits of applying Gramsci’s theories to 
contexts of armed conflict are, what the explanatory power of concepts such as hegemony, 
passive revolution, or the historical bloc in violent settings is, or how it is possible to account 
for external intervention within war-torn societies.  By establishing a link between Gramsci’s 
concepts and the peacebuilding and statebuilding literature, however, it is possible to 
conceive peacebuilding and statebuilding as processes informed by power struggles between 
rulers and the ruled, between dominant groups and subaltern groups.  These struggles are 
themselves historically rooted in and informed by specific modes of production and cultural, 
social, and political structures.  This perspective has the advantage of not determining any a-
priori ethical and normative content to the concept of peace, therefore avoiding any 
theologism.  A Gramscian perspective on peacebuilding and statebuilding processes stresses 
the need to address the ensemble of social relations and ensure their cohesion, instead of 
targeting only one of the multiple layers that constitute society – such as the market, civil 
                                                        
11 Morton, A.D. Unravelling Gramsci: Hegemony and Passive Revolution in the Global Political Economy  (London, Pluto Press, 
2007), pp. 16-17. 
12 Ibid., p. 17. 




society, the state, or culture – and the mechanisms and practices associated with its 
reproduction or transformation – such as violence, norms, institutions, laws, and rights.  A 
critical realist view of these processes attuned to their complexities therefore emerges, based 
on a Gramscian understanding of power and the reproduction, transformation, and 
conservation of social orders.14  Such a view is sensitive to the historical and social structures 
of armed conflicts settings, such as the unevenness of state power and state formation or the 
changing and fluid power dynamics between the actors taking part in the conflict, which are 
too often overlooked by peacebuilding and statebuilding mainstream accounts.  It is also 
sensitive to the different layers of the social world, to the complexities of war-torn societies, 
to the structures and mechanisms through which power operates, and to the strategies 
deployed by all actors involved.  Finally, Gramsci’s ideas and concepts help me answer the 
central research question of this thesis.  How does an analysis of civil local peace initiatives 
that resist power-networks and structures responsible for the prolongation of conflict in 
Colombia contribute to understanding social and political change in war-torn societies? 
Argument of the thesis 
Nestling my argument between the literature on peacebuilding, civil resistance and 
non-violence, and Gramsci, I explain that the nature of the peace achieved in Colombia will 
depend on the outcome of the struggle between rural communities and the State, not on 
external intervention of conflict management techniques. The capacity of peasant 
communities to challenge power structures at the origin of both the conflict and their current 
situation is therefore key for the outcome of the peace process in Colombia.  
The argument of this thesis is that peasant communities have managed to develop 
counter-hegemonic alternatives to the domination of traditional political and economic ruling 
elites.  They are then in a strong position to challenge the development model that sustains 
violence and armed conflict.  But whilst all three communities under study succeeded in 
considerably reducing levels of violence, protecting their members, and developing 
alternative models in the midst of armed conflict, it remains to be seen whether they will be, 
or have already been, able to contribute to bringing about structural change in Colombia in a 
post-conflict setting.  The challenges they faced during the armed conflict in the context of 
                                                        




extreme violence are indeed different to the ones posed by the post-conflict setting.  My 
research has identified three key elements which were instrumental to the success of peasant 
communities’ resistance, based on which their role in building peace can be assessed, both 
pre- and post-conflict.  The transformation of common sense into a critical consciousness, the 
control over space through strategies of war of position, and the building of alternative 
historical blocs all help explain the dynamics of the three communities under study.   
My research finds that their initiatives are likely to be integrated within the 
government’s model for the post-conflict setting.  Peasant communities have not yet 
managed to spread their critical consciousness within political society.  Neither have they 
gained key positions within the economy beyond their local horizons.  I argue that their ability 
to further challenge the power structures which lies at the roots of violence and armed 
conflict in Colombia depends on their capacity to spread their critical consciousness within 
political society, to challenge the anti-peasant bias that pervades civil society, and to build 
bridges with urban social groups.  This ability also depends on the degree to which they 
establish control over space and succeed in transforming their social power into political 
representation at national level.  Otherwise, the tools and strategies that were useful in the 
midst of armed conflict will unlikely bring about structural changes.  Neither will they allow 
peasant communities to build peace on their own terms. The nature of the peace that will be 
achieved depends on the outcome of the relationship between the government and rural 
communities.  
Structure of the thesis 
This thesis is structured in six chapters.  The first chapter provides an introduction to the case 
studies and a reflection on the methods I used in order to answer my central research 
question. It also conducts a detailed literature review, identifying the gaps my research aims 
to address, and setting the stage for the design of my theoretical framework based on the 
political theory of Antonio Gramsci.  
Chapter 2 then develops a theoretical framework for the analysis of the role of 
peasant communities in building peace based on Gramsci’s political theory.  This chapter also 
lays the groundwork and informs the rest of the thesis.  I use Gramsci’s concepts to think 




Colombian armed conflict and its resolution.  I argue that Gramsci’s spatial awareness, 
historical sociological approach, and reflections on the relationship between dominant and 
dominated groups prove useful tools for thinking about such communities, conflicts, and 
peacebuilding processes, and for explaining their outcomes. I explain in broad terms the 
meaning of Gramsci’s concepts and show their relevance for the study of local actors’ peace 
initiatives, such as peasant communities in Colombia. I discuss the epistemological and 
methodological grounds on which the application of these concepts to civil war settings in 
general, and Colombia in particular, rest.  Finally, I conclude by laying the groundwork for the 
empirical case-studies that follow, discussing Gramsci’s own criteria for the study of subaltern 
groups and engaging with issues of consciousness, autonomy, power, and political and social 
change. The transformation of common sense into a critical consciousness, control over space 
through strategies of war of position, and the building of alternative historical blocs are the 
three key dimensions that help me explain the dynamics and logic of peasant communities’ 
peacebuilding initiatives.  
Chapter 3 looks at how the three peasant communities under study managed to 
transform common sense into a critical consciousness, thus reinstating the political process 
while facing extreme violence.  I argue that their ability to go beyond the common sense 
imposed upon them by armed actors, the state, and traditional political parties alike created 
opportunities in a context that did not seem to offer any. The emergence of a particular 
political consciousness, linked to a conception of the world that challenges the common sense 
imposed upon subaltern groups by ruling elites, and the loss of fear have interacted with each 
other from the birth of these peasant communities until the present day. I demonstrate that 
the loss of fear was instrumental to the decision to break the law of silence and overtly resist 
armed actors and the state.  It was also key to building the collective strength required to 
sustain such initiatives over time.  Finally, the loss of fear made possible the unity of thought 
and practice, symbolised by the adoption of the guiding principles of neutrality, nonviolence, 
and human rights.  These principles informed the normative framework that enabled 
members of the peasant communities to resist in the midst of armed conflict. 
Chapter 4 analyses the strategies employed by the communities to establish control 
over space.  It argues that such control over space is key to the place members of peasant 
communities occupy within society.  However, a material basis was required onto which this 




territory provided such a material basis, not only for the subsistence and everyday lives of 
peasant communities, but also for their memory-building efforts and for the development of 
alternative modes of production based on solidarity and dignity.  I argue that the extent to 
which peasant communities managed to assert a control over space determined their place 
within society, as expressed in terms of individual and collective rights, location within the 
economy, and political power.  In this regard, a capacity to control space is key to challenging 
the impact of the neoliberal economic policies promoted by the state. 
In chapter 5, I use Gramsci’s concept of the historical bloc and the national popular to 
look at efforts by peasant communities to build alliances.  In building such alliances, peasant 
communities have developed different models of social and political transformation to bring 
about peace. These models range from the self-autonomy of the CdPSJA with their rejection 
of both the State and capitalism, to the confrontational, power-seeking strategies of the 
ACVC, and the liberal stance of the ATCC and their efforts to bring the state back in. I argue 
that these approaches help explain the extent to which each one of these peasant 
communities succeeded in challenging the power structures at the root of the armed conflict. 
Chapter 6 reflects on and concludes the case-study chapters within the context of the 
government’s concept of territorial peace, as the latter is the bedrock of its post-conflict 
policy and strategy.  I show that the most likely outcome of the peasant communities’ struggle 
is that they will be integrated within the government’s post-conflict policies and vision. I argue 
in this chapter that the struggle between peasant communities on one hand, and the state 
and neoliberalism on the other, is likely to end up in a process of passive revolution; meaning 
that some of the peasant communities’ demands will be integrated into the government’s 
vision for the post-conflict setting, symbolised by the concept of territorial peace.  It also 
means that peasant communities will maintain a strong impact at the local level, depending 
on the extent to which they have managed to develop alternative historical blocs, and that 
Colombia’s ruling elites will make concessions, to a certain extent.  But my findings and 
conclusion also point to the fact that peasant communities’ initiatives are likely to be 
absorbed by state power and the capitalist economic system, rather than lead to systemic 






Chapter 1: Literature review and methodology 
Introduction to the case studies 
Justification of the case studies 
I used a theory-driven empirical approach to my research.  At the heart of this thesis lays a 
concern with the struggle of the many communities and activists I had the chance to meet in 
Colombia.  The experience of these people and my encounter with them are the starting point 
of my research.  My aim is to say something meaningful about their struggle for peace in 
Colombia.  I did not choose the topic of my research according to either theory or the need 
to fill a gap in the literature, but according to my own experience and knowledge of these 
communities.  However, this experience led me to develop assumptions about the role of 
these actors regarding peacebuilding in Colombia, which give the thesis its rationale and 
theoretical basis.  Therefore, some of the justifications that I put forward in justifying my case 
studies have been made a-posteriori.  The reasoning for the choice of the specific cases, 
however, has been made a-priori to highlight differences between these cases and make their 
comparison both meaningful and useful to answer the central question of this research.  I 
ground and support my assumption that these communities have a fundamental role to play 
in building peace by looking at these experiences through the lens of theory and existing 
academic literature. 
First of all, my aim is to understand how an analysis of civil local peace initiatives that 
resist power networks and structures responsible for the prolongation of conflict in Colombia 
contributes to understanding social and political change in war-torn societies.  There are 
many kinds of local actors who claim to be building peace in Colombia.  These actors range 
from NGOs, human rights activists, and lawyers, to rural communities, be they indigenous 
communities, Afro-Colombian communities, or peasant communities.  They have all suffered 
the consequences of the conflict and have articulated different responses to facing violence 
and building peace.  Considering my research question, I decided to focus on rural 
communities because they are located in highly strategic regions where the conflict reached 
its highest level of violence.  It is in these regions – which have only relatively recently been 
colonised by a migrant population in search of land for their subsistence, and where the state 




conflict is most visible, namely land.  In other words, these communities are at the core of the 
conflict, where actors and structures, ideas and material factors meet, and where the impact 
and nature of the conflict can be seen in their most visible, clear, and raw dynamics and 
manifestations.  A close look at these the histories of these communities and initiatives 
therefore takes us deep into the superstructures of the armed conflict, into its political, social, 
and cultural dynamics, the analysis of the former being often overlooked at the expense of 
the structural causes and foundations of the latter in the literature about civil wars and 
conflicts.  
These communities can be considered as a product of the conflict, of state violence, 
and of neoliberal economic policies in Colombia in the sense that they constitute local 
responses to these challenges.  In this regard, it can be argued that the armed conflict and 
state violence produced three kinds of sociocultural responses, including the one led by 
peasant communities: (1) the indigenous people’s struggle for autonomy, (2) civil resistance 
by peasant communities, and (3) pragmatic adaptation of the Internally Displaced People in 
urban centres.  I follow two Colombian scholars, Clara Ines Garcia and Clara Ines Aramburo, 
who argue that it is crucial to understand these communities’ experiences both as protection 
and reaction to deal with the armed actors’ pretensions and interests on one hand, and as 
ways of increasing their autonomy, self-organisation, and identity construction on the other 
hand.15  The creation of these communities is a political act, determined by the self-
recognition of its members as political and social subjects, willing to claim sovereignty over 
the land, and determined to struggle for the respect of their political processes and 
fundamental rights by all armed actors.  But I go further and argue that the experiences of 
these communities have also to be understood as peacebuilding practices.  My assumption 
that peasant communities can play a key role in building peace in Colombia comes from the 
fact that they are also a product of the conflict.   
My second decision was to focus on peasant communities rather than choosing 
communities from other ethnic backgrounds, such as indigenous or Afro-Colombian 
communities.  The reasons for this choice are threefold.  First, while indigenous and Afro-
Colombian communities also lead resistance movements which share similar characteristics 
with peasant-led resistance movements, their differences are too important to be compared 
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based on just one case study per group.  The significance of my findings would have been 
undermined had I chosen only one case study for each one of these groups, as they would 
not necessarily be representative of the whole group.  Also, on a more practical level, the time 
and resources available to me did not allow in-depth research on each of these groups, which 
represent a unique world in their own right.  Second, while the Afro-Colombian population 
accounted in 2005 for 10.5% of the population, and the indigenous for 3.4%, the non-ethnic 
population – within which peasants should be included – constituted 85.94% of the 
population according to the last census.16  Whereas the census does not specify the share of 
peasant population living in the countryside, it does suggest that the peasant population is 
much larger than the Afro-Colombian or indigenous populations.17  Even though Afro-
Colombian and indigenous communities might be as visible as peasant communities, the 
presence of the latter covers a wider part of the territory; there are more peasant-led 
communities than any other ethnic communities.18  Finally, the most important reason for 
focusing on peasant resistance is that these communities in Colombia have a long history of 
resistance. Their struggle can be traced back to the nineteenth century.  This resistance is 
intimately tied to the long-lasting agrarian problem in relation to the tenancy, use, and 
exploitation of land, which is in turn one of the main issues at the origin of the conflict.  
Therefore, my research starts from the assumption that these communities are key to a post-
conflict peacebuilding phase in Colombia and to the implementation of the agreement 
between the FARC and the Colombian government.  
Regarding the choice of specific communities as such, I focus my attention on high-
profile communities with significant differences to enable useful comparisons regarding their 
strategies, their discourse, and their attitudes towards the state.  While not the first to 
formally organise as a non-violent community in order to resist armed conflict, the CdPSJA19 
has become one of the best-known peace initiatives.  Since its creation in 1997, it has 
managed to survive in one of the most violent regions of Colombia.  Its radical position and 
decision to break all relations with the Colombian state has stirred much controversy but has 
also inspired many people to grant it moral, political, and economic support.  The CdPSJA finds 
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its grounds in the principle of neutrality and the distinction between civilian populations and 
armed combatants. It legally owns the land on which it has established its settlements. In 
contrast, the ACVC does not own the land where its members are living, but relies on a legal 
figure to assert its control over the territory.  The ACVC managed to pressure the Colombian 
government into recognising its zone of influence as a Peasant Reserve Zone (ZRC).20  This 
peasant initiative finds its roots in the Meta department in 1987; its legal character was 
recognised by law in 1994.21  Also, in 2010, the ACVC won the National Peace Prize awarded 
by several international and national organisations, and promoted by the German and French 
embassies22.  It has therefore a wide national influence and directly engages in talks with the 
government.  Finally, the ATCC was the first successful experience of civil resistance in 
Colombia. One of the main characteristics of the ATCC’s strategy was to engage in dialogue 
with all the armed actors.  Born in 1987, the association received the Right Livelihood Award, 
promoted as an alternative Nobel Prize, in December 1990, which brought it to the attention 
of the national government. Since 2007, it has been the beneficiary of a Collective Reparation 
Plan designed in collaboration with the CNRR.  
To conduct a meaningful comparison, it is necessary that the cases show some 
differences but also that they share a common ground.  The common basis for the comparison 
can be unfolded as follows.  First, these communities all claim to contribute to building peace 
in their own settings and to be the bearers of alternative models of development, political 
and social order, and peace. They seek to promote a positive social change, or even construct 
their own alternative social order outside of the sphere of influence of the state. But they also 
call upon the state to protect their physical integrity and provide basic services. In other 
words, they build their identity in resistance to the actual state, but in reference to an ideal 
state and democratic society.   Second, they were all constituted in regions that have only 
recently, been colonised and have usually been considered as havens or zones of refuge.  They 
are also regions where the state and its institutions have historically been weak, if not absent.  
Finally, they are all instances of resistance to the same context of interrelated dynamics of 
violence caused by the confrontation between the state, guerrillas, and paramilitary groups; 
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the exploitation of natural resources; the drug-trafficking business; and the socio-political 
conflict.  All these conflicts are interrelated, their separation to some extent artificial, but they 
can be brought down to one common element: control over the land. 
Historical and sociological background of peasant communities 
The Peace Community of San José de Apartadó (CdPSJA) 
The CdPSJA was created 23 March 1997. The birth of this peasant community symbolised the 
convergence and confluence of several processes as shown by Aparicio.23 The experience of 
tenant farmers fleeing from paramilitary groups, the activism of political parties and 
organisations, and the action of national and international NGOs based on international 
humanitarian and human rights norms: all these processes led to the creation of the CDPSJA. 
The massive displacement of thousands of peasants due to violence by paramilitary groups in 
1996 was the concrete factor that led about 400 families to gather and think about possible 
alternatives. It is now one of the oldest and best-known peasant communities in Colombia. 
The original idea of a Peace Community was first given to the peasants of San José by 
Monsignor Cancino, Bishop of Apartadó. The small farmer population of the township of San 
José de Apartadó then declared itself as neutral to express its willingness not to be involved 
in the armed conflict, supported by the bishop and two national organisations: CINEP and 
Comision Intereclesial de Justicia y Paz.24 Besides reiterating their right not to participate in 
the armed conflict, the small-scale farmers of the Peace Community developed a holistic 
organisational process based on nonviolence. The community thus showed that its initiative 
was not only aimed at self-protection but also at the elimination of the conflict and the 
construction of peace.  Its internal rules offer a sense of community, solidarity, and economic 
autonomy. This alternative way of achieving set goals provides its own responses to the basic 
human and co-existential needs of its members. Through a participative structure, it has 
developed autonomous systems for training and economic solidarity, among others.25 
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Figure 1 - Location of the settlements of the Peace Community of San José de Apartadó within the municipality of Apartadó 
The small township of San José de Apartadó is located in a strategic area along the 
foothill of the Serranía de Abibe (Figure 1), a region in dispute between several armed actors 
such as drug traffickers, FARC, paramilitary groups, private entrepreneurs, and the state. Until 
the paramilitary incursions in the 1990s, the township of San José had been a stronghold of 
leftist political parties such as the Union Patriótica and a zone of influence of the FARC. While 
the mountains of the Serranía de Abibe are still a FARC rear-guard, control of paramilitary 
groups which emerged from the demobilisation of the former Autodefensas Unidas de 
Colombia (AUC) is now dominant.  These groups impose their social and political control over 
the land and its inhabitants, to the benefit of economic interests and with the tacit approval 
of the state.26  
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The Cimitarra River Valley Peasant Association 
The ACVC was created in 1996 after several peasant protests took place in September 
and October 1996 in San Pablo and Barrancabermeja. It is composed of 120 Community 
Action Councils (Juntas de Acción Comunal) belonging to the municipalities of Yondó, 
Cantagallo, San Pablo, and Remedios (Figure 3). The peasants living in these areas have been 
displaced because of the armed conflict in other regions or within the Magdalena Medio 
region itself (Figure 2). The ACVC is integrated by three branches covering the four 
municipalities already mentioned.  According to the organisation, the ACVC was created to 
resist against the prevailing development model in the Magdalena Medio, promote an 
authentic and definitive agrarian 
reform, and defend the dignity, 
rights, and solidarity of the 
peasants.27  Even though the ACVC 
was formally created in 1996, the 
social, economic, and political 
movement that led to its birth can 
be traced back to the 1980s and is 
intimately linked to peasant 
resistance against the various 
interests of several actors to assert 
their social, economic, and military 
control over the land. A few Peasant 
leaders began to encourage the 
development of a peasant 
economy. This organisational 
process led to the creation of 
community shops or cooperatives, 
each of which was coordinated by 
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an administrative council and an administrator. These community shops and cooperatives 
then became the centre of this economy based on exchange and barter.28 
At the beginning of the 1990s, several landowners of the region began to feel 
threatened by the organisational and economic strength of this peasant-led process, and 
targeted the cooperatives.29  This is also when the violence caused by the confrontation 
between the state, paramilitary groups, and the guerrillas reached a peak and caused massive 
displacements of population. The peasants of the region then started to speak out and 
organise protests to urge the government to pay attention to their situation.  In 1996, two 
marches were organised in San Pablo and Barrancabermeja that led to the signing of 
agreements with the government, around the need for social, economic, and agrarian 
reforms.  Unfortunately, neither one of these agreements was implemented.  This, and action 
by paramilitary groups, led the peasant movements, now formally represented by the 
Permanent Regional Working roundtable for the Peace of the Madgalena Medio (Mesa 
regional permanente de trabajo por la paz del Magdalena Medio - MRPTPMM), to organise 
what they named the exodus of 1998; it lasted for 103 days and mobilised around 10 000 
peasants.  The outcome was the signing of new agreements with the government on 4 
October 1998.  In addition to renewed social and economic commitments, the government 
reaffirmed its willingness to strengthen the fight against paramilitary groups and their 
supporters in the Magdalena Medio region.30 
After the signing of these agreements, the ACVC initiated a request for the creation of 
a ZRC.  After a long administrative and political process, the ZRC was finally approved on 10 
December 2002, only to be cancelled by the Alvaro Uribe Velez administration in January 
2003.  After 10 years of struggle, the ACVC finally managed to get the decree recognising the 
Cimitarra Valley as a ZRC reinstated in 2010, when a new President, Juan Manuel Santos, was 
elected.   Since December 2000, the Magdalena Medio region has been the target of the 
paramilitary violence in collusion with the state’s armed forces.  This caused massive 
displacement of the population. The aim of this repression of the peasant population and 
members of the ACVC can be explained by their opposition to economic projects related to 
the exploitation of oil and gold and the design of new waterways and roadways.  The intent 
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of paramilitary groups in asserting their control over the land was related to money 
laundering coming from drug-trafficking through land purchase, the palm oil agribusiness, and 
extensive cattle farming. 
Peasant Workers Association of the Carare Region (Asociacion de Trabajadores Campesinos 
del Carare - ATCC) and the South of Santander region 
Ever since Spanish colonisation, the Carare region has been characterised by its isolation from 
the core settlements, and later as a haven with a weak state presence. Several social groups 
found there a refuge where they could live their lives and benefit from the rich natural 
resources of the region.31  As the Cimitarra Valley, it is part of the Magdalena Medio region, 
but its development and dynamics are quite different, as it represents a natural sub-region 
within Magdalena Medio.  From the 1940s onward, the Carare region saw several surges of 
colonisation of its lands, first in an attempt to exploit wood and cultivate cocoa, rice and 
vegetables under the direction of local authorities.  Then, people fleeing the violence caused 
by the confrontation between the Liberal and Conservative parties arrived. From these first 
population surges were born the peasant-led organisational processes that would 
characterise the region in the 1970s and 1980s and in which the ATCC leaders took part.32  
While not the first peasant-led civil resistance experience in Colombia, the civil 
resistance initiated by the ATCC is often considered as pioneering.  Created in 1987, the 
visibility of the organisation gradually increased until it reached its peak in 1990 when the 
ATCC was awarded the Right Livelihood Award.33  Older members of the ATCC recall the 
period leading to the creation of the association as one of increased violence due to the 
confrontation between the state’s armed forces, paramilitary groups, and guerrillas.  The 
1970s and 1980s were indeed characterised by an increase of the intensity of the conflict due 
to the presence of the FARC and the ELN, who first entered the region in 1975, and a 
counterinsurgency campaign led by the Colombian army, in addition to the actions of 
paramilitary groups from 1982 onward.34  During this time, approximately 12 years, an 
estimated 530 to 585 civilians were killed, 60% by the paramilitary groups and 40% by 
guerrillas.35  To find a solution to this bloody dynamic, several leaders belonging to villages of 
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the Carare River Valley secretly gathered in May 1987.  The armed groups had issued an 
ultimatum for the local population to displace, join them, or be killed.  Refusing to arm 
themselves or to join the actors in the military conflict, the leaders decided to engage in 
dialogues with the latter and organise non-violently for peace and development.  And so, the 
ATCC was born, with the aim of guaranteeing the rights of its members to life, peace, and 
work.36  The ATCC’s area of influence is located in the south of the Santander Department 
(Figure 3) and covers the municipalities of Bolivar, Cimitarra, Sucre, La Belleza, El Peñón, and 
Landázurri, along the Cimitarra River Basin and where the state’s authority does not stretch.  
All three communities have therefore a large history of resistance, have articulated a 
clear discourse, and developed well-grounded practices throughout the past 30 years.  They 
represent some of the most prominent experiences of peasant communities in Colombia and 
have received large international support.  Their transnational links provide insights into the 
local and global dimension of peacebuilding and resistance.  These three communities 
illustrate different ways to assert autonomy, challenge the state authority and sovereignty, 
and build peace.  However, even though they all started as a reaction to the seemingly 
unmanageable level of violence that struck them as a result of the armed conflict, and even 
though they based their discourse and practices on the human rights and international law – 
in particular the distinction between civilians and armed combatants and the concept of 
humanitarian zone – they came up with different strategies to protect their members, 
influence the behaviour of armed actors and that of the state, and articulate alternative 
visions of a peaceful social change.  To start introducing the rationale of this thesis, it is useful 
to frame such local peace initiatives within past and current academic debates.  The following 
section engages in a discussion on how the peacebuilding literature has analysed the role of 
local actors, including not only communities but also civil society organisations or urban 
associations, within peacebuilding processes.  The explanation of the rationale and argument 
of this thesis will logically follow and build on this discussion to conclude this introduction.  
                                                        











From NGO worker to researcher 
I have myself, as a foreigner working for a human rights organisation, been part of the 
highly polarised Colombian context, and this invites a discussion about my previous 
experience living and working in Colombia and the differences that I experienced returning 
there as a researcher. Prior to undertaking this PhD, I worked for PBI in Colombia, which gave 
me the opportunity to accompany the CdPSJA and the ACVC.  While such experience 
contributes to a more sophisticated understanding of the struggle faced by peasant 
communities, it may also introduce bias or subjectivity in my argument in the sense that my 
solidarity is with these communities.  Nevertheless, by acknowledging this subjectivity and 
adhering to academic research standards, I have managed to overcome this obstacle.  
Arguably, the interaction of the researcher with the world and the world’s influence on the 
researcher forms part of a circle of reflexivity; a truly objective position does not exist.37  
Thanks to that prior experience, access to the CdPSJA and the ACVC was very easy. I 
simply wrote an email and received a positive response. However, returning to the CdPSJA 
and the ACVC’s settlements as a researcher was a very different experience to working 
alongside these communities as an NGO worker. The purpose of my presence within their 
settlements was not the same, and my position as a researcher in relation to these 
communities differed significantly from the one I had as a NGO worker. To put it simply, while 
the CdPSJA and the ACVC requested and expected something from me in my capacity as an 
NGO worker and representative of PBI Colombia, upon my return as a researcher it was now 
me as an individual who needed something from them. While the communities needed access 
to the protection that I, with my white t-shirt with a PBI logo on it, could provide them by 
being physically present within their settlements, as a researcher I needed access to their 
words, perspectives and views on the questions that I brought with me during my field 
research.  
This position as a researcher came with responsibilities toward the communities. I had 
the obligation not to put them in danger, to abide by their community rules while spending 
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time within their settlements, and to be as transparent as possible regarding the activities I 
wanted to undertake. For instance, I always asked the community leaders before going to 
interview military or police officers. In one case, I decided not to conduct the interviews due 
to concerns raised by the leader of the community. While I was conducting fieldwork in 
Colombia, I also heard that communities were tired of researchers or people visiting the 
communities and failing to engage with them after getting what they needed. In this regard, 
I am afraid that I have failed so far to consistently engage with all three communities about 
the results of my research. I have not given up on engaging with them though, and I aim to 
do so in the following months.   
My experience with the ATCC was totally different, as I did not know the Association 
before I went to visit them during my fieldwork. I was very fortunate to be introduced to the 
President of the ATCC by a researcher from the National Commission for Reparation and 
Reconciliation. I also had the chance to go there with another PhD researcher who was 
undertaking his field research at the same time as I was and was not only studying the 
experience of the ATCC but the CdPSJA’s as well. In this case, my initial contact with the 
President of the ATCC was key, as he arranged almost all interviews for me and took me to 
several remote settlements. The fact that I already knew the CdPSJA and the ACVC, but not 
the ATCC before undertaking my field research created some sort of imbalance in the way I 
looked at each community. I quickly realised that I looked at the ATCC’s experience through 
the lens created by my knowledge of the CdPSJA and the ACVC. For instance, I expected to 
find in the ATCC the same sense of community, and the same alternative, anti-capitalist and 
anti-establishment political ideas. However, this was not the case and this first came as a 
surprise to me. I was immediately intrigued, and my reflections on these differences 
deepened my research and clearly shaped the conclusions I reach in this thesis.  In this regard, 
the method and theoretical framework I developed in chapter 2 helped me mitigate this 
original bias. This framework allowed me to look at all three communities through the lens of 
similar criteria. 
My prior professional experience in Colombia finally explains the fact that I 
approached my field research from a deductive and not inductive perspective. It was 
impossible for me to approach this subject without preconceived ideas about the initiatives 
of peasant communities. Having a very clear idea and concrete experience of my empirical 




resistance and peacebuilding initiatives led by CdPSJA and the ACVC. The theoretical 
framework I apply throughout this thesis is not therefore something that emerged during field 
research. Even though a Gramscian language can be found within some of the ACVC’s 
publications and claims, this theoretical framework is something I brought to the field and 
applied to my empirical subject. I used Gramsci’s ideas both as a methodology, for the study 
of local actors’ resistance, and a theory, for the analysis of the wider political context of this 
resistance and how this resistance is related to this very same context. Gramsci’s ideas acted 
as guiding principles for the choice of my methods during my field research, helped me 
formulate questions for the semi-structured interviews I conducted, and analysed the three 
dimensions I have identified in my sub-research questions and which I look at in chapters 3 to 
5, namely the role of consciousness, control over space, and the building of alternatives and 
alliances. I used Gramsci’s ideas to reflect on these three dimensions and inform the analysis 
of all three communities’ role in peacebuilding.  
Knowledge claims 
Through this research about peasant communities in Colombia, I aim to produce idiographic 
knowledge claims.  In defining the practice of peasant communities’ resistance and their role 
in peacebuilding, I acknowledge that this practice is the product of a specific social and 
political context.  As a result, all truth claims are specific only to this context.  My aim is to 
draw lessons from a single case which could be extrapolated to other cases, as my central 
research question hints at.  However, the eventual generalisation of my findings is not my 
primary aim, and it is therefore more reasonable to think that my research will only be valid 
in the Colombian context.  Although I address the eventual generalisation in the conclusion 
of my thesis, this analysis is not part of the core of my research.  This does not in any way 
lessen its significance, as I have already outlined.  Neither is it crucial for my research findings, 
as it focuses only on Colombia. 
My starting point is a social phenomenon that must be observed to evaluate its impact 
– positive or negative – upon other social processes, be they agents or structures.  The 
causality I seek to uncover is thus both social and political.  In this regard, a reflection on multi-
causality and the relative significance of the specific causal relation I wish to uncover seems 
inevitable.  Indeed, state formation and peace-building processes in Colombia are also being 




actions of social groups which do not belong to the human rights movement, or the actions 
of the Colombian government.  In this thesis, I focus only on the role of peasant communities 
in building peace, but do this considering other causal elements and their relationships to the 
impact of peasant communities’ practices. The theoretical framework I develop in Chapter 1, 
based on Gramsci’s political theory, helps me to address this methodological consideration 
by emphasising political struggles between ruling elites and subaltern groups, while framing 
this struggle within the broader hegemonic structures in Colombia.  In this regard, I use theory 
as ‘a guide to empirical exploration’ and the identification of causal processes.38  This causal 
analysis also makes it necessary to engage in some kind of moral discussion, as my findings 
could be interpreted as enunciating a moral judgement.  Reflecting my convictions, my 
research will seek to find evidence of the positive impact of peasant communities.  Accepting 
that values and knowledge claims are often interrelated39 and acknowledging the fact that 
the nature of the concepts I will analyse, such as peace and resistance, are both morally 
charged concepts, are unavoidable.  This is even more so in the extremely polarised 
Colombian context, as the referendum on the peace agreement demonstrated in October 
2016. 
Rational and context of field research activities and methods 
During my research, I spent three months in Colombia, with two-week visits to three 
peasant communities.  The rest of my time I spent in the cities of Apartadó, Medellín, 
Barrracabermeja, Bucaramanga, and Bogotá.  I carried out 84 semi-structure interviews,40 the 
majority with members of peasant communities.  I also interviewed state officials, army and 
police officers, NGO workers, a member of the Constitutional Court, and Church members in 
all these cities.  I attended a state-organised event about the concept of territorial peace and 
the role of rural communities regarding the implementation of the peace agreement.  Even 
though I do not claim to use ethnographic methods, my analysis has inevitably been 
influenced by participant observation conducted both during my fieldwork and from 
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experience while working with PBI.  Finally, I was a visiting fellow at the University of Los 
Andes in Bogotá, which allowed me to present my work to a group of scholars from this 
university.  My research heavily relies on the result of this fieldwork, during which I had access 
to the Colombian literature.  In particular, I have to mention here the works of Aparicio41 and 
Burnyeat42 on the Peace Community of San José de Apartadó (CdPSJA), and the report of the 
National Commission for Reparation and Reconciliation43 on the Carare Worker and Peasant 
Association (ATCC).  These studies into two of the communities I look at provided me with 
invaluable insights and perspectives.  I also collected a great number of primary sources about 
the three communities, in the form of internal documents, archives, and newspapers.  The 
ATCC archives proved an extraordinary source of information.  These archives were collected 
and systematised by the state-sponsored National Commission for Reparation and 
Reconciliation (CNRR) during the writing of El orden desarmado, a research monograph on 
the history of the ATCC written by the Group for Historical Memory of the CNRR.44  The Tierra 
newspapers published by the Cimitarra River Valley Peasant Association (ACVC) were also a 
great source of information.  The CdPSJA, the ATCC, and the ACVC are the three communities 
I look at in this thesis. 
The design of the semi-structured interviews I conducted was informed by both early 
reflections on Gramsci’s criteria for the study of subaltern groups and my previous experience 
in Colombia.  The data gathered during these interviews was key for the final structure of this 
thesis. In this regard, my fieldwork considerably shaped my research by pointing at key 
dimensions of the struggles and initiatives of all three communities. Indeed, the three 
dimensions that are the subjects of chapters 3 to 5 all emerged during my field research. My 
reflection on these dimensions was then systematised by looking at them through the lens of 
Gramsci’s key ideas regarding consciousness, strategies, and the building of alternatives and 
alliances.  
My prior experience with the CdPSJA and the ACVC facilitated my access to their 
members, as trust was already established. This meant that even though I could only spend a 
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relatively short amount of time within all three communities, creating opportunities for 
interviews was also relatively easy, at least with the most visible leaders. While my priority 
was to interview leaders of all three communities, I identified other potential interviewees on 
the basis of interviews already conducted, informal discussions, and more spontaneous 
opportunities. I obtained prior consent from all my interviewees and preserved their 
anonymity in the vast majority of cases. When consent was given to mention their true name, 
I only mentioned names of the most visible leaders in the thesis, as this would not increase 
the risk they already face. The challenges I faced were related to the opportunities to 
interview less visible members, such as young people and women. The vast majority of my 
interviewees are historical members of the communities or current and prominent leaders. I 
struggled to interview younger members of the communities and this means that my thesis 
might not reflect their views on the questions and issues I raised. The fact that my 
interviewees are also mostly men means that a gender perspective could not be properly 
integrated within this thesis.  
Another challenge was to get access to local state officials and employees. These 
officials and employees were not very willing to speak to me given the topic of my research 
and their own relationship with, or views on all three communities. When I obtained 
interviews, I was merely offered a very neutral and carefully thought discourse. Interviews 
with embassy officials were easier to obtain but did not prove very useful either in most cases. 
Overall, I used the remaining interviews I conducted with state officials, embassy officials, or 
NGO workers to address specific points in relation to their relationships with all three 
communities. Finally, the responsibility I had not to put the communities in danger 
constrained the way in which I explained my research to other actors, the extent to which I 
could move freely within and between the settlements of the communities, and the possibility 
of interviewing certain persons such as members of the military or police active within the 
communities’ local settings.  
Regarding my own individual security, I carried out a risk assessment prior to travelling 
to Colombia. Given the fact that I would carry out field research in very polarised and tense 
regions, I took it for granted that my presence would not be perceived as neutral to external 
observers and that the need to take security measures was evident. I obtained a student visa 
from the Colombian embassy in London. I also decided to always travel with members of the 




international NGOs in Apartado and Barrancabermeja rather than in hotels. While I did not 
face any security incidents during my stay in all three communities, another PhD student who 
travelled with me to the ATCC settlements did face an incident in the city of Cimitarra. He was 
approached by two men while waiting for the bus to Bogotá who asked him about what he 
was doing in the region and about his whereabouts. He told them he was waiting for the 8pm 
bus to Bogotá. The two men then suggested it would be better for him to take an earlier bus, 
the 6pm bus, and then left. Nothing came of this veiled threat, but it was a reminder of the 
control paramilitary groups still exert in the region.  
Local actors, peacebuilding, and social change: a literature review 
My aim in this thesis is to contribute to peacebuilding studies by bringing in insights from 
literature that is more directly focused on the role of social movements in resisting power. 
While I take the literature on peacebuilding; and in particular that on the role of local actors 
within peacebuilding process as a starting point, my research spans three fields of academic 
study: peacebuilding studies, resistance and non-violence studies, and Gramscian studies. In 
this literature review, I first explain my dissatisfaction with the peacebuilding literature. Then, 
I introduce insights from resistance studies and non-violence studies and demonstrate how 
the peacebuilding literature could benefit from integrating these insights for the analysis of 
local actors within peacebuilding processes. Finally, this literature review also paves the way 
for the design of my own theoretical framework based on Gramsci’s political theory. My 
argument is that peacebuilding studies have assumed that conflict management, external 
interventions or mediation are necessary to build peace. The critical strand of the literature 
makes progress by placing the needs, culture, and rights of local actors at the centre of any 
sustainable peace. However, it still relies on the assumption that external intervention is 
necessary and is unable to explain how local actors’ needs could effectively be prioritised. On 
the contrary, the literature on civil resistance and non-violence provides useful insights for 
the study of the capacity of local actors to challenge power structures, and therefore 
effectively materialise their needs, culture and rights. Nevertheless, civil resistance and non-
violence studies’ lack of attention to social and political contexts, their reductionist concept 
of power, and emphasis on technique or strategies led me to turn to the political theory of 




shares similarities with civil resistance and non-violence studies, but goes further. Indeed, it 
integrates civil resistance and non-violence studies’ insights into a broader theory of social 
and political change that is better able to explain the outcome of political and social struggles. 
Gramsci acts as a bridge between all literatures discussed in the sense that his concept of 
hegemony provides a useful theory of social and political change in which human agency is 
awarded the ability to influence its environment without ever losing sight of the economic 
structures. 
The peacebuilding and statebuilding literature has been characterised in the past 
decade by a prolific increase in the number of new publications, be they books or articles, 
reflecting a growing interest for statebuilding interventions and peacebuilding missions.  
Navigating the great diversity of themes, theoretical approaches, issues, and contexts 
addressed is a challenge.  In addition, this literature borrows from several disciplines and 
fields of study, such as development studies45, security studies46, democracy promotion and 
democratisation47, conflict resolution48, state theory49, and also now ethnographic and post-
colonial studies50.  The main debates turn around the liberal peacebuilding and statebuilding 
norms, practices, and record: the promotion of democracy, market-based economic reforms, 
and the creation of state institutions aimed at regulating social and political conflicts.51  Liberal 
and critical approaches argue against one another without being able to go beyond ‘liberal 
peace’.  Many new solutions for war-torn societies have been suggested.  But discussions 
seem to have reached an impasse.52  One of the most important issues at stake within this 
debate concerns the role of the ‘local’, a term which is used in very different – and sometimes 
confusing – ways in the literature.  As much as the liberal vs. non-liberal divide, the local turn 
divides the liberal and critical strands of the literature.  Even though there is a growing 
consensus about the need to integrate local contexts and actors within the analysis of 
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peacebuilding and statebuilding practices,53 there is no agreement on what going ‘local’ 
means.  Neither is there agreement on what must be done to better reflect local needs, 
culture, and identities, to use Richmond’s terminology54.  The local turn55 divides the liberal 
and the critical strands of the literature to such an extent that there is almost no dialogue 
between the two.56  As a result, the debates have reached an impasse and do not show any 
sign of progress.  Liberal scholars do not leave the liberal framework of analysis alone but seek 
to fix it,57 while critical scholars have made promising but yet unsatisfying attempts to 
theorise a ‘post-liberal peace’.58 
In the meantime, liberal and neoliberal peacebuilding and statebuilding practices have 
not lost their influence and continue to inform policies towards war-torn societies.  Jahn 
argues that all development policies towards non-Western states, from modernisation 
theories to the transition paradigm to statebuilding interventions, share the same liberal 
assumptions.59 She attributes the resilience of peacebuilding and statebuilding practices to 
“the power of the liberal ideology which constantly reasserts itself in spite of contradictory 
evidence”.  Failure only confirms liberalism’s own superiority and blame is put on non-liberal 
countries. This attests to “the depth of its power as a cognitive framework”. 60  Much of the 
critical literature follows this analysis in pointing at liberalism’s flaws to explain the failure of 
peacebuilding and statebuilding interventions.61  As the failure of liberal peacebuilding and 
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statebuilding missions to connect with local populations and local contexts and to live up to 
their standards and promises became obvious, a growing resistance to peacebuilding and 
statebuilding practices emerged.  Going local was then seen as the magic formula to solve 
peacebuilding practices and studies.  This has led to the development of concepts such as 
‘local ownership’, ‘do no harm’, or ‘local capacity building’, and to the design of a results-
based framework of analysis oriented towards the needs of aid organisations and 
practitioners.62  It has also given rise to a vast literature on the role of civil society within 
peacebuilding processes – only to some degree within statebuilding – in relation to 
democracy, state accountability or economic development.63  However, the persistence of 
local resistance within war-torn societies indicates the need to rethink its impact and role 
within peacebuilding and statebuilding processes.  On one hand, the emphasis on civil 
society’s contribution to peacebuilding does not address the fact that the institutional and 
neoliberal framework of peacebuilding interventions has delegitimised local actors, denying 
them the capacity to promote meaningful political, social, and economic change.  On the 
other hand, the critical literature has attempted to restore g local actors’ political agency, but 
this attempt is too conceptual to have any practical and meaningful impact.  Neither strand 
provides useful analytical tools for the study of local actors’ capacities to challenge power 
structures that both cause and sustain armed conflicts.  We do not need any alternative 
concept of peace64 or a new conceptualisation of the ‘local’, as some scholars have tried to 
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develop.65  Neither do we need a new recipe or model for peacebuilding.  Resistance and non-
violence studies provide us with useful insights about how local actors could both challenge 
liberal peacebuilding models and guarantee their needs, interests, and rights for a more 
sustainable peace.  These fields of study can help refocus the debate on national 
peacebuilding dynamics rather than on international interventions and the dichotomy 
between local and international actors.  They can also emphasise local actors’ strategies to 
bring about social and political change. 
The gap between international and local actors 
Although peace research was initially informed by grassroots and bottom-up perspectives, 
and developed by groups with a political concern (Schmid 1968: 217), top-down, technical 
and elitist approaches now prevail.  The current literature has illustrated how the different 
peacebuilding and statebuilding approaches have so far failed to connect with local actors 
and consider local contexts.  The liberal assumptions underlying peacebuilding endeavours in 
the 1990s were proven to be flawed.  The idea that the creation of free markets and the 
implementation of democratic institutions would generate growth and economic 
development, break the dynamics of violence, and lead to a sustainable peace failed to live 
up to its promise.  This acknowledged failure led to an emphasis on the need for strong state 
institutions before implementing liberal reforms.  Statebuilding thus took prominence in the 
2000s and informed peacebuilding policies.  As the previous peacebuilding missions, 
statebuilding interventions were principally aimed at strengthening the stability and security 
of the international system by creating strong state institutions able to maintain a rather 
narrow model of peace.  They were also informed by Western interests and ideas and sought 
to impose Western models of democracy.  The difference between these two decades lies in 
the nature of the state that was being promoted.  While peacebuilding in the 1990s was 
concerned with the “kind of state”, statebuilding in the 2000s was concerned with the 
“degree of state”.66  However, statebuilding practices have rather reinforced the gap between 
international interventions relying on national elites on one hand, and local populations on 
the other.  
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Several authors have analysed this gap.67  They highlight the limits of top-down 
approaches to statebuilding and peacebuilding and how this generated resistance by local 
actors and led to a lack of legitimacy or peacebuilding and statebuilding missions.  They show 
how the failure to consider local dynamics undermined peacebuilding and statebuilding 
objectives. Autessere argues that local dynamics were crucial in fuelling the violence and 
prolonging the conflict in Congo between 2003 and 2006 and should have been addressed in 
order to achieve a sustainable peace.68  According to her, a post-conflict peacebuilding frame 
prevented international actors tackling local peacebuilding issues and addressing local 
agendas. Chandler has shown how statebuilding denied the autonomy of the political 
process.69  Finally, the critical strand of the literature has undertaken an ethical critique of the 
liberal peace and its impact on local populations.70 
The role of local actors within the liberal and critical strands of the literature 
The mainstream liberal trend of the literature tries to answer three different kinds of 
question: How to build liberal and effective state and a lasting peace? Under what conditions 
does peacebuilding work? What works and what does not work?  Although the institutional 
strand of the literature also acknowledges the importance of local contexts and the need to 
adapt peacebuilding and statebuilding missions to this context,71 civilians are absent from 
their account of peacebuilding and statebuilding and are granted no peacebuilding capacities 
at all.  At best, peacebuilders should take some kind of social measures to improve “the living 
conditions of those segments of the population hardest bit by the structural adjustment”72 
and reflect on how local actors could take ownership of liberal norms, values, and practices 
and be empowered.  Instead, the literature focuses on how to deal with spoilers.73  Local 
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parties are encouraged to meet certain standards of behaviour and political, social, and 
economic measures are designed to alter their behaviour.  It is then generally assumed that, 
given the devastation brought by war, there is no capacity for peace at the local level and that 
international involvement is necessary.74  In this regard, the role of international actors can 
be viewed as a modern version of the mission civilizatrice.75  Paris argues that  
Peacebuilding operations embody a type of globalisation that has gone largely unnoticed in recent 
discussions on international affairs – not a globalisation of goods and services, nor of cultural products 
like films and television shows, but rather, a globalisation of the very idea of what a state should look 
like and how it should act. To the extent that peacebuilding agencies transmit such ideas from the core 
to the periphery of the international system, these agencies are, in effect, involved in an effort to 
remake parts of the periphery in the image of the core.76 
The autonomy of civil society agents is not possible without external intervention. In other 
words, their agency depends on international capacity.  For Chandler, underlying this 
perspective is a discourse rooted in the cultural difference between international liberal 
agents and local agents.77 For Richmond, the local is conceived as an apolitical and pre-
modern sphere of social interaction.78 
Within the mainstream strand of the literature, however, a growing number of studies 
has focused on how to integrate the contribution of local actors and institutions to 
peacebuilding so as to make the latter more effective.  These studies have focused in 
particular on civil society’s contribution to the different phases of peacebuilding processes.79  
NGOs, peacebuilding practitioners, and policymakers have heavily relied on these studies to 
support and justify their programmes.80  The Peace Laboratories funded and promoted by the 
EU in Colombia are such an example.81  Others have studied the impact of decentralisation 
and the role of local governance in peace and development by increasing legitimacy, 
accountability, inclusion, and participation, and reached contested and opposite 
conclusions.82  The UK-based Institute for Development Studies (IDS) published a series of 
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bulletins in which concepts such as security or governance are rethought ‘from below’.83   
Following this local turn, the notion of ‘local ownership’ has become a buzz term.84  New 
concepts and approaches have emerged to highlight local peacebuilding capacities and link 
them with national processes, such as community-based approaches,85 Zones of Peace,86 or 
Local Peace Committees.87  However, these approaches still advocate functional or 
institutional solutions that do not address the political dimensions of peacebuilding. 
The critical literature on peacebuilding has identified local actors and issues as key for 
building a sustainable peace.88  In particular, it shows that liberal peacebuilding in practice is 
always the product of the interaction between international and local actors that often results 
in a hybrid peace.89  This challenges the neat binary distinction between international and 
local dimensions of peacebuilding.90  As part of this critical strand, the concept of hybridity 
has recently been developed in order to describe the nature and kind of peace that is 
emerging in post-conflict societies and has also been applied to other sectors or phenomena 
of post-conflict spaces, such as governance, violence, or institutions.91   Mac Ginty deploys 
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the concept of hybridity in order to counter the “overcoming hegemonic narratives of conflict 
and internationally supported peace interventions” and break with the reification and fixity 
of categories and concepts implied by such narratives.92  He also argues that hybridity is useful 
to emphasise local agency and norms that have so far been romanticised within peacebuilding 
and statebuilding theory and practice.  According to him, this concept allows us to question 
the kind and quality of peace that is promoted by liberal agents and look for alternative ways 
of building a better peace.93  Mac Ginty argues that hybrid peace results from the interplay of 
four factors: the compliance powers of liberal peace agents, networks, and structures; the 
incentivising powers of liberal peace agents, networks, and structures; the ability of local 
actors to resist, ignore, or adapt liberal peace interventions; and the ability of local actors, 
networks, and structures to present and maintain alternative forms of peacemaking.94  
Similarly,  several authors deploy the concept of hybridity or hybrid political orders as an 
alternative to the discourse on ‘failed’ states and fragility. They argue that the concept of 
hybridity is broad enough to incorporate the wide variety of non-state actors, forms, and 
orders that characterise post-conflict spaces.95  According to Boege et al., hybridity ‘focuses 
on the combination of elements that stem from genuinely different societal sources that 
follow different logics; and it affirms that these spheres permeate each other and, 
consequently, give rise to a different and genuine political order’.96  In these hybrid political 
orders, the state does not have the privilege position as the hegemonic political framework 
that it enjoys in Western consolidated states.  On the contrary, the state shares authority, 
sovereignty and legitimacy with other actors.   For this reason, Boege et al. discard the state 
as the main unit of analysis.  Finally, they argue that the concept of hybridity puts the 
emphasis on the positive potential of local actors and provides an opportunity to reflect on 
how to engage with local culture, traditions and institutions in a constructive way.97  It 
therefore provides the tools to “identify and support processes of positive mutual 
accommodation between modern state institutions, customary local institutions and civil 
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society institutions which might lead to the emergence of new forms of sustainable 
statehood”.98 
While a simple definition of hybridity is used by MacGinty and Boege et al.,99 
Richmond has tried to give a more normative, prescriptive, and even sometimes philosophical 
content to this concept drawing on post-colonial theory and the work of Michel Foucault. For 
Richmond, hybridity is the outcome of the encounter between international liberal actors and 
local actors (“the infrapolitics of peacebuilding”100 as he calls them). It is also the product of 
their capacity to engage with each other and the result of the interaction or clash between 
different forms of political organisations.101 This might be either in favour of local versions of 
peace or of liberal versions of peace.102 Hybridity is in practice already emerging and has the 
potential to give birth to a post-liberal peace, meaning a peace based on the everyday needs, 
culture, and welfare of local actors rather than on the norms, values, and institutions 
promoted by the liberal peace. In Richmond’s view, a focus on hybridity would give birth to a 
fourth generation of peace “that transcends the limitations of liberalism and aims for an 
empathetic and emancipatory form of peace”.103  Contrary to the liberal peace, hybridity 
deterritorialises and emerges in “different ways and at different times in these polarised 
relations via local resistance, co-option and domination, or compliance and accommodation, 
between local and liberal forms of peacebuilding”.104 Rather than producing subjects, a hybrid 
post-liberal peace enables subjects to produce peace.105  In my view, the concept of hybridity 
oversimplifies the dynamics affecting post-conflict and conflict spaces and reifies them 
through a polarised opposition between local and international actors.  It also fails to consider 
the national dynamics that characterise post-conflict spaces.  More importantly, these 
authors do not actually explain how local actors are able to resist and challenge networks of 
power in post-conflict or conflict settings. 
The critical peacebuilding literature has also explored the concept of the everyday as 
an attempt to propose theoretical alternatives to the liberal peace model and its failure to 
address local contexts.  The basic argument is that a lasting peace has to rely on local actors’ 
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everyday needs, identity, and culture rather than on liberal norms and institutions.106  
Richmond has written extensively on the ‘everyday’, to theorise an emancipatory peace based 
on a local-liberal hybridity which privileges the everyday needs and rights of citizens, as well 
as culture, identities, and local agencies rather than state security, state national interest, and 
free markets.107  It is not easy to grasp at first sight what the everyday represents, as its 
meaning is heavily dependent on context.  In the context of Western twentieth-century 
political and social theories, Western sociologists first used the concept of the everyday to 
analyse Western societies.  In the literature about peacebuilding and statebuilding, the 
definition of the everyday given by Richmond and Mitchell is “the seemingly mundane, often 
repetitive activities through which human beings sustain their lives and social structures”.108 
Mitchell gives a more detailed definition of the everyday, as the “set of experiences, practices 
and interpretations through which people engage with the daily challenges of occupying, 
preserving, altering and sustaining the plural worlds that they occupy”.109  Both these 
definitions point to the fact that the everyday is not a specificity of the local, although the 
literature on peacebuilding tends to focus on the everyday happening in local contexts and as 
opposed to liberal values and forms of power.  For Richmond, the everyday is “a site of 
resistance, assimilation and adaptation, and of hidden agencies. It is also the site where power 
is often experienced in its most negative forms”.110 He frames the everyday as a space of 
critical agency, a site where the local and the international, the liberal and the non-liberal 
‘meet and are negotiated, leading variously to repulsion, modification, or acceptance’.111   
Richmond claims that the literature on the everyday results in a need to theorise from the 
everyday context and those most affected. The politics of the everyday seeks to incorporate 
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social and community contexts into peacebuilding methodology, epistemology, theory, and 
policy. These become a basis for the construction of an everyday peace, in part international 
and institutional, democratic, observing rights and needs, with a rule of law, and in part 
representative of local identity, custom, culture, institutions, and expectations. It reflects 
“local-local, and its transnational, transversal connections, including with the many agencies 
of the liberal peace, but also increasingly with those actors who are outside this 
consensus”.112 
One of the contributions of the concepts of hybridity and the everyday is to emphasise 
the role of culture within peacebuilding at the local level.  MacGinty argues that culture is 
intimately linked to local and traditional modes of conflict resolution. The principal advantage 
stemming from traditional and indigenous approaches to peacebuilding, he posits, lies in their 
culturally intuitive nature.113  Richmond builds on this perspective and argues that culture is 
marginalised in the current peacebuilding and statebuilding practices as well as in the related 
institutional, liberal, and neoliberal theories and their rights, security, and markets version.  
Culture has been ignored due to the problem-solving rights based approach to peacebuilding.  
Yet local cultures are at the basis of local actors’ social and economic systems, which he calls 
their cultural agency.114  Culture is therefore identified as instrumental to local actor’s agency 
and autonomy.  Kappler showed that culture plays a role in the reconstruction of the social 
fabric of local communities affected by violence and in creating legitimate social orders.115  
Woodhouse argues that culture has a role to play through its capacity to mobilise energies 
for sustainable peacebuilding at different stages of the conflict.116  Culture is therefore 
identified as instrumental to local actors’ agency and autonomy.  But none of these scholars 
explain how culture could have an impact beyond the everyday realms and contexts of local 
actors. 
While a focus on the everyday represents an improvement to liberal theories, it is not 
a useful tool to analyse local actors’ agencies.  On the contrary, it reduces their agency to their 
capacity to influence their everyday environment.  It does not say anything about how the 
concept of the everyday could challenge the structural constraints imposed by this same 
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environment.  If we are to understand how local actors interact with these structural 
constraints and have an impact beyond their local environment, it is necessary to go beyond 
the everyday and the tactical realm.  The crucial issue is not the need to rethink the concept 
of peace based on the everyday, but how to bring about social and political change at the 
everyday level.  In this regard, the concept of the everyday does not say anything about local 
actors’ capacities to challenge the material networks of power in which they evolve.  It also 
discards broader historical dynamics in the analysis of post-conflict and conflict settings, a gap 
which the sociological approach to statebuilding117 tries to fill by advocating the need for a 
perspective that takes into account the longue durée.118   
The sociological approach to statebuilding also illustrates my argument that we do not 
need to move away from the concepts used by liberal peacebuilding and statebuilding, 
namely state and civil society, to replace them with other concepts such as hybridity or the 
everyday. On the contrary, what is required is a rethink of the concepts of state and civil 
society and how the two interact and mutually constitute each other in post-conflict and 
conflict spaces.  The critical literature assumes that the rethink of the concept of peace based 
on the everyday and hybridity will lead to better peacebuilding and statebuilding practices.  
This is based on a moral or ethical perspective which does not consider the materiality of 
power that characterises post-conflict spaces.  If we want to explain the transition from 
conflict to peace in an accurate way, we need a theory of social and political change that gives 
us the tools to explain and understand such a change.  Instead of focusing on values, 
identities, and norms and conceptualising an ethical concept of peace, the emphasis should 
be placed on issues related to domination and hegemony, coercion and consent, state and 
civil society.  Peace not only depends on values but also on material power relations and the 
struggle for power, be they social, political, or economic.  Peace does not emerge from the 
everyday or the apolitical interaction between international and local norms and actors.  
Peace is the outcome of power struggles between rulers and the ruled.  While the former try 
to maintain their domination, the latter resist and contest it. 
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Power, agency, and strategies of non-violent movements 
In this regard, the literature on civil resistance and non-violence provides useful insights about 
the concept of power, the autonomy and agency of resistance movements, and their 
strategies.  Theories of civil resistance rest on a particular understanding of power according 
to which the sources of rulers’ power depend on the obedience and cooperation of ruled 
subjects.119  In this regard, the coercive aspect of non-violent resistance is based on the 
removal of the adversary’s key sources of power.120 Such an understanding departs from 
conceptions of power as violence or coercion, has informed civil resistance campaigns and 
practice, and was coherently articulated by Sharp.121 This understanding of power has been 
used so far to explain how civil resistance campaigns were able to overthrow dictatorships, 
put an end to colonisation, or protest against non-democratic laws within formally democratic 
institutions and contexts. However, it has not been applied to contexts of civil wars where 
resistance is exerted not only against actors backed by state power but also against illegal 
armed actors.  Although recent studies have shown that civilian institutions proved to be a 
critical factor for both explaining and limiting levels of violence,122 the majority of studies of 
civil resistance campaigns in contexts of civil wars is either descriptive or normative.123  
Similarly, while the clear majority of the literature on civil resistance has focused on instances 
where the overthrow of authoritarian power and its replacement by democratic or more 
legitimate actors was the main objective, the extent to which civil resistance theories are 
relevant for struggles against structural violence remains to be seen.  There is reason to 
believe that local peasant communities in Colombia have had a positive impact on the direct 
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violence they faced, but useful insights could be gained from a study of their struggle to build 
peace and challenge structural violence.  Theories of civil resistance, in particular the theory 
of power underlying them, could complement peacebuilding theories.  Indeed, the latter 
often rely on a structural and institutional understanding of the sources of power and rarely 
take into account the social sources of power.  
In addition, civil resistance studies usually stress the influence of agency in bringing 
about political change.  While Sharp’s theory of power has been criticised for not taking into 
account structural constraints to power,124 recent studies have tried to bridge the gap 
between structure and agency125 and challenge more structural approaches coming from 
social movements studies.126  Chenoweth and Stephan’s central contention is that non-violent 
campaigns have a participation advantage over violent insurgencies, which is an important 
factor in determining campaign outcomes.  According to them, “nonviolent campaigns 
facilitate the active participation of many more people than violent campaigns, thereby 
broadening the base of resistance and raising the costs to opponents of maintaining the status 
quo”.127  They argue that the failure of non-violent campaigns is best explained by their 
inability to overcome the challenge of participation, rather than by the power of structural 
factors.  They find that this argument is valid independently of the structures or political 
opportunities faced by non-violent campaigns.  Schock128 analyses the interaction between 
political opportunities and strategic choices, and identifies key factors for explaining the 
outcome of civil resistance campaigns.  In this regard, he argues that such concepts as 
mobilisation, resilience, leverage, tactical innovation, and the shifting between methods of 
concentration and methods of dispersion are instrumental for the success of non-violent 
campaigns. These studies represent attempts to understand how civil resistance campaigns 
can have a positive impact on national structures of power.  However, they fail to provide a 
useful analytical framework for understanding movements that not only try to challenge 
political power, but also more global power structures. 
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Finally, the study of strategies and techniques of non-violent actions has traditionally 
been one of the main focuses of the literature on civil resistance, with a focus on the dynamics 
of non-violent strategies129 and the effectiveness of such strategies.130  New studies have also 
analysed how these strategies are shaped by or embedded in cultural elements.131  But the 
study of non-violent strategies can also be linked to peacebuilding.  Indeed, some studies have 
shown that the outcomes achieved through non-violent means are likely to lead to peaceful 
settlements and be more permanent than those achieved through violence.132  It has also 
been argued that the changing nature of war and conflict throughout the twentieth century 
has created new opportunities for non-violent strategies to bring about peace through 
molecular processes.133   The literature on civil resistance and non-violence therefore provides 
useful insights for the study of the capacity of local actors to challenge power structures, their 
agency, and their strategies. As Jackson argues, a focus on resistance could palliate some of 
the flaws of peacebuilding studies.134 Such a focus would entail a serious engagement with 
the concept of power and its complex nature, as well as a stronger critical engagement with 
neoliberal capitalism and historical materialist theories of class and state power.135 It would 
also put the emphasis on the concept of structural violence that was key to early peace 
studies.136 Finally, it has the potential to re-focus attention away from high-level elites, public 
officials and top-down macro-level processes, towards local actors, local agency and more 
bottom-up, societal processes.137 
Conclusion 
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Authors such as Lederach,138 Rupesinghe,139 Nordstrom,140 Boulding,141 and Pearce142 
have all insisted on local actors’ capacities to build peace.  However, these grassroots and 
bottom-up initiatives have failed so far to have an impact at national level by challenging 
power structures that sustain violence and armed conflicts.  The different strands of the 
peacebuilding literature have tried to find solutions to the gap between local actors and 
international peacebuilding interventions.  In its attempt to save liberal peacebuilding, the 
mainstream literature has tried to develop a cosmopolitan model of global governance within 
which a cosmopolitan human rights agenda is consistent with the communitarian defence of 
political autonomy and cultural diversity.  The critical strand of the literature offers a new 
conceptualisation of the local and argues that the concepts of hybridity and the everyday 
should be used as the basis of a more sustainable and just peace, if the ‘local’ is to be 
emancipated.  What is needed, though, is a detailed understanding of how local actors can 
build on their culture, interests, and needs in order to challenge the roots of their domination 
and alienation, and challenge power structures.  The literature on non-violence and resistance 
is therefore useful, as it challenges the assumption, which underlies both the liberal and 
critical strand of the peacebuilding literature, that peace requires management or 
intervention.  In this regard, Jackson argues that resistance studies can ‘save peace studies’, 
by refocusing the field on ‘the role of power dynamics in conflict and peace’.143 Emancipation 
requires political struggles, not a new conceptualisation of peace or what the local means.  It 
also requires a recentring of the analysis towards the national dynamics of peacebuilding 
processes.  Such a recentring is also coherent with calls to consider “peacebuilding as 
essentially local”144 and with the insights of early peace and conflict resolution scholars who 
promoted a holistic and bottom-up perspective.  Leonardsson and Rudd show that the 
common denominator of this perspective “is the emphasis on a peace built on internal, 
domestic and local traditions as well as cultural practices.  Outside actors can lend valuable 
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support but are never more than bystanders in decisions on what type of peace is to be 
built”.145  Finally, Pearce has shown the problems associated with externally funded and 
supported peacebuilding.146 These considerations have led me to identify the political theory 
of the Italian activist and thinker Antonio Gramsci as offering the most useful tools in this 
regard, as I explain in more details in the next chapter.  
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Chapter 2: Gramsci’s Politics in the Context of Armed Conflicts 
Introduction 
As argued in the previous section, research on peacebuilding and statebuilding is deeply 
embedded within a liberal and neoliberal framework of analysis, although a critical strand 
within this literature has been growing.  Given the failure of peacebuilding and statebuilding 
policies and the incapacity of the literature to go beyond critique of these policies in spite of 
some recent very interesting efforts,147 there is a need to overcome the dead-end at which 
the literature has arrived and to bring in a new perspective.  The previous chapter addressed 
the reasons why theoretical frameworks based on the concepts of hybridity and the everyday, 
analyses relying on a liberal understanding of civil society, and Zones of Peace and Local Peace 
Committee approaches are not analytically useful to fully understand how local peacebuilding 
actors can challenge power.  There is a need to explain why peacebuilding agreements are 
often pressed into conservative projects which preserve the status quo and do not address 
the roots causes of conflict.   
Within International Relations (IR), the application of Gramsci’s concepts has 
traditionally been limited to the sub-discipline of International Political Economy (IPE).  More 
recently, however, debates have focused on their explanatory power when applied to the 
international level and on their historical and contemporary relevance.  In this context, calls 
have been made to introduce Gramsci’s concepts to other IR fields.  Although Gramsci’s ideas 
– and Marxist thought in general – have been applied to the popular struggles that have 
characterised Latin America in the second-half of the twentieth century and the beginning of 
the twenty-first century,148 these studies have not explicitly or directly related to peace and 
                                                        
147 Mac Ginty, R. International Peacebuilding; Mitchell, A. Lost in Transformation: Violent Peace and Peaceful Conflict in 
Northern Ireland, (Basingstoke and New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011); Richmond, O.P. A Post-Liberal Peace. 
148 Freeland, A. 'The Gramscian Turn: Readings from Brazil, Argentina, and Bolivia', A contra corriente, 11:2 (2014) pp. 278-
301; Hesketh, C. 'From passive revolution to silent revolution: Class forces and the production of state, space and scale in 
modern Mexico', Capital & Class, 34:3 (2010) pp. 383–407; Hesketh, C. 'The Clash of Spatializations: Geopolitics and Class 
Struggles in Southern Mexico', Latin American Perspectives, 40:4 (2012) pp. 70–87; Hesketh, C. and Morton, A.D. 'Spaces of 
Uneven Development and Class Struggle in Bolivia: Transformation or Trasformismo ?' Antipode, 46:1 (2014) pp. 149–169; 
Modonesi, M. Subalternity, Antagonism, Autonomy: Constructing the Political Subject, (London, Pluto Press, 2013); Morton, 
A.D. 'Structural change and neoliberalism in Mexico: “Passive revolution” in the global political economy’, Third World 
Quarterly, 24:4 (2003) pp. 631–653; Morton, A.D. 'Change within continuity: The political economy of democratic transition 
in Mexico’, New Political Economy, 10:2 (2005) pp. 181–202; Morton, A.D. Unravelling Gramsci; Portantiero, J.C. Los usos de 
Gramsci (Mexico, Flios Ediciones, 1981); Suárez, H. (ed.) Antonio Gramsci y la realidad colombiana (Bogotá, Ediciones Foro 
Nacional por Colombia, 1991); Zavaleta, R. La autodeterminación de las masas, Compilador Luis Tapia (Bogotá, Siglo del 




conflicts, with one notable exceptions.149  Other studies applied Gramsci’s political theory to 
context of statebuilding and post-war reconstruction.150  This chapter explores the relevance 
of Gramsci’s thought for the study of war-torn societies in relation to peacebuilding and state 
formation processes, especially for the role of local actors within these processes, building on 
the example of Colombia.  It analyses the explanatory power of Gramsci’s concept in relation 
to resistance to armed conflict, the state, and neoliberalism in Colombia, where internally 
displaced peasants have formed “peasant communities” to both protect themselves and build 
peace.  A close look at the struggles of these communities through a Gramscian lens takes us 
deep into the superstructures of the armed conflict and reveals its political, social, and 
cultural dynamics. 
This chapter then moves away from the peacebuilding and statebuilding literature to 
develop a theoretical framework for the analysis of the role of local actors’ peace initiatives 
based on a particular understanding of the concepts deployed by the Italian political theorist 
and activist Antonio Gramsci.  I use Gramsci’s concepts to think about non-violent resistance 
and local peace building initiatives in the context of the Colombian armed conflict and its 
resolution.  I argue that Gramsci’s spatial awareness, historical sociological approach, and 
reflections on the relationship between dominant and dominated groups prove useful tools 
for thinking about such communities, conflicts, and peacebuilding processes, and for 
explaining their outcomes.  In particular, it proves to be a useful tool to understand both the 
processes and structures of social and political conflicts (hegemonic struggles and the 
conditions of emergence and reproduction of hegemony, historical blocs) on one hand, and 
the outcome of these conflicts in terms of revolution/transformation/conservation 
(hegemony, passive revolution, transformism, Ceasarism) on the other.  Such an approach 
draws attention to the interplay between the counter-hegemonic projects of local actors’ 
peace initiatives and the hegemonic projects and strategies of ruling groups.  This approach 
also frames these struggles within the broader social structures that condition and inform 
them.  These structures contribute to the reproduction or conservation of a given social order 
as well.  In other words, Gramsci’s thought represents a useful theory of social and political 
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change in which human agency is awarded the ability to influence its environment without 
ever losing sight of the economic structures.  His ideas can be conceived as a network of 
concepts which are dialectically related and historically grounded.  Concepts such as 
hegemony, the historical bloc, passive revolution, war of position, war of movement, and 
organic and traditional intellectuals, are all linked to one another and Gramsci uses them to 
analyse what he calls the ‘ensemble of social relations’151.   
By focusing on the relationship between cultural, political, and ideological factors on 
one hand (the superstructures), and the economy (the structure) on the other, Gramsci’s 
concepts give us a good understanding of social and political change without losing sight of 
the material conditions that underlie these changes, while avoiding any economic 
determinism at the same time.  Throughout this chapter, I will defend the five following 
assertions: 
1. First, Gramsci’s non-deterministic yet structurally grounded theory of social and 
political change is useful to think about the relationship and struggles between 
subaltern groups and ruling groups within a global historical materialist 
perspective.   
2. Second, it provides a historical-materialist theoretical framework that stresses the 
voluntarist elements (human agency) without losing sight of the structure (the 
economy).  In this regard, it helps reflect on the transformative capacity of human 
beings, on the power of the ‘powerless’ and their strategies, as hegemony is 
located within the process of social reproduction and transformation.  This 
structural location places constraints on actors but also leaves them room for the 
possibility of constructing new hegemonic projects and formations or historical 
blocs.152   
3. Third, his concepts of the integral state and civil society provide a useful 
alternative to the liberal versions of these concepts in order to understand how 
social, economic and political change occurs.  It allows me to look beyond the state 
understood in a Weberian and institutional form, without taking the state out of 
the picture.  A focus on hegemony draws attention to how state power is 
constructed, exerted, and maintained instead of focusing on state failure.  The 
                                                        
151 Gramsci, A. Selections. 




armed conflict in Colombia symbolises not only a crisis of state but a crisis of 
hegemony.  While the absence of state control in some regions explains why illegal 
groups can operate, most of the violence is committed by state-sponsored 
paramilitary groups or the state itself.   
4. Fourth, Gramsci’s spatial awareness emphasises uneven development and on the 
connections between local, national, and international dynamics as well.  This 
parallels the uneven presence and power of the state within war-torn societies 
and Colombia in particular, and the uneven impact of the capitalist mode of 
production as well.   
5. Fifth, Gramsci makes the link between the political and cultural realm of everyday 
life and struggles for hegemony at the national-popular realm. Gramsci explains 
how everyday life and culture can be mobilised to go beyond their local spaces and 
reach a universal, ethico-political stage. 
In what follows, I first explain in broad terms the meaning of Gramsci’s concepts and 
show their relevance for the study of local actors’ peace initiatives, such as peasant 
communities in Colombia.  Then, I discuss the epistemological and methodological grounds 
on which the application of these concepts to civil war settings in general, and Colombia in 
particular, rests.  Finally, I conclude by laying the groundwork for the empirical case-studies 
that follow, discussing Gramsci’s own criteria for the study of subaltern groups and engaging 
with issues of consciousness, autonomy, power, and political and social change. 
Hegemony, resistance, and social change 
Hegemony, state, and civil society 
Gramsci’s theory of hegemony emphasises the ruling class’s use of strategies to gain consent 
of subaltern groups to preserve a given social structure.  Hegemonic social groups exert both 
domination and intellectual and moral leadership.153  Gramsci explains how dominant groups 
achieve leadership and exert power through the development of social cohesion and 
consensus within society.  Indeed, the position of dominant groups and the degree of consent 
they achieve is never guaranteed.  Rather, it requires the design, construction, and 
implementation of political projects and social alliances, or historical blocs.  These projects 
                                                        




and alliances, with the help and mediation of organic intellectuals, those linked to a given 
social group and who ensure the cohesion and unity of both the ruling elites and the social 
whole.  In other words, they ensure its hegemony over the rest of society.  In this regard, 
while the concept of hegemony was used in reference to contingent situations before 
Gramsci, with Gramsci the concept becomes key in understanding how the unity of ‘the 
ensemble of social relations’ is achieved and maintained.154 
Gramsci’s concept of hegemony thus draws attention to the dialectic between 
coercion and consent and between rulers and the ruled in the formation of social and political 
orders.  Hegemony unites in a dialectical way the moments of force and consent, domination 
and direction (dominazione e direzione), state and civil society.  Gramsci’s ‘dual perspective’ 
on power implies that “the more the first ‘perspective’ is ‘immediate’ and elementary, the 
more the second has to be ‘distant’ (not in time, but as a dialectical relation)”.  At the 
individual level, this means that “the more an individual is compelled to defend his own 
immediate physical existence, the more will he uphold and identify with the highest values of 
civilisation and of humanity”.155  This echoes peasant communities’ use of a human rights 
discourse to defend their life and territory. 
Hegemony refers to the construction of consent through and beyond the state and 
civil society.  Gramsci therefore emphasises the fact that social cohesion must be actively 
constructed, preserved, and reproduced through political, social, and cultural means.  It does 
not automatically flow from the working of the economy.  This perspective is helpful to 
understand why liberal and neoliberal peacebuilding and statebuilding fail to achieve a 
sufficient level of consent by neglecting the political, social, and cultural dimensions of such 
processes. Peace will not automatically flow from economic measures or technocratic policies 
aiming at strengthening the state.  On the contrary, peacebuilding is a political process in 
which a struggle is fought over what the state should be and should do, over the nature of 
society and the citizens that compose it, and over the economic structure. 
At the centre of Gramsci’s theory of hegemony lies the concept of historical bloc.  I 
argue that peace processes and the struggles that are an integral part of their dynamics can 
be considered as attempts to constitute new and alternative historical blocs.  For Gramsci, 
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“structures and superstructures form an ‘historical bloc’.  That is to say ‘the complex, 
contradictory and discordant ensemble of the superstructures is the reflection of the 
ensemble of the social relations of production”.156  Gramsci implies here that for the 
domination of a ruling group to be hegemonic, it must rely on both force and consent.  
Gramsci also uses the concept of historical bloc in a second way to refer to relationships 
between social class forces.  As Morton argues (Morton, 2007: 119), the notion of historical 
bloc directs “attention to which social-class forces may have been crucial in the formation of 
a historical bloc or particular state”.157  In this regard, the concept of historical bloc stresses 
the influence and impact of social-class struggles on state formation where states evolve in 
alternative conditions of development.  This is coherent with Gramsci’s concept of the state 
as being constituted by both political society and civil society.  The concept of historical bloc 
also emphasises the potential for resistance to hegemony.  Although the economic structure 
determines the framework of action of individuals, “the political process remains open 
because of the various strategies and courses of action available to social-class forces 
struggling for hegemony”.  This potential for counter-hegemony is related to Gramsci’s 
thinking about the strategies of subaltern classes, analysed later in this chapter. 
The dual and dialectical dimensions of hegemony and power are also reflected in 
Gramsci’s concept of the integral state understood as both political society and civil society, 
which include both the ethical-political and repressive functions of the state, “hegemony 
protected by the armour of coercion”.158  The state is therefore not merely associated with 
the monopoly of legitimate violence.  According to Gramsci, the apparatus of state coercive 
power is constituted “for the whole of society in anticipation of moments of crisis of 
command and direction when spontaneous consent had failed”.159  Gramsci conceives of the 
state as one point within a web of social relations of power, embedded within political and 
civil society, while being at the same time a “concrete form of a productive world”.160  This 
leads Gramsci to affirm that civil society and the state are one and the same,161 by which he 
means that civil society and its private associations constitute ‘the hegemonic apparatus of 
one social group over the rest of the population (or civil society): the basis for the State in the 
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narrow sense of the governmental-coercive apparatus’.162  Gramsci also shows how the ruling 
class asserts its hegemony through the private organisms of civil society: ‘The State does have 
and request consent, but it also ‘educates’ this consent, by means of the political and 
synodical associations; these, however, are private organisms, left to the private initiative of 
the ruling class’.163  But the hegemony of a ruling groups depends in the last instance on the 
economic structure.164 
Such a conception of the state shows how state power operates within the “ensemble 
of social relations”165, and moves away from traditional perspectives on state institutions as 
the locus of such power.  According to Short, “The notion of ‘state power’ is thus related to 
the nature of the relationship between the dominant or ruling elements of the ‘ensemble of 
social relations’ and the subaltern elements, a question of political subjectivity and 
legitimacy.’166  Such a conception of the state has also been used by a very interesting strand 
of Colombian academic literature in order to analyse the relationships between the armed 
conflict and state formation.167  This is useful to address what Gonzalez has identified as one 
of the main difficulties for the understanding of the armed conflict in Colombia.  He argues 
that the vast majority of the conceptual categories available for political analyses tend to 
dilute politics into the state and to establish a sharp separation between state and society.168  
My contention is that Gramsci’s political theory allows me to solve this problem.  
For Gramsci, intellectuals are the key agents in charge of organising social hegemony 
and state domination – consent and coercion – and ensuring the cohesion of the social whole, 
historical blocs, and state power.  The best known of Gramsci’s characterisation of 
intellectuals is his distinction between organic and traditional intellectuals.  The term organic 
refers to the fact that intellectuals or the ideologies they diffuse have the specific functions 
of ensuring the homogeneity between structure and superstructures on one hand, and 
organising human masses and the terrain on which they move on the other.  But it also refers 
to the fact that organic intellectuals are organically linked to a particular social group.  In other 
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words, they directly emerge from this group and ‘give it homogeneity and an awareness of its 
own function, not only in the economic but also in the social and political field’.169  By 
traditional intellectuals, Gramsci refers to intellectuals who emerged out of past economic 
structures and seem to ‘represent an historical continuity uninterrupted even by the most 
complicated and radical changes in political and social forms’.  Priests, teachers, clerks, or 
men of letters fall within this category.170  This apparent neutrality or autonomy of traditional 
intellectuals is, however, a “social utopia”, because they also have a social-political function 
within society.171 
Probably more important than the distinction between traditional and organic 
intellectuals is Gramsci’s insistence on this very social-political function of intellectuals, be 
they organic or traditional.172  In this regard, the relationship between intellectuals and the 
economic structure is not as direct as it is between a particular social group and the current 
social relations of production.  This relationship is “in varying degrees, ‘mediated’ by the 
whole fabric of society and by the complex of superstructures”173.  Gramsci therefore argues 
that intellectuals are the “functionaries” of these superstructures.174  This point is critical to 
understanding the function of intellectuals regarding the hegemony of a particular social 
group.  Intellectuals are “the organisers of society”.175  They organise the “social hegemony 
and state domination”176  of the ruling class, in the sense that they ensure coherency and 
cohesion between economic-corporate interests and superstructures.  They are therefore 
connected to the formation of hegemony or counter-hegemony by social class forces in their 
attempts to maintain a specific social order or create an alternative order.  In this regard, 
intellectuals are necessary for the maintenance of a specific mode of production and for the 
social foundation of the hegemony of the ruling class.  They have a crucial role in the making 
of historical blocs.  Chapter 4 addresses this theme in more detail.  
From the organising social-political function of intellectuals, Gramsci reaches two 
conclusions.  He first refutes the existence of socially and politically neutral intellectuals.  This 
is something we should keep in mind in the analysis of social movements: “There does not 
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exist any independent class of intellectuals, but every social group has its own stratum of 
intellectuals, or tends to form one”.177  In other words, intellectuals are not an autonomous 
and independent social group.178  Second, Gramsci insists that this social-political function, 
and therefore the distinction between intellectuals and non-intellectuals, is not defined by 
the “intrinsic nature of intellectual activities”, but by “the ensemble of the system of relations 
in which these activities (and therefore the intellectual groups who personify them) have their 
place within the general complex of social relations”.179  This means that seemingly non-
intellectuals in the sense of the term might qualify as intellectuals for Gramsci, such as a 
worker, an entrepreneur, or a state official.180  Gramsci thus argues:  
All men are intellectuals, one could therefore say: but not all men have in society the function of 
intellectuals. When one distinguishes between intellectuals and non-intellectuals, one is referring in 
reality only to the immediate social function of the professional category of the intellectuals, that is, 
one has in mind the direction in which their specific professional activity is weighted, whether towards 
intellectual elaboration or towards muscular-nervous effort.181 
In relation to counter-hegemonic struggles, the need to create “a new stratum of 
intellectuals consists therefore in the critical elaboration of the intellectual activity that exists 
in everyone at a certain degree of development”.182  This same intellectual activity, itself part 
of a general practical activity, has to be oriented towards “a new equilibrium” in order to 
become “the foundation of a new and integral conception of the world”.183  The activities of 
organic intellectuals are therefore intimately linked to the rise in consciousness of a particular 
social group, in that these intellectuals are key to the organisation of the latter as they 
establish a link between theory and practice.184 
Finally, Gramsci stresses the importance, for any social group that wishes to counter 
the hegemony of another social group, of getting the support of the traditional intellectuals: 
“One of the most important characteristics of any group that is developing towards 
dominance is its struggle to assimilate and to conquer ‘ideologically’ the traditional 
intellectuals.”185  However Gramsci argues that “this assimilation and conquest is made 
quicker and more efficacious the more the group in question succeeds in simultaneously 
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elaborating its own organic intellectuals”.186  The extent to which peasant communities 
manage to develop their own organic intellectuals is key to their success. 
To conclude this section, it is important to say a few words on structural and agential 
aspects of hegemony, as peasant communities are not only resisting concrete political and 
economic projects but also the structural conditions imposed on them by armed conflict and 
neoliberalism.  Joseph draws attention to the importance of considering both the conditions 
in which hegemony emerges and operates on one hand, and its materiality on the other.  A 
theory of hegemony must therefore look at the agential dimension of hegemonic struggles, 
but it must also locate this struggle within concrete social structures.187  The structural aspect 
of hegemony is concerned with social reproduction of structures, whereas the agential 
dimension represents conscious hegemonic projects and strategies.188  In other words, the 
outcome of social and political struggles is not only determined by the relationship between 
dominant and subaltern groups, but by the social structures in which these struggles take 
place.  This points to ways in which structures and agents interact and mutually constitute 
each other.  Agents do not consciously create structures but contribute to their 
transformation and reproduction, while structures condition the strategies available to 
agents.189  It is to these strategies that I now turn. 
The potential for change: war of position and war of manoeuvre 
Gramsci’s ideas are also useful to think about local actors’ strategies in the context of civil 
armed conflict. His concepts of war of position and war of manoeuvre are relevant for the 
analysis of counter-hegemonic and anti-passive revolution movements.  They draw our 
attention to the dynamics of political struggles taking place within conditions of hegemony or 
passive revolution, and to the strategies employed within these struggles as well, while linking 
at the same time these dynamics and strategies to the political structures in which these 
struggles take place.  For Burgos, Gramsci offers a theory of social transformation whose logic 
is the construction of new centres of power within society.190 He provides us with a useful 
alternative to theories of revolution understood as a simple assault on the ruling class’s 
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power.  Instead, revolution is conceived as the slow conquest of centres of power and 
influence within civil society to gain predominance over political society. 
Gramsci first developed the concept of war of position with the aim of designing an 
adequate strategy for the Communist party within modern European states.  This is done 
based on a distinction between the nature of the state or political power in the East, where 
the war of manoeuvre was successfully applied in 1917 in Russia, and in the West where a 
war of position was the only form possible and “where the social structures were of 
themselves still capable of becoming heavily-armed fortifications”:191  
The fundamental task was a national one; that is to say it required a reconnaissance of the terrain and 
identification of the elements of trench and fortress represented by the elements of civil society, etc.  
In the East the State was everything, civil society was primordial and gelatinous; in the West, there was 
a proper relation between State and civil society, and when the State trembled a sturdy structure of 
civil society was at once revealed.  The State was only an outer ditch, behind which there stood a 
powerful system of fortress and earthworks.192  
According to Gramsci, the need for more complex and long-term strategies, in other words 
the need for a war of position, is then required to confront modern states:  
The massive structures of the modern democracies, both as State organisations, and as complexes of 
associations in civil society, constitute for the art of politics as it were the ‘trenches’ and the permanent 
fortifications of the front in the war of position: they render merely ‘partial’ the element of movement 
which before used to be ‘the whole’ of war, etc.193 
The existence of civil society and the predominance of the moment of consent over the 
moment of force are then necessary conditions for the success of a war of position.194  
Therefore, the concept of war of position is considered by Gramsci to be the decisive moment 
in politics.  It corresponds to the moment of consent and is being fought on the terrain of civil 
society or hegemony.195 
To determine whether the explanatory power of the concept of war of position can 
be extended to contexts of civil wars, it is necessary to remind, as I have already mentioned, 
the theoretical basis of the concept of war of position.  The latter indeed finds its origin in an 
analysis of the nature of state power and the political power by which the dominance of the 
ruling class is assured.  This is the nature of political power which ensures the possibility for a 
war of position to be successful.  My analysis therefore needs to show the extent to which 
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the Colombian state can be considered a modern state.  In addition, the realm of politics is of 
crucial importance and is the decisive one, over military dynamics: “Politics, here too, must 
have priority over its military aspects and only politics creates the possibility for manoeuvre 
and movement”.196  From these two theoretical assumptions on which the concept of war of 
position is based – namely, the superiority of the realm of politics and the nature of state and 
political power – it is possible to deduce that a war of position is possible in so far as the 
political process remains open and provides different opportunity to the subaltern groups to 
conduct a counter-hegemonic struggle.  In a similar vein, if subaltern groups are to have a 
chance to win their struggle, they must conduct it on the very terrain which ensures the 
dominance of the ruling class and the power of the state.  In Colombia, this terrain 
corresponds to the struggle over land.  Therefore peasant communities’ strategies have such 
an important spatial dimension and aim at asserting their control over a given territory 
(Chapter 4).  Gramsci has also developed concepts to think about how ruling groups maintain 
their domination over subaltern groups and counter the latter’s strategies.  These are the 
concepts of passive revolution, transformism, and Ceasarism. 
The dialectic of reproduction and transformation: passive revolution, transformism, 
and Ceasarism 
The concept of passive revolution is one of the key concepts used by Gramsci to analyse social 
and political change in conditions of uneven development.197  In this regard, it can be 
adequately applied to countries located at the periphery of the capitalist system.  Gramsci 
himself argues that ‘the concept of passive revolution (…) applies not only to Italy but also to 
those countries that modernise the state through a series of reforms or national wars without 
undergoing a political revolution of a radical Jacobin-type’.198  I argue that the concept of 
passive revolution is useful for the analysis of peacebuilding and statebuilding/formation 
processes.  First of all, this concept frames political and social relations in terms of dialectic 
processes of revolution/restoration and points to the interaction between movements from 
below and movements from above.199  Second, it is relevant for the understanding of the role 
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of the state within capitalist societies, to create and sustain conditions for the accumulation 
of capital. Third, it frames the resistance of local actors not only within the dynamics of the 
armed conflict but also in the longue durée of the state formation process and the 
reproduction of capitalist social relations.  Finally, it focuses on the transitional state.  Passive 
revolution becomes a potential tendency intrinsic to every transitional process.  It therefore 
offers a theory of social change. 
The concept of passive revolution refers to processes of revolution coming from 
above, generally through state intervention. The inclusion of subaltern groups demands 
under the domination of the ruling group but without awarding a real control over politics to 
these subaltern groups.200   When the state is leading and assuming the function and position 
of dominant groups, we deal with what Gramsci terms a “’Piedmont’ type function in passive 
revolutions”.  This refers to  
[…] the fact that a State replaces the local social groups in leading a struggle of renewal.  It is one of the 
cases in which these groups have the function of “domination” without that of “leadership”: 
dictatorship without hegemony.  The hegemony will be exercised by a part of the social group over the 
entire group, and not by the latter over other forces in order to give power to the movement, radicalise 
it, etc. on the “Jacobin” model.201  
Change happens through small transformations which progressively contribute to bringing 
about a new political order.202  We deal with a situation of passive revolution when the 
dominant political force manages to integrate and even absorb the opponents’ interests and 
claims to render them harmless for the system and structures.  A new political order or state 
is established that suits the capitalist mode of production and social relations and does not 
affect profits made by owners of the means of production and capital.  As Gramsci argues 
about the emergence of fascism in Italy,  
There is a passive revolution involved in the fact that – through the legislative intervention of the State, 
and by means of the corporative organisation – relatively far-reaching modifications are being 
introduced into the country’s economic structure in order to accentuate the “plan of production” 
element; in other words, that socialisation and co-operation in the sphere of production are being 
increased, without however touching (or at least not going beyond the regulation and control of) 
individual and group appropriation of profit.203 
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In this regard, it should be observed that although the concept of passive revolution may refer 
to a revolution from above without mass participation, it is also linked to popular mobilisation 
from below in a second sense.  According to Gramsci, it refers to  
The fact that ‘progress’ occurs as the reaction of the dominant classes to the sporadic and incoherent 
rebelliousness of the popular masses – a reaction consisting of ‘restorations’ that agree to some part of 
the popular demands and are therefore ‘progressive restorations’, or ‘revolution-restorations’, or even 
‘passive revolutions.204 
Gramsci illustrates this second sense when he describes the Risorgimento and other historical 
periods as passive revolution in contrast to the way the French Revolution managed to 
establish a new political and social order in a Jacobin-Napoleonic manner, when force 
prevailed.205  
The passive aspect of passive revolutions consists in co-opting, cutting, or channelling 
the revolutionary potential of subaltern groups and popular initiatives.  According to 
Showstack Sassoon’s interpretation of passive revolution,  
The acceptance of certain demands from below at the same time encouraging the working class to 
restrict its struggle to the economic-corporate terrain is part of this attempt to prevent the hegemony 
of the dominant class from being challenged at the same time as changes in the world of production are 
accommodated within the current social formation.206  
Showstack Sassoon furthermore states that “when the bourgeoisie is ascendant, the ‘passive’ 
aspect of its political revolution has to do with the molecular transformation of the old 
traditional classes and any relatively more progressive ones.” For her, “the revolution consists 
in the establishment of a new State, or a political superstructure generally suited to the 
eventual dominance of the capitalist mode of production”.207  Passive revolution is in this 
sense a technique employed by the ruling class when its hegemony is threatened or in 
contexts where there was no hegemonic domination.  Modifications to the social, economic, 
and political system are introduced in a situation of “domination without that of ‘leadership’: 
dictatorship without hegemony”.208 
Gramsci's concept of passive revolution avoids falling into the trap of structural 
functionalism and gives the possibility to account for social change and power struggles.  The 
dialectic character of passive revolution presupposes the existence of a “vigorous antithesis 
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which can present intransigently all the potentialities for development”.209  This puts the 
emphasis on the contradictions of revolution/restoration and the role of subaltern groups in 
shaping the content and form of social relations, the state, and the material conditions 
underlying the latter.  The concept of passive revolution applied to countries undergoing 
peacebuilding transitions therefore allows us to point to the dynamics of 
revolution/restoration that characterise peace and statebuilding processes.  On the other 
hand, the concept of passive revolution can also be considered as a theory of the survival and 
reorganisation of state identity through which social relations are reproduced in new forms 
consonant with capitalist property relations.210  The Colombian president’s strategy can be 
interpreted in such a way, as is shown in the last chapter of this thesis.  However, in line with 
Callinincos’s critique of the concept of passive revolution,211 we should not fall into the trap 
of overstretching this concept and characterise any kind of restructuring process as passive 
revolution.  Passive revolution should indeed only be applied to processes through which 
systemic transformations are achieved through non-revolutionary means.  This is the only 
way to avoid the risk of overstretching the concept, which would then just become “another 
way of referring to the dynamism and flexibility of capitalism”.212  In the case of Colombia, 
revolutionary outbreaks or progressive demands have always been kept in check.  This refers 
to the second sense in which Gramsci uses passive revolution in which the state incorporates 
subaltern groups’ progressive or even revolutionary demands into a conservative project of 
restoration.  The peacebuilding process in Colombia is part of such a conservative project 
combining elements of reform and restoration together, which envisages systemic changes 
regarding land ownership.  While former president Alvaro Uribe Velez put the emphasis on 
the use of coercion, current president Juan Manual Santos continues this project through 
consensual means in order to achieve a full hegemony.  
Trasformismo is the second of the three historical forms corresponding to processes 
of revolution-restoration. It broadly refers to the absorption of opposition forces within the 
leading political party in power, and the suppression of differences and contradiction 
between them.  The government “set itself above and over the parties” leading to the 
disintegration of “their interests and activities within the permanent framework of the life 
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and interests of the nation and State”, and to a rupture of the bound between parties and the 
‘broad masses’.213  The first element of trasformismo is a process of “molecular changes which 
in fact progressively modify the pre-existing composition of forces, and hence become the 
matrix of new changes”.214  This refers to the incorporation of “individual political figures” 
belonging to the opposition or resistance into the governmental forces.  The second element 
of trasformismo happens at the collective level of political parties, when entire groups of an 
opposition party pass over to the leading political party.215  Such strategies of trasformismo 
are common in Colombia, through attempts to co-opt leaders of peasant communities and to 
divide resistance movements.  Also, an important number of former leftist figures, even 
guerrilla members, now support conservative forces such as paramilitary groups or right-wing 
political parties.  
Finally, the last moment symbolising a dynamic of revolution-restoration is defined by 
Gramsci as Caesarism.  Such a phenomenon occurs when none of the competing political 
forces is in a position to defeat the other.  Instead, their struggle and the equilibrium of forces 
in which they find themselves lead towards catastrophe and then mutual destruction.  This is 
when another force, usually but not necessarily a “great ‘heroic’ personality”, intervenes to 
resolve the stalemate and arbitrate the struggle.  Caesarism may be both reactionary or 
progressive, and political analysis needs to weigh which one of these elements predominates.  
What is relevant for my purpose in Gramsci’s concept of Caesarism is the way in which he 
relates the mechanism of the Caesarist phenomenon, i.e., force and coercion, to the stage of 
development of a given country.  Within modern societies, police mechanisms prevail, 
whereas within pre-modern societies, the military use of force predominates: “modern 
Caesarism is more a police than a military system”.216  This echoes Gramsci’s analyses about 
the relevance of wars of position and wars of manoeuvre in different contexts, and my 
reflections of these two strategies within violent settings.  This distinction between modern 
and pre-modern does not have to be necessarily understood in a temporal sense.  Power is 
uneven, as are the structures within which hegemonic struggles take place.  In Colombia, in a 
context of armed conflict, the military use of force prevails in rural areas, whereas the police 
of society predominate in more urban areas.  This can be observed after the failed peace 
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process between President Andres Pastrana and the FARC in 2002.  A Caesarist solution 
occurred when Alvaro Uribe Velez won the elections, putting an end to the stalemate in which 
the FARC and the government found themselves, and resorted to the use of military force 
against the FARC in the countryside, whereas police forces remained predominant within 
cities.  
Gramsci developed the concept of hegemony and its associated concepts through an 
analysis of the history of state formation in Italy but also Europe in general.  I have already 
established some parallels regarding the relevance of Gramsci’s concepts for the Colombian 
context.  However, it is legitimate to ask whether the application of Gramsci’s political theory 
to a contemporary context of armed conflict in Latin America does not lead to overstretching 
the explanatory power of these concepts.  This is this question and problem now addressed.  
Gramsci’s relevance for the study of war-torn societies 
So far, the use of Gramsci within International Relations has been confined to the sub-
discipline of International Political Economy (IPE), thanks to Cox’s influential articles and 
monographs and the Italian school.217  Nevertheless, recent debates have on the one hand 
called for a move away from state centrism and the application of Gramsci to traditional IPE 
themes and concerns, while others have advocated for the application of Gramsci’s concepts 
to other, unexplored IR fields, such as conflict studies.218  However, I do not think that this 
should be done by looking at post-modern strands of political theory and cultural studies, as 
Worth argues.219  By taking the concept of hegemony and its associated concepts to a context 
of civil war, I move away from the traditional uses of the concept in cultural studies or IPE.  
First, cultural studies tended to focus on modern societies and privileged a more liberal 
reading of Gramsci that did not consider the fundamentally Marxist ideas and politics held 
and promoted by Gramsci himself.  My empirical subject, civil resistance in contexts of armed 
conflict, draws attention to the role of violence and non-violence within hegemonic struggles, 
and within the formation of hegemonic projects and the making of historical blocs.  It also 
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reminds us that violence is an inevitable tool used by dominant groups and the state to coerce 
dominated groups, especially where there is a hegemonic crisis and where the dominance of 
one group over the others relies heavily on coercion.  In this regard, nowhere is the extent to 
which neoliberalism, the state, and its institutions continue to depend on violence more 
visible than in peripheral developing countries and war-torn societies, to which Colombia 
belongs.  This fact seems to have been forgotten within developed countries, although the 
resistance movements born out of the 2008 economic crisis in continental Europe and the 
United States have directly experienced state violence over the past few years.  In addition, 
within civil wars the fact that political struggles always have a military substratum appears 
clearly, as does the use of violence to coerce groups that do not consent and ensure control 
over a territory.  As Gramsci deployed his concepts in contexts where the state monopoly on 
legal violence was established, even if not entirely consolidated, reflection on the explanatory 
power and limits of the application of Gramsci’s concepts to violent settings is therefore 
required. 
Second, IPE studies were concerned with how hegemony operates at the level of 
world orders and contributes to the formation of a transnational capitalist class.  Here, my 
focus is on the national sphere, although external intervention does play a role in shaping and 
influencing the structures and form of hegemony and the strategies available to actors at 
national level.  Peasant communities appeal to international solidarity.  They are supported 
by international organisations, which in turn engage in dialogue and pressure the Colombian 
state to respect human rights norms and international laws.  It is necessary to reflect on how 
this international support and these international norms fit within the formation of 
alternative historical blocs at national level, especially in the case of the CdPSJA, which heavily 
relies on actors and norms on an international scale in order to strengthen its autonomy.  The 
resort to violence and coercion by the Colombian state is also conditioned by this 
international pressure, as are the actions of paramilitary groups.  The FARC also benefits from 
international support, albeit covert, and ideas and norms promoted at international level 
have an impact on its behaviour, if the political cost of not respecting them is too high.  Finally, 
the international dimension of the conflict cannot be overlooked.  Therefore, close attention 
must be paid to how to account for and explain international intervention from a Gramscian 
perspective.  But these two issues depend on a broader debate about the epistemological 




countries.  I will start by discussing this debate before looking more closely at violence and 
international intervention.  
Gramsci and the North/South question 
Several studies have already applied Gramsci’s political theory to a Latin American context 
and argued that it is possible to build on Gramsci’s reflections on European “late” developing 
countries such as Italy, Spain, or Portugal, and on his analysis of North/South relations in the 
Mezzogiorno (Southern Italy).  Morton argues that Gramsci’s thought is relevant to the study 
of what we might term today as developing countries and North/South issues.  According to 
Morton, the concerns expressed by Gramsci about processes of hegemony and passive 
revolution and his awareness of processes of capitalism and uneven development linked to 
the failure of state formation and hegemony in Italy represent a relevant starting point to the 
study of processes of state formation elsewhere in the world.220  In a similar vein, Munck 
argues that the struggle for hegemony is key to an understanding of development in Latin 
American countries.221  He adds that Gramsci provides us with a useful set of concepts to 
deconstruct “the hegemonic imaginary of neoliberalism and to construct a counter-
hegemonic culture”.  For that, his work “needs to be grounded in the reality of current popular 
struggles in Latin America and their aspiration to create a world beyond neoliberalism”.222  
Finally, Short argues that Gramsci speaks to a non-European context thanks to his emphasis 
on difference and on how this difference can be made into a coherent social whole, forming 
a historical bloc that will ensure the hegemony of a dominant social group.223  In this regard, 
the use of Gramsci’s thought not only gives me the opportunity to break with Western-
centred conceptions of politics in general, but also with Western-centred analysis of war-torn 
societies in particular, and the peacebuilding and statebuilding policies targeting these same 
societies. 
The question of whether Gramsci’s concepts can be applied to different contexts and 
problems than those which pre-occupied Gramsci himself is not new and has usually been 
addressed on the basis of Gramsci’s essay entitled Some Aspects of the Southern Question, in 
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which he appreciates the need for autonomous peasant politics and subjectivity.224  However, 
before writing this essay, Gramsci was already concerned with what he perceives as the 
“central problem of national life in Italy – the Southern problem”,225 and he deals extensively 
with issues related to the relationships between the industrial north and the rural south, 
between workers and peasants, and peasant mentalities in his pre-prison writings.  Three 
themes emerge from his writings on the Southern question, which are directly relevant to my 
focus on peasant communities within a developing country: the need for an alliance between 
peasants and workers and the leading role of the proletariat within such an alliance; the 
relationship between cities and the countryside and the agrarian question as crucial factors 
for understanding the state formation process in Italy; and peasants’ consciousness and 
mentalities, and the need to overcome the lack of social cohesion within the ideological field. 
In an essay on workers and peasants published in L’Ordine Nuovo in August 1919, 
Gramsci argues that the First World War brought about changes in peasant mentalities that 
the embryonic capitalist system failed to do.  He affirms that a feudal mentality still survives 
in countries that “are still backward in capitalist terms”226.  For this reason, economic and 
political institutions are seen as natural, perpetual, irreducible categories, and not as 
historical categories.  The idea of the modern liberal-capitalist state is unknown and the state 
actually contributes to the reproduction of this feudal mentality.  For Gramsci, this is why 
peasants cannot think of themselves as a class or part of a bigger whole.  Therefore, they 
cannot have the capacity to challenge the broader structures of their domination.227   
Peasants could not see further than their individual situation and give a “centralized 
expression to their aspirations and needs”.228  They also only engaged in limited defensive 
actions of relations against landowners that did not have any long-term impact.  Peasant 
consciousness was “dependent upon the social conditions created by the democratic-
parliamentary State”.229  In his essay on the Southern question, Gramsci further emphasises 
the social disintegration and lack of cohesion that characterise the South and the peasant 
masses.  Big landowners and intellectuals dominate the South, and the ideological sphere is 
the most important field of this centralisation.  For Gramsci, this ideological sphere, 
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dominated by the conservative Southern intellectuals, is key to the maintenance of the bound 
between peasants and big landowners.  The former were bound to the latter through the 
mediation of intellectuals.  An agrarian bloc liaising with Northern capitalism and preserving 
the status quo was created in the South, and the Southern intellectuals, whose loyalties 
resided not with the peasants but with national and European societies, were instrumental in 
ensuring its cohesion.  One of the keys to the success of the alliance between workers and 
peasants is the formation of organic intellectuals bound to the proletariat, in order to break 
with the agrarian bloc supported by Southern intellectuals and to organise peasant masses 
into autonomous and independent formations.230  The First World War brought significant 
changes to social disintegration of the South.  It provided peasants with an organic conception 
of class struggle and the discipline needed to reconstruct the state after the capitalist 
catastrophe.  It is possible to draw a parallel between Gramsci’s analysis and the role of 
violence and the impact of armed conflict on peasant masses in Colombia, which contributed 
to the emergence of a peasant consciousness including the experiences, culture, and interests 
of peasants, and ensuring their cohesion with the help of organic intellectuals (Chapter 3).  
Gramsci’s emphasis on the role of intellectuals in the preservation of the status quo, and also 
on their potential to break with conservative ideologies, is crucial to the understanding of the 
creation and survival of peasant communities.  In all three empirical chapters that follow, I 
will point to the different layers of intellectuals involved either in a negative or a positive way 
with peasant communities, and stress their origins and functions in relation to both peasant 
communities and other actors.  These intellectuals have a key role regarding the emergence 
of a new peasant consciousness (Chapter 3), peasant communities’ strategies to protect their 
territory (Chapter 4), and the formation of alternative historical blocs (Chapter 5). 
Gramsci identifies factory workers and peasants as “the two driving forces of the 
proletarian revolution” and the “backbone of the revolution”.231  However, the former would 
have to be the leading force.  Gramsci argues that peasants, if left by themselves, would not 
be able to organise and wage a revolution.  The mass of peasants has to be organised, and 
the new psychology that emerged out of the War has to be channelled and directed towards 
the accomplishment of a concrete historical goal.232  These themes come back in several 
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articles.  Solidarity between peasants and workers is key to the resolution of the Southern 
problem, and eventually to the problem of political power at a national level: “only the 
working class, by seizing political and economic power from the hands of the bankers and 
capitalist, is in a position to resolve the central problem of national life in Italy – the Southern 
problem”.233  Gramsci emphasised the leading role of the working class, but he is aware that 
such a solution needed the support of the peasantry.  Collaboration between peasants and 
workers is fundamental in that “the working class is the most politically educated section of 
the whole of the working people; it must confront the problem of force and realize that it can 
be largely resolved by the actions of the peasant masses”.234  Peasants would prepare the 
ground for a frontal assault of the workers against the state.  They are “the principal actors in 
the pre-revolutionary action”, Gramsci affirms.235  In fact,  
The workers’ emancipation can be secured only through an alliance between the industrial workers of 
the North and the poor peasants of the South – an alliance designed to smash the bourgeois State; 
found the workers’ and peasants’ State; and construct a new apparatus of industrial production that 
will serve the needs of agriculture, serve to industrialize the backward agriculture of Italy and hence 
raise the level of the national produce to the benefit of the working masses.236 
This theme is further explored in Gramsci’s essay on the Southern question, where he 
emphasises the key role of class alliances and argues that revolutionary action should be 
conducted jointly by workers and peasants under the leadership of the industrial proletariat 
(Gramsci, 1978). Leading, in this case, means “making these two questions [the Southern 
question and that of the Vatican] its own from the  social point of view; understanding the 
class demands which they represent; incorporating these demands into its revolutionary 
transitional programme; placing these demands among the objectives for which it 
struggles”.237  This view on the Southern question is interesting in that it problematises the 
question of the autonomy of the peasantry in relation to class alliances, the role of 
intellectuals, and the structures and hegemonic projects of the capitalist class.   
Gramsci also points to the difficulties of uniting peasant masses and creating peasant 
parties.  Achieving this unity requires a “dialectical relation” between “spontaneous” peasant 
impulses and the activities of intellectuals situating themselves “on a new basis of concrete 
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pro-peasant policies”.238  Such a dialectical relationship between intellectuals and peasants 
can be observed in the creation and continuing existence of peasant communities.  I will pay 
attention to the articulation between the interests and objectives of intellectuals – such as 
church members; NGO workers, both national and international; national politicians; and 
academics – and peasant communities, and how this contributes to the formation of an 
alternative historical bloc based on rural issues and themes (Chapter 4).   
The alliance between workers and peasants relates to the town-countryside 
relationship and the importance of the agrarian question.  Gramsci deals with these questions 
in the context of the Risorgimiento (i.e., Italian unification) and relates them to the Italian 
state formation process and its national structure.  According to Gramsci, the North/South 
opposition during the Risorgimiento reflects an opposition between cities and countryside.  
There was no organic relationship between countryside and cities, separated by very distinct 
civil and cultural traditions.  Gramsci pays attention to cultural conceptions and mental 
attitudes, to the structure and origin of intellectuals, and their reflection in the political 
programmes of national political parties.239  Some of Gramsci’s core concepts come into play 
in his analysis of the relationships between North and South and the formation of Italian unity.  
He stresses the mix of coercion and consent used by the democratic liberals, representing the 
northern urban bloc, opposed to the Southern rural bloc of the Mezzogiorno, in order to 
discipline and channel the discontent of peasants; he highlights the importance of leadership, 
of the North over the South, and the lack of leadership of peasant masses. He also points to 
the role of intellectuals in ensuring the cohesion of a given bloc.240  Gramsci’s analysis in fact 
points to the importance of framing peasant communities’ struggles within the broader 
context of the Colombian state formation process. 
Finally, Gramsci points to the role that cultural ideas and beliefs play in explaining the 
backwardness and lack of development of the South.  According to the bourgeois ideology, 
the latter is blamed on the “organic incapacity”241 of the peasants of the South and their 
racial, biological inferiority.  Cultural ideas are used to hide the fact that inequalities between 
North and South actually lie in economic and political conditions.242  The problems of the 
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South are perceived as local problems, not as national problems.  In his essay about the 
Southern question, Gramsci argues that even the Northern proletariat has adopted this view, 
and that its modification is part of the solution to the Southern problem.  Gramsci affirms that 
“in order to win the trust and consent of the peasants and of some semiproletarian urban 
categories”, workers must  
…overcome certain prejudices and conquer certain forms of egoism which can and do subsist within the 
working class as such, even when craft particularism has disappeared […] They must think as workers 
who are members of a class which aims to lead the peasants and intellectuals. Of a class which can win 
and build socialism only if it is aided and followed by the great majority of these social strata. If this is 
not achieved, the proletariat does not become the leading class; and these strata (which in Italy 
represent the majority of the population), remaining under bourgeois leadership, enable the State to 
resist the proletarian assault and wear it down.243   
As I will later show, in the Colombian case, a similar rhetoric can be observed in the discourse 
of Colombian ruling elites regarding peasants, although the social structures and nature of 
exploitation in rural and agricultural society differed from the one on which Gramsci bases his 
analysis.  This rhetoric is based on cultural ideas and beliefs that hide and justify the 
exploitation and domination of landless peasants by large landowners.  This discourse, 
relayed by government officials, economic associations and unions organically linked to large 
landowners, and conservative intellectuals, pervades Colombian society and its urban 
population, contributing to an anti-peasant bias that portrays peasants as pre-modern, 
backward, opposing development, and, not least, collaborators or members of the 
guerrillas.244  I will draw attention to the relationship between cultural and material factors 
linked to the domination of peasants in my analysis of how peasant communities break and 
challenge this anti-peasant bias (Chapter 2).  
The conflict between global and local dynamics is often portrayed in terms of ethnicity 
or race within the civil war literature.  However, through its emphasis on class struggle and 
uneven development, a focus on Gramsci seems to be more adequate to Latin America’s 
dynamics, even though class solidarities and other collective identities are often interrelated.  
For instance, in Colombia, local resistance is principally led by indigenous, peasants, and Afro-
Colombian people.  I argue that local peace initiatives are better understood as resistance to 
forms of class domination and violence based on material modes of production.  This places 
the use of land and the exploitation of natural resources at the centre of this struggle between 
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subaltern groups and ruling elites.  Identities play an important role, but I argue that the 
underlying problem and structural dynamics affecting diverse ethnic groups in Colombia, such 
as Afro-Colombian and indigenous people, are the same as those affecting the peasant 
population.  In addition, all these identities share a common adherence to a mode of 
production based on subsistence and the respect of natural resources.  Finally, whilst the local 
resistance represented by peasant-led peace initiatives must be linked to national and local 
violence caused by the armed conflict, it also represents an opposition to external 
intervention linked to a capitalist mode of production and the political actors associated with 
the latter.  I will now address the implication of using Gramsci’s concepts in violent settings 
where external interventions do play a considerable role. 
“Weak states”, civil wars, and organic crises 
War-torn societies are located at the intersection between global dynamics led by the 
capitalist mode of production and exploitation, national dynamics and local dynamics of 
violence fuelled by historical modes of political, and social and economic domination 
inherited from the colonial period.  Against the literature on weak states, I argue that the use 
of a Gramscian framework of analysis is better suited to the analysis of civil armed conflicts.  
By moving away from institutional perspectives that emphasise state functions and the failure 
to ensure the monopoly on the use of violence, a Gramscian perspective points to the social 
basis of states and to the lack of hegemony.  Gramsci, in this sense, can be considered as a 
historian of ‘the instability of weak states (…) that unify comparatively late (…) and do so on 
the basis of poorly constructed foundations’.245  To develop this argument, I introduce the 
concept of organic crisis. 
Gramsci usually associates the term ‘organic’ with many different words.  For instance, 
he talks of the ‘organic quality’ of intellectuals246 and of ‘historically organic ideologies’.247  In 
these contexts, the term organic refers to the fact that intellectuals or ideologies have the 
specific functions of ensuring the homogeneity between structure and superstructures, of 
organising human masses and the terrain on which they move.  They are therefore connected 
to the formation of hegemony or counter-hegemony by social class forces in their attempts 
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to maintain a specific social order or create an alternative order.  In this regard, they are 
necessary for the maintenance of a specific mode of production and for the social basis of the 
hegemony of the ruling class.  But Gramsci also uses the term ‘organic crisis’ to describe a 
crisis of hegemony, or a general crisis of the State.248  A crisis of hegemony refers to these 
historical situations of conflicts between rulers and ruled, when subaltern classes no longer 
recognise the traditional parties that govern them.  The ruling class has lost its capacity to 
lead and only dominates subaltern classes through coercion, which means that the latter 
‘have become detached from their traditional ideologies, and no longer believe what they 
used to believe previously (…).  The crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and 
the new cannot be born’.249  This could be either because of the ruling class’s failure to assert 
its political leadership, because consent has been forcibly extracted, or because new popular 
demands put forward by subaltern groups have led to a revolution.  These situations usually 
lead to a crisis of the state in general and can trigger violent confrontations.  Only an organic 
solution can put an end to such crises, and this highly depends on the ability and capacity of 
one of the groups in contention to gather the other groups under its sole banner and 
leadership.250  
On this basis, I argue that it is possible to establish a parallel between civil wars and 
Gramsci’s concept of organic crisis.  Together with the concept of the integral state, such 
parallel constitutes a useful alternative to explanations of civil wars based on the greed and 
grievance model.251  Gramsci’s conception of the state as political society and civil society 
emphasises the role and function of private elements of society in conditions of hegemony, 
but also conditions of organic crisis: 
A weakened State structure is like a flagging army; the commandos – i.e. the private armed 
organisations – enter the field, and they have two tasks: to make use of illegal means, while the State 
appears to remain within legality, and thus to reorganise the State itself.252 
Within violent settings, the ethical function of the state tends to be hidden from view, while 
its coercive and repressive function prevails.  As other scholars who have applied Gramsci’s 
political theory to violent contexts explain, this coercive dimension of hegemony is often left 
aside and forgotten.  As Dodge argues ( 2006: 457), for Gramsci, ‘the extended deployment 
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of coercion or the use of conflict by one group to defeat another is used to make sure that 
the conditions exist for hegemony to develop’.253  Dodge shows in the context of post-war 
reconstruction in Iraq and the failure of American policies that ideologies and institutions 
alone are not enough to generate a sufficient level of consent to secure hegemony.  Applied 
at international level, this means ‘a state achieves international hegemony when it manages 
to construct a world system based upon the combination or ‘fit’ of material power, ideological 
domination and institutional stability’. 
 In addition, an emphasis on the concept of organic crisis provides a useful alternative 
to the Weberian conceptual approach that characterises the statebuilding literature and 
emphasises state institutions and functions as key factors of security and development.  By 
placing the political process at the centre of the analysis to explain the crisis of states, a 
Gramscian approach to civil wars moves away from the assumption that the strengthening of 
state institutions and functions is the only prerequisite for peace, security, and development, 
and stresses the need for an organic relationship between the different layers or structures 
of society.  Such an emphasis on coercion is also coherent with recent Colombian studies that 
analyse state formation through the prism of violence and illegality.254  It also problematises 
the autonomy of state institutions and points to the fact that the power of the state lies in 
the social and ideological consensus within which its institutions evolve and in the ability of 
one social group to gain or extract the consent of other groups and institutionalise this power, 
which ultimately relies on force.  Once this social and ideological consensus is broken, 
institutions no longer work.  Dodge has shown in the context of the invasion of Iraq by the 
USA that statebuilding plans that conceive of state institutions and apparatus as empty shells 
or tools that can be inherited and shaped according to a new common sense are doomed to 
fail.255 
It is possible to provide a reading of the crisis of the Colombian state according to the 
concept of organic crisis.  While the ruling elites have managed to assert their domination 
over the dominated groups, they could not develop their leadership on the latter.  Popular 
protests and discontent could be either repressed or channelled through alliances at the 
regional and national level until the mid-1960s.  The failure to address the agrarian question 
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and insert the rural population into a national historical bloc created breaches that illegal 
armed groups took advantage of in order to contest the authority, legitimacy, and sovereignty 
of the state through a war of movement.  This challenge, combined with the failure to 
broaden the social bases of the state and gain the consent of peasants, has put the Colombian 
state on the verge of disintegration.  This, in turn, led to external interventions – in the form 
of various peacebuilding, statebuilding, and development policies, either civil or military – in 
order to ensure the existence of the Colombian state in conformity with neoliberal 
international norms and values.  However, I argue that the solution to the Colombian organic 
crisis and the nature of peace achieved depend on the outcome of political struggles at 
national level rather than on external interventions.  Thus a study of peacebuilding in 
Colombia must take as a starting point local resistance to political power. 
The ‘national point of departure’ and external intervention 
My analysis of local resistance in Colombia takes the resistance of peasant communities as a 
point of departure. I consider this point of departure as nodal in the analysis of wider 
transformations related to the peace process in Colombia.  Within these peasant 
communities, local, national, and global dynamics meet.  Gramsci was a ‘profound national 
political thinker’256 who nevertheless always took into account the interconnection between 
national and international realms.  This perspective suits Latin American political realities, 
whose national political dynamics remain dominant.  While these national realities are 
constrained by international economic and political phenomenon, global conceptual 
approaches usually lack explanatory power when it comes to Latin America.257  Contrary to 
peacebuilding and statebuilding studies which take the international actors, policies, and 
concepts as their starting point to analyse national and local settings, this section, inspired by 
Gramsci's understanding of the relationship between the national and international, argues 
that: 
…the internal relations of any nation are the result of a combination which is ‘original’ and (in a certain 
sense) unique: these relations must be understood and conceived in their originality and uniqueness if 
one wishes to dominate them and direct them.  To be sure, the line of development is towards 
internationalism, but the point of departure is ‘national ‘ – and it is from this point of departure that 
one must begin.  Yet the perspective is international and cannot be otherwise.258  
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In this regard, although my starting point is local responses to armed conflict’s local dynamics 
and the state’s strategies, peasant communities also have to be considered as a form of 
resistance to a domination based on capitalist and neoliberal modes of production linked to 
the global political economy.  This does not challenge the fact that they are first and foremost 
resisting and trying to overcome the violence which keeps the war economy, or ‘systems of 
violence’,259 going.  But under this lens, the peasantry appears as a subaltern class contesting 
illegal armed actors’ violence and domination, the state, and neoliberalism.  I aim to show 
their role in constituting and contesting the social, economic and political orders in which they 
evolve and, eventually, in building peace.  Therefore, the account will describe changes to the 
relations of production and violence that affected peasant-led peace initiatives at national 
level, while embedding them within the global political economy of uneven development.  
Whereas the point of departure is local, the combination of both national and international 
dimensions of peasant communities’ struggles will prove key in order to assess their role in 
challenging political power and bringing about social change.  
Political power and social change 
At first sight, it is hard to understand how non-violence can be successful in armed conflict 
contexts.  However, the experience of peasant communities proves that non-violent 
strategies can be successful within such violent settings.  Theories of non-violent civil 
resistance rest on a particular understanding of power according to which the sources of the 
ruler’s power depend on the obedience and cooperation of the ruled subjects.260  Such an 
understanding departs from conceptions of power as violence or coercion. It has informed 
civil resistance campaigns and practice, and was coherently articulated by Sharp.261  This 
understanding of power has been used so far to explain how civil resistance campaigns were 
able to overthrow dictatorships, put an end to colonisation, or protest non-democratic laws 
within formally democratic institutions and contexts.  However, it has not been applied to 
contexts of civil wars where resistance is exerted not only against actors backed by state 
power but also against illegal armed actors.  Although recent studies have shown that civilian 
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institutions proved to be a critical factor for both explaining and limiting levels of violence,262 
the vast majority of studies of civil resistance campaigns in civil war contexts is either 
descriptive or normative.263 There is reason to believe that local peasant communities have 
had a positive impact on the direct violence they faced, but useful insights could be gained 
from a study of their struggle to build peace and challenge structural violence.  This is where 
Gramsci’s understanding of power proves useful, as it points to the social basis of power and 
articulates both its material and ideational aspects.  Theories of non-violence might be able 
to explain how non-violent strategies contribute to the seizing or overthrowing of political 
power, but Gramsci’s understanding of power goes further.  It is not sufficient to withdraw 
one’s consent and get the agreement of the masses in order to bring about social and political 
change.  It is necessary to rely on coercion and exercise a decisive function within the 
economic structure, and ensure the coherency of structure and superstructures through the 
formation of an alternative historical bloc. 
For Gramsci, social change in modern societies is brought about by taking power, or 
control of the state, through the waging of a war of position.  A given social group rises to 
power both through hegemonic activity within civil society and the formation of alternative 
historical blocs to overcome the economic-corporate stage of its development, and reach a 
universal stage that will assert its hegemony over other subordinate groups by representing 
their interests.  In addition, the hegemony of the ruling group must be based on its decisive 
function within the economic structure.  It is not enough to educate the consent of subaltern 
group.  It is also necessary to build alliances and a hegemonic historical bloc which will unite 
the economic structure with the superstructures.  For Gramsci, any attempt at taking state 
power through a war of positions is pointless if a given social group cannot exercise this 
decisive function within the economic structure.  The logic is different with a strategy of war 
or manoeuvre.  It is possible to take control of the state and then seize by force the means of 
production.  Any attempt by a given social group to change the world without taking power 
or exercising a decisive function in the economy is probably doomed to failure and will end 
up in reformism, passive revolution, or trasformismo.  In the rest of this chapter, I lay the 
ground for the empirical case studies that follow. 
                                                        
262 Kaplan, O. 'Nudging Armed Groups’; Kaplan, O. 'Protecting civilians’; 
263 Alther, G. 'Colombian peace communities’; Anrup, R. and Español, J. 'Una comunidad de paz’; Arbeláez Rudas, M. 
'Comunidades de Paz’; Burnyeat, G. 'On a Peak in Darien’; Comisión Nacional de Reparación y Reconciliación - Grupo de 




From resistance to alternative historical blocs for peace 
Gramsci explains accommodation and how dominant groups establish their hegemony over 
subaltern groups.  But he does that in order to think about how to transform accommodation 
into rebellion,264 even though he does not use the term counter-hegemony. Thinking about 
counter-hegemony, therefore, involves thinking in a Gramscian way265 about how subaltern 
groups can bring about social and political change.  Gramsci’s interest in subaltern groups was 
threefold.  He aimed to develop a methodology for studying subaltern groups, to write their 
history, and to reflect on the development of alternative political strategy of transformation 
based on subaltern groups.266  In this section, I relate these three aspects to peasant 
community initiatives.  Peasant communities’ efforts represent an attempt to break with the 
structures that gave rise to the armed conflict and state violence, and develop a political 
economy that does not contribute to the reproduction of the armed conflict.  They aim to 
create social relations that do not reproduce these structures, but rather transform them with 
the aim of achieving and bringing about peace.  Their practices represent conscious 
hegemonic projects and strategies aimed at challenging the social, political, and economic 
basis of power in Colombia. 
Power, subaltern groups, and counter-hegemony 
In his writings on subaltern groups, Gramsci establishes a link between the political and 
cultural realms of everyday life and struggles for hegemony at the national-popular level.  
Gramsci explains how everyday life and culture can be mobilised to develop a new critical 
consciousness that goes beyond subaltern groups’ local settings and reaches a universal, 
ethico-political stage.  In fact, as Munck argues, ‘the cultural struggle to create an identity is 
inseparable from the struggle for power or access to it’.267  Culture and politics are indeed 
intermingled within peasant communities’ struggle to develop a new common sense, develop 
alternative economies, and present peasants as political subjects entitled with individual and 
collective rights.  These cannot be separated from their struggle for power within Colombian 
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society.  Similarly, peasant communities’ cultural link with their territories and the practices 
they develop within these very territories are closely related to their struggle for power 
(Chapter 3).  
Gramsci’s thought is useful to understand the power of the powerless.  He not only 
reflected on subaltern groups for its own sake, but to try and design strategies of political 
transformation.  Gramsci’s reflections on subaltern groups are closely related to the other 
concepts he developed.  As Green argues,268 it is necessary to ‘understand how the subaltern 
classes relates to Gramsci’s thought as a whole’.  This is because ‘his analysis of the subaltern 
is interwoven with his political, social, intellectual, cultural, philosophical, religious, and 
economic analyses.’  The possibility, or even necessity, of waging a war of position and not a 
war of manoeuvre is linked to Gramsci’s conceptualisation of the state and its associated 
distinction between East and West.  As power is not concentrated in the state as the sole 
locus of power, but is spread throughout civil society as well, Gramsci comes to the conclusion 
that political power and therefore social change can be best achieved through the taking of 
positions of power within civil society with the help of intellectuals.  Civil society is not 
conceived as a realm of freedom, as liberal peacebuilding policies assume, but as a realm of 
hegemony.  Ultimately, the transformation of subaltern groups’ position ‘requires a 
transformation of the state and its oppressive social relations, since subaltern groups can only 
cease being “subaltern” once they have transformed the relations of subordination that cause 
their marginalization’.269  Gramsci believed that subaltern groups can bring about social 
change and alter their subordinate position.  Through his analyses, he came up with a political 
strategy through which subaltern groups can achieve such transformation.  The latter requires 
‘political struggle’, in the sense that ‘subaltern groups have to become conscious of their 
social position, organize, and struggle to transform their social positions, since organization 
and representation alone will not transform the relations of subordination’.270  According to 
Green, ‘for Gramsci, a self-aware and historically informed conscious leadership combined 
with the spontaneous political activity of the people is the “real political action” of subaltern 
groups’.271  Subaltern groups have to form alliances with other subaltern groups, some of 
which have to assume moral and intellectual leadership in order to develop a new culture or 
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values, new social relations, and a new conception of the state.  These new values must be 
defended through a war of position for subaltern groups to become dominant within society 
and eventually become state.  Subaltern groups must go and look beyond their local settings 
and identities as subaltern.  They must go beyond asking the state to merely protect them 
and their rights, and must  ‘historicize and conceptualize the relations that cause their 
subordination and attempt to transform the relations and systems of power that created and 
maintain the relations’.272 
Gramsci’s reflections on subaltern groups are therefore useful to understand how 
peasant communities can challenge material relations of power in contexts of armed conflicts 
and peacebuilding settings.  In such contexts and settings, violence seems to rule out any 
possibility of non-violent civil initiatives, thus subordinating the realm of politics to the 
military dynamics of the conflict.  Also, civilian have usually been considered as powerless 
when facing illegal armed groups and the state army.  It seems at first sight that Gramsci 
himself would discard any chance of conducting a war of position within these contexts.  It is 
then crucial to explain how local actors are able to place the realm of politics (as opposed to 
the military realm) at the centre of the struggle against the state in contexts of violent armed 
conflicts, thus creating spaces in which the political process can be reinstated and the 
domination of hegemonic forces contested through a war of position.  It is also necessary to 
focus on how local actors can create these trenches and fortifications required by the war of 
position to reach the ethico-political phase of their counter-hegemonic initiatives, through 
the development of a critical consciousness, taking control of the space, and making 
alternative historical blocs.  These three elements structure the next three chapters in the 
form of case studies based on the experience of the CdPSJA, the ACVC, and the ATCC.  Peasant 
communities have developed a new common sense. They have waged a political struggle over 
land and the nature of the Colombian state, and have built alliances with other subaltern 
social groups.  But before explaining the rationale of these chapters in more detail, I must 
introduce the methodological criteria developed by Gramsci himself for the study of subaltern 
groups.  
Gramsci’s methodological criteria for the study of subaltern groups 
                                                        




Gramsci offers useful methodological criteria in order to understand new forms of political 
agency in relation to the history and practice of subaltern groups.  Before turning to these 
criteria, it is useful to stress that for Gramsci, the history of subaltern classes is intertwined 
with that of state-civil society relationships.273 The subaltern groups’ activities, given their 
subordination to the ruling groups, are always subject to the activity of the latter.274  In this 
regard, the ‘history of subaltern social groups is necessarily fragmented and episodic’, and 
the process of their unification ‘is continually interrupted by the activity of the ruling 
groups’.275  A study of subaltern groups will therefore also be a study of the ruling class’s 
reaction to the activity of the former. Such a study must then include attempts by the 
dominant groups to assert their domination, and eventually their hegemony, on subaltern 
groups,276 as ruling groups usually seek to create new parties or political formations in order 
to ‘conserve the assent of the subaltern groups and to maintain control over them’.277 
In his notes on Italian History, Gramsci introduces several criteria for the study of 
subaltern groups.  These criteria focus on the political formations created by the latter in 
order to exercise their resistance and counter-hegemonic activities.  These political forms of 
agency will be analysed in relation to ‘transformations occurring in the sphere of economic 
production’.278  Gramsci also argues that for subaltern groups to challenge the material basis 
of their domination, they must develop new ideas and ideologies.  As a result, it is necessary 
not only to study the ‘quantitative diffusion’ of the newly created political formations created 
by the subaltern groups, but also ‘their origins in pre-existing social groups, whose mentality, 
ideology and aims they conserve for a time’.279  The key is to understand why some subaltern 
groups try and assert their autonomy within the old political, social, and economic framework 
– they might try and influence the traditional dominant groups’ political formations, to whom 
they are actively or passively affiliated, and this might lead to processes of ‘decomposition, 
renovation or neo-formation’ – while others break with this framework and develop new 
ideas or ‘integral autonomy’.280  In this regard, the six criteria laid out by Gramsci are not just 
methodological.  According to Green, they also  
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…represent the phases in which a subaltern group develops, from a “primitive” position of 
subordination to a position of autonomy.  That is, the phases represent the sequential process in which 
a subaltern group develops and grows into a dominant social group or, in other instances, is stopped in 
its ascent to power by dominant social groups or political forces.281 
Gramsci’s method also stresses the importance of analysing the common terrain 
occupied by both groups and where structure and agency meet.  This terrain determines the 
array of strategies available to both actors.  The final outcome will be the product of political 
struggles over power.  Two final elements or ‘yardsticks’ are missing to be able to measure 
the level of historical and political consciousness achieved by subaltern classes.  These 
yardsticks are the two phases through which subaltern groups acquire ‘autonomy vis-à-vis 
the enemies they had to defeat’, and ‘support from the groups which actively or passively 
assisted them’ in order to build a counter-hegemony.282  This method therefore links the 
autonomy and agency of subaltern groups to both the political formations they create 
because of their counter-hegemonic activities, and the material structures of the sphere of 
economic production.  
In addition to these methodological considerations, Gramsci emphasises the 
asymmetry between subaltern groups’ strategies and ruling groups’ strategies.  He thought 
that the success of the working class’s strategies to resist and gain autonomy from the ruling 
class and eventually become state has to be related to its capacity and ability to develop a 
new political practice that is not symmetrical with that of the dominant classes.  Whereas the 
ruling class can rely on the state to assert and maintain its domination, the standpoint of 
subaltern groups is mainly to be found within economic and civil society.  As Mouffe argues:  
Even in this respect, the history of the subaltern classes is asymmetrical, ‘their history, therefore is 
intertwined with that of civil society, it is a “disjointed” and discontinuous function of the history of civil 
society, and thereby of the history of states and groups of states’, A discontinuous history, a history of 
a mediated relation to the state – in short, a history of an asymmetrical autonomisation which aims to 
construct new political forms.283  
Therefore, if the working class wants to avoid being co-opted by the state, ‘it must gain local 
hegemony both before and after the seizure of power; This implies the existence of non-state 
institutional forms which encourage a dynamic development of the base and generate 
mechanisms for the “socialisation of politics”’.284 
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Finally, a subaltern group is involved in a moment of political activity only when it 
reaches the third stage or level in the development of a political class consciousness and aims 
to establish its hegemony in society.  The political struggle of the class and its party is one 
which is conducted in terms of establishing an alternative hegemony.  It is not the site which 
makes a struggle political, but the way in which the struggle is conducted.  It is the way in 
which questions are posed, in a universal rather than a corporative manner which makes the 
struggle political or not.  Peasant communities’ struggles in Colombia have reached this third 
stage.  By using a universal language, the language of human rights, and by claiming that their 
initiatives could represent the basis of a universal-national peace, they engage in a political 
struggle over power. 
Rationale of the case-study chapters 
The structure of the remaining chapters unfolds as follows.  The case study chapters (Chapters 
2, 3, and 4) focus on the agential dimension of this struggle for peace while at the same time 
stressing the interplay between the actions and practices of all actors involved on one hand, 
and the economic, political, social, and cultural structures that characterise Colombia on the 
other.  The latter ‘are not reducible to the activities that they govern or the practices they 
support; rather it is these social structures that make human activity and social practices 
possible and it is within this structural context that a theory of hegemony must be 
developed’.285  It logically follows that a theory of hegemony takes as its subject the processes 
through which the social structures of a given society are reproduced and transformed.  
Joseph argues that ‘it is precisely this location in the process of social 
reproduction/transformation which places constraints but also allows for the possibility of 
different agents to construct and elaborate their own hegemonic blocs, projects and 
alliances’.286  This echoes Jessop’s argument about the strategic selectivity of structures.287 
The case studies then develop as follows.  First, if we want to change the world, we 
must challenge the ideas that contribute to the reproduction of social relations and give rise 
to the common sense that pervades society.  For this to happen, dominated groups must be 
conscious of the context of their struggle and of their interests and power.  Counter-
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hegemonic projects represent a conscious attempt to act upon a given situation.  The first of 
the case study chapters therefore focuses on the process through which peasant communities 
broke with the hegemonic projects of illegal armed actors, the state, and Colombian political 
society.  I trace this consciousness back to social and political struggles over the land, and I 
analyse the process through which peasant communities move from the economic-corporate 
stage to the political stage, following Gramsci’s interpretation of the second moment of the 
‘relations of forces’.288  This consciousness must also be situated within the structured context 
that gave rise to and sustains hegemony in Colombia.  Gramsci is well aware that the 
consciousness of subaltern groups is politically determined, and that the move from the 
stages mentioned earlier require political leadership and education in order to overcome the 
fragmentation of consciousness that characterises the first stage of the political moment of 
the relations of forces.  Consciousness needs to be stimulated to transcend its particular 
location.  In this regard, peasant communities must act against the inertia and indifference of 
Colombian society; against the ideologies, mentalities, and consciousness of individuals that 
contribute to the reproduction of hegemonic structures; and make visible the moral crisis of 
the Colombian society.289  However, the struggle of peasant communities cannot be reduced 
to a study of ideas and beliefs, be they those held by members of peasant communities or 
those that support the domination of ruling groups.   
Indeed, a hegemonic struggle is more than just a clash of world views or group 
consciousnesses.  There is also a need to change the social relations behind ideas that 
contribute to inequalities, alienation, and violence in order to change the world.  Peasant 
community counter-hegemonic projects are driven by the necessity to transform the 
structures of hegemony, or domination where hegemony is not complete, starting from the 
localised consciousness of the particular group they represent.  Because ideas find their 
origins in social structures and institutions, they must therefore challenge not just the 
dominant ideas within society, but the very social structures and institutions that produce 
them.290  Here the focus is not just on ideas or consciousness, but on the structures and 
underlying causes of a given state of affairs, such as violence and the armed conflict in 
Colombia.  However, the question remains as to how it is possible to change social relations.  
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This raises the problem of the strategies used by peasant communities to conduct their 
counter-hegemonic struggle.  I argue that space plays a key role in the struggle conducted by 
peasant communities.  It is through spatial strategies that they manage to assert their control 
over a territory and bring about change.  Indeed, as Joseph argues:  
Counter-hegemonies are broken up and fragmented, confined to plural space and micro time.  
Therefore, if a counter-hegemonic project is to be truly successful, it must transcend 'surface' 
hegemonic battles with other projects, go beyond this terrain, and fundamentally alter the deeper 
hegemony of society.  It has to challenge the relatively enduring space and time generated by the 
underlying social structures, the relatively unconscious character of these relations and engage in a 
process of transformation.  Because of the relative weigh that deeper, structural hegemony has over 
actual hegemonic practices, a transformative project is not easy and is really only achieved under 
conditions of structural crisis.  Then the gaps and fractures that start to open up allow counter-
hegemony more of a chance to squeeze out its own space.291 
Finally, for Gramsci, if a counter-hegemonic or anti-passive revolution struggle is to be 
successful, the challenge of social structure must be accompanied by the formation of 
alternative hegemonic blocs supported by political projects and social alliances.  ‘The 
capturing of space is linked to the physical construction of a hegemonic bloc which can forge 
together a unity, while also maintaining a clear direction’. 292 Hence, the third case study 
chapter studies the efforts of peasant communities to build such an alternative hegemonic 
bloc, while stressing the interaction between the alternatives projects of peasant 
communities and the ones of the dominant groups, without losing sight of the structural 
dimension of this hegemonic struggle.  I emphasise processes such as the elaboration of 
political projects, the articulation of interests, the construction of social alliances, the 
development of historical blocs, the deployment of state strategies directed at peasant 
communities, and the initiation of passive revolutions.  I show how the three different 
peasant communities represent three different models of social transformation,  models 
which have implications for their ability to build peace.  
The next three chapters are based on this rationale.  I reflect on the findings 
established throughout these chapters in Chapter 5 of this thesis and reach a conclusion about 
whether, how, and to what extent peasant communities are able to challenge the power 
structures which sustain the armed conflict and it root causes. 
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Chapter 3: Between Fear and Consciousness: Transforming common sense in 
the midst of armed conflict 
This was a consciousness anchored in our heart, given that in any moment they could kill us, they will 
kill us and that, well, we will not be afraid of that. So I think that, well, this has been the most important 
aspect, this is the depth of the community, to create such a consciousness and know that if I die, well, I 
die fighting for a just cause, for the defense of life, the right that life be respected as well as families […], 
any citizen (leader of the CdPSJA).293 
Introduction 
This chapter analyses how peasant communities managed to transform what Gramsci calls 
‘common sense’ into a critical consciousness and reach a hegemonic conception of the 
world294. It is concerned with the processes through which groups of peasants who have been 
displaced as a consequence of the armed conflict, came to conceive of themselves as 
autonomous actors and think about solutions to resist and live in the midst of the armed 
conflict.  Through such a focus on consciousness, I draw attention to the work required to 
translate collective consciousness in its economic-corporate phase into a universalising 
phase, the moment of moral and intellectual leadership, or hegemony.  In other words, as the 
opening quotation illustrates, peasant communities’ narrative has evolved from the 
protection of peasants living in the midst of armed conflict to the protection of any citizen or 
life, and the building of peace in Colombia. To analyse these processes, I use Gramsci’s 
thought on consciousness and his concept of common sense to theorise about the 
relationship between thought and action, between ideas and political, social, and economic 
change.  This theoretical framework is applied to the initiatives led by the CdPSJA, the ACVC, 
and the ATCC.  
My argument is twofold.  First, the possibility for collective action in the midst of 
armed conflict and of withdrawing consent to the domination of armed actors was made 
possible by a context which, according to peasants themselves, left them no other choice than 
to organise.  It was also made possible by the development of a new consciousness based on 
principles of neutrality, non-violence, and human rights.  However, the causal relationship 
between consciousness and action is not as straightforward as it might seem.  An analysis of 
the social processes that accompanied the emergence of a particular political consciousness 
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shows that, in the context of civil wars, the process of losing fear played an instrumental role 
in the creation and resilience of peasant communities’ initiatives.  Such a process was decisive 
in that it enabled peasants to recover their autonomy and enact their own power onto 
external structures and actors.  The loss of fear allowed peasants to break the ley del silencio 
(the law of silence).  It also made possible the existence of cooperation and solidarity between 
the members of the community.  Crucially, it allowed members of the community to engage 
in dialogue and collective reflections about the ‘what to do’ question, about possible 
strategies to break with the ongoing violence, and eventually build peace.  The emergence of 
a particular political consciousness, linked to a conception of the world that challenges the 
common sense imposed on subaltern groups by ruling elites, and the loss of fear have 
interacted with each other from the birth of peasant communities until today. Their 
relationship is dialectical; in other words, we need both in order to explain how peasant 
communities managed to generate and sustain their own social and political power, and enact 
this power onto the external world. 
Secondly, I argue that the specific consciousness, or new conception of the world, 
developed by members of peasant communities represents a break from both the traditional 
dominant ideologies on one hand, and the ideologies imposed by the armed actors, be they 
paramilitary groups or guerrillas, on the other.  Traditional ideologies in Colombia have 
accompanied and supported changes in the dominant mode of production, from the 
encomienda and the hacienda of the colonial era to the neoliberal development models of 
the second half of the twentieth century.  Characterised by an anti-peasant bias (reference), 
they have also contributed to ensuring the maintenance of peasants in a condition of 
subalternity.  They found their political expression in the Liberal and Conservative parties that 
have historically mediated the relationship between the population and the state.295  In 
addition, erupting from the 1960s onward, the current illegal armed actors, paramilitary 
groups, and guerrillas, have tried through violent means to impose opposite social orders 
which also represent particular ideologies.  However, by stressing notions of autonomy, 
dignity, and neutrality backed by a human rights discourse, I argue that the peasant initiatives 
under study represent a break from both the ideologies mentioned and the previous peasant-
led attempts in Colombia at challenging the power structures that are at the root of their 
                                                        




alienation.  This new conception of the world and the political culture that comes with it have 
already had a huge impact at local level and represent a huge asset for an eventual post-
conflict setting. 
I support this argument through three distinct moments.  In the first section, I 
introduce Gramsci’s reflections on the role of consciousness for political actions.  In the 
second, I analyse the structural origins that determined the emergence of a new conception 
of the world, or consciousness, within the peasant population in each one of the regions 
under study.  Finally, in the last section, I focus on the social processes that accompanied the 
emergence and sustainability of peasant communities’ initiatives. The loss of fear is identified 
as a key moment that, in the interaction with the emergence of a particular political 
consciousness, made possible both the withdrawal of consent and the commitment to non-
violence.  
Consciousness, common sense, and autonomy in the midst of armed 
conflict 
The CdPSJA, the ACVC and the ATCC have all managed to develop principles and norms which 
they have used to successfully protect themselves amid armed conflict.  Even though the task 
of challenging the dominant groups’ common sense and transforming it into a critical 
consciousness might initially seem impossible, they have developed a new peasant identity, 
culture, and subject that suits their everyday needs in the midst of armed conflict.  I argue 
that while Gramsci’s reflections on the relationship between consciousness and political 
action are useful in helping us to understand how peasant communities managed to develop 
alternative conceptions of the world, they need to be extended in order to explain how they 
challenged violent coercion and repression to eventually break the law of silence and lose 
fear. 
According to Gramsci, consciousness, common sense, and autonomy are closely 
linked.  Subaltern groups gain autonomy by abandoning the ruling class’s conceptions of the 
world and applying a new conception to their external world.  In a discussion about the unity 
of thought and action, Gramsci indeed argues that a subaltern group has 
…for reasons of submissions and intellectual subordination, adopted a conception which is not its own 




following it, because that is the conception which it follows in ‘normal times’ – that is when its conduct 
is not independent and autonomous, but submissive and subordinate.296 
For Gramsci, consciousness and autonomy are therefore intimately linked to politics 
understood as conscious action in pursuit of a common social goal.  It is in fact ‘through the 
activity of transforming and consciously directing other men that man realises his “humanity”, 
his “human nature”’, and can be said to be ‘essentially political’.297  This transformation of the 
world is determined by consciousness and preceded by an ‘ethical improvement’ in the sense 
that a person can ‘potentiate’ themself and ‘develop’ themself before applying their will to 
the external world.298  In this regard, consciousness is not only grounded in the material 
structures of the social world, but also in human being’s social activities.  This gives rise to 
‘two theoretical consciousnesses (or one contradictory consciousness)’, one that reflects a 
man’s practice, and another one that is ‘superficially explicit or verbal’.299  The second one 
can be powerful enough ‘to produce a situation in which the contradictory state of 
consciousness does not permit of any action, any decision or any choice, and produces a 
condition of moral and political passivity’.300  At the individual level, political action occurs 
when the unity between theory and practice within a person’s consciousness is achieved.  At 
the collective level, the ‘unity between “spontaneity”301 and “conscious leadership” or 
“discipline” is precisely the real political action of the subaltern classes’.302 
Therefore, if political change is to occur under the impulsion of subaltern groups, a 
change in their consciousness has to happen.  Subaltern groups have to detach themselves 
from the common sense imposed on them by ruling groups and used to maintain the 
subaltern groups’ condition of passivity, in order to form a distinct social and cultural bloc, or 
‘intellectual-moral bloc’.303  They must break this relative acceptance or consent, which is part 
of any hegemony and which is awarded to the ruling groups, in order to be able to think about 
strategies of resistance and consciously think of themselves as autonomous actors. In a 
context of armed conflict, this implies more than a mere transformation of common sense, 
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as coercion prevails over consent.  Challenging common sense also means breaking the law 
of silence and the violent coercion which maintain peasants in a state of passivity.  That said, 
Gramsci’s conception of power as both coercion and consent indicates that even in violent 
settings consent has to some extent to be awarded, opening up a role for ideas in the 
transformation of social relations.  Gramsci’s conception of ideology identifies different levels 
on a continuous scale.  While philosophy appears at the higher end of this scale as a coherent 
‘intellectual order’ in which the individual  dimension of thought prevails, common sense lies 
at the bottom for its ‘diffuse’ and ‘un-coordinated’ features.304  Common sense is 
‘mechanically imposed by the external environment’.305  As Dodge argues,  
Common sense is the structure of everyday thinking through which the majority of any population live 
the greater part of their lives.  It is within Common sense that the hegemonic ideology exists in symbiotic 
dominance with its vanquished predecessor, securing its own influence by assimilating the more salient 
parts of the other.306   
Ideologies become historical forces when their philosophical components remain in 
close contact with common sense.307  Unity between philosophy and common sense, 
intellectuals and the masses, theory and practice, is ensured by politics and leads to a rise of 
consciousness.308  This is then born on the level of ideologies and political and social struggles. 
It is also a necessary condition for the development of a hegemonic force, in the sense that 
hegemony ‘supposes an intellectual unity and an ethics in conformity with a conception of 
reality that had gone beyond common sense and has become, if only within narrow limits, a 
critical conception’.309  Gramsci stresses the fact that this change in consciousness  
…takes place therefore through a struggle of political ‘hegemonies’ and of opposing directions, first in 
the ethical field and then in that of politics proper, in order to arrive at the working out at a higher level 
of one’s own conception of reality.  Consciousness of being part of a particular hegemonic force (that is 
to say political consciousness) is the first stage towards a further progressive self-consciousness in which 
theory and practice will finally be one.310 
Consciousness is conceived as being determined by the economic structure only in the first 
instance.  This implies that in the case of peasant communities, the formation of 
consciousness cannot just be traced back to the relations of exploitation imposed by 
neoliberalism, but has to be searched for in the political, social, and ideological realms, the 
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superstructures on which human beings become conscious of their condition of subaltern 
people, and on which political forces organise to either preserve or challenge structures.311  I 
will point to this when explaining how the political struggles in which peasant communities’ 
members took part contributed to shaping their perception of the structural factors which 
are at the origins of their domination.  These political struggles also gave rise to specific 
political cultures, which are reflected within the principles, norms, and organisations created 
by peasant communities.   
The fact that consciousness is born on the level of ideologies and political struggles 
also implies that it is a social process, that it is socially mediated.  In this regard, consciousness 
is not the product of individual reflections but of social and cultural relations between human 
beings, and can thus be regarded as collective consciousness.  Within this process, the role of 
intellectuals is crucial to form and sustain this collective consciousness.  Intellectuals make 
the activity of the masses a coherent whole,312 and bridge the gap between theory and 
practice, between two conceptions of the world, one reflected in practice, and the other in 
thought.313  Their task is to establish a link between higher philosophies and the popular 
beliefs of the masses in order to construct an ‘intellectual-moral bloc which can make 
politically possible the intellectual progress of the mass’.314  Gramsci stresses the importance 
of this dialectical relationship between intellectuals and subaltern groups when he explains 
that 
Critical self-consciousness means, historically and politically, the creation of an elite of intellectuals.  A 
human mass does not ‘distinguish’ itself, does not become independent in its own right without, in the 
widest sense, organising itself; and there is no organisation without intellectuals, that is without 
organisers and leaders, in other words, without the theoretical aspect of the theory-practice nexus 
being distinguished concretely by the existence of a group of people “specialised” in conceptual and 
philosophical elaboration of ideas.315 
To do that, intellectuals must be organically linked to subaltern groups.  Any movement 
aiming to challenge the hegemonic common sense has to produce intellectuals emerging out 
of the masses while remaining in contact with them.316  Gramsci illustrates this point in a 
section explaining the weaknesses and failure of idealist philosophy and the ideas of the 
Renaissance to extend its influence beyond the elites: 
                                                        
311 Gramsci, A. Selections, p. 178. 
312 Gramsci, A. Selections, p. 330. 
313 Gramsci, A. Selections, p. 333. 
314 Gramsci, A. Selections, pp. 332-333. 
315 Gramsci, A. Selections, p. 334. 




What was lacking, however, was any organic quality either of philosophical thought or of organisational 
stability and central cultural direction […].  one could only have had cultural stability and an organic 
quality of thought if there had existed the same unity between the intellectuals and the simple as there 
should be between theory and practice.  That is, if the intellectuals had been organically the intellectuals 
of those masses, and if they had worked out and made coherent the principles and the problems raised 
by the masses in their practical activity, thus constituting a cultural and social bloc.317 
As Gramsci argued, any subaltern group must exercise some kind of hegemony within 
civil society before gaining state power.  However, this also means that hegemonic activities 
led by subaltern groups will be limited as they do not benefit from the capacities granted by 
state power and civil society institutions controlled by the state, and the means of coercion 
and diffusion that come with it.  The fact that the peasant communities under study have 
managed to transform common sense into a critical consciousness and translate it into 
practice in the midst of armed conflict remains a puzzle, and this puzzle does not seem 
understandable by a change in consciousness only.  This is because in Colombia, peasant 
consciousness was more often shaped by coercion rather than consent.  In this regard, 
Gramsci’s concept of power as both coercion and consent is useful, as it reminds us that 
domination requires some degree of consent to be effective, and that consent is always 
backed by coercion. 
My argument therefore completes Gramsci’s reflections on consciousness and 
common sense with an emphasis on how peasant communities managed to break the law of 
silence and lose fear.  As I show in the following two sections, the process through which the 
peasant communities’ initiatives under study transformed common sense into a critical 
consciousness was the product of (1) how peasants interpreted the structural factors at the 
roots of their domination, (2) a change in consciousness, and (3) the loss of fear.  In this 
regard, consciousness and subjectivities of peasant communities’ members are the product 
of the interaction between several processes of different durations: long-term structures of 
the conflict and class-struggles around land issues; symbolic events fixed in time; and mid-
term processes of the organisation of the resistance.  Before analysing the social processes 
through which peasant communities transformed common sense into good sense, I now turn 
to the structural processes which have informed peasants’ consciousness. 
                                                        




A historical and spatial perspective on peasant consciousness 
Adopting a sociological-historical perspective, I pay attention to the social relations of 
production that determined and still determine in the first instance the conditions under 
which the consciousness of members of peasant communities under study was born and 
sustained.  I show how social relations of production and development policies conditioned 
the emergence of particular political, social, and ideological superstructures.  On these 
superstructures emerged social and political conflicts to which I then turn in order to explore 
the context which nurtured peasant consciousness.  These conflicts gave rise to radical 
peasant protests and organisations whose mentalities and ideologies can still be seen in the 
creation and birth of the initiatives led by the CdPSJA, the ACVC, and the ATCC.  Finally, I 
analyse the immediate context of the creation of these three communities, and the dynamics 
generated by the armed conflict that led peasants to regroup and gather in order to find ways 
to survive and avoid new forced displacements. 
Primitive accumulation, accumulation by dispossession, and forced displacement 
The processes of primitive accumulation of land, land concentration, and the displacement of 
frontier settlers are constant characteristics of the colonial and Colombian economy from the 
eighteenth until the twentieth century.  The continuous expulsion of peasant population 
towards areas of wasteland and rainforests due to the structure of land ownership is a symbol 
of the lack of solution to the agrarian problem that still characterises Colombia today.318  This 
economic dispossession was reflected in the political realm by the exclusion of poor rural and 
urban populations and their subordination to ruling and economic elites through client-based 
networks.319  The lack of solution to the agrarian problem therefore had tremendous political 
consequences.  Peasants who were not linked to the hacienda-based economic networks 
would move to the frontier areas and wasteland, where they would develop communities 
with egalitarian values.320  These values can be observed within peasant protests and 
movements, from the peasant revolts of the 1930s321 to the creation of the FARC in the 1960s 
and the peasant communities under study in this thesis.  The latter’s initiatives must be 
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conceived as a continuation of these peasant protests, even though they also represent a 
break from these peasant movements and illustrate the development of a new critical 
consciousness.   
These processes started with the Spanish colonisation and were accelerated with the 
introduction of capitalist modes of production in the first decades of the nineteenth century.  
Orlando Fals Borda, one of the most renowned Colombian sociologists, characterises the 
impact that these processes had as a ‘decomposition’ of the peasantry.322  This meant that 
the peasantry as a class, which has always been a class dominated and exploited by others, 
was disrupted and its tiers disorganised: 
In general terms, it is possible to say that the peasantry has evolved from pre-capitalist forms in which 
the satisfaction of basic necessities was emphasized, either on third-party land or its own, to free forms 
of labour or small producers, in which the peasantry is subject to capitalist market and price laws, 
competition, profit maximization, concentration of land and monopoly of resources.  This led to rural 
proletarization.323 
This ‘decomposition’ of the peasantry was made possible by the end of the indigenous 
reserves and the end of slavery, going from pre-colonial forced labour to free forms of labour 
which conformed better to rising capitalism, and benefited from the support of rural elites, 
the state, and foreign countries.324  But although the primitive accumulation of natural 
resources was one of the main drives of the Spanish conquest of the American continent, the 
concentration of land only appeared with the creation of the hacienda in the eighteenth 
century.  This followed the introduction of liberal economic policies under the influence of 
both the ideals of the French Revolution and the emerging English industrial capitalism.  
Before that, the encomienda was the dominant form of social and economic association 
characterising the pre-independence Colombian society.  The encomienda was considered a 
tool to educate the indigenous people and raise taxes, and was the source of all political and 
social power, prestige and wealth.325  However, the mere fact that the rights granted by the 
encomienda to the encomendero were awarded over a group of indigenous people and not 
over the land implied that the struggle for power was not for the possession of land or natural 
resources, but for the alienation of human labour power.326  It is only when human labour 
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power started to be scarce, either because indigenous people were exterminated or because 
former slaves were emancipated, that the need to own the land arose.  Therefore, the interest 
in land ownership coincides with the need to find new forms of subordination and domination 
for a population that had obtained its emancipation from the encomienda during the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries through biological and cultural mestizaje 
(miscegenation).   While the rights over groups of indigenous people had previously allowed 
the extra-legal use of land, from now on the rights over land would allow the extra-legal 
subjection of mestizo327 population as labour-power.328   In other words, the legal title over 
land now guaranteed the use of cheap labour and the subjection of the peasant mestizo 
population.329  It also intricately tied peasants to the will of landowners and therefore became 
the limit and condition of the former’s social relations and hopes of social success and 
enrichment.  This fact is crucial to understanding the subsequent evolution of political power 
in Colombia.330  A series of laws between 1821 and 1850 proceeded to undo the existing tie 
between the peasantry and the land and favoured land concentration, thus making free 
labour available for the haciendas or plantations.331  The vast majority of peasants became 
sharecroppers, tenants, or day labourers.  Many of them emigrated to the Magdalena Medio 
river basin, where the ACVC is now located.332 
Along this continuous diminution of safe and servile manpower, the peasants’ need 
for land and work to survive also emerged as a consequence of the creation of the 
hacienda.333  The ownership of the land already fulfilled the function of subordination of the 
peasant population as it does nowadays.  The only difference is that whereas today the end 
goal of landowners is the primitive accumulation of wealth, in the pre-independence 
Colombia the end goal was the acquisition of social and political power and individual 
prestige.334 
It is interesting to note that the basis of the subjection and subordination of peasants 
not only derived from the ownership of legal titles over the land by large landowners, but the 
power of the latter also relied on the consent of the peasants themselves.  This is how in the 
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Andean highlands – the situation was different in the lower valleys and lowlands – the 
hacienda became the dominant form of social, economic, and political association through 
which all social relations and possibilities of social success were channelled.  The hacienda 
moulded the values and attitudes of the peasant population so that they would work towards 
the fulfilment of the economic needs of landowners.  The peasants came to adopt the values 
and attitudes of the typical large landowner as the adoption of these values represented the 
only possibility to get a piece of land and move up the social and economic ladder.  This social 
mimicry ensured the hegemony of landowners and laid the grounds for the authoritarianism 
and paternalism that still characterises Colombian politics today.  In addition, the conditions 
imposed by the ownership of land and the social mimicry that accompanied the model of the 
hacienda ruled out any possibility of resistance by peasants.  A critical attitude did not make 
functional sense as it would have ruined any chance to acquire a piece of land.335  Peasants 
actually sought to settle within a hacienda.336  After Independence and the progressive 
disappearance of the hacienda model, peasants’ grievances would then be channelled 
through the Liberal and Conservative parties and the Church.  
According to Uribe López, this permanent process of primitive accumulation of land 
lies at the root of the continuous expansion of the agrarian frontier and the dispossession of 
frontier peasants.337  This dispossession is itself at the origin of the massive forced 
displacement of population in general, and peasants in particular, until today. In fact, the 
growth of an export economy in the last decades of the nineteenth century led to an increase 
in the concentration of land tenure through the forced displacement of thousands of peasant 
settlers.338  The development of exports then correlates with the concentration of land tenure 
through the displacement of thousands of peasant settlers.339  It is estimated that around 5.7 
million people have been displaced,340 8.3 million hectares of land illegally seized, and 350 
000 plots abandoned.341  But while until the mid-twentieth century peasants were pushed 
towards new colonisation areas and frontier lands given the available of huge areas of 
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wasteland, the vast majority now end up in urban areas, contributing to the pauperisation of 
the main urban centres, such as Apartadó, Barrancabermeja, Bogotá, and Medellín.  
The primitive accumulation of land by large estate owners began with the growth of 
the Colombian export economy in the 1850s.342  This is when the integration of many isolated 
Colombian regions began, also in part as a result of the many civil wars that characterised the 
nineteenth century.343  For instance, the integration of the Urabá region, where the CdPSJA 
was created in 1997, first occurred in a spontaneous way through the extraction and 
exportation of raw material, such as wood or rubber.  This indicated the predisposition of the 
region for the exportation of agricultural goods. The commercial exploitation of land would 
eventually reach its peak with the intensive exportation of banana crops by the United Fruit 
Company from the 1960s onward.344 
Many different actors have historically followed the migration waves of peasant 
settlers or attracted new settlers by creating new economic opportunities.  Be they 
merchants, road contractors, or large landowners at the end of the nineteenth century and 
beginning of the twentieth century;345 or cattle farmers, paramilitary groups, guerrillas, and 
drug traffickers in the second half of the twentieth century, these actors were not interested 
in politically integrating these isolated regions with the rest of the country.  Taking advantage 
of a weak state presence, but also from the complicity of local and national authorities,346 
they aimed to connect these regions to global and world markets and trade by exploiting 
primary resources (the exception to that is the guerrillas, which would extract and accumulate 
resources from the cultivation of coca crops for their own funding).  As a result of these 
activities, peasant settlers have been displaced, dispossessed and displaced again, following 
a pattern colonisation-conflict-migration-colonisation.347  Forced displacement was and still 
is one of the conditions that generates an overflow of population and guarantees the 
availability of cheap labour.348  Catherine LeGrand explains: 
	
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, a massive privatization of public lands occurred. 
The Colombian government officially alienated 3.2 million hectares of public lands in this period, while 
an even greater quantity of land passed into private hands through illegal appropriations [...] The land 
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entrepreneurs chose to privatize not any public land, but specifically that land already occupied by 
peasant settlers. Furthermore, they sought to monopolize immense extensions of territory [...] The 
cumulative effect was to block the peasants from access to the most desirable land, thus encouraging 
them to sell their labor power.349 
The primitive accumulation of land combined with development policies that favoured 
the creation of large estates and landowners’ interests to give rise to a dual structure of land 
tenure and ownership.  Large extensions of land were then, and still are, concentrated in the 
hands of a few, and the smallholdings multiplied to the detriment of middle size properties.350  
This agrarian structure was also characterised by the concentration and the idleness of the 
most productive lands.351  In the nineteenth century, Colombia was still characterised by a 
dense highland Andean population and lowland export agriculture.352  The former would 
eventually provide the main source of labour for the latter, through a process of migration 
from the highlands to the middle and lowlands.  The transition from the highlands to large 
estates was mediated by the formation through migration of a new smallholding peasant 
sector in the middle altitudes and lowlands.353  In the second half of the twentieth century, 
government-development policies further contributed to the articulation of regions located 
at the periphery of the main economic centres.  New migration waves followed the 
implementation of many different economic projects which were accompanied by the 
construction of roads and communication systems.  The construction of the road connecting 
Medellín to the Caribbean Coast in the Urabá Gulf is representative of these economic 
projects,354 as is the Carare railway.355 
The absence of a true agrarian reform has played a huge role in the persistence of 
primitive accumulation, land concentration, and forced displacement in Colombia until today.  
While there have been a few progressive laws and attempts to solve the agrarian problem,356 
the actions of a power bloc constituted by economic, political and military elites have always 
succeeded in preserving the status quo.357 This power bloc was not uniform though. There 
were and still are differences within the capitalist class in Colombia, in particular between 
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landowners and agro-exporters on one hand, and industry-based groups. Within the former 
group, coffee growers and stockbreeders had a prominent role. Within the later group, urban 
manufacturers were key. According to Uribe López, the economic policies implemented by 
the Colombian government between the 1970s until the 1990s, in particular the import 
substitution industrialization, had two main objectives.358 The first one was to protect 
domestic production, and the second one was to increase the income of coffe-growers. These 
two objetives constituted the pillars of the alliance between agro-exporters and industry-
based groups, which are themselves the pillars of the power bloc mentioned above.359 This 
power bloc then had, and still has to date, divisions that represent different interests based 
on economic sectors and geographical origins. These divisions reflect the social and 
geographical fragmentation of Colombian society. Whilst Colombian elites have always 
managed to come together in the face of peasant protests and the danger of any agrarian 
reform, these divisions have also hindered the formation of a more democratic, unified and 
modern state.360  
The anti-peasant bias and anti-communism that characterised the ideology of this 
power bloc find their concrete manifestation in the veto to any progressive agrarian reform, 
both through legal means (Law 100, 1944; Law 135, 1961; The Alliance for Progress; The 
Chicoral Agreement in 1972) and illegal activities (alliances with paramilitary groups and drug 
traffickers), as well as in the continuation of the current armed conflict.  This refusal of any 
progressive agrarian reform and any change to elite-led development policies is part of what 
Mauricio Uribe Lopez has termed a systematic veto opposed by the elites to nation 
building.361  A pact within the dominant power bloc between rural and industrial elites made 
sure that economic policies worked to their own benefit, favouring land and capital 
accumulation, and excluding the vast majority of the population.  This dominant bloc has also 
always been able to carry out its economic activities unaffected by the civil armed conflict.  
This means that neither winning the war nor making peace is one of their priorities.  For the 
elite, the armed conflict has always been foreign and perceived as a carnage between 
sectarian peasants.362  
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This anti-peasant bias running throughout the twentieth century comes in support of the 
elites’ practices and their economic interests.363  It is symbolised by the military operations 
against the peasant republics of Marquetalia in 1964, which eventually led to the birth of the 
FARC.  This bias is still very present nowadays and has affected the three peasant communities 
under study. They have all been the target of stigmatisation and harassment by military and 
government officials, including the former President of Colombia, Alvaro Uribe Velez.  To this 
anti-peasant bias corresponds a similar bias against frontier land and colonisation areas, 
marginal spaces for which Colombian urban elites show disinterest and contempt.  As 
Gouëset argues: 
Colonization fronts and empty spaces do not constitute a national myth, a symbol of nation and state 
building effort (labour), a space where a common national future is being forged. Rather, for many 
people, these inaccessible spaces, where state authority does not manage to assert itself, appear as 
symbols of the “social Colombian chaos”.364 
For Gouëset, this bias is at the origin of Colombia’s difficulties of territorial construction.365 
This stigmatisation of peasant communities surfaced in different ways in the 
interviews conducted during my field work.  When I asked them about the CdPSJA, a 
Lieutenant and a Captain belonging to the 17th Army Brigade in Carepa, which has jurisdiction 
over the Serranía de Abibe where the CdPSJA is located, answered in a very defensive tone; I 
had made no accusation or assumptions of any kind.  They argued that peasants were noble 
and hardworking people who did not want anything to do with the state.  They added that it 
was not clear why the CdPSJA refused to engage in a dialogue with state institutions.  
According to the Lieutenant and the Captain, this is why the state cannot help them, even 
though there are public policies ready to be implemented for the benefit of the CdPSJA.  The 
Lieutenant also said that the accusations made by the community against the army were 
vague and incorrect.  They said that the community never wants to support its claims and 
complaints, which is why the juridical apparatus cannot open cases based on these complaints 
and this explains why immunity prevails.  The Lieutenant, who was also a jurist in charge of 
human rights issues, mentioned the legal framework that the army has to respect, in 
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particular the international law and the rulings of the Colombian Constitutional Court.  They 
also stressed the fact that peace communities in Colombia do not have any legal basis.  
Neither, they said, do the humanitarian zones created by Afro-Colombiancommunities in the 
Urabá Chocoano.  Finally, the Captain mentioned that a meeting had been held about two 
weeks before this interview, between national and regional authorities. Its main theme was 
the CdPSJA.  He said that the conclusion reached was that the community’s radical position 
makes everything very difficult.  Even the regional ombudsman (Defensor del Pueblo) could 
not meet with the community.366  
While this rich interview raised many issues, many of which I address later in this 
thesis, here I aim to stress the officers’ tendency to blame peasants for their own situation 
and present the state as a benevolent actor that would willingly help peasants if only the 
latter let them do so.  This soft version of the anti-peasant bias mentioned also reveals itself 
if we manage to read between the lines, precisely when the Lieutenant said that peasants do 
not want anything to do with the state.  Indeed, the next step is usually to assimilate the 
CdPSJA with a nest of guerrilleros.  Finally, the officers’ apparent lack of comprehension of 
the position adopted by the CdPSJA towards the state appears quite inconceivable to anybody 
with even a minimum knowledge of the crimes that have been committed against the 
community over the past 20 years. 
Another instance of this anti-peasant bias appeared during an interview with the Chief 
Intelligence Officer of the Second Division.  I asked them about their perception of 
organisations such as the ACVC.  They suggested that organisations that defend peasants’ 
rights and represent their interests are managed by leaders who only seek their own personal 
benefit and manipulate peasants.  The officer added that these organisations tend to make 
very broad accusations on the basis of isolated cases.  Finally, they criticised laws that protect 
minorities to the detriment of the rest of the population.  According to them, these laws 
create distinct classes of citizens.  There are too many rights and not enough duties in 
Colombia,367  they said.  Again, the anti-peasant bias is quite clear.  In this discourse, peasants, 
all of whom have suffered most of the consequences of the armed conflict and have 
traditionally been subordinated to the power of landowners, are presented as over-protected 
citizens manipulated by leaders seeking their own benefits.  
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The very problem that peasants are facing is then related to land accumulation and an 
ideology stigmatising them. The strategies of accumulation of land by dispossession 
implemented by the illegal armed actors and the state resulted in the enforced displacement 
of hundreds of thousands of peasants in Colombia.  De-territorialisation and estrangement 
were then the problems to which these peasants tried to find a solution.  These problems 
were the direct consequence of military strategies and operations to ‘clean’ the territory from 
any subversive and illegal presence, and assert the sovereignty of the state.  But they can also 
be traced back to past struggles between capitalist entrepreneurs and peasants, landowners 
and migrant workers.  Many of the peasants who are now part of these communities migrated 
to these regions as settlers to escape the violence they suffered in other regions or in search 
of a piece of land to provide for the subsistence of their family.  Cycles of violence and the 
history of land colonisation in Colombia are interrelated processes.  Control over the land 
meant access to power, and the forceful displacement of peasants has a long history in 
Colombia.  The latter can be traced back to the numerous civil wars of the nineteenth century 
between Conservatives and Liberals in Colombia, until the paramilitary violence and land 
grabbing of the 1990s and 2000s. This logic of forced displacement can also be linked to a 
specific model of economic development, represented by the capitalist and neoliberal 
economic policies that have been implemented in Colombia with the active support of the 
state.  While peasant consciousness was determined by the structural conditions of 
exploitation related to a capitalist mode of production, it is the lived experience of these very 
structural conditions that led peasant communities’ members to make the decision to overtly 
resist the violence imposed by illegal armed actors, the state, and economic policies.  In this 
regard, colonisation processes, social struggles, and the immediate context are the three key 
factors to understanding how the consciousness of peasant communities’ members evolved 
from passive acquiescence to the refusal to accept the current state of affairs.  
Peasant consciousness and colonization processes: independence, resilience, 
subsistence. 
The reasons for settling in a new region are diverse. Migration waves have been either 
spontaneous, forced, or state-led. In the first instance, the search for new economic 
opportunities, either through the sale of their own labour power or the availability of public 




second case, violence pushed thousands of peasants to flee, either to other rural areas or 
cities.  In the last instance, the state developed economic projects, developed communication 
infrastructures, or provided new public services to connect new regions to the national 
market.  In the Carare region, where the ATCC is located, governmental authorities promoted 
economic projects or measures, such as the development of bridle path networks, land titling, 
and the supply of social and economic subsidies, in order to encourage new settlers to occupy 
the widely available public lands (Comisión Nacional de Reparación y Reconciliación & Grupo 
de Memoria Histórica, 2011: 41).368  The Carare region also received new settlers fleeing the 
violence of the early 1950s from other regions, although the opposition between liberal 
guerrillas on one hand, and the army and conservative bands on the other also generated 
internal migration waves. After the liberal guerrillas of the 1950s capitulated and accepted 
the amnesties granted by President Rojas Pinilla, a former army general who took power after 
a coup in 1950, the municipality of Cimitarra became the centre of colonisation programmes 
aimed at reinserting former guerrilla members in society. In addition to former guerrilla 
members, a great number of peasants took advantage of the improvement of road networks 
and the arrival of new companies to move to the Carare region.  
The patterns of colonisation and migration waves reveal the concern of frontier 
settlers for economic independence and for the search for new land to work. This concern is 
present amongst the peasants who created the peasant communities under study.  It stems 
from a need to provide the means of subsistence for their family and gave rise to a peasant 
economy based on subsistence.  This peasant economy which characterised frontier peasants 
and settlers reflects certain psychological mindsets, such as autonomy, which is also rooted 
in the same material need to provide for the subsistence of the family.  This autonomy is 
related to a traditional peasant demand to be left in peace, which can be traced back to the 
peasant league of the 1930s and can still be heard today from the mouths of peasants.  Finally, 
peasants whose migration was spontaneous often recall with a certain nostalgia their arrival 
to the regions where the peasant communities are now located.  They mention the feeling of 
freedom that they experienced and look back to this period as one of abundance and 
promising new possibilities.369  When they arrived to a new region, peasant frontiers had to 
build everything anew.  They faced hardship imposed by rural life in mountain and jungle 
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areas.  Due to these hard conditions, peasants built up the resilience necessary to survive on 
those lands.  A machete and their physical qualities were their main assets to work the land 
and mould it according to their needs.  Some would settle with their whole family.  Other 
would first venture on their own before their family could come, once the land started to 
provide the necessary means of subsistence.  The development plan of the ACVC illustrates 
this point well:  
 
The peasants who arrived to the Cimitarra Valley in the 1950 had been expelled from their original land 
due to the violence of the 40s and 50s. In the vast majority of cases, they belonged to families who only 
could only count on their own work capabilities in order to reach into the jungle, where they had to get 
used to the use of axes and machetes, as traditional tools such as hoes and rakes ceased to be useful.370 
The concern for economic independence which depends on the acquisition of land is the basis 
of a peasant economy based on subsistence.  In this regard, labour becomes very important 
as the mediating element between peasant and land. Through labour, peasants would work 
on the land and provide for the needs of their families.  This insistence on labour takes on a 
particular meaning and is elevated to the rank of value.  The right to work is one of the three 
rights that constitute the slogan of the ATCC, along with the right to life and the right to 
dignity, while the CdPSJA is organised in working groups whose function is to fulfil the 
economic and social needs of the community. 
In all three regions, members of peasant communities usually look back at the 
colonisation process, either because they have memories of it or because their parents told 
them about it, as one which was full of wealth and open to promising new opportunities in 
spite of the hard living conditions.  The Serrania de Abibe, where the CdPSJA is located, was 
considered a haven where they would be able to get hold of a small parcel of land and build 
a family.  Members of the CdPSJA usually come from three different backgrounds.  Some of 
them are peasants who migrated to the region of Urabá in the 1950s or 1960s from Cordoba 
or Antioquia.371  Others came from the villages and settlements situated along the via al mar 
from Medellín to Turbo, and were involved in the trade unions and political movements of 
the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s.372  Finally, some were originally born in the Serrania de Abibe 
itself and have locally been displaced by the armed actors present in the region.373  One of 
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them recalls that he was ‘born in a municipality which was called Dabeiba […] But they 
brought me to this zone when I was a small child, and I have always been a peasant like this, 
I was brought up in the countryside’.  Asked about why they migrated to this region, he said 
that ‘they [his fathers], even though very poor (…) could move without any problem to any 
areas and could divinely start working here.’374 The quasi-absence of violence is also 
mentioned by one of the founding members of the ATCC who arrived to the Carare region in 
1961.375  ‘There was no violence’, he says, before going on to stress the wealth of the land: 
‘Most of us arrived here in the Carare region, because it is a very good land, which gave a lot 
of bananas, corn, rice.’376  Food was available in abundance, and peasants could make 
economic gains.377  Members of the ATCC recall how they could pick the piece of land they 
wanted and chose its size, but had to consult with the oldest settlers in order to determine 
the limits and edges of their plot. Once they had built a home and reached some kind of 
stability, they would be joined by their family or form a family on their new land.378  A 
particular social order then started to emerge, with its economies, solidarities, and 
conflicts.379 
Settlers started to organise this social order according to different criteria.  The first 
layer was constituted by the oldest families of the region, around which other layers were 
formed and to which other families or production centres had to pay services and loyalty.  
Another group of settlers was formed by day labourers, dominated by traders and merchants. 
Social life was organised around production and economic needs. 380 Associations and 
organisations were born out of the need to develop these social and economic relations.  But 
the Juntas de Accion Comunales381 and the several churches present in the region also played 
an organisational role in regulating social life and arbitrating social conflicts. 382  When the 
FARC arrived to the Carare region in 1966, it tried to impose its political structure on this 
existing social order and took up several of the social functions assumed by other 
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organisations. The FARC found in the Carare region a stable rear-guard, even though the 
population has traditionally followed liberal and conservative political allegiances.383  
In 1975, the army created the battalion Rafael Reyes in Cimitarra, and installed a 
military based in La India.  But the state military presence did not offer any solution to the 
social problems faced by the population and furthered the crisis of the state’s legitimacy.  The 
situation deteriorated even more with the arrival of paramilitary groups in 1983, and the Law 
of the Silence became the norm within the population.  This increase in the intensity of the 
armed conflicts damaged the social fabric of the population, severed the existing solidarity 
networks and turned upside down the social organisations that were born out of settlement 
processes.  Only the leaders who opposed resistance to the armed groups conserved the 
adhesion of all the population.384   While the several waves of colonisation and settlers and 
the social fabric which was born out of them form the long-term contextual background of 
the creation of the ATCC, the deterioration of the armed conflicts and the emergence of 
leaders represent the immediate context in which the ATCC was born.  In the 1980s, faced 
with increased violence, displacements of population, and problems related to land tenure 
and the concentration of land, the peasants of the Carare region began to manifest their 
discontent and concerns through protests, complaints, and rallies. 385 
These social and cultural experiences played an important role in the formation of 
peasants’ consciousness and the conception of the world symbolised by peasant 
communities.  Values such as resilience, autonomy, dignity, and hard work find their roots in 
these experiences of hardship and social relations of solidarity between peasants. They are 
tied to a peasant economy based on subsistence which also informs the political economy of 
peasant communities.  This colonisation process was a direct consequence of the process of 
primitive accumulation of land, land concentration, and dispossession of peasant frontiers 
analysed earlier.  In the second half of the twentieth century, the implementation of vast 
economic projects further worsened the situation of peasants in the Urabá and Magdalena 
Medio regions.  They led to social and labour conflicts within the banana crop industry in 
Urabá, and the exploitation of oil in Magdalena Medio.  These conflicts also informed the 
development of a specific peasant consciousness and identity that led to the birth of the 
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peasant initiatives under study.  These social and political conflicts informed peasants’ 
perceptions of their own material situation and contributed to their political culture.  It is to 
these processes that I now turn.  
The rise of a peasant consciousness: social and political struggles over land 
In addition to colonisation processes, the social, political, and military struggles over land and 
labour rights had a strong influence on the consciousness of peasant communities’ members, 
which remained a fragmented common sense, though.  This reminds us that for Gramsci ‘the 
history of subaltern social groups is necessarily fragmented and episodic’,386 and ‘intertwined 
with that of civil society’ and ‘states and groups of states’.387  These struggles informed the 
political cultures which peasants have inherited and are nowadays reflected in the attitudes 
of the peasant communities under study towards the illegal armed actors, the state, and the 
market. 
Peasant resistance movements in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries were born 
out of the agricultural entrepreneurs’ attempts to acquire labour and assert their rights over 
large parts of public lands. LeGrand claims that ‘out of this form of labour and peasant 
resistance to it emerged one major thread of rural protest ideology that continues alive in the 
Colombian countryside to the present day’ (LeGrand, 1984: 28).  She suggests that tensions 
between landlords and frontier peasants were and still are informed by changes in the socio-
economic and institutional environment (LeGrand, 1984: 47).  She argues that ‘the roots of 
this social tension must be sought in the process of frontier expansion and particularly in the 
form of labor acquisition associated with it in the period 1870-1930’ (LeGrand, 1984: 47).  This 
period saw the growth of the export economy in the middle altitudes and lowlands of 
Colombia, which in turn stimulated the concurrent expansion of an independent, market-
oriented peasantry in nearby frontier regions (LeGrand, 1984: 33).  In the years after 1875, 
peasants started to organise to resist encroachment, by refusing to sign tenancy agreements 
or leave their land (LeGrand, 1984: 37).  Progressive laws attempting to reform land 
ownership had a strong impact on the settler’s perception of their own situation (LeGrand, 
1984: 38).  According to LeGrand, ‘It gave them the sense that the national government was 
on their side, it imbued their interests with legitimacy, and it provided a focal point around 
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which they began to organize in their own defense’.388  While frontier peasants’ resistance 
was not successful in the vast majority of cases, 
…the landlords' apparent success could not, however, obliterate the settlers' memory of the experience 
through which they had passed. The fact of dispossession, which touched so many peasant families, 
imbued them with a personal conviction of the illegitimacy of the properties on which they worked and 
an underlying resentment against the landlords. This rural consciousness lay inactive until structural 
changes in the 1920s provided the peasants with leverage to renew their struggles against the 
predominance of the great estate.389 
A counter-offensive of the peasantry against landowners occurred in the 1930s 
because of the intervention of the state and the agrarian policies it adopted.  The strong 
economic growth of the 1920s was followed by an economic depression and a sudden 
pauperisation which would influence these peasant protests. Conflicts turned around the 
contractual conditions of peasants working in the haciendas and the search for new pieces of 
land.  While tenants sought to improve their working conditions, peasant settlers started 
occupying the land of new haciendas.390  The connections established between growing 
socialist movements and peasant protests in the 1920s and 1930s contributed to the 
spreading of agrarian movements, and weakened the control of hacienda owners over 
peasants, who then started to take action outside traditional political parties.  However, 
attempts by socialist groups to influence peasant protests and demands also led to a 
fragmentation of peasant movements. 391  It pushed the Liberal party to take an interest in 
peasant demands, which was reflected by some of the measures taken by the Olaya Herrera 
administration, such as the creation of rural unions tied to the Liberal party as an instrument 
for the progressive transformation of rural areas.  The policies of land fragmentation and 
distribution promoted by the same administration also led to the demobilisation of peasant 
movements and to the restoration of the control of the traditional parties.392  Four decades 
later, similar peasant protests and land invasions happened under the impulsion of the 
National Association of Peasant Users (Asociacion Nacional de Usuarios Campesinos – ANUC).  
Created in 1968 by the then President of Colombia Carlos Lleras Restrepo in order to promote 
an agrarian reform from below, the ANUC played a key role in organising peasant movements 
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in the 1970s.393 The marches, protests and land invasions organised by the ANUC soon got 
out of control of the state, but they lost momentum from 1972 onward due to the ANUC’s 
own internal divisions, but also in the face of both military and landowner-led repression.394 
The ANUC lost touch with its base, and around 1978 the peasant-led struggles against agrarian 
elites were over and the ANUC was left in a state of crisis that considerably affected the 
strength of peasant protests.395 The demise of the ANUC also illustrated the significant power 
of landowners in Colombia and the considerable strength of agrarian capitalism.396 
Whilst the ANUC played a key role in the formation of a peasant consciousness, it was 
in the 1930s that the formulation of a rural protest ideology centred on the issue of public 
land initially developed.397  The idea that frontier land and public land belong first and 
foremost to those who work it was born.  It was also in the 1930s that socialist ideas started 
to influence peasant communities, a phenomenon which would grow under the influence of 
the Communist party and the ideological influence of the guerrillas, in particular in the regions 
where the CdPSJA, the ACVC, and the ATCC were born.  The ideas of dignity and autonomy 
were strong components of the struggle led by the peasant leagues of the 1930s.  The strikes 
of the 1920s, the squatter movements of the late 1920s and early 1930s, the conflicts of the 
Violencia, the conflicts between workers and trade unions and companies from the 1960s 
onward, the land invasions incited by the ANUC in the 1970s, and the peasant protest of the 
1990s in reaction to paramilitary violence are all manifestations of a same problem that finds 
its origins in the social relations of production, the agrarian problem, and exclusion of 
subaltern groups from political participation.  Actors change, but the issues at stake are the 
same.  The three regions under study have witnessed these conflicts surrounding the use and 
ownership of the land.  
In Urabá, where the CdPSJA was born in 1997, these political, armed, and social and 
economic conflicts have influenced peasants’ consciousness since the 1960s.  This region was 
the target of several development projects in the 1970s and 1980s to try and connect its 
economy to the core economic centres of the country.  These industrial projects brought 
about important transformations to both the traditional agrarian structures and economy, as 
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well as to the demographic growth of the population, which had a direct impact on peasants’ 
lives.  They favoured monoculture and permanent crops over a traditional peasant economy. 
This led to the displacement of peasant populations away from the banana axis, but gave rise 
to the urban network surrounding this axis as well.398  However, the injection of private capital 
further weakened the state presence and strengthened the isolation of the region.  Today, 
activities related to drug trafficking and the confrontation between armed groups are the 
prevailing source of violence, but conflicts in the region first turned around the relationship 
between workers and employers.  These conflictive relationships were apparently mainly 
labour-related and characterised by industrial actions.  However, employers used to say that 
the conflict was not related to labour, which indicates that something more was at stake.399  
Progressively, other actors such as political parties, the state and the army, the guerrillas, 
paramilitary groups, and drug traffickers, appeared and gave shape to the political and 
military conflicts that still strike the region today.  Guerrillas first appeared in Urabá in the 
1960s.400  They started to indoctrinate peasants and accompany colonisation waves,401 but a 
radical change happened in 1974 when the FARC’s influence spread over the whole region.  
This triggered a strong reaction from the army and state security entities.402   
Between 1966 and 1980, the conflict between the state army and the guerrillas was 
first purely military and located at the periphery of the banana axis.  From 1980 onward, this 
dynamic started to change.  The labour-related and military conflicts then became 
interrelated.403  During the 1980s, trade-union and labour-related conflicts were closely linked 
to the conflicts between the FARC and the Popular Liberation Army (EPL) and their urban 
militias,404 to such extent that the EPL, a former leftist guerrilla group, ended up working for 
entrepreneurs and collaborating with state entities.405  Towards the end of the 1980s, 
entrepreneurs felt concerned and threatened by Communist influence, trade union 
movements, and the violence between guerrillas.  Burnyeat explains that this is when the 
Urabá region was re-imagined as a region with natural resources that had to be exploited in 
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order to connect its regional market to international trade and the global economy.406  This 
gave rise to several unrealised economic projects aimed at developing communication 
systems, such as the interoceanic canal or the Pan-American Highway.  This imaginary, very 
much alive today as the Strategic Plan for the 2011–2020 period, forms the justification of 
entrepreneurs’ efforts to bring back order and impose capitalist forms of production and 
exploitation in Urabá through the use of terror and the support of paramilitary groups.   
The 1990s saw the emergence of the paramilitary groups, both in Urabá and at 
national level.  The Córdoba and Urabá United Self-Defense Groups (ACCU) grew around 1993 
and 1994 and would eventually unite with other paramilitary groups to form the Colombian 
United Self-Defense Groups (AUC) in 1997.  In addition, what can be characterised as state-
sponsored paramilitary groups were created by law in 1994 in the Department of Antioquia, 
whose governor at the time was Alvaro Uribe Velez, who would become President in 2002.407  
The Special Services of Surveillance and Private Security, or convivir, received the support of 
General Rito Alejo del Río, then Chief Commander of the 17th Army Brigade created in 1993 
to conduct counter-insurgency operations in Urabá.  These developments triggered the 
highest level of confrontation and violence ever seen in the region.  Paramilitary groups’ 
actions, usually in collusion with the state armed forces, put an end to the presence and 
influence of leftist political parties such as the Communist Party and the Union Patriótica, and 
to the guerrillas’ domination as well.  Between 1995 and 1997, paramilitary groups committed 
several massacres which led to the massive displacement of thousands of people.  The 
massacre of the leaders of the Balsamar cooperative, located where the main settlement of 
the CdPSJA now is, also has a symbolic meaning in the memory of the peace community’s 
members, many of whom participated in the cooperative.  The Balsamar cooperative came 
to symbolise a very specific model of peasant-based development and economy, created in 
1985 with the support of the Dutch.  It promoted values such as autonomous labour and 
trade, the empowerment of peasants, and a development model closely connected to the 
leftist political project led by the Patriotic Union political movement in the region.408  These 
values are the very reasons its leaders were assassinated.  All these elements are to be found 
in the critical consciousness developed by the CdPSJA.  Similarly, many members of the 
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CdPSJA have been involved in the Patriotic Union political movement,409 whose economic and 
political models have strongly influenced the creation of the Peace Community.410  
In the Magdalena Medio region, the beginning of oil exploitation catalysed the first 
waves of colonisation of the twentieth century and led to the creation of Barrancabermeja.  
Oil exploitation also determined the evolution of economic development and social conflicts 
in the whole region.411  From the mid-1950s onward, violence, the armed conflict, and the 
struggle for land conditioned the most recent waves of colonisation.412  Social, political, and 
economic conflicts reflected the exclusion of peasants from the appropriation of natural 
resources and access to land.  The state has been unable to manage these conflicts and 
implement political and social reforms which would benefit all social groups.  The proliferation 
of armed groups and the emergence of drug trafficking in the 1980s lead to new types of 
violence and the displacement of thousands of peasants to urban centres.413 
The Magdalena Medio region, where the ACVC is located, possesses large natural 
wealth and resources, including coca crops, gold, cattle-breeding farms, agribusiness, and 
most of all, oil.  The control of these resources is a key factor for explaining the high level of 
violence in the region.  From the 1980s onward, the drug-trafficking business in the 
Magdalena Medio region brought about a change in the use of land and favoured the 
concentration of private property in the hands of extensive cattle farm owners.  Cattle 
farming activities replaced agriculture and cattle farmers got hold of the most arable lands.  
Drug traffickers also bought a huge amount of land to launder their money and gain territorial 
control in collaboration with paramilitary groups and cattle farmers.  This resulted in the 
formation of large and unproductive stretches of land in order to prevent the fragmentation 
of land in the hands of individual peasants.  The latter were then displaced towards more 
unfertile lands.414  As in Urabá, labour-related conflicts have a long history.  But while in Urabá 
the main economic activities were related to the cultivation of banana, in the Magdalena 
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Medio region the economy was dominated by oil extraction and refinery in Barrancabermeja, 
Yondo, and Cantagallo, and palm oil in Southern Bolivar.  As in Urabá, these labour-related 
conflicts came to be closely linked to the dynamics of the armed conflicts between guerrillas, 
paramilitary, and the state.  The Magdalena Medio region played an instrumental role in the 
emergence of paramilitary groups.  It was indeed one of the first centres of expansion of the 
paramilitary phenomenon, which grew out of the Puerto Boyacá model in the 1980s.415  
Owned by the state in the nineteenth century, the land where the municipality of Puerto 
Boyacá is today located was bought in 1927 by an oil company, the Texas Petroleum Company 
(TPC).  Backed by the state, TPC managed to extend its activities by buying or occupying the 
land of peasant settlers, and started exploiting in 1946.  The demographic and economic 
growth of the region was then determined by activities related to the exploitation of oil.  The 
following decades saw the emergence of social conflicts between TPC and the  peasants, the 
arrival of the FARC in the 1970s, and eventually the counter-insurgency reaction that gave 
birth to the paramilitary project in Puerto Boyacá at the beginning of the 1980s.416  
But the region was also key to the FARC expansion in the 1970s.417  As in Urabá, the 
FARC expansion followed the colonisation process led by peasant migrants.  The 4th Front 
was created and later replaced by the 11th Front. The 1970s and above all the 1980s saw a 
strengthening of the FARC presence in the southern part of the Magdalena Medio region.418  
However, challenged by the emergence of paramilitary groups in Puerto Boyacá from the mid-
1980s, the FARC had to retreat to the northern part of the region where it created new fronts, 
in particular in the Cimitarra River Valley, in South Bolivar, and in the Chucurí zone.419  In the 
1990s, weakened by the activities of paramilitary, drug traffickers, and army operations, the 
FARC concentrated its control in the mountain ranges and forests of the periphery of the 
Magdalena Medio, especially the Serranía de San Lucas, the Cimitarra Valley River, and the 
eastern mountain ranges of the Oriente Antioqueño.420  While maintaining its presence in the 
Serranía de San Lucas, the FARC faced a strong paramilitary and military offensive in the years 
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2000 and 2001.  It was then further weakened and confined to peripheral areas in the 
Cimitarra River Valley, South Cesar, South Bolivar, and Cimitarra.421  
Even though the ACVC was formally created in 1996, the social, economic and political 
movement that led to its birth can be traced back to the 1980s, and even the 1940s.  It is 
intimately linked to peasants’ resistance against the various interests of several actors to 
assert their social, economic, and military control over the land.  From the creation of the 
peasant leagues in the 1940s onward, the peasant population started to organise around the 
defence of its interests.422  A few peasant leaders began to promote the development of a 
peasant economy.  This organisational process led to the creation of community shops or 
cooperatives, each of which was coordinated by an administrative council and an 
administrator.  These community shops and cooperatives then became the centre of this 
economy based on exchange and barter.  In addition, in the 1960s the ANUC encouraged the 
occupation of lands as a protest tool, and the Peasant Coordination of the Magdalena Medio 
(Coordinadora Campesina del Magdalena Medio) promoted peasant protest in Southern 
Bolivar.423  Protests and rallies were organised in 1985, 1987, and 1988, in the municipalities 
surrounding Barrancabermeja, and in the north-eastern part of the Department, to ask for 
basic public services, the respect of human rights, and fight for the defence of the land.  
Several peasant-led organisations managed to mobilise up to 120 000 people, but eventually 
faced the full force of state repression.424  This peasant mobilisation continued during the 
1990s.  About 90 protests were reported, organised around claims for better infrastructure, 
credits, the devolution of stolen land, and the denunciation of human rights violations 
committed by the army and paramilitary groups.425 
At the beginning of the 1990s, several landowners of the region began to feel 
threatened by the organisational and economic strength of this peasant-led process, and 
targeted the cooperatives.426  This is also when the violence caused by the confrontation 
between the state, paramilitary groups, and the guerrillas reached a peak and caused massive 
displacements of population.  The peasants of the region then started to speak out and 
organise protests in order to urge the government to pay attention to their situation.  In 1996, 
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two marches were organised that led to the signing of agreements with the government in 
San Pablo and Barrancabermeja, around the need for social, economic, and agrarian reforms.  
Unfortunately, none of these agreements was implemented.  This and additional paramilitary 
group actions led peasant-led movements to what they named the exodus of 1998.  This 
exodus lasted for 103 days and mobilised around 10 000 peasants. The outcome was the 
signing of new agreements with the government on 4 October 1998.  In addition to renewed 
social and economic commitments, the government reaffirmed its willingness to strengthen 
the fight against paramilitary groups and their supporters in the Magdalena Medio region.427 
Finally, the Carare region428, where the ATCC is located, has been identified under 
different names since the Spanish colonisation – isla del Carare, Carare-Opon, Provincia de 
Velez, and more recently, Nucleo provincial del Carare.  Spanish colonisation caused the 
displacement of the indigenous population Carares, Nauras, and Nauracotas.  Isolated and 
sparsely populated until the eighteenth century, the Carare region was progressively 
populated, in response to the needs of new routes connected to the Magdalena Medio River, 
even before the Independence of Colombia.  Thanks to its strategic location linking the 
Atlantic Ocean to the Province of Antioquia, its natural and agricultural resources, and its 
communication roads, new settlements were established in the nineteenth century around 
the trade of wood and tobacco.  The construction of new roads and the exploitation of oil 
gave a new impulse to the growth of the region at the beginning of the twentieth century.  
From the 1940s onward, the Carare region saw several surges of colonisation arriving to its 
lands, first in an attempt to exploit wood, cultivate cocoa, rice, and vegetables, under the 
direction of departmental authorities. Settler Associations were created around economic 
activities.  Then, people fleeing the violence caused by the confrontation between the Liberal 
and Conservative parties in the 1950s migrated to the Carare region.  In the same decade, 
under the presidency of Gustavo Rojas Pinilla (1952-1958), the government launched new 
economic projects to develop the mining industry and road networks, and attract new settlers 
to the Carare region in search of new economic opportunities.429  The settlement where the 
heart of the ATCC is located, La India, became one of the most important outposts of the 
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region, one of the main economic centres for the trade of banana and wood, and the home 
of the Adventist Church.430 
These struggles between peasants and landowners ended up being resolved through 
tentative agrarian reforms that eventually favoured landowners and rural elites, and 
precipitated the incorporation of free labour at the service of extractive industries or caused 
further displacements of peasants.431  But the struggle for land reform hit a low at the end of 
the 1970s and left the main peasant organisation in a severe crisis.  This crisis would end up 
annihilating peasant protests, including within its most radical sectors.432  In many ways, the 
peasants who started the initiatives under study inherited from this history of struggles and 
resistance.  They inherited particular values, ideologies, and consciousness that would 
eventually find their reflection in the creation of peace communities or associations.  But this 
consciousness was not enough alone to lead to the creation of these peasant communities as 
they are now.  The extreme violence provoked by the armed confrontation between the state, 
paramilitary groups, and guerrillas, placed peasants in an untenable situation that left them 
with no choice but come up with a radical solution.  
‘We had no choice’ 
In all three instances, the creation of particular institutions to protect themselves and defend 
their rights coincided with a situation of extreme violence.  In Urabá, massive displacements 
occurred during 1996 and 1997, following large-scale military operations both in the valleys 
and the Serrania de Abibe. In the Magdalena Medio region, paramilitary violence 
overwhelmed peasants’ settlements.  One of the first ACVC settlements, La Cooperativa, was 
burnt in 1996 by paramilitary groups.  Finally, in the Carare River Valley, peasants recall the 
terrifying number of human bodies that could be seen in the river every day.  The general 
feeling was that peasants could not cope anymore.  This feeling usually led them to say that 
they had no choice but to organise.  In the Carare region, this decision was triggered by the 
ultimatum that the army, in collusion with paramilitary groups, gave to the population.  This 
is how one of the peasants describe the dead-end in which the population found itself, and 
the ultimatum issued by the army:  
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Well, the idea of creating the ATCC… Well, that does not… does not arise from an intentionality as such, 
as in ‘let’s organise in order to create an organisation’ […] The ATCC arose out of an immediate reaction 
that had to be taken in a crucial moment, in which the armed actors placed civilians in the obligation to 
make a commitment. But it does not arise like ‘let’s organise to provide an answer’, but in order to make 
a decision… Let’s put it like that, at the crossroads in which the conflict was in the 1960s, 1970s and 
1980s, that left the whole country and even more concretely the Magdalena Medio region […] in a 
situation characterised by facts that happened then. Eh… in the year 1987, after the armed actors killed 
many peasants, killings which reached the number of 500, maybe more than 600, well, killed peasants. 
Some areas were bombarded as well. So before… In La India, which was kind of the central, eh… market 
place for peasants in the region, paramilitary men and army men took advantage of one of the market 
days, in order to eh… give an ultimatum to the peasants. So, they concentrated them in the public 
square, and told them ‘You have three months to decide. You take arms as guerrilla members, you join 
the paramilitary groups, you take arms in the army, you leave the region, or you die.’  That was the 
origin, that is to say, there was three months for us peasants to decide what we would do. Seize 
weapons, as guerrilla or paramilitary members, or leave the region, because if you don’t you would end 
up like many others before, like many peasants who had been killed.’433 
This quotation, worth citing at length, is interesting because of the interactions between 
agency, consciousness, and structures that can be found at play in this story.  It is as if 
peasants of the Carare region were awoken from their passivity by the dead-end in which 
they found themselves.  The structural conditions of violence imposed by armed actors had 
left them with no choice but to make a choice.  
Paradoxically then, faced with no choice, the peasants found the resources to come 
up with an alternative that symbolises the transition from passiveness to action and stresses 
the importance of labour.  Another member of the ATCC explains that another displacement 
was not a viable option: ‘When we saw this alternative, well, we… where do we go?  (…) a 
family that would go to Bogotá, as busy as this city is [….], would only suffer, endure hard 
conditions.’434 The same peasant goes on to say: ‘So we said no.  What we have to do is arm 
ourselves with values. (…) We will arm ourselves with values, and arm ourselves with working 
tools, shovels, pikes and the rest, to cultivate the land, work on the land.’435  But this 
ultimatum was not the only event that led peasants to find a choice where there was 
seemingly none.  The extreme violence caused by the presence of the FARC, paramilitary 
groups, and the army became unbearable.  The most shocking stories focus on the number of 
bodies going down the river.  But peasants’ accounts of the period preceding the creation of 
the ATCC are also filled with stories of harassments caused by all armed actors.  Many of them 
recall the events connected to the ‘carnetisation’ campaign led by the army. The army asked 
all individuals living in La India to be identified.  They gave everybody a ‘carnet’ to replace 
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their official ID cards in an attempt to control the population and prevent any collaboration 
with the FARC.  This carnet was granted for a specific number of days depending on whether 
the army thought the individual was suspicious or not.  Some had to renew their carnet every 
3 days, some every 15 days.  Considering that the journey to the military base cost money and 
could take up to a day for some peasants, this represented a huge burden for them.  
Humiliations also took place at the military base itself when peasants came to renew their 
carnets.436 
In the Urabá region, the level of violence reached its peak in the years 1996 and 1997 
and also led members of the CdPSJA to come to the conclusion that there was no other option 
but to organise to survive in the midst of the armed conflict.437  According to one of the 
leaders of the CdPSJA, the counter-insurgency and military operation led by the army against 
the FARC did not lead to it defeat.  It led instead to the ‘total extermination of the Patriotic 
Union’ – a political party born out of the peace negotiation between the government and the 
FARC in the 1980s and representing the political interests of the latter – and ‘to raze all 
peasants and indiscriminately displace [them]’.438  This leader carried on to say that staying 
on their land ‘was only the only way to resist’.439 ‘There was no other option’, he said, 
‘because at the end of the day we are peasants who have not studied, and we will not go to 
the city just to starve’.440  He added: ‘This is what we had to do. We had to join forces and if 
they kill us, at least they will kill us together, but there is no other option’.441 
The conviction of being at a dead-end was also accompanied by a feeling of general 
tiredness due to the level of violence reached and the indiscriminate character of the armed 
actors’ reprisals against the population.  Peasants’ recollection of the problem they were 
facing before the creation of the peace community, ZRC, or association, is often rooted in 
concrete instances of violent episodes.  One of the members of the CdPSJA recalls la 
derrota,442 when he had to leave his home to find refuge in San José de Apartadó because of 
paramilitary violence.  When I asked him to tell me his story, Don Alberto asked me whether 
he should start at the very beginning, from the moment he called la derrota, (the defeat)?  
                                                        










Don Alberto was referring to the very day he left his home because of violence caused by the 
activity of paramilitary groups and the army.  Before this day, Don Alberto said that he and 
his brother lived quietly in the vereda Las Playas, part of the corregimiento of Caracoli.  
Guerrilla and paramilitary groups were nowhere to be seen. He recalled the bombings that 
started while he was cooking breakfast.  The army was conducting a counterinsurgency 
operation in collaboration with paramilitary groups in an effort to take control of the region.  
Caught between air bombings, paramilitary checkpoints preventing them reaching the 
nearest main city, Apartadó, and rumours and stories of raids against other peasants’ 
properties and possessions, Don Alberto and his brother did not know what to do.  They finally 
met another group of people, including children, who were fleeing as well.  Together they 
managed to reach San José de Apartadó, a village situated about a 50 minutes’ drive from 
Apartadó.  They were given a farm to share, but paramilitary groups soon raided the farm, 
killed all the animals, and set fire to the ranch.  Don Alberto identified this very moment as 
the beginning of his resistance:  
 It turned out that they took all the beasts, the cows as well. And they set fire to the ranch. They ate the 
pigs, ate the chickens, and set fire to the ranch and there was nothing left. They left us poor. Right. And 
from this moment onward, we started to resist.443  
It is interesting to note that Don Alberto identified the beginning of his resistance with a 
situation where he had nothing to lose.  This also seems to imply that there was no choice.  
Anywhere they went, they would find war and violence.  They had to find another way.  
Another testimony confirms this view:  
Seeing that the situation was getting worse every day and that we had to find alternative ways of living 
to be able to live in the midst of this war, it (the creation of the community) was speeded up, it was 
speeded up before and even more to create the community.444  
Peasants had to find a way to stay on the land, their only chance to successfully resist.  As a 
community, they 
..organised with this purpose in mind, to resist, because we were finally aware that we were not being 
respected, but we bet on resisting in the midst of the armed confrontation, and wishing that, well, at 
least we would show to the world, that another way, a different way, is possible, but that in the end the 
system, the global world model, do not let us. But that it is possible because we are a community, we 
are a group of alive peasants, human beings who live in the midst of this situation, then yes, it is possible, 
but the system do not allow it due to the huge interests.445 
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The creation of these communities was a direct reaction to this extreme situation and 
the conditions analysed so far.  They are the final result of a reflection on the practical 
question ‘What do we do’?  The collective dynamics which were born out of these reflections 
implied the need to challenge what Gramsci calls ‘common sense’, the conception of the 
world and the ideas informed by the ideologies that ruling elites’ use in order to cement their 
hegemony and preserve their economic interests.  In their concrete situation, this common 
sense was not only imposed by the state but also by the very structural conditions imposed 
on them by the armed conflict.  Challenging common sense, and freeing themselves from a 
certain fatalism regarding their situation, allowed peasants to make a choice where there was 
seemingly none.  It also favoured the emergence of a critical collective consciousness, an 
awareness of being part of a bigger community, which would enable them to survive in the 
midst of armed conflict. 
From economic-corporate struggles to struggles for hegemony 
Challenging common sense amounted to redefining the doable.446  For Gramsci, workers were 
to some extent more alienated at the level of ideas than at the level of practice.   The situation 
of Colombian peasants in the 1990s is without any doubt different to that of Italian workers 
in the 1920s.  But the peasants who formed peasant communities chose not to displace 
themselves but to enlarge the field of possible actions, which at first sight seemed unrealistic.  
They did not act according to what was possible, but redefined the doable.  They sought to 
transform the conditions imposed on them by the armed actors, the state and neoliberal 
policies, and developed new principles and discourse in order to survive in the midst of armed 
conflict.  This is well illustrated by an anecdote that preceded the creation of the CdPSJA, 
related by Aparicio.447  When paramilitary violence reached its highest peak in the Serrania 
de Abibe in 1996, thousands of peasants had to flee.  Then Mayor of Apartadó, Gloria Cuartas, 
decided to send buses and trucks to allow the peasants who had been pushed into the 
settlement of San José de Apartadó to leave the area.  Cuartas wanted to take them to safer 
areas, for fear they be forced to flee again or even killed.  However, both the leaders and 
peasants refused to get on the buses and leave.  They would rather stay in San José de 
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Apartadó, and run the risk of being killed than to leave their homes.  This is echoed by Father 
Javier Giraldo, a priest who has been involved with the CdPSJA since its inception and is now 
one of its leaders and organic intellectuals.  He recalled that during the week following the 
creation of the community, the reaction of all armed actors in general and the army in 
particular was incredibly violent.  The army conducted air raids against the various 
settlements of the community and pushed thousands of peasants to flee and leave their 
hamlets: 
So in this moment (the week following the creation of the community), the peasants found refuge in 
the hamlet of San José. And there many of them flew, flew where they had family members, flew to 
other regions of the country, to look for… But a small group of peasants remained of more than… I have 
always calculated that more than 800 people, right. And these were the ones who made a pact of 
resistance, not to be expelled, even though they had to be killed, but not to abandon their land. Well, 
in spite of the aggression which was so strong at this time, and the fact that there were many dead 
people, air raids and all the threats, and in spite of that, here, there was a pact of resistance. They 
imposed one condition, that we (the Intercongregational Commission of Justice and Peace, of which 
Father Giraldo was the director) accompany them 24h per day. And the commission of Justice and Peace 
accompanied them with a small but permanent team, which was always there with them. So this gave 
them some strength and they organised the resistance, that is to say, to resist was not to be displaced. 
Even though they be killed.448 
Another anecdote related to the ATCC illustrates this same refusal to accept the options that 
were imposed on them, to refuse any form of fatalism, and to make a choice that would open 
new possibilities and redefine what was doable.  In May 1987, an ultimatum was sent to the 
peasants of the Carare region by the army and the paramilitary groups.  The latter gathered 
the population of La India in the central square of the village to tell them that they now had 
three options.  They could either join them or the guerrillas, leave the region, or die.  This 
moment is recalled as a turning point in the collective memory of the ATCC.  Faced with what 
looked like a dead-end, some peasants, led by a few leaders, started to engage in discussions 
about possible alternatives to the ultimatum that had been imposed upon them.  This is when 
they came up with the idea of engaging in dialogue with all the armed actors present in the 
region, the Army, the paramilitary groups, and FARC guerrillas.449 
These anecdotes symbolised the will of the peasants not only to break with the 
domination imposed upon them.  They also illustrate their will to break with the fatalism that 
led them to a kind of half-passive, half-forced acceptance of the ideology, rules, and coercion 
imposed by the state, paramilitary groups, and the guerrillas on one hand, and with a feeling 
                                                        





of powerlessness while facing extreme violence on the other.  In the following sections, I 
analyse the process through which the members of peasant communities developed a critical 
consciousness in line with their needs.  Following Gramsci’s insights, I pay attention to the 
process through which the fragmented common sense of peasants evolved into a critical 
consciousness.  I show how losing fear was instrumental to the development of this critical 
consciousness.  It made possible the adoption of new principles and the mobilization of 
everyday practices towards the development of a new common sense that goes beyond 
subaltern groups’ local settings and reach a universal, ethico-political stage aiming at 
protecting any life, as the introductory quote to this chapter illustrates.  This critical 
consciousness was the product of the encounter between ‘higher philosophies’, such as 
Human Rights and International Law, and the popular and traditional values of peasants.  It 
led to the development of a new peasant subject and identity fit for resistance and 
peacebuilding in the midst of armed conflict.  While the birth of this critical consciousness is 
often identified with symbolic events constituted as landmarks by peasant communities’ 
members themselves, I show how everyday practices and the working of memory contributed 
to the emergence and sustainability of this critical consciousness.  Finally, I analyse the role 
of intellectuals, both organic and traditional, in cementing and cohering this critical 
consciousness.  
Dealing with fear: breaking the ‘ley del silencio’ 
In the context of oppressive and authoritarian regimes, Sharp pointed to the need to cast off 
fear as one of the prerequisite of non-violent struggle.450  He was not the first one in doing 
so, as Gandhi’s writings also stress the importance of courage and bravery for the success 
non-violent actions.  In order to act on their consciousness, participants in non-violent 
struggles have to lose fear and accept the violent consequences that may follow as a result of 
these struggles, for instance being tortured, harassed, imprisoned, or even killed.  For Sharp, 
the necessity to cast off fear has political roots, insofar as power not only relies on coercion, 
but also on the cooperation and consent of subjects.  Indeed, the sources of power identified 
by Sharp – i.e., authority, human resources, skills and knowledge, intangible factors, material 
resources, and sanctions – ultimately depend on the obedience of the subjects of this power.  
                                                        




Both the capacity to impose sanctions and the effectiveness of sanctions rest on cooperation, 
either voluntary or enforced.451  The degree to which sanctions produce obedience heavily 
relies on the fear that these sanctions inspire, to such an extent that Sharp talks about the 
‘paralysing political effect of fear’.452  Therefore, it logically follows that the strategic choices 
available to activists, subjects, and resistance movements in order to resist against oppressive 
and authoritarian regimes ‘will be determined by the degree to which the participants have 
become fearless’.  In fact, if members of non-violent movements fear for their lives, the 
movements collapse.453  Sharps sums up well the role of fear within non-violent struggles: 
[…] It is the casting off of one’s fear – or at least the deliberate reduction and control of one’s fear – 
which makes possible the challenge, the persistence in face of repression, and the capacity to bring into 
operation the sources of strength and change which can finally lead to victory. This courage makes 
possible nonviolent discipline in face of severe repression and provocation; and this nonviolent 
discipline is in turn necessary for the operation of the technique. The nonviolence in nonviolent action 
rests upon courage.454 
Sharp’s insight can complement Gramsci’s reflections on consciousness.  In the context of an 
armed conflict, the relationship between consciousness-raising efforts and resistance 
changes in many ways.  The experience of the peasant communities under study suggests that 
peasants were clearly aware of the problems they were facing but were prevented from 
confronting the armed actors for fear of retaliation.  The process through which peasants lost 
fear was therefore key to the self-organisation of the community and the development of a 
concrete proposal of resistance.  A close look at the dynamics of the emergence of peasant 
communities and the narratives of their members suggest that fear and the need for 
protection were amongst the primary motivations for creating, joining and adhering to the 
community’s principles and proposal.  For peasant communities’ grassroots members, this 
decision usually did not find its roots in political or ideological preferences, or stances.  One 
of the members of the CdPSJA explains as follows the reasons why she and her family decided 
to join the community: 
We could not go out alone. Because all the area was dominated by paramilitaries only, by all these 
people. As soon as you went out alone, they would catch you, inquire about you, asking where is the 
other person, or where is… But how could you know? (…) They would catch you to interrogate you. If 
you did not justify yourself (…), take that, the head, they would beat you. You would then feel 
humiliated, and this is the reason why I decided to join the community, because I say that I could not 
work in Mulatos.(…) Another family arrived there and settled on the land in Mulatos. And what did they 
do? They had to come and join the community. They had to flee because they could not stand it either 
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there. Because every night they had to come and wake up in the mountain, because if these people 
caught some of them in the house, they would shoot you in the back of the neck. So, because of this, 
we came here.455 
In the Carare region, in the case of the ATCC, a peasant recalls the time when the guerrillas 
directly warned him to keep his mouth shut.456  He had in fact just arrived to this region, and 
was looking for a piece of land to settle with his family: ‘When I arrived here to this harbour, 
this river, in the same boat as I came I had to come with a group of guerrilla members.’  He 
explained that he was travelling with his mum and brothers in order to find work, as it was 
still possible to find uncultivated land in this region.  The guerrilla members then asked him if 
he knew someone who could recommend him.  He did indeed.  But fear accompanied his 
journey: ‘They did not threaten me, nothing of the sort, but they had me quite worried.  
Because the army had infiltrated the guerrilla (…) They were definitely in command.’  He then 
said that he told the guerrilla where he was going to settle.  To which the guerrilla members 
answered, according to him:  ‘Right, it is fine, it is fine.  In the next few days we will pay you a 
visit […] to explain you what the movement [the FARC] is.’  But the peasant knew well what 
this was about:  ‘The only thing is, look… whoever opens his mouth is dead.  They immediately 
told you.  He [one of the guerrilla members] delicately said “whoever opens his mouth is dead.  
You have not seen anything.’”457  The law of silence was the unofficial rule through which the 
armed actors controlled the population.  However, some individuals would also use the law 
of silence to settle existing personal conflicts.  The opposition between armed actors was used 
to settle accounts within the population.  For instance, to get rid of a neighbour, a person just 
had to tell the guerrilla that the neighbour was working as an informant of the Army.458  This 
was common practice in La India, as one member of the ATCC recalls.459  Once someone was 
accused of collaborating with one or the other armed actor, or of giving away too much 
information about one actor or the other, this was tantamount to a death sentence.  It was 
almost impossible to plead  innocence, although it seems that in the Carare region, in areas 
where the guerrilla was well established and knew the population well, an informal ‘right’ to 
be investigated was sometimes granted.  But most of the time, killings and assassinations 
were indiscriminate, thus increasing the feeling of fear and uncertainty. 
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The process through which the members of peasant communities in resistance lost 
fear and still dealt with fear explains why we witness a continuous exchange between 
strategies of overt resistance, and strategies of covert resistance.  In the three cases under 
study, the latter were necessary in order to come up with the former.  When peasants of the 
Carare region were faced with the ultimatum already mentioned, one of the difficulties they 
found related to the danger that represented the organisation of meetings and gatherings to 
decide what to do.  One of the members that participated in these meetings explains the 
tactics they had to employ in order to escape the control of the armed actors: 
These meetings were conceived in the following way. (…) it was not possible to gather four, five, or six, 
or a group of people (…) But the strategy was that, I had an idea so I told it to someone else, this 
someone else to another one, and then we would meet. So we would socialize what we were thinking, 
what we believed, thought and believed, regarding the strategy of how to face, let’s put it like that, the 
situation we were going through with the [armed] actors.460  
This founding member of the ATCC carried on explaining that guards were required in order 
to be able to carry out these meetings.  These guards would: 
…give the alert when they would see something strange. And if we would be meeting now in this house 
here, we would not meet again here. But we had to go somewhere else. And this is how ideas started 
to be raised […], and the whole thing started to be organised, and organising how to deal with the 
situation became possible.461 
In addition to the presence of guards, other stratagems were employed to keep the meetings 
secret, such as the ‘strategy of the stones on the roof’.  At the very moment the guards would 
spot danger, they would throw a stone at the roof of the house where people were meeting: 
‘This was an alert. This meant, go away.’462 
The process through which peasants lost their fear is not a linear relationship of cause 
and effect.  It is not possible either to identify a precise moment when people lost fear, even 
though some peasants recall certain moments as pivotal: 
The fear was dreadful. There was everybody by the bank of the river. Brother Simon was very important. 
Everybody by the bank of the river. And nobody would dare get in the rowboat. And he got in. ‘let’s go 
and come back alive’. And when they saw that he got in the rowboat, with such optimism, people 
followed him. This is why they could go and meet there, with the… with the… with the commandant 
(the local FARC commandant, alias Geronimo). So, you see, there was one individual who tomo la 
batuta, “let’s go, let’s go, we will definitely come back!’ And many people were waiting the moment 
when they could see them come down the river, in the… in the water! Because without knowing… 
without knowing what would happen there, you see. So, this is how it happened. He was the one who 
took… ‘let’s go, let’s go because God is with us, and we will go and we will come back’.463 
                                                        







Rather, losing fear is a process that happened over a period of time and is still happening to 
some extent, insofar as the members of these communities still have to deal with fear.  This 
process highlights a dialectical relationship between losing fear itself, and the actions whose 
purpose is to break the law of silence, such as speaking up against human rights violation or 
directly confronting the armed actors.  This point is well illustrated by Jerez,464 a member of 
the ACVC and director of the Peasant Reserve Zone National Association (ANZORC): 
Clearly, people were being deprived of their lands (…). And how did [paramilitary groups] do it? Well, 
using terror, murders, the quartering of bodies, all this was like… Now, when the ACVC was created, we 
had to denounce all this, because people were scared. We had to denounce, it was very important (…).465   
But neither is the process of losing fear an even one.  In this regard, it is also in a 
dialectical relationship with actions aiming at strengthening the collective strength of the 
community and cementing its cohesion, such as those actions aiming at restoring confidence 
between people.  After describing the dead-end in which peasants of the Carare region found 
themselves in 1987, when ‘there was nowhere to go’, one of the early members of the ATCC 
explains:  
We [the peasants] did not understand Josué,466 what he wanted to say, because I answered him many 
times, I mean, ‘You can get yourself killed but I won’t […] Organise yourself, get yourself killed, but not 
me…’ Because I thought that, directly, if one spoke, one would be killed. No!.467 
Building trust and solidarity between people was important for them to lose their fear and  
make possible the sharing of fear between all.  Fear gradually decreases as the collective 
construction of a community binds people together, breaking individual logics; a feeling of 
belonging to this very community starts emerging.  This can be put down to solidarity, as a 
member of the ATCC explains: 
(…) if you are about to die, you don’t die alone but everybody dies, or nobody. And this eases the fear, 
between all of us… That is to say, you are going to jump into the river and you don’t know how to swim, 
right. But someone tells you, ‘jump, I will help you out if you are drowning.’ And someone else says: 
‘jump!’ And you see that there are so many people that it is not possible for you to drown. Yes or no? 
This, if you jump with someone, but if you are alone, what happens? Do you jump? No! If I jump I drown! 
So, this is important, the unity.468 
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But the need to deal with fear also led to the creation of a new cultural identity 
because of the collective dynamics of the organisational processes of peasant communities’ 
initiatives.  For instance, just a few days after the CdPSJA released its declaration on 23 March 
1997, proclaiming its neutrality, the army conducted operations with the support of 
paramilitary groups which led to the forced displacement of hundreds of peasants.  Most of 
them flew to urban centres, but about 800 decided to stay in the hamlet of San José.469  
Occupying empty houses, fearing for their lives, suffering from a lack of food, no humanitarian 
assistance, and state neglect,470 peasants agreed to sign a pact of resistance.471  They decided 
to stay, whatever the cost.  Through meetings, discussions, and solidarity, peasants started to 
collectively organise in order to survive in the midst of the extreme violence they were facing, 
with the support of the Church, the Intercongregational Commission of Justice and Peace 
(CIJP), and the International Committee of the Red Cross.  The four months which followed 
saw the concretisation of the principles and norms set out in the March declaration.  This 
period is when organic intellectuals were born and when the rules of the community were 
formulated.  For Burnyeat, it is also during this period of time that what was originally 
conceived as a protection strategy in the midst of armed conflict became a ‘political 
community’.472  A feeling of being a community was born,473 and with it the working groups 
so important to the philosophy of the community.  This feeling of belonging is still at the core 
of the community’s critical consciousness today, as the words of one of the leaders of the 
community illustrates.  He explains that the initiative of the CdPSJA is a form of ‘solidarity-
based resistance’, whose most important task is to create a ‘consciousness anchored in our 
heart’ through efforts to collectively reflect on a daily basis on the path we are heading to’.  
He goes on to say that this ‘has led them to (…) have a consciousness, and war taught us to 
live as a community, and it is very clear to us that this is what we want’.474  In my view, this 
feeling of belonging and organisational process enabled the community’s members to 
collectively deal with fear, which strengthened the withdrawal of consent to the domination 
of armed actors.  Indeed, the process of losing fear is intimately linked to the act of denying 
this consent to the armed actors’ intimation and to the refusal to obey to their will.  A member 
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of the CdPSJA explains why it was important to lose fear in order to speak up to the armed 
actors:  
For instance, the guerrilla comes forward to tell you that, well, to ask you questions, or to ask you for 
favours above all, as a way of asking favours, well one has to say no, we don’t take orders from any of 
the armed actors. Because, and tell them why, not to be afraid of telling them the truth. The same with 
the public armed forces. Not being afraid to tell them that we can’t be with anyone of them because 
you all do us harm.475 
This shows that the effectiveness of the law of silence is not only based on coercion 
or terror, but also on the consent, albeit passive, of the population.  This dialectical dynamic 
between coercion and consent finds its manifestation in the cooperation of some individuals 
with the armed actors, be they guerrillas or paramilitary groups.  In addition to fear, a certain 
lack of trust, individualism, and sometimes indifference led some individuals to see obedience 
to the armed actors’ orders as the best way to survive in the midst of the conflict.  This is 
especially clear in the case of the ATCC.  A member of this association recalled how difficult, 
not to say impossible, it was to organise public meetings before the creation of the 
organisation.  He also mentioned that they ‘did not trust [in each other] because then some 
used to work for paramilitary groups, others for the guerrilla […] this is what we used to 
experience’.476  The fact that the domination of illegal armed groups was also grounded, to 
some extent, in the consent of the population is well expressed by another member of the 
ATCC who provides a very clear illustration of the dialectical relationship between losing fear 
and the development of a critical consciousness.  He explains that in 1988, a year after the 
creation of the ATCC, ‘the most terrific aspects [of the conflict] faded, such as the law of 
silence, the indifference, (…) the non-brotherhood’.  According to him. this feeling of 
indifference meant that there was ‘no consciousness of some sort about saying that the 
neighbour was my brother as well’.  On the contrary, for him ‘this indifference made possible 
the fact that in a particular region, the majority of the population, everybody would act and 
feel alone… and would do what seemed best for his own person.’  As in the case of the CdPSJA, 
losing fear was then intimately linked to the development of a new critical consciousness that 
would strengthen the social cohesion of the population and encourage people to ‘engage with 
each other again.’  As my interviewee explained, ‘This region was colonised by many, many 
people in provenance of different parts of the country.  So the first challenge was how to put 
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an end to this indifference, and the other was how to foster reconciliation.’  Losing fear and 
the strengthening of social cohesion and relationships then represented the first steps to the 
development of principles, strategies, and agreements in order to resist in the midst of armed 
conflict.  He went on to say that ‘from then on’, it was really about: 
developing a common criteria and define a few rules. And these rules were considered as cohabitation 
pacts, and these pacts were agreed between the civil population in its entirety, between peasants, this 
gave ground for the definition of mutual respect pacts between the actors, for the engagement in 
dialogue, but these dialogues had to be well defined and had to have a… a… say, a process of how these 
dialogues were going to be. Transparency, open dialogues, and, dialogues of mutual understanding, for 
instance (inaudible), dialogues where, where, where the primary condition was being able to 
understand and being in a position to listen to each other. So, these leaders came up with a well-crafted 
strategy about how the dialogues would be, how would reconciliation work, how would forgiveness 
work, also because it was… it was… say, this very reconciliation was also an exercise of forgiveness with 
the very [armed] actors, because let’s say that in the progress of the dialogues, who was actually talking 
to the [armed] actors? It was the widows and widowers, the orphans, eh… anybody who was a victim 
of (Inaudible) were those who sat down to talk with their aggressors. And to say ok, we can do an act of 
forgiveness. We have allied but we are going to respect our ways of thinking. And this meant that eh… 
that this forgiveness was being able to show an example to the new generation that the facts that 
occurred in the past would not be repeated, to the sons of our sons, right? How to start building a space 
where dialogue was the driving force for understanding all these differences and for searching ways out 
eh… eh… like how to live together, to search for ways out that would allow us to stay on our land.477 
In this quotation, all the elements which enabled the development of a critical consciousness 
are present.  The identification of strategies to counter the actions of armed actors and 
withdraw consent, the development of principles and norms, the role of memory, and the 
role of organic intellectuals are all key stages of the development of a new critical 
consciousness.  What the authors of El orden desarmado argue regarding the ATCC can be 
applied to the CdPSJA and the ACVC: 
During the emergence [of the association] a process of identity creation occurred in which the 
community distinguished itself from armed actors, acquired a feeling of belonging as a group and claim 
the right to decide, as community, how to organise itself and [choose] the path that the collective life 
project should take.478 
It is these elements and processes that I analyse in more details in the following sections.  
Withdrawing consent: Non-violence, neutrality and human rights 
Few studies have paid attention to the capacity of civilians to oppose resistance to armed 
actors. Kaplan argues that the success of this withdrawal of consent usually relies on the 
existence of social interactions between armed groups and civilians other than through 
violence, and the existence of a collective organisation supporting civilians’ demands.479  
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Building on the previous section, I push this argument further to show that the institutional 
element, i.e., the mere existence of an institution, is not enough to explain the logic and 
dynamics of the process of withdrawing consent.  Losing fear and the design of a political 
proposal in line with peasants’ consciousness of their own dignity, autonomy, and rights, were 
both instrumental to withdraw consent in an effective way.  In this regard, the choice for non-
violence, the adoption of a neutral position, and the use of a human rights discourse 
symbolise the emergence of a critical consciousness which aims to break with the logic and 
dynamics of armed conflict by withdrawing consent to the armed actors’ domination.  These 
principles eventually reached peasant communities through external actors, such as the 
Church, national human rights organisations, and international NGOs.  However, this new 
critical consciousness also builds on more traditional peasant values, such as dignity, 
autonomy and labour, as well as on the everyday experience of peasants. 
The success of withdrawing consent is intimately linked to the existence of a proposal 
that puts together the logic and principles of such an initiative.  One of the leaders of the 
ACVC explains: 
If there is no organisation, if there is no proposal, well, the relationship between peasants and guerrillas 
is likely to be characterised by subordination, that is to say, the peasants would be subordinated to the 
presence of strong guerrilla, with a lot of economic power, with military power and with political power, 
because they are… they… are within the territories, and they exert a certain political power, of control, 
of… the… that is to say, they are like a state within the state with whom you have to talk, reach 
agreements, agree, or disagree, yes.480 
It is not enough to say ‘no’ or to deny in discourse only the domination of armed actors.  As I 
have shown, losing fear represents a first step towards a break with a kind of passive 
acceptance of their own domination.  The creation of a discourse justifying their position, 
backed by the creation of an institution, was the second step towards withdrawing consent.  
Considered as a political proposal, the institutions created by the CdPSJA, the ACVC, and the 
ATCC take a concrete expression in the form of an organisation, association, or community.  
While the logic behind withdrawing consent is similar in all three cases, the concrete 
modalities of this process differed quite sensibly.  The ATCC engaged in dialogue with both 
legal and illegal armed actors while the CdPSJA and the ACVC decided to break all 
relationships with illegal armed actors.  The ATCC reached agreements with illegal armed 
actors and the army while the decision of the CdPSJA and the ACVC was unilateral and was 





not negotiated with any of the armed actors.  For the CdPSJA’s members, this meant a cultural 
change, as Burnyeat shows,481 something which I explore further in Chapter 3.  The context 
in which these communities were first created was also different.  The ATCC was born in 1987, 
at a time when the international human rights cooperation did not have the influence it would 
have a decade later, when the ACVC and the CdPSJA were created.  Finally, the historical 
context and political culture of the three regions where these communities are located is also 
to be taken into account in order to understand the differences characterising their critical 
consciousness.  This historical context and the political struggles form the ideological terrain 
onto which this critical consciousness emerged.  
All three communities decided to adopt non-violence as a core principle of their 
struggles.  But while in the case of the CdPSJA and the ACVC the possibility of armed resistance 
was never considered, the founding members of the ATCC did reflect on the relevance of such 
a violent alternative.  This shows that the adaptation of non-violence in the case of the ATCC 
was a combination of pragmatism and moral considerations.482  In fact, Josué Vargas, the first 
president and an outstanding leader of the early years of the ATCC first advocated the 
necessity to take arms.483  According to the authors of ‘El orden desarmado’, the voices 
advocating for the violent option were discarded by a combination of pragmatic 
considerations and the influence of the Adventist Church.484  The awareness that the violent 
option would just end up fuelling the conflict without bringing about any kind of progressive 
change seems to have played a role in pushing the decision in favour of non-violence.485  This 
is true for all three communities.  But for the ATCC, making such a decision in the 1980s was 
not easy.  Indeed, during its early phase, the ATCC could not benefit from the institutional 
support of national and international NGOs or international organisations for its protection.  
As for the withdrawal of consent and the adoption of non-violence, the neutrality 
principle operated in practice according to different modalities in each case.  However, in the 
three cases of the CdPSJA, the ATCC, and the ACVC, its aim was to distinguish civilians from 
armed combatants in order to guarantee the protection of the former.  Article 2 of the 
declaration released by the CdPSJA on the day of its creation defines the community as ‘part 
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of peasant and civilian population, non-combatant and which, in spite of the conduct of 
hostilities, will be protected no matter how rigorous confrontations are’.486  In addition, in 
Article 3, the declaration imposed rules on the community’s members.487  They must not take 
part in the armed confrontation, be it directly or indirectly, and must fulfil the following 
conditions.  The first is ‘to refrain from carrying and/or have arms or explosive material’.  The 
second is ‘to refrain from providing any logistical support to one side or the other of the 
conflict’.  And the third is ‘to refrain from resorting to the armed actors in order to solve 
internal, personal, or family-related problems’.  For the members of the CdPSJA, this 
represented a change in practices and habits regarding their relationship with armed actors, 
in particular with the guerrillas, with whom they had a political and historical relationship.488 
They had to stop selling food or providing water, not only to FARC combatants but to  the 
army as well.  In other words, it represented a break with the fragmented common-sense-
dictating behaviour which was imposed on them by armed actors, even if saying ‘no’ meant 
having to face retaliation.  This was the only way civilians could survive in the midst of armed 
conflict and put an end to the endless humiliations489 and accusations of belonging to one or 
the other side.  In all three cases, the idea of neutrality was a product of different scales, 
actors, and influences.  Finally, to some extent, the adoption of a human rights discourse 
symbolises the transition from an economic-corporate struggle to a struggle for hegemony.  
The use of such a discourse makes a start at locating peasant struggles within a more universal 
framework.  It also represents a first step towards the articulation of the significance of these 
struggles for peacebuilding in Colombia.  I elaborate on this last point in Chapter 5 in relation 
to the making of alternative historical blocs.  
In parallel to these rules and principles, peasant communities have developed a critical 
consciousness that combines these principles with more traditional peasant values, such as 
dignity, autonomy, and solidarity.  Both these principles and traditional values are being 
reflected within their everyday practices.  The everyday then becomes the site where this 
critical consciousness is being sustained and maintained.  It is through their everyday practices 
that peasant communities managed to break with the dynamics of the armed conflicts and 
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change their position or representation within this conflict.490  For the members of the 
CdPSJA, the ATCC, and the ACVC, being neutral meant changing their everyday practices in 
order to stop being involved in the armed conflict.  It not only involved changing their 
behaviour towards armed actors, but also how they related to each other.  In this regard, one 
of the leaders of the CdPSJA explained that their initiative is ‘an organisational response 
building on a daily basis’.491  He went on to say that these principles and values have to be 
sustained day after day as ‘he who does not build on a daily basis gets lost within the struggle.  
Everything ends the day he stops fighting.’  As a community, their action is then collective, 
such as the working groups or the collective labour, ‘because within a situation such as the 
one we are going through, it is not possible to resist on your own’.492  Another member of the 
CdPSJA added that the identification to these principles are ‘a fundamental basis’ for the 
community, ‘as [they] are autonomous and [they] are different to many other organisations 
that, one way or another, have always opted for individualism, egoism, and for [receiving] 
state benefits’.  These principles are then ‘very useful to identify ourselves as a true peace 
community’.493  The everyday life of the CdPSJA shows that those special and symbolic 
moments, which were constituted as landmarks in the building of resistance, are not the only 
elements playing a role in sustaining the collective and individual consciousness of peasant 
communities’ members.  This new critical consciousness is also sustained through everyday 
practices, such as cultivating the land, participating in the working groups once a week, or 
going to school.  These three moments, awareness-raising efforts, memory building, and 
everyday practices are entangled within the experience of peace community members.  This 
is quite clear in the words of the legal representative of the CdPSJA at the time of my 
fieldwork.  He said that everyday life within the community is a ‘truly and incredibly deep 
experience’ and ‘a labour full of teachings’.  He added:  
The everyday means building consciousness with every passing day, and a reflection regarding the fact 
that this [the community’s resistance] is very important, that there is no other way out than this one, 
the search for peace. So I think that the everyday has enabled us to… enabled us to maintain ourselves, 
with every passing day we think and analyse and that, and that we can reflect on the importance of the 
community, which is truly where in spite of so many deaths, so much horror we have been through in 
this region, I think that this has turned into hope, I don’t think we have realised that all these aggressions 
and deaths, well, they could have led us to stop the struggle because of… No! I think that we have 
suffered so much pain that the pain has turned into hope and we think that this is the way we fight, 
                                                        







when the pain has turned into hope, I think that we can carry on for days on end and we can be assured 
that we are doing it.494 
While this collective dimension is present in the charter of the ATCC in that members 
of the association have to ‘associate in order to guarantee the right to life and work’,495 its 
charter seems to indicate that it conceives of itself as an association of individuals rather than 
aiming to form a collective unity.  Article 2.e states that ‘the Association and its members 
considered as individuals, do not involve themselves in any way with armed actors, and stay 
foreign and impartial to subversive and paramilitary groups [operating] in the region’.496  The 
charter also reflects another dividing line between the critical consciousness developed by 
the ATCC and the CdPSJA.  While the latter, since its inception, has been critical of the state 
and will eventually ‘break’ with the state, the former affirms in its charter the need to 
‘cooperate with state organisms in the social and economic rehabilitation processes in the 
area’.  It also recognises the ‘legitimately constituted authority of the national army’, calling 
to respect its sovereignty.497  Finally, even if the ACVC is also formally an association and has 
not formulated a narrative of organic unity as the CdPSJA has, the collective dimension of its 
initiative is much more important than in the case of the ATCC.  This is particularly visible in 
the production dimension of its economic practices, in the way it engages in politics, and in 
its relationship to the territory.  These differences can be explained historically and 
contextually.  The ATCC has suffered much more from FARC violence and coercion, while in 
the case of the CdPSJA and the ACVC, the relationship was more consensual, even though it 
cannot be characterised as collaboration.  Similarly, the influence of the Communist party and 
other leftist movements has always been stronger in the regions where the CdPSJA and the 
ACVC are located, whereas in the Carare region, the traditional Conservative and Liberal 
political parties have remained dominant.  Finally, the CdPSJA and the ACVC have also been 
exposed to the influence of the international human rights movement, which has developed 
a highly critical vision of the state.  All these elements help explain why some traces of the old 
fragmented common sense remain in the narrative of the ATCC, but not in the case of the 
CdPSJA and the ACV.   
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This critical consciousness can be found clearly articulated by the mouths of leaders 
and supporters of the three peasant communities under study.  However, as I came to 
understand during my fieldwork, while grassroots members of the communities all agree with 
these principles, their understandings of these principles usually focus on their concrete 
application.498  In other words, they will not always be able to explain in detail the reasons 
behind these principles, but they know perfectly how they are to be put in practice.  This 
discrepancy between leaders and grassroots members points towards the importance of 
organic and traditional intellectuals in the development of peasant communities’ initiatives.  
It is to their role that I now turn to.  
Leaders and organic intellectuals 
The best known of Gramsci’s characterisation of intellectuals is his distinction between 
organic and traditional intellectuals.  Within the category of traditional intellectuals, I include 
those traditional intellectuals who support peasant communities from within international 
organisations, NGOs, and even embassies.  Their role can be reduced to two functions. First, 
they not only help peasant communities in organising the resistance, but also in processing 
legal cases against the state and paramilitary groups in order to get some kind of justice and 
discover the truth in relation to the several massacres, disappearances, and displacements 
they have suffered.  Lawyers belonging to Colombian NGOs have had prominent roles in this 
regard, as have members of national NGOs.  Second, those traditional intellectuals who 
contribute to the protection of peasant communities and have a political role in connecting 
the local struggle of peasant communities with broader issues related to peacebuilding and 
the state in Colombia.  International NGO workers, embassy and United Nations officials, but 
also Colombian intellectuals are included in this category.  I analyse their role in more detail 
in the next chapter, which deals with the protection strategies used by peasant communities 
to protect both their territory and members.  
I also consider as traditional intellectuals people who have contributed to the creation 
and maintenance of the peasant communities under study without being organically tied to 
peasant communities. Burnyeat has shown the role played by the Intercongregational 
Commission of Justice and Peace (CIJP) in the creation of the CdPSJA and the few years that 
                                                        




followed.499  Motivated by socialist ideas and influenced by the liberation theology, this 
organisation has connected the community’s struggle with national and international 
organisations and movements.  It is through the CIJP that the CdPSJA managed to receive the 
support of Peace Brigades International, an international NGO that ensures protective 
accompaniment for human rights defenders.  The CIJP has also contributed to the 
development of the CdPSJA’s critical consciousness, in particular regarding the adoption of a 
human rights discourse and the neutrality principle.  The CIJP’s own representation of the 
community describes it as a practice in resistance and a humanising process against the 
negative impact of capitalism.500  The CIJP’s ideas have not only clearly left their mark on the 
CdPSJA’s narrative, but also on their concrete decisions.  The decision to break all relationship 
with the state echoes the institutional mistrust in the state, portrayed as a terrorist state, that 
the CIJP shared with the community.  In addition, in the three regions under investigation, the 
influence of the Church was instrumental in the struggle of peasants to survive and resist in 
the midst of the armed conflict, as I have already mentioned in relation to the adoption of 
non-violence.  As for the former, the idea of a non-violent and neutral community was 
suggested by the Archbishop of Apartadó before being appropriated by peasants of the 
Serrania de Abibe.  The CdPSJA was also accompanied by the CIJP during the first few years 
after its creation.  Father Giraldo, who was a member of the CIJP, still accompanies the 
community and can now be considered as one of its main leaders.  In the case of the ACVC, 
the Diocese of Barrancabermja was an important support ever since the exodo campesino in 
1998 and still supports the ACVC’s initiatives today.  In this regard, the Archbishop of 
Barrancabermeja, Monsignor Castrellón, intervened during the introduction of the National 
Meeting of Peasant, Afro-descendent and Indigenous Communities for the Land and Peace of 
Colombia, organised by the ACVC in August 2011.  In addition, another churchman, Father 
Francisco de Roux, also supported the ACVC in the development of economic projects and 
joined the ACVC in dialogue with illegal armed actors when he was director of the Magdalena 
Medio Peace and Development Program.  Some of them had the role of intermediaries 
between the armed actors and the communities, or between the state and peasants.  The 
Archbishop of Apartadó, for instance, first gave the idea of forming a neutral community to 
the peasants of San José de Apartadó, and took the final proposal to the armed actors.  In the 
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case of the ATCC and the CdPSJA, the distinction between organic and traditional intellectuals 
blurs when it comes to the role of priests in the creation and cohesion of the association.  
Indeed, some of them had and have been living in the area for a long time.  As founding 
members of the ATCC, they participated in the discussions after the ultimatum received by 
the population in 1987, and led the dialogue with the armed actors afterward.  They had a 
direct influence on the adoption of non-violence principles.  They also contributed to the 
cohesion and internal strength of the community through their more direct role as priests, 
i.e., in the organisation of masses and religious ceremonies.  In addition, as for the CDPSJA, a 
priest came to be organically linked to the community’s struggle.  While Father Javier Giraldo 
first started to accompany the CdPSJA as a member of the CIJP, he eventually became part of 
the Internal Council of the Community and still assumes a key political, social, legal, and 
religious role within the community. 
Alongside those traditional intellectuals, all three peasant communities have 
developed what Gramsci calls ‘organic intellectuals’.  All the members of the three peasant 
communities under study affirm that a few individuals played an instrumental role in the 
process that led to the creation of these peasant communities and in the success of their 
struggle.  These ‘organic intellectuals’ can be categorised under two different categories.  On 
one hand are those who emerged directly from the peasant communities.  They were born 
during the very organisational processes that would lead to the creation of the CdPSJA, the 
ATCC, and the ACVC.  On the other are those who joined their struggle and came to be 
organically linked to the resistance of these communities.  In both cases, organic intellectuals 
played a key role in strengthening the three processes that have been highlighted , losing fear, 
withdrawing consent, and adopting non-violent principles.  Intellectuals had both a social and 
a political function.  They contributed to the strengthening of the internal cohesion of each 
community through awareness-raising and memory-building efforts, pushed the creation of 
institutions that would eventually support the political proposal of the communities, and 
influenced the ideas that would accompany the resistance of these communities.  In other 
words, they contributed to the emergence of a new peasant critical consciousness and were 
key to the organisational process of the communities’ initiatives.  In addition to these 
functions, they have developed more elaborated versions of the critical consciousness 
analysed above.  Jesús Emilio, one of the most prominent leaders of the CdPSJA, is the most 




consciousness, both through their contact with international actors and their experience as 
peasant farmers.  For him, resisting is ‘the voluntary decision of a person who does not agree 
with injustices’501. He says that the economic, political and social system according to which 
the world is organised is profoundly unjust: ‘In the end the system is a millenary dictatorship 
(…). Wherever you look, there is this dictatorship of power. Kings, empires, capitalism… (…). 
This has always been like this and will go on like this forever.’502  He divides the world in two 
parts.  One refers to an unfair way of thinking, and the other is a way of thinking akin to 
resistance.  No matter how big or widespread injustices are, they cannot eradicate the latter 
way of thinking.  However, he goes on to say that ‘it is not because we think differently that 
we will change the world.’503  In fact, the vast majority of humanity takes part in these 
injustices, compete within the system and enjoy the system.  This way of life or system is 
nowadays being sold as ‘development’, and human beings strive for this way of life.  As a 
result, humanity ‘will go from bad to worse’ and injustices will increase together with 
violence.  This is the result of the economic system, within which ‘humanity does not fit’, and 
which is ‘against humanity for money’.504  I portray other organic intellectuals and analyse 
their specific roles and functions in more detail throughout the following chapters in relation 
to peasant communities’ strategies of war of position and the making of new historical blocs.  
For now, it is enough to say that they are in my view key to making the link between what 
Gramsci refers to as ‘two theoretical consciousnesses (or one contradictory consciousness)’, 
one that reflects a man’s practice, and another one that is ‘superficially explicit or verbal’.505  
They help resolve within the consciousness of each individual member of peasant 
communities this discrepancy between theory and practice through overcoming fear and 
elaborating principles which allow them to survive in the midst of armed conflict.  At the 
collective level, they contribute to the ‘unity between ‘spontaneity’ – those traditional 
peasant values and stories of oppression and violence – on one hand, and ‘conscious 
leadership’ – symbolised by the principles and norms designed within each community – on 
the other, which ‘is precisely the real political action of the subaltern classes’.506 
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I have shown that the emergence of a critical consciousness was key to the creation and 
current existence of the CdPSJA, the ATCC, and the ACVC.  A rise in their consciousness 
allowed them to overcome the fatalism and determinism that, together with coercion, is at 
the origin of their passivity.507  It gave rise to a new conception of the world that peasants 
applied to their external world in order to change it.  An analysis of the process through which 
peasants lost fear and the social dynamics accompanying it helps explains how peasants 
managed to overcome the fragmented common sense imposed on them by armed actors and 
political society alike.  This critical consciousness allowed peasant communities to break with 
this common sense, and place politics at the centre of their relationships with armed actors 
and the state.  But it also represents a break with more traditional political adhesion by 
leading to new political forms, practices, and alliances that are asymmetrical to the ruling 
elites’ political practices.  In all three cases, what began as a protection need would soon 
evolve into peace initiatives going beyond peasants’ corporate interests.  The success of the 
CdPSJA and the ACVC in sustaining their initiatives and the decay of the ATCC can be explained 
by referring to how this critical consciousness has evolved and has been sustained over time.  
In addition, the fact that there remained some elements of the old fragmented common sense 
in the principles and norms designed by the ATCC – in particular in relation to the state – helps 
explain why the former could not maintain the autonomy of its early years.  It ended up partly 
co-opted by the state and other external actors.  That said, all three communities contributed 
to the emergence of a new peasant subject fit for resistance in the midst of armed conflict.  
By stressing notions of autonomy, dignity, and neutrality backed by a human rights discourse, 
I have argued that the peasant initiatives under study represent a break from both traditional 
political ideologies and previous peasant-led attempts in Colombia to challenge the power 
structures that are at the root of their alienation.  This new critical consciousness and the 
political culture that comes with it have already had a huge impact at local level and represent 
a huge asset for an eventual post-conflict setting.  I discuss this potential for peacebuilding in 
relation to the peace agreement reached by the state and the FARC in Chapter 5.  But before 
doing that, I carry on the analysis of the CdPSJA, the ATCC, and the ACVC in relation to how 
they can challenge the power that is at the source of their alienation.  I take a close look into 
                                                        




how they establish some kind of control over their territory (Chapter 3) and make new 





Chapter 4: ‘Making’ the Territory: the spatial politics of peasant communities 
Introduction 
Anecdotes 
The banner located at the entrance of the CdPSJA contains a warning to any visitor.  The 
territory of the community is private property and access is not permitted without due 
authorisation.  In any other context, this warning would leave passers-by with the feeling that 
behind this gate lives an unsympathetic, conservative neighbour, keen to enforce their 
individual right to private property and ensure that nobody trespasses.  But behind this gate 
lives a community which has been resisting armed conflict for the past 18 years.  In fact, this 
warning is mostly aimed at the Colombian armed forces and the illegal armed groups 
operating in the region.  Still, it is hard to understand how such a banner can successfully 
protect the community, and I wonder what the point of such a seemingly powerless warning 
in front of brute force and violence is.  The banner next to the warning presents us with a 
similar puzzle.  It lists all the principles attached to the territory of the community.  It states 
that members of the community commit to not carry arms; to not drink alcohol; to fight for 
justice and against impunity; to not receive any money as part of the individual compensation 
of victims; to not to sow illegal crops; to not manipulate or hand over information to any of 
the armed actors; to not participate in the armed conflict, either directly or indirectly.  Still, 
we are left with a puzzle.  How can these principles possibly contribute to the protection of a 
territory and its people? 
This chapter is about the strategies employed by the CdPSJA, the ACVC, and the ATCC 
to protect and ‘make’ this territory.  Space plays an important role in the resistance by these 
communities, to such an extent that it is possible to make a case for conceiving the peasant 
communities’ initiatives as territorial, or spatial, projects.  Peasant communities need a 
territory to be able to challenge the power of armed actors, the state, and multinational 
companies. This territory is filled with principles and ideologies.  These visible principles 
provide a specific representation of these territories and civilians as neutral actors in the 
midst of the armed conflict.  Analyses of peasant communities’ resistance are too often 
normative and present these principles as the key factor in the success of civil resistance led 




material relations which contribute to the making of this very same territory.  These material 
relations are inscribed within places, networks, and scales.  In this chapter, I analyse the 
complex strategical interactions between places, networks, and scales that converge towards 
a given territory to both ensure its protection and create counter-hegemonic spaces for 
peace.  That allows me to provide an explanation of peasant communities’ strategies that not 
only puts the emphasis on norms and on the consent aspect of peasant communities’ power, 
but also on the territorial character of these strategies and the material aspect of their power.  
This chapter represents an effort to understand how peasant communities ‘make’ 
spaces on which their consciousness, or conception of the world, can be enacted and put into 
practice to establish more peaceful social relations.  Indeed, to understand the contribution 
to peacebuilding by the three peasant communities of the CdPSJA, ACVC, and ATCC, I argue 
that it is not enough to rely on a normative, descriptive, and historical account of these 
initiatives.  The spatial dimension is key to accounting for the success of peasant communities 
in protecting their territory, claiming their rights, and growing as a community.  By integrating 
a spatial dimension to the Gramscian framework of analysis used so far, I further use 
Gramsci’s understanding of power as both coercion and consent in order to explain the 
outcome of peasant communities’ non-violent strategies.  I look at the role played by space 
in counter-hegemonic and anti-passive revolution struggles against both structural and 
conjectural violence.  By making a case for considering the political institutions created by 
peasant communities as spatial institutions, I link the social relations and political struggles 
analysed in the previous chapter to the production of space, and analyse how space in return 
contributes to shaping social relations.  This provides a ‘spatialised’ perspective of Gramsci’s 
concept of hegemony and war of position on one hand, and of the counter-hegemonic 
struggle of peasant communities on the other.   
My argument is straightforward.  I claim that the ability of peasant communities to 
assert their control over a specific territory is crucial for their autonomy and capacity to build 
peace.  Phrased in a Gramscian terminology, this first means that the autonomy of peasant 
communities is determined by the degree to which they manage to establish an ‘organic’ 
connection with the spaces they inhabit.  Peasant communities have to ensure the cohesion 
between the ideological, political, and economic elements of their struggle, and the territory 
serves as unifying ground for that purpose.  Second, to control the place peasant 




which their communities are located.  Space is intimately linked to the formation of peasants’ 
political subjectivities and is at the heart of their counter-hegemonic struggle.  In this regard, 
the spaces symbolised by peasant communities are ‘not merely physical location but 
ideological location as identity’.508  The political subjectivity of peasant communities’ 
members, in other words their place or ideological location within society, is dialectically 
related to the control they have over their territory, over the space occupied by their 
communities.  Both are conditioned and obtained through the spatial strategies which are the 
subject of this chapter.  Third, the peasant communities’ ability to produce autonomous 
spaces that break with the capitalist mode of production is a necessary pre-condition of their 
capacity to contribute to peacebuilding and the post-conflict setting in relation to challenges 
at the regional and national scales.  Peasant communities, based on a very specific 
representation of the territory, promote a political economy that does not contribute to 
violence; does not fuel the armed conflict; provides concrete and viable solutions to problems 
faced by peasants; and forms the basis of peaceful social relations in line with the cultural, 
economic, and social needs of the population.  
To support this argument, I pay attention to the spatial politics of peasant 
communities.  By ‘spatial politics’, I mean the range of practices, strategies, and tactics used 
by peasant communities to stay on or return to their land, protect their territory, build 
counter-hegemonic networks, and produce counter-alternative spaces.  I deploy Gramsci’s 
concept of war of position and I draw on Jessop et al.’s theorisation of socio-spatial 
relations.509  I use the concepts of territory, place, scale, and network (TPSN) to show how 
peasant communities tried – and managed to different extents and degrees – to assert their 
control over a particular geographical space.  I first introduce what Soja has termed the ‘socio-
spatial dialectic’510 ( Soja, 1989: 76) and the TPSN framework of analysis.  Then I discuss this 
framework in relation to Gramsci’s concepts of hegemony and war of position.  These first 
two short sections provide a conceptual framework to engage with the relationship between 
social relations and spatial relations within peasant communities and develop the next section 
in order to analyse peasant communities’ strategies.  The rest of this chapter analyses these 
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strategies, which were developed by peasant communities in order to assert a control over 
the territory they inhabit. 
The socio-spatial dialectic 
It is necessary to distinguish between space as nature, the environmental and contextual 
space in which human beings relate to each other on one hand, and space as a social product, 
‘the created space of social organization and production’ on the other.511  In this chapter, I 
draw on Soja’s definition of the latter.  Soja argues that ‘the organization, and meaning of 
space is a product of social translation, transformation, and experience.  Socially produced 
space is a created structure comparable to other social constructions resulting from the 
transformation of given conditions inherent to being alive, in much the same way that human 
history represents a social transformation of time’.512  Understood as such, space as an object 
of study has made its appearance within several fields of study.  In an attempt to map this 
spatial turn, I identified the literature on geography and resistance;513 on the relationships 
between state and space;514 on social movements and contentious politics;515 on territory, 
power and conflict in Colombia;516 on Globalization;517 and on the International Political 
Economy.518  Within this literature, the concepts of place, scale, network, and territory appear 
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to be central to any geographical and spatial analysis of social phenomena.  These fields of 
study have built on the reassertion of space within critical social science and the ‘socio-spatial 
dialectic’ in order to address issues of concern to this thesis, such as resistance, conflict, social 
movements, state formation, and neoliberalism.  The need to emphasise the multiple 
dimensions of space, and to question the privileging of any spatiality of a given social 
phenomenon, is considered crucial for any complete analysis of said phenomena.  A 
consensus seems indeed to have emerged in that space is constituted through social relations 
but also shapes the latter.  Spatial and social relations stand in a dialectical relation to each 
other. 
Soja’s socio-spatial dialectic 
Soja has shown how social science in general and Marxism in particular have been aspatial, 
even in their critical strands (Soja, 1989).519  A ‘historical imagination’ has characterised 
modern social theory and subordinated space to time.520  Space was not only subordinated 
within critical social theory, but the instrumentality of space was ignored as well.  The way 
capitalism contributed to shape and produce space, and to adapt the spatial organisation of 
society to its needs was hidden from view.  Similarly,  the fact that the state was a ‘socially 
produced space actively engaged in the reproduction of a particular social spatialization’ 
remained unproblematised.521 Soja traces the origins of post-modern geographies, in other 
words, geographies which take into account the spatial dimension, to three authors: Henri 
Lefebvre, Michel Foucault, and John Berger.  He argues that the latter two have contributed 
to a restructuring of critical social thought and enabled us to ‘see more clearly the long-hidden 
instrumentality of human geographies, in particular the encompassing and encaging 
spatializations of social life that have been associated with the historical development of 
capitalism’.522  But the reassertion of space within critical social thought would not happen 
until the 1970s when a Marxist geography began to emerge and emphasise the significance 
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of spatiality.523  A ‘socio-spatial dialectic’ was born, in which the question of the autonomy of 
spatial processes in relation to social relations of production predominated524. 
Soja argues for a simultaneity of social and spatial relations of productions.  He claims:  
The structure of organized space is not a separate structure with its own autonomous laws of 
construction and transformation, nor is it simply an expression of the class structure emerging from 
social (and thus aspatial?) relations of production.  It represents, instead, a dialectically defined 
component of the general relations of production, relations which are simultaneously social and 
spatial.525 
For Soja, this simultaneity relies on the existence of a ‘space-to-class homology’, ‘a 
corresponding spatial homology to traditionally defined class relations and hence to the 
contingencies of class conflict and structural transformation’.  Soja assumes that ‘the two sets 
of structured relations (the social and the spatial) are not only homologous, in that they arise 
from the same origins in the mode of production, but are also dialectically inseparable.526  
This is the socio-spatial dialectic. 
Such an emphasis on this socio-spatial dialectic draws attention to processes of 
differentiation rather than homogenisation.  In Colombia, the state formation process since 
independence has been characterised by a fragmentation of the territory, regions, and 
population.  To understand the nature of the Colombian state, it is fundamental to 
understand this process of fragmentation and the reasons behind the differences and 
confluences within the many Colombian departments.  It is key as well to understand how 
these variations are related to the dynamics of political violence, to the armed conflict, and 
to the uneven presence of the state.527  In this regard, Vásquez argues that the differentiated 
development of settlement processes, the uneven insertion of these processes within 
national and international economic development, the formation of different and diverse 
social and political identities, and their differentiated relations with state institutions and 
political parties, are all key elements in understanding both in space and time the current 
situation.528  Following the same line, Gutiérrez Lemus shows that natural resources, 
territories, capital, and population are central elements to any understanding of the different 
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spatial configuration achieved in Colombia, the presence of the state, and the emergence of 
distinct social and political orders.529  This Colombian school has combined history and 
political science with anthropology and geography to develop a socio-spatial analysis of 
political violence and state formation in Colombia.  Its members show how different actors 
have contributed to make spaces of representation and spatialities based on specific social 
relations of production (the encomienda, the hacienda, and liberal and neoliberal modes of 
production), out of which have grown different social, cultural, and political forms of 
organisation.  The latter were the result of struggles between owners of the means of 
production on one hand (encomenderos, hacenderos, large landowners, the state, 
multinational companies), seeking to achieve social and political control over both population 
and territory, and subaltern groups (settlers, peasants, indigenous people, amongst others) 
trying to escape or resist this control.  In this chapter, I look at the spatial dimension of these 
struggles.  I draw a parallel between the elements mentioned by Gutiérrez Lemus – natural 
resources, territories, capital, and population – and the concepts of place, scale, networks, 
and territory, widely used in the discipline of human geography.  The latter concepts can 
indeed be used to explain the formation of spaces of representation and spatialities in 
Colombia.  In this regard, I show below how peasant communities have developed strategies 
to challenge these spaces and spatialities by using places, scales, and networks s to establish 
some kind of control over a territory.   
Places, Scales, Networks, and Territories 
Recent debates about the integration of a spatial dimension into social science analyses 
should not privilege any of the many dimensions of space.530  Jessop points to the limits of 
focusing the analysis on one of these dimensions only and argues for the need to recognise 
the multiple dimensions of space and its polymorphy in sociospatial theory.  This would allow 
for a more complete depiction and analysis of the ‘the organisation of sociospatial relations 
in multiple forms and dimensions’.531  According to Jessop et al., ‘sociospatial theory is most 
powerful when it (a) refers to historically specific geographies of social relations; and (b) 
explores contextual and historical variation in the structural coupling, strategic coordination, 
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and forms of interconnection among the different dimensions of the latter’.532  Similarly, 
Leitner et al. argue that analyses of social movements and contentious politics should not 
privilege any of the multiple dimensions of space.  In practice, social movements indeed draw 
on several dimensions at once.  They therefore stress the importance to analyse the ‘co-
implication’ of these spatialities and argue that  
In determining how geography matters, we assert that a priori decisions (ontological or otherwise) to 
reduce this multi-valency to any single master concept can only impoverish analysis, by offering a partial 
viewpoint into how geography matters in contentious politics. Further, it is necessary to pay attention 
not only to the pertinence of particular spatialities in particular contexts, but also to their co-implication. 
It is not simply a question of the co-presence of the pertinent spatialities, but also how they shape one 
another and, thereby, the trajectory of contentious politics.533 
This emphasis on the multiple dimensions of space form the basis of my analysis of the 
strategies used by peasant communities to assert their control over a territory. 
I decided to draw on the theoretical framework provided by Jessop et al., which they 
call the TPSN framework.   Table 1 gives a visual illustration of this framework as described by 
the authors.  I will now briefly define the concepts of territory, place, scale and network.  
Table 1. Four key dimensions of sociospatial relations. Source Jessop, B. et al.  'Theorizing sociospatial relations’, Environment 
and Planning D: Society and Space, 26:3 (2008) p. 393. 
Dimension of sociospatial 
relations 
Principle of sociospatial 
structuration 
Associated patterning of 
sociospatial relations 
Territory Bordering, bounding, Dividing land into parcels, enclosure 
Construction of inside/outside 
divides; constitutive role of the 
outside 
Place Proximity, spatial embedding, areal differentiation 
Construction of spatial divisions 
of labour; differentiation of 
social relations horizontally 
among ‘core’ verse peripheral 
places 
Scale Hierarchisation, vertical differentiation 
Construction of scalar divisions 
of labour; differentiation of 
social relations vertically among 




transversal or ‘rhizomatic’ 
differentiation 
Building networks of nodal 
connectivity; differentiation of 
social relations among nodal 
points within topological 
networks 
 
The concept of territory has traditionally been associated with the space occupied by 
the state.  However, a territory can refer to any bounded land united by political, social, 
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economic, or cultural activities.  Notions of borders, inside/outside, division of lands into 
parcels, or enclosure are crucial to any understanding of territorial practices and the 
construction of a specific territory.534  The notion of territory is actually very important for the 
analysis of peasant communities, as the territory is precisely what they claim they have to 
defend.  In addition to this protection dimension, the territory also shapes the identity of 
peasant communities through a strong feeling of belonging to the land.  Finally, the territory 
is also a space that they have to shape, construct, and make, and which will play a crucial role 
in their resistance.  Some academics working on Colombia have used the notion of 
territoriality to analyse how territories are shaped, formed, or constructed, therefore moving 
away from the state-influenced concept of territory.535  In this regard, the concept of 
territoriality not only deals with the appropriation of a delimited space by a state or any other 
group seeking power, but also refers to the belonging to a territory through a process of 
identification and representation, either collective or individual.  This process often ignores 
classic political or administrative borders.536  In the following section, I show how peasant 
communities contest the appropriation of the territory by the state and illegal armed groups 
and try to establish an organic relationship with the territory they inhabit. 
Jessop defines place as ‘the socially produced grids and horizons of social life’.537  This 
points to the fact that ‘places are sites where people live, work and move, and where they 
form attachments, practice their relations with each other, and relate to the rest of the 
world’.538  As a result, places have a distinct materiality that shape not only social interaction 
but also social movements and the many strategies available to them as well.539  Jessop argues 
that place ‘offers a whole series of strategically selective possibilities to develop social 
relations that stretch over space and time.540  However, social movements also assign 
meanings to places, be they antagonistic, neutral, or friendly places.  In this regard, places 
might be crucially important for the identity, memory, and social fabric of social movements.  
This is the case for peasant communities.  Places can also be conceptualised as spaces outside 
the reach of power structures, where people can safely design strategies of resistance to 
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hegemonic practices, or as ‘cultural arenas’541 where people develop alternative visions of 
society to the ones imposed by the power of hegemonic or dominant actors.  The peasant 
communities of the CdPSJA, the ACVC, and the ATCC have all created such places. 
The term ‘scale’ has usually been employed to refer to the boundaries or levels 
created by the organisation of social relations; of spaces of many different sizes, such as the 
local or the global scale; of national or the international scale; or even of regional or world 
scale.  However, it is important not to lose sight of the fact that scales are not fixed, a-
historical spaces.  Scales should not be treated as the fixed levels of analysis of IR theory or 
peacebuilding and statebuilding studies.542  Rather, a growing literature on the political 
economy of scale in human geography points to the fact that scales are the product of political 
and social struggles over space and across time.543  Scale is therefore conceptualised  
…as a relational, power-laden and contested construction that actors strategically engage with, in order 
to legitimise or challenge existing power relations.  In the course of these struggles new scales are 
constructed, and the relative importance of different scales is reconfigured.  Central to the politics of 
scale is the manipulation of relations of power and authority. This process is highly contested, involving 
numerous negotiations and struggles between different actors as they attempt to reshape the scalar 
spatiality of power and authority.544 
However, my interest is not in the production of scales as such but in the politics of scale or 
scalar politics545 developed by subaltern groups or social movements.  Such a politics of scale 
assumes that ‘the social power that can be mobilised is dependent on the scale or spatial level 
at which social actors operate’.546  As a result, ‘the success or effectiveness of social and 
political strategies for empowerment is related to the ways in which geographical scale is 
actively considered and mobilised in struggles for social, political, or economic resistance or 
change’.547  An emphasis on the scalar strategies of peasant communities is in line with the 
fact that ‘it is often not scale per se that is the prime object of contestation between social 
actors, but rather specific processes and institutionalized practices that are themselves 
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differentially scaled’.548  Finally, in addition to the political dimension of the production of 
scales, Smith points to the fact that the production of scales is also a cultural process, as 
‘individual and group identities are heavily tinctured by attachments to place at different 
scales’.549  Drawing on these insights about scales, I analyse the politics of scale used by 
peasant communities in a relational way.  Indeed, peasant communities and scales mutually 
constitute each other, something that I began to show in the previous chapter.  But in addition 
to being the product of the interactions, connections, and conflicts between different scales, 
peasant communities use and shape scales to assert their control over a territory. 
Finally, networks have been described as a key strategy used by social movements to 
challenge structures of power.  Leitner et al. argue that ‘such networks are crucial for sharing 
knowledge about strategies and tactics, and developing common political identities and 
alternative imaginaries’.550  Networks are key to the emergence of those individuals whom 
Keck and Sikkink have called ‘activists beyond borders’.551  What Featherstone has termed 
‘counter-global networks’ have given rise to ‘geographies of connection that have shaped 
forms of opposition to dominant forms of globalised practices’.552  Featherstone defines 
networks ‘as the overlapping and contested material, cultural and political flows and circuits 
that bind different places together through differentiated relations of power’.553   Peasant 
communities are themselves both the product and the promotors of such networks at 
different scales, between different places, and connecting different territories.  
Table 2. The sites of one-dimensionality. Source: Jessop, B. et al. 'Theorizing sociospatial relations’, Environment and Planning 
D: Society and Space, 26:3 (2008) p. 393. 
Abstract – simple 
point of entry 
Field of application 
Territory Place Scale Network 
Territory Methodological territorialism    
Place  Place-centrism   
Scale   Scale-centrism  
Network    Network-centrism 
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While looking at peasant communities through a supposed god’s eye is impossible, I 
argue that the combination of these sociospatial dimensions has several advantages.  In 
comparison to historical and normative approaches to the study of civil resistance initiatives, 
which are often too descriptive in my view, the TPSN framework provides a more complete 
and analytical explanation of the strategies used by peasant communities in order to assert 
their control over a territory and ‘make’ this territory.    
To avoid falling into the trap of one-dimensional analyses, which Table 2 illustrates, 
Jessop et al. argue that investigations into ‘the mutually constitutive relations among their 
structuring principles [of the territory, place, scale, and network] and the specific practices 
associated with each of the latter’ are required.554  In this chapter, I therefore analyse the 
strategies used by peasant communities through the practices related to each of the 
sociospatial dimensions mentioned, and relate them in turn to the structuring principles of 
territory, place, scale, and network.  The application of the TPSN framework to peasant 
communities follows and expands on the suggestion that this framework of analysis can 
inform the analysis of social movements and contentious politics.  In this regard, Jessop et al. 
suggest that it could be deployed in order to ‘decipher the strategies and tactics of individual 
and collective agents, organizations, and institutions that are engaged in contentious politics 
as they perceive them as participants’.  According to them, ‘the TPSN schema could provide 
a basis for deciphering the variegated, polymorphic spaces of contention that have been 
produce through different types of social mobilization in different historical – geographical 
contexts’.555  In this chapter I apply the TPSN schema to peasant communities and their 
strategies as emergent strategies oriented towards the transformation of previous socio-
spatial relations informed by the landscapes of territory, place, scale, and networks.  As Jessop 
et al. put it:  
…the actualization of specific sociospatial possibilities, in any TPSN combination, involves material 
interactions among different structures and strategies that draw upon these principles of sociospatial 
organization in differential, historically, and geographically specific ways.  This structuration process 
imposes determinate limits on the form, shape, and trajectory of present and future TPSN combinations 
and on the sociospatial relations through which they are mediated, produced, and transformed.556 
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In this chapter, I analyse how peasant communities assert their control over one of these 
sociospatial dimensions, the territory.  My analysis mainly explores the territory as a 
structured field, ‘produced in part through the impact of other sociospatial structuring 
principles on territorial dynamics’.557  This refers to the vertical column in Table 3.  However, 
I will also pay attention to the interactions between the structuring principles and practices 
related to the three other sociospatial dimensions, namely place, scale and network. 
Table 3. Beyond one-dimensionalism: conceptual orientations Source: Jessop, B. et al.. 'Theorizing sociospatial relations’, 
Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 26:3 (2008) p. 395. 
Structuring 
principles 
Field of operation 
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Scale as area 
rather than level 
(local through 
global), spatial 
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In the rest of this chapter, I combine this TPSN framework with Gramsci’s concepts of 
hegemony and war of position.  Before getting into the empirical analysis of peasant 
communities’ strategies, I briefly address the links between Gramsci’s concepts and the TPSN 
framework.  I show how hegemony can be spatially contested through a war of position 
involving the use of places, scales and networks. 
                                                        




Spatialising Gramsci: the spatial dimensions of power and hegemony 
Gramsci’s spatial awareness 
Soja argues that a spatial dimension can be found in Gramsci’s thought.558  According to him, 
Gramsci’s studies represented a ‘general effort to focus attention upon the political, cultural, 
and ideological dimensions of capitalism […] and, especially, to elaborate upon the role of the 
modern capitalist state and its imposed territorial division of labour’.559  Soja carries on, 
claiming that by emphasising the ensemble of social relations, Gramsci ‘concretized the mode 
of production in time and space, in history and geography, in a specified conjunctural 
framework which became the necessary context for revolutionary strategy’.560  Although not 
explicit, this spatial dimension was present in Gramsci’s writings and ‘clearly evident in the 
spatial relations embedded in the social formation and in the particularities of place, location, 
and territorial community’.561  Soja shows how Gramsci locates revolutionary strategy within 
three key arenas of social relations, ‘all linked in one way or another to the spatiality of social 
life under capitalism’.562  First, on the level of political and ideological structures, Gramsci 
shows an awareness of the socio-spatial dialectic, in that he emphasises the relationship 
between occupational and territorial structures.  Second, Gramsci relates the exploitation of 
the working class to specific places, such as their homes and workplace, ‘the point of 
consumption and reproduction versus the point of production’.  Third, Soja argues that ‘these 
two strategic emphases came together again in Gramsci’s conceptualisation of the 
revolutionary historical bloc, an alliance of popular movements fighting for similar goals and 
linked conjuncturally to the specific conditions of capitalist crisis’.563 This anti-reductionism 
that emphasises political, cultural, and ideological conditions means that revolutionary 
consciousness was from now on rooted in ‘the phenomenology of everyday life’.564 
However, Soja is not the only one pointing to the relevance of Gramsci’s writings for 
thinking about the socio-spatial dialectic. Jessop argues that ‘Gramsci’s philosophy of praxis 
involves not only the historicisation but also the spatialisation of its analytical categories’.565  
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Although Gramsci did not make spatial thinking explicit, Jessop claims that Gramsci was as 
sensitive to the historical specificity of all social relations as he was to their specific location 
in place, space, and scale.566  Jessop not only considers Gramsci's use of spatial metaphors, 
but also draws attention to Gramsci's analyses of the inherent spatiality as well as temporality 
of social relations567:  
We should also consider [Gramsci’s] interest in the actual rather than metaphorical spatiality of social 
relations and practices, in their spatial conditioning and in the relevance of social relations and practices 
to spatial issues.  For Gramsci was not only sensitive to the historical specificity of all social relations (..) 
but also to their specific location in place, space and scale.  Indeed, these two are clearly interconnected 
in any ensemble of social relations.568 
Gramsci’s concepts were therefore sensitive to issues of place, scale, networks, and territory.  
Even more interesting is the fact that Gramsci’s interest in the spatial dimension of social 
relations was not only academic.  This attention to space was also rooted in a deep awareness 
that the strategies of subaltern groups must be spatial,569 as the strategies used by both 
capitalism and the ruling elites also are.  Hegemony is not only social but spatial as well.570 
Hegemony and space 
In Hegemony: A Realist Analysis, Joseph develops an argument about the relationship 
between hegemony and space.571  He argues that hegemony plays a role in reproducing the 
social space of society and ensuring its cohesion.  In addition, hegemony binds space and time 
by working ‘alongside ideology in developing representations of space which are tied to the 
dominant material practices’.572  From this, Joseph distinguishes between three distinct 
conceptions of space: as a field of action, as representations, and as a basis of action.  He 
sums up the relationship between these three conceptions:  
Space and ideology are inextricably bound in a basic material sense.  Space acts as the site of ideological 
articulation and symbolic interaction.  Space, in short, is representational, and, of course, the control of 
representation is crucial to the process of hegemonising.  So from these material relations arise strategic 
relations, driven by hegemonising processes.  The relation between space and ideology is both given 
and potential.  Out of the necessary relation come different articulations and projects.  Space is both 
necessary to the reproduction of ideology and the terrain for its application.  As our earlier distinction 
between secreted and articulated ideologies indicates, the production of ideology is used strategically.  
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Hegemonic projects and practices involve the articulation of ideology in conjunction with control over 
space.573 
The connection between ideology and control over space means that ideological location as 
identity is reinforced and articulated by physical location.  In my analysis of the spatial 
strategies used by peasant communities, I pay special attention to the articulation between 
the principles and conception of the world analysed in the previous chapter on one hand, and 
their territories on the other.  In the case of peasant communities, that means that their place 
within society, both in terms of political power and legal rights, is linked to their ability to 
assert their control over the territory they occupy.  The latter is in turn achieved through the 
deployment of strategies which Gramsci would call a war of position.  
Place is key to the design of resistance strategies.  Without a place, social movements 
or individuals are bound to use tactics as a means of finding their own places within structures 
of power.574  Everyday resistance has no place of its own. Within the everyday, people find 
their way through networks of power relations through ruse, tricks, appropriation of rules, 
principles, and norms imposed from above, but they do not pose a challenge to these 
networks of power.  For this to happen, resistance has to produce its own space from which 
to design alternative or counter-hegemonic practices and ideologies.  This is where Gramsci’s 
concept of war of position is most useful, as it consists in building the trenches and permanent 
fortifications which will allow a particular social group to achieve control over space, and thus 
hegemony within civil society and the state as a whole.  
By linking these insights to the TPSN framework and the concepts of space of 
representation and spatialities, my contention is that a war of position involves the strategic 
use and combination of places, scales, networks, and territories, leading to the making of 
spatialities.  The ability of peasant communities to assert their control over a territory is based 
on how well they move between scales, mobilise networks, and fill their territory with places.  
All four dimensions of space interact with each other in the strategies of peasant 
communities.  The rest of this chapter analyses these strategies. 
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The spatial and territorial strategies of peasant communities: territory, 
place, scale, and networks 
The analysis of the strategies employed by the CdPSJA, the ACVC, and the ATCC reveals the 
crucial role that space plays in the success of their initiatives.  The meaning of the resistance 
of peasant communities is intimately tied to the territory.  Resisting means staying on the 
land, and working, and cultivating it.  One of the leaders of the ACVC I interviewed used the 
Spanish verb ejercer – which inspired the title of this chapter –to explain the meaning of the 
relationship between peasants and the land.  The use of this verb is very interesting in that it 
conveys the very practical, affirmative and active attitude that peasants have regarding the 
territory.  This contrasts with the way the peasants’ use of the land is usually described, as 
backward, pre-modern, and preventing any modern economic development.  Literally, ejercer 
means practising, making, exercising, or exerting, as in making a manufactured product, 
practising a profession, exercising a right, or exerting influence or pressure.  Peasants do 
something with the territory; they are not idle.  The territory is not only there to produce the 
means of subsistence for peasants.  They also have to make something out of the territory, 
shape it, and mould it according to their cultural, social, economic, and political needs.  In the 
rest of this chapter, I compare this exercise of ‘practising the territory’ to Gramsci’s concept 
of a war of position.  The latter involves the promotion of principles at different scales and 
their association with different places, the connection of these places within wider networks 
of power, and the gaining of positions within these same networks, to protect and 
appropriate a territory and produce on it.  Both territory and land form the material basis of 
the political economy promoted by peasant communities to bring about social change and 
build peace. 
The struggle for the territory led by peasant communities is characterised by 
processes of protection and appropriation at the level of superstructures, i.e., ideology, law, 
politics, and culture, and processes of production at the structural level, i.e., the economy.  
These processes imply a struggle for the representation of this territory; efforts to base 
peasant initiatives on legal and normative grounds; the building of protection networks at 
different scales and in different places; the binding of communities’ collective memory with 
particular places within the territory; and the development of economic projects.  These 




fulfils peasants’ needs to survive in the midst of armed conflict and eventually build peace.  
While material needs inform the struggle and strategies of peasant communities, 
representations, norms, politics, and culture ultimately shape the development of economic 
alternatives.  The territory is the space where power relations are challenged through spatial 
strategies of protection, appropriation, and production. These strategies characterise the war 




The protection strategies developed by the CdPSJA, the ACVC, and the ATCC all combine 
place, scales, and networks to achieve some control over their territory and protect peasants.  
The normative aspect of these strategies, the principles of neutrality and non-violence, have 
often been highlighted to explain how protection worked.575  However, I show in this section 
that effective protection also depends on political relations of power at the national and 
international scales, and on peasants’ ability to rebuild the social fabric of their community.  
Indeed, while the success of these strategies depends on peasant communities’ ability to 
control representation, both in their relation to illegal armed actors and institutional actors, 
it then also relies on their capacity to use scales, mobilise networks, and create safe places 
for the growth and strengthening of social bonds within their community.  The concepts of 
scales, places, and networks therefore allow me to go beyond a mere normative and legal 
analysis of the protection strategies employed by peasant communities to confront armed 
actors, challenge the state, and build their internal strength and cohesion.  These strategies 
required gaining positions at local, national, and international scales, and connecting these 
positions within networks aimed at the protection of specific places and territories.  
The first task the ATCC, the CdPSJA, and the ACVC were confronted with was to protect 
themselves from the actions of armed actors, both legal and illegal.  As I have shown in the 
previous chapter, all three communities have put non-violence and neutrality at the core of 
their new critical consciousness, as the most effective way to establish a distinction between 
combatants and civilians.  This positioning was, and still is, key to their protection and 
                                                        




autonomy.   In all three cases, these principles allowed peasant communities to undermine 
the control of armed actors over both their territory and their members by breaking the 
dynamics and logics of their domination, which ultimately relied on the cooperation of 
peasants.  However, the form of these mechanisms differed, leading to different meanings 
and practice of neutrality and non-violence.  While the ATCC put in place mechanisms of direct 
dialogue and confrontation with armed actors, the CdPSJA aimed to mitigate violence by 
relying on actors and networks at the international scale, and the ACVC combined these two 
aspects.  
The ATCC developed four specific mechanisms to put into practise the principles of 
neutrality and non-violence.  The best known of these mechanisms is represented by the 
dialogues that the ATCC engaged in with all armed actors.  However, intra-community 
dialogues, denunciations, and conflict management have all contributed to the 
implementation and success of the neutrality and non-violence principles.  In May 1987, after 
receiving an ultimatum issued by the army and paramilitary groups, giving peasants the choice 
to displace, join one of the armed groups, or be killed, around 50 peasants decided to hold a 
meeting with the FARC units present in the region.  This meeting, held on 21 May 1987, is 
recorded as the foundational event during which peasants managed to break the law of 
silence576 and were considered by the FARC as a valid interlocutor.577  The leader of the group, 
Josué Vargas, directly confronted the FARC and formulated the conditions raised by the 
peasants of La India.  The peasants asked that the FARC not kill any more peasants, and 
insisted that they would not help or support the FARC anymore.  They also made clear they 
would not accept orders or conditions from the guerrilla group, and that FARC soldiers should 
not visit peasants’ homes anymore.  A fifth condition sarcastically urged FARC members to 
get a proper job.578  About two weeks later, on 11 June, a second meeting was held with the 
FARC, this time in presence of one of the FARC chiefs of staff.  Around 3000 peasants attended 
the meeting, in which the FARC agreed to the first four points mentioned.  The peasants of La 
India committed to withdraw any help or support to the guerrillas, army. or paramilitary 
groups, whereas the FARC agreed not to assert any kind of political pressure against civilians: 
no more visits to peasants’ homes or meetings in the schools of the area.  The FARC agreed 
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not to intervene within peasants’ internal affairs and would stop managing conflicts between 
peasants.  Instead, peasants themselves committed to solving their internal conflicts, be they 
social, economic, or political.  Finally, both the FARC and the peasants agreed to meet every 
time the situation required.579  In parallel to the dialogues with the FARC, the peasants of La 
India also started talks with the army.  Two meetings took place on 28 May and 5 July.  The 
first happened during a visit of the armed forces chief commander to the hamlet of La India.  
While during this first meeting, the commander only offered rhetorical support,580 the 
outcome of the second meeting, in the presence of 5000 peasants, was much more 
interesting.  Whereas paramilitary groups had only unofficially attended the meeting and did 
not speak at all, they later on withdrew their permanent presence in La India.  The link 
between the army and paramilitary groups was made obvious, and the ATCC carried on 
speaking to the army if it wanted something from the paramilitary groups.  They proceeded 
like that until after the killing of the first leaders of the association in February 1990, after 
which they engaged in direct dialogue with the paramilitary groups.  After the 5 July meeting,  
the army committed not to violate peasants’ rights.  In turn, the ATCC agreed to deal with and 
solve the community’s internal conflicts and to watch over the behaviour of its members.  But 
most importantly for the good functioning of the dialogues, the ATCC committed to ‘inform 
the army, the guerrilla and paramilitary groups of all meetings and agreements reached with 
any one of them’.  The ATCC would also be transparent regarding its own activities.581  
According to the president of the ATCC at the time when I conducted my research interviews, 
rather than generating power, these dialogues allowed the ATCC to achieve ‘equal status’ 
with the armed groups.  He argues that ‘from the moment when there was the need for 
dialogue, armed force was not imposed upon us’.582  He added that dialogues had to be 
transparent, collective, and held with senior commanders.583  These dialogues were 
successful in considerably reducing violence between 1987 and 2000.584  However, my 
contention is that they did not allow the ATCC to solidly establish a territorial control over its 
sphere of influence, as the ATCC lacked the ability to use scale and mobilise networks beyond 
a regional scale.  In fact, the success of the ATCC heavily relied on two other mechanisms, 
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namely the intra-community dialogue and the organisation’s investigatory capacity to deal 
with threats from armed actors and resolve internal conflicts.  I have already analysed in detail 
the first mechanism, closely linked to the ATCC’s new critical consciousness, which allowed 
peasants to break the law of silence, organise the resistance to armed actors, and agree on 
principles to guide peasants’ behaviour.  The second mechanism transformed the ATCC into 
a true conflict resolution body and an institution in charge of controlling social order, solving 
conflicts between peasants, and dealing with threats issued by armed actors against members 
of the ATCC.585  It is this mechanism which gave the ATCC its social and political power over 
its sphere of influence, and prevented armed actors from taking advantage of conflicts 
between peasants to assert their control and domination.586 
What is relevant here is the fact that these intra-community dialogues and this 
conciliation function were also key in maintaining coherence between principles and actions 
within peasants’ behaviour and practices until the beginning of the 2000s.  But when they 
became weaker, as demands for regulation overcame the ATCC’s capacities, and adhesion to 
the ATCC’s principles decreased, the ATCC proved less able to control armed actor’s activities 
within its sphere of influence.  For instance, a surge in the cultivation of coca crops occurred 
at the beginning of the 2000s and the ATCC could not contain the expansion of coca crops 
cultivated by peasants.587  The minutes of several meetings with paramilitary groups and 
guerrillas show that these groups took advantage of this weakness to challenge the ATCC’s 
principles and interfere within its affairs.  They often tried to challenge the degree to which 
ATCC members followed these principles, and impose their own agendas onto the ATCC.588  
In a meeting between the ATCC and the AUC on 15 November 2001, the AUC commander 
said: 
It is good to meet with the community, given that people from the Carare [region] are branded as 
guerrilla members; so it is better to clarify doubts, because where there is doubt, there is no tranquillity, 
neither peace. We have always respected civilians and what we do not want is that guerrilla members 
camouflages as peasants. The best thing is to seek dialogue, I invite the community to speak without 
fear, the objective is to correct mistakes and that you are aware of our policies. We do not want to meet 
you as enemies but in search of friendship. We are going to clean this zone from any guerrilla presence 
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and we will be there as long as required. With the efforts you have made today we will smooth things 
over. What we are seeking is to recover the territory.589 
In another meeting, the same AUC commander stated that the AUC would ‘only fulfil their 
responsibilities to the extent the ATCC fulfils its owns’, adding that ‘in this region nothing 
happens without authorization from this group [the AUC]’.590  The minutes of the meetings 
and workshops held by the ATCC in several hamlets in 2000 are illustrative of the 
organisation’s difficulties to solve conflicts and internal problems, and to reach favourable 
agreements with armed actors.591  The ATCC archives also show a tendency to rely more on 
the protection of the army from 2000 onward, as the dialogues with illegal armed actors 
proved difficult.592 
The ATCC’s protection strategies heavily relied on its capacity to persuade armed 
actors to respect civilians, and therefore on the consent of armed actors, on one hand, and 
on the strength of the ATCC’s social fabric on the other.  Its relationship with armed actors 
achieved equal status, as the quotation from the president of the ATCC explains, but the ATCC 
lacked the capacity to coerce armed actors.  The limits of the ATCC’s protection strategies 
were illustrated by the massacre of its first leaders.  Dialogues with armed actors were not 
able to prevent these killings and counter the negative impact of their strategies of open 
denunciation and confrontation with armed actors.  On 26 February 1990, the three most 
prominent ATCC leaders were assassinated together with a Colombian journalist working for 
the BBC, Silvia Margarita Duzán.  While the responsibility of this massacre can only be 
attributed to those who committed it, most likely paramilitary groups,593 the use of violence 
by these groups has been characterised by some members of the ATCC as a reaction to the 
strategy of overt confrontation and denunciation of armed actors’ crimes used by the leaders 
of the Association.594  One of my interviewees termed the massacre as a ‘failure’ of the 
leadership of the association, as they did not realise what the consequences of their actions 
would be.595  This strategy of overt political confrontation with paramilitary groups and their 
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supporter represented a threat to the latter’s interests, which they decided to address by 
killing the leaders of the ATCC.  Although the Association had received institutional support 
from local authorities and gained international recognition in December 1990 when it was 
awarded the Right Livelihood Award, its lack of connections and influence at national and 
international scale meant that dissuasion was not high enough to increase the cost of such 
attacks and thus prevent them.  For the authors of this massacre, the cost of having their 
illegal activities made visible and denounced at national and international scale was higher 
than the cost of killing the ATCC leaders and the BBC journalist.  The massacre of the ATCC 
leaders showed the limits of the strategies and mechanisms used by the association so far.  
After this episode, the next leaders abandoned the overt confrontation of armed actors and 
limited their denunciations to legal claims and the collection of information for use in legal 
proceedings.  
The examples of the CdPSJA and the ACVC illustrate how peasant communities could 
generate coercion using scales and the mobilisation of protection networks.  In particular, 
power relationships at national and international scales and opportunities to connect with 
wider networks at the same scale impacted how peasant communities managed to protect 
their territory and members.  These power relationships influenced the cost of using violence 
for paramilitary groups and the state to coerce peasant communities, although they offered 
no guarantee that violence would not be used.  Both these organisations have developed 
strong protection networks at the regional, national, and international scales, and have made 
strategic use of a discourse based on human rights and international law.  This has allowed 
them to carry on speaking up in public and disseminating their denunciations.  Although this 
does not come without risk, the fact that they could carry on denouncing human rights 
violations and other crimes committed by armed groups reflects their ability to develop 
protection networks at national and international scale, making good use of power 
relationships between international actors, most of all states and NGOs, and the Colombian 
state.  This international support is considered a key factor by both communities.  One of the 
former presidents of the ACVC mentions the European Union (EU) and the United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP)  as key supporters in the years following the creation of the 
Association.596  Another leader597 explains how the ability to speak up and denounce not only 
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the armed actors’ abuses but also the effects of coca fumigation programmes implemented 
by the government, was obtained through the development of networks connecting the local 
experience of peasants, regional and national human rights organisations, and international 
actors.  They explain that ideas about human rights were spread through social organisations 
based in Barrancabermeja, such as the Regional Corporation for the Defence of Human Rights 
(CREDHOS) and the Grassroots Women’s Organisation (OFP), and connected with local 
peasant-led initiatives and protests born in the 1980s.  This encouraged peasants to ‘establish 
[themselves] as projects’,598 in particular with the help of the Magdalena Medio Development 
and Peace Program.  Before that, until the mid-1990s, the peasants of the Magdalena Medio 
region had engaged in dialogues with the guerrillas and the army in order to gain respect for 
civilians, although these dialogues were not as formal as those led by the ATCC.  The leader 
already quoted599 explained that these uncoordinated efforts were not successful, as every 
time peasants came back from a protest, they suffered retaliations from paramilitary groups 
and the army.  The action of local action councils, gathering peasants of a same hamlet, was 
not legally strong enough to deter illegal action by armed groups and get the government to 
protect peasants.  After the hamlet of La Cooperativa was burnt by paramilitary groups in 
1994, the director of this programme, Father Francisco de Roux, met with peasants of the 
region.  According to the leader, he encouraged them to ‘organise themselves, because the 
struggle is hard.  The struggle is for the land.  For oil and gold (…) There are paths to follow, 
this has to be brought to the United Nations’, he said.600  The idea of creating an organisation 
whose aim would be to improve the respect of peasants’ rights and promote a model of 
development in line with their needs was a direct response to this situation.  Peasants were 
then able to transform the ACVC into a crucial node within wider networks at regional, 
national, and international scale.  From then onwards, the ACVC was able to mobilise 
protection networks based on a human rights discourse, gain the necessary international 
support, and strengthen the social fabric of the 120 local action councils which make up its 
local base.  The ACVC was also able to publicly denounce human rights violations committed 
by all armed actors as it generated political pressure on the government. Jerez mentions a 5-
minute radio programme that used to be broadcasted with the sole purpose of denouncing 







these violations.601  All these efforts led to the creation of the ZRC, a territorial and legal 
initiative which is the most important tool used by the ACVC, not only for the protection of 
peasants but also for its strategies of appropriation and production, as I show later in this 
chapter.  
The regional networks to which the ACVC was connected were linked to actors at 
national and international scales. Through the help of both traditional and organic 
intellectuals, such as Father Francisco de Roux and the leaders of the ACVC who went on 
advocacy tours in Europe and the USA, the ACVC could exert the necessary pressure on the 
Colombian state.  The same leader quoted had the opportunity to go to Germany in order to 
‘present before the European community the human rights situation and the projects related 
to the defence of the territory and food sovereignty’.602  They met with a member of the 
German Foreign Ministry and with German members of parliament (MoP) from different 
political parties.  One of the MoPs agreed to ask the Colombian government to clarify the 
legal situation of Andres Gil, an ACVC leader who was jailed at the time, to legally recognise 
the ZRC, and to bring justice for the 16 cases of extrajudicial killing that took place in the 
zone.603  They said that they were  ‘not afraid’ to tell diplomats that they were contributing 
to ‘the fact that our country is intoxicated’, given that the money they give to Colombia is 
used to fund military operations.  But they also explained to them that they ‘might not be 
responsible’ because they are ‘told [by the government] that here [in Colombia] they are 
killing guerrillas, but what they are killing is peasants and burning hamlets and fumigating 
lands’.604  All ACVC leaders are given the chance to go abroad for advocacy purposes.  At the 
same time, this rotation contributes to their political formation.605   
Resettlement processes led by all three communities are a good example of how they 
have used scales and mobilised networks for the protection of specific places.  These 
processes also illustrate the connection between strategies of protection, strategies of 
appropriation, and strategies of production.  Resettlement was first meant to resettle 
displaced peasants on their land, but it was also conceived of as a protection strategy.  These 
protection strategies have allowed peasant communities to organise the resettlement of 
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some of their members on the lands they used to live in before being displaced.  In the case 
of the CdPSJA, some members could return to the hamlet of La Resbalosa with the support of 
the community.  One of the leaders explains that the principles allow them to keep fighting 
and return to their land: 
So this is why we stay alive, these principles were created (…), neutrality, no-collaboration with any 
[conflicting] parties, with this objective, because we say that this is a path [that we] built, it is a path of 
life. And we fight for the defense of our territory (…) We have carried out many returns [to our land] 
with the support of the community (…).606 
He says that he himself returned to his hamlet with the support of the community.  This is 
‘how people started to return to Mulatos as well (…). There, we then built, we started working 
on an idea, where Luis Eduardo Guerra was assassinated (…), like a small hamlet, the one that 
nowadays is known as the Luis Eduardo Guerra Peace Hamlet’.607  
This quotation shows how strategies of protection and processes of appropriation of 
the territory are intermingled.  What started as a process to help families settle back on their 
land after being displaced was eventually accompanied by the creation of a specific place and 
its association with a specific meaning, a peace hamlet named after a member of the 
community assassinated by paramilitary groups in collaboration with the Army in February 
2005.  As Burnyeat explains, returning to their land was very important for the CdPSJA both 
to recover their rural way of life and to occupy territory in order to resist from new places and 
break the spatiality produced by armed actors and the conflict.608 In addition to re-
appropriating and producing on them, this implied protecting them by occupying places 
within a territory, and connecting these places within wider protection networks and with 
actors at different scales. 
The ATCC also promoted the return of displaced peasants by mobilising actors at 
regional and national scales.  This is illustrated by a meeting convened and organised by the 
ATCC on 16 August 1987 which gathered around 8000 peasants in the village of Cimitarra.  
The aim of the meeting was to report abuses against civilians and promote the return to their 
land of peasants from the hamlet of La Corcovada.  While peasants from La Corcovada had 
frequently been stigmatised as being guerrilla sympathisers, paramilitary groups had 
displaced the FARC guerrillas and used La Corcovada as one of their main bases in the area.  
                                                        
606 CdP#8, San José de Apartadó, 16 April 2014. 
607 CdP#8. 




The presidential adviser for peace issues, the governor of the Department of Santander, and 
the commanders of the 2nd Division and the 14th Brigade attended the meeting.  Josué 
Vargas, at the time the main leader and president of the ATCC, stated during this meeting 
that peasants needed an army which would protect them instead of harassing them, one that 
would put an end to the actions of the FARC guerrillas and the Muerte a Secuestradores (MAS) 
paramilitary group.  He added that in order to truly rehabilitate the peasants of La Corcovada, 
the following points had to be addressed:  
1. Return to their land of displaced people; 2. Credits which do not suppress the limited peasants 
resources; 3. Full involvement of the SENA with the agrarian sector; 4. Creation of a free-of-charge 
training centre on agricultural and industrial issues; 5. Continuation of the building and verification of 
the Carare region roads that are included in the National Rehabilitation Plan; 7. Administrative and 
financial counselling  for the organisation of shops, cooperatives and peasant micro-enterprises; 8. 
Intervention of the INDERENA for the reforestation of the region.609  
A few months after this meeting, 40 families went back to La India with the support of the 
ATCC, but only a few families managed to return to their land in La Corcovada.610 
 Similarly, the unsuccessful attempts made by the CdPSJA to create humanitarian 
zones represented an effort to use a territorial and spatial concept in order to protect civilians 
in remote areas of the Serrania de Abibe, which had witnessed new forced displacements 
between 2003 and 2005.  As the peace committees representing several hamlets located on 
the territory of the CdPSJA explain, the strategy of the army, in collaboration with paramilitary 
groups, seeks to ‘empty the hamlets so that paramilitary groups take the land, as occurred in 
other years in the hamlets of Rodozali and Playa Larga’.  The hamlet of Mulatos went from 98 
families to 10 families in less than a year, as the ‘loss of harvests, animals, the burning of their 
houses, trumped-up legal charges presenting them as places occupied by the guerrillas, 
tortures and murders’, left them with no other choice than to flee.  Faced with such violence 
these hamlets and the CdPSJA came up with the idea to set up humanitarian zones.  These 
would be specific and delimited places where no armed actors are allowed.  Two things are 
worth highlighting in this proposal.  First, the initiative not only takes into account the 
protection needs of peasants, but also the ‘organic’ needs of the communities.  On one hand, 
the proposal specifies that these zones ‘aim to be a refuge when armed combats take place 
between armed actors’.  The proposal also explains that these places ‘cannot be bombed nor 
attacked’.  The protection of the zones would ultimately rely on public denunciation of human 
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rights violations and on the action of national and international actors, such as the defensoria 
and procuraduria, the Office of the United Nations for Human Rights (OHCHR), and embassies.  
On the other hand, ‘these spaces require full respect as they will also be places where 
communities can gather in order to enable the hamlet to carry out its excellent community 
work, both reflective and educational’.  Peace Committees were to be established in each 
hamlet and granted the task of coordinating the protection and organic elements of the 
proposal.  ‘Elected by the hamlet itself’, the committee ‘will be able to act on its behalf’.  These 
committees will also ‘work together with the other committees of the hamlet and the 
[internal] council of the Peace Community of San José for the planning of communitary and 
organisational work.’  Finally, together with the Peace Community’s Council, they will take 
part in the ‘concertation meetings about the provisional measures with the state’.  Second, 
the proposal also defines commitments which peasants are bound to respect in order to be 
allowed within the zones: 
Within the peace zones – humanitarian zones – no armed actors will be allowed in, no arm or war 
artefact will be authorised, no information will be provided to any of the armed actors, no collaboration 
with them will be authorised. In addition, families that are part of the above-mentioned hamlets and 
that can take part in the peace zones – humanitarian zones – commit to fight against impunity, for truth, 
transparency regarding community and organisational actions, motivated by a peasant solidarity 
between hamlets and the Peace Community of San José de Apartadó.611  
Although the CdPSJA did set up these humanitarian zones and made their official recognition 
by the government one of four conditions to be met in order to renew dialogue, it did not 
manage to get the necessary political support for the initiative to be successful and be legally 
recognised by the Colombian government.  The argument put forward is that humanitarian 
zones can only be created when there is an international conflict. There needs to be 
negotiations between parties in conflict for humanitarian zones to be recognised according 
to International Humanitarian Law.612  The government also argues that the CdPSJA does  ‘not 
acknowledge and refuses the presence of the state armed forces within the Peace Community 
of San José de Apartadó, but also requires these to provide protection’.  According to the 
government, this position is contradictory and amounts to ‘claiming access to education 
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without allowing the presence of professors’.613  Even though an order issued by the 
Constitutional Court in 2012 supported the community’s claims,614 these humanitarian zones 
have not yet been officially recognised.  The community made a last attempt at putting the 
proposal on the table in 2014 when its legal representative took part in the fourth delegation 
of victims to the peace talks in Havana between the government and the FARC guerrillas.  The 
negotiating parties received five delegations of twelve victims, who travelled to Havana to 
give their testimony and make their proposals about how to deal with victims’ rights as part 
of the peace process.  However, the CdPSJA has not heard back from the negotiating parties 
to date.615  This example illustrates the fact that the success of the spatial strategies led by 
peasant communities depends on their ability to build protection on political grounds, using 
scales and mobilizing networks. 
The type of neutrality promoted by the CdPSJA and the ACVC heavily relies on actors 
and norms at national and international scale, and on the protection networks of which they 
are a part.  While I deal with the main ACVC strategy, namely the establishment of a ZRC, in 
more detail in the next section, the example of the CdPSJA illustrates how networks, scales, 
and places converge towards the protection of a territory.  The declaration issued by the 
CdPSJA on the day of its creation states that none of its members should be the target of 
human rights violations or infringements of International Humanitarian Law.616  As in the case 
of the ATCC, cooperation with armed actors is prohibited.617  But most importantly, it is 
affirmed that CdPSJA ‘will take all relevant and necessary measures to control access or transit 
of any person without the right to remain or move within the settlements’ of the CdPSJA.618  
The community’s principles are then closely associated with its territory.  Article 6 of the 
declaration states that the community’s settlements will be clearly identified by banners and 
fences.  According to the internal rules of the community, the Internal Council of the CdPSJA 
is in charge of making sure that armed actors respect the community’s settlements.  It is also 
its duty to denounce any violations at national and international scales.619  The CdPSJA 
controls its territory through the circulation and diffusion of information on armed actors’ 
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activities.  This implies the use of messengers who walk hours, for lack of a phone network, 
from one hamlet to another in order to inform members of the Internal Council of any 
violations or combat between armed actors.620  The CdPSJA then publishes the information in 
a press release and disseminates it through its national and international network support.  
One of the organic intellectuals of the CdPSJA also frequently informs the Colombian Attorney 
General’s office of any violations.  The information thus reaches many different places in the 
USA and Europe, such as the offices of NGOs like Amnesty International or Human Rights 
Watch; members of parliament and Foreign Ministry officials in Washington, Brussels, and 
other European capitals; and embassies in Bogotá.  The CdPSJA has been able to develop such 
networks in the few years following its creation thanks to the support of the Inter 
Ecclesiastical Commission of Justice and Peace, and to the accompaniment of the NGOs Peace 
Brigades International (PBI) and Fellowship of Reconciliation (FoR).  This points to the other 
way the CdPSJA tries to protect its territory, namely through the presence of international 
NGO workers within its settlements.  While PBI ensures a frequent but not permanent 
presence in the main settlement, FOR has a permanent presence in one of the community’s 
hamlet, called La Union.  This presence allows these two NGOs to provide international actors 
such as embassies, foreign offices, or members of parliament with reliable information and 
ask them to take action to protect the community and its territory.  During emergencies, for 
instance if combat occurs or a member of the community is in danger, these NGOs are not 
only able to make calls to army commanders at local and national levels, but also to quickly 
inform embassies in Bogotá, which then put pressure on the Colombian state to act.  They 
also coordinate visits by ambassadors to the community’s settlements, or advocacy tours for 
the CdPSJA’s leaders in Washington, DC, and Europe.  In 2011, Jesús Emilio Tuberquia went 
on an advocacy tour in Washington DC.  Amongst other people, the leader of the CDPSJA met 
with representatives from the Inter-American Human Rights Court, and from the office of 
congresswoman Nancy Pelosi.  He was accompanied to these places by members of PBI and 
FoR, who helped organise the meetings.621  The basic aim of these types of meetings is to 
raise the profile of the CdPSJA and that of its members, so that the US government  will put 
pressure on the Colombian state to protect the CdPSJA and respect its human rights.  The 
CdPSJA then relies on the desire of the Colombian state to improve its image and human rights 
                                                        
620 Aparicio, J.R. Rumores, p. 151. 




record before the international community.  The international actors met during these 
advocacy tours use all this information in their dialogue with the Colombian state, write 
letters to the Colombian president’s office, or even pass resolutions within parliaments.  As 
the CdPSJA gains key positions at the international scale, its territory therefore becomes the 
central node of a wider protection network connecting many different places at local, national 
and regional scales, and whose action is oriented towards the protection of community’s 
members and their territory.  While these dissuasion strategies have not always been 
successful, as the massacre in February 2005 of eight community members, including three 
children, illustrates, they have allowed the CdPSJA to establish a relative control over its 
territory, stay on its land, and even organise the return of several families to their original 
settlements.  
Finally, both the CdPSJA and the ACVC have managed to challenge the state in its role 
of duty-bearer of human rights by using legal strategies at national and international scales 
and gaining key positions within national and international courts.  The ATCC is the only one 
who has not resorted to the international scale in order to obtain justice and seek protection, 
and this in spite of the total impunity for the several crimes committed against its members.  
In particular, the ACVC and the CdPSJA have ensured the protection of their members through 
the Inter-American system.  The recourse to actors and mechanisms at international scale has 
provided them with the recognition of their control over their territory.  In the case of the 
ACVC, in 2000 the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights granted precautionary 
measures to the ACVC after finding that the Association had been “’declared a military 
objective by regional paramilitary organisations and subject to systematic threats as well as 
fatal attempts on the lives of its leaders’.622  The Corporation for the Defence and Promotion 
of Human Rights (REINICIAR) applied for these measures on the ACVC´s behalf.  In December 
1997, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights requested the adoption of 
precautionary measures on behalf of the members of the CdPSJA considering the killings of 
43 members since they had declared neutrality in the armed conflict that same year.623  In 
2000, the president of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights requested provisional 
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measures for 189 members of the community.  Since then, the Inter-American Commission 
and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights have recommended that the Colombian state 
take measures to guarantee adequate protection for the Peace Community.  The provisional 
measures issued by the Inter-American Court were ratified by the Colombian Constitutional 
Court through the sentence T-1025 in 2007, which establishes that the CdPSJA and the state 
should agree on the measures by which the community would be protected.  The meetings 
held to agree on these measures are the only spaces in which the CdPSJA now engages in 
dialogue with the state.  However, the state has not followed orders of the Constitutional 
Courts.  Two court orders were issued in 2012, but with few results again.  The judge of the 
Constitutional Court who was in charge of delivering the orders characterised the attitude of 
the state as omission, both at local and national level.624  She added that the initiative of the 
CdPSJA ‘sought to draw the attention of the state’ towards regions where its presence is 
weak.  She argued that the CdPSJA and other communities were constructing ‘protection 
networks’ through the use of International Humanitarian Law, Human Rights International 
Law, the treaty ratified [by Colombia] as a democracy, and the Constitution’.  For her, these 
protection networks should allow the state to offer ‘clear responses’ in order to protect these 
communities, which could also be a ‘way to consolidate the presence of the state in forgotten 
spaces’.625  The second 2012 court order gives a good understanding of the disagreements 
between the state and the CdPSJA.626  But most importantly, it encourages the state to 
respect the humanitarian zones already mentioned that the CdPSJA has created.  The order 
states that ‘the recognition that the Peace Community does not refuse nor asks for the 
withdrawal of public armed forces, but [requests] the respect for the humanitarian zones, 
open a path towards the revision of the current conditions under which both the fulfilment 
of the public armed forces constitutional function and the respect of the rules of the 
humanitarian zones in light of the international humanitarian law and the constitution can be 
guaranteed in a harmonious manner’.627  Even though the state has fulfilled one of the four 
demands of the CdPSJA thanks to the Constitutional Court orders, the majority of these orders 
remain ignored.  But they can be used as advocacy tools by the CdPSJA itself, international 
organisations, embassies, or international courts in order to put pressure on the Colombian 
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state.  Although the latter has not legally recognised humanitarian zones or the community’s 
principles, in practice the CdPSJA has been able to remain on its territory thanks to this 
international pressure.  As Father Giraldo argued during the court hearing that led to the 
issuance of the 2012 Constitutional Court order, the measures taken by the state do not aim 
to fulfil its obligations but to avoid the international community’s monitoring and the trial of 
crimes against humanity.628 
While the creation of a Peace Community and humanitarian zones by the CdPSJA was 
first and foremost a protection strategy, it soon became intermingled with strategies of 
appropriation.  To assert their control over their territory, the CdPSJA and the ACVC have 
sought to ground their claims in both legal and political grounds, illustrated by the use of 
different figures which legitimise their claims and their organisations.  While, as I have shown, 
the CdPSJA relies on international norms and owns the land at the same time, the ACVC has 
used a national legal figure, the ZRC.  In addition to these legal strategies, the CdPSJA, the 
ACVC, and the ATCC have developed practices to strengthen the link between their members 
and the territory, leading to what can be termed an organic appropriation of the territory, 
closely related to memory and the communities’ narrative of their resistance.  It is to these 
strategies of appropriation that I now turn.  
Appropriation 
Appropriation refers here to the strategies employed by peasant communities in order to gain 
legitimate control over the land and establish an organic connection with their territory.  
Regarding the former, I have shown in the previous section how the protection strategies 
used by the CdPSJA can also be characterised as strategies of appropriation.  The appeals 
made by the CdPSJA before the Constitutional Court or the Inter-American system not only 
aim to protect the community’s members but also to assert its control over its territory 
through legal means.  In parallel to these initiatives, the CdPSJA has started to acquire land as 
a means of appropriating the territory, to resist economic projects promoted by multinational 
companies aimed at exploiting natural resources, and to implement its own solidary 
economy.  Burnyeat estimates that the community now collectively owns around a thousand 
hectares.629  Members of the community who own pieces of land also put them at the 
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disposition of the community for collective work and production.  As I show in the next 
section, the efforts of the CdPSJA to acquire new land are related to strategies of production 
and the development of a peasant economy.  This connection between strategies of 
appropriation and production is also quite clear in the case of the ACVC.  The ACVC has 
managed to obtain the legal recognition of its collective rights over the land through the legal 
norm of the ZRC. According to ACVC members, the objective of the ZRC is the ‘strengthening 
of peasants in the territory’.630  The use of the ZRC was conceived as a means to ‘claim the 
right to land, and the right to live on [the land]’,631 given that ‘the land belongs to peasants’.632  
The ZRC is not only meant to guarantee the legal rights of peasants to appropriate the land 
but also to ensure that their basic needs are fulfilled and they have a ‘decent life’633.  In the 
words of one of the ACVC leaders, it is a ‘territorial proposal’ offering solutions to peasants’ 
problems, such as ‘access to land within the territory, the formalisation of property, 
development, [and] a peasant subject [granted] with rights’.634  They carry on to explain: 
The territorial exercise that we propound (…) is the full satisfaction of peasants’ right (…) With this norm 
it is possible to get access to land, award property rights over plots [of land], it is possible to require the 
state to ensure a more effective institutional presence.635 
For them, the ZRC is a tool to break with land accumulation; with social relations based on 
domination, clientelism, and paternalism; and to promote an agrarian reform.636  It is not my 
intention here to go into detail about the potential of the ZRC in this regard.637  My point is 
that the ZRC is the key element of the ACVC’s war of position and  the practice that allows the 
association to appropriate the territory through the mobilisation of networks, the raising of 
resources, and the establishment of connections between local, regional, and international 
scales.  It has then provided a legal basis to the ACVC’s claim to territorial control, as the ZRC 
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scope and purpose are defined by a national law, No. 160 of 1994.  As such, the law 
guarantees the collective rights of peasants to manage their own territory, and their 
individual rights to own the land through the Family Farming Unit.  The application decree of 
the Law 160 states that the objective of the ZRC is to ‘promote and stabilise a peasant-based 
economy, overcome the causes of social conflicts which affect [these zones], and, in general, 
create the conditions for the achievement of peace and social justice in the respective 
areas’.638 The ACVC has used the ZRC as an advocacy tool at international scale and gained 
support of members of parliament and international NGOs.639  The ZRC has allowed the ACVC 
to raise resources for the development and implementation of economic projects which 
favour peasants’ needs and a peasant-based economy.  For instance, international 
institutions such as the EU or the World Bank have funded some of these projects.  Finally, it 
is part of the cultural appropriation of the territory by peasants.  The ACVC has produced a 
disc entitled ‘Short musical stories for historical memory’,640 which illustrates this cultural 
appropriation.  The inside cover of the disc states: ‘This Project seeks to contribute to the 
process of remembrance through shorts musical stories.’  It is argued that these musical 
stories, thanks to their ‘great testimonial value, bring to the construction of collective 
memory and the denunciation of serious human rights violations that occur in rural areas’.  
But the songs also ‘provide an account of the vitality of resistance processes and cultural 
movements within peasant communities’.  The author of an article about music and musicians 
of the Cimitarra River Valley ZRC adds that these musicians convey ‘messages of social 
consciousness, and reflection on their own reality with great critical contents’.641 
This cultural appropriation of the territory is part of the second part of this section, 
namely the establishment of an organic connection between peasants and the land.  It points 
to the fact that resistance, territory, and autonomy are connected in the peace communities’ 
members’ discourse.  This is the result of the material relationship that exists between the 
land on one hand, and the practices and associated discourse of peasants and peace 
communities aiming at appropriating this very same territory on the other.  The president of 
the ATCC at the time of my visit explained this link between resistance, territory, and 
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autonomy.  He even established a link between the territory and the identity of the members 
of peace communities.  He uses an organic metaphor comparing the usual meaning of the 
territory as a vast area of land, to a conception of the body as one’s own territory: 
Let’s see… Resistance has to be understood as going much further than me staying or refusing to do 
something that I don’t want to do […] This is related to the very spirituality of a person.  And when I talk 
about spirituality, I think that here is… where there is… also a debate with the Government, when we 
talk about territory.  I think that if you see, look, since the creation [of the world], animals are territorial, 
we are territorial.  This is not only because we live on a territory.  This is also for us to understand that 
this is where one should initiate as well, including the discussion with the State, for then what territory 
means, and for us what the territory is.  Because it is… so difficult, maybe, when there is resistance, to 
displace people.  To displace peasants, to displace negroes, indigenous people, because the territory is 
part of our life, of our spirituality, and our cosmovision. This is where we grew up, where we have learnt 
everything, for us the territory is the father and the mother.  So this is part of the uprooting, of rooting 
out the… anybody’s entrails.  When a person or whoever feels is the meaning, this is what we call 
resistance.  It is resistance to them rooting out our heart.  Or rooting out our soul.  And this is not done 
for the sake of doing it, just because I don’t want to leave. No, this is just that I cannot conceive this… 
that this is part of life.  And people differ whether they have lived here, or have lived there.  So for him, 
his territory is his body.  For instance, one of the exercises we do as association is the integration of 
other… of other organisations, right.  For instance regarding… say, resistance, and when we talk about 
what resistance means, when we marry and anchor it to a territorial perspective, this is from a spiritual 
ground.  For instance, for women, their territory is the body.  If you ask one of the women from the Ruta 
Pacifica, she says that “for us [women] the first territory is the body”.  So if you say… the ways I 
understand resistance, because my body is the whole me.  And when there is this sense of belonging, 
when there is this moral and spiritual identification, this is when one cannot say that resistance do not 
go further, the fact of me being here, with what belongs to me and what… what I have.  And which what 
is mine only”.  So when the ensemble of this, say, these persons feel that, it is.. is… is… it is the 
component of everything.  Not only because I work and live here, but also because this is part of the 
beginning.  It is part of my life, of my spirituality. 642 
This very same conception of the territory is often found from the mouths of the leaders.  One 
of the leaders of the CdPSJA says that, in contrast with the use of the land made by the 
government,  
We see that the peasantry, for this form of historical subsistence, I think that [for] the peasantry the 
meaning of the land […], as the indigenous people say, is our mother.  This is because I don’t think that 
a peasant without land is a true peasant.  He is not a peasant because if he goes to the city, he does not 
have a cardbox, and he ends up, probably, stealing, eh… He ends up doing many things, he ends up as  
homeless, because our true form of life as peasants relies on the land.  A peasant without land is not a 
peasant […] So I think that the meaning of the land for us as a community is the most important thing 
within the process of our struggle.  Because without the land, we could not really move forward with 
regard to the economy that we want and all the means of subsistence required for every family.  
Everything starts from there, from the land, where it is possible to cultivate and where it is possible to 
survive.  This is why the struggle of the indigenous people have historically been that very same struggle.  
The land, because if they don’t have any land they cannot survive and struggle.643 
This representation of the territory could not be more opposed to the one used by the 
government, which  is based on the extraction of natural resources and the development of 
monoculture farming to satisfy the requirements of a neoliberal economy aimed at attracting 






foreign investors.644  For the grassroots members of peasant communities, the meaning 
assigned to the territory is much more practical.  It is related to the production of the means 
of subsistence and the potential for having a better life, both for the family and the 
community as a whole.  The more spiritual conception of the territory expressed by organic 
leaders grows out of this material relation and symbolises the existing organic relationship 
between peasants and the land.  The values, norms, and principles promoted by peasant 
communities, such as life, dignity, labour, neutrality, and non-violence, are all linked to the 
land in an organic way and contribute to positioning peasant communities within their 
political, social, and economic environment.  
Resisting thus means defending a territory, and this same territory provides the 
necessary means of subsistence for the development of the community and its members.  
According to one of my interviewees, ‘civil resistance is how we defend our territory’.645  It is 
about defending life within their territory.  They added that ‘the word “to resist” is a vast, big 
and significant one’ and carried on stressing the relationship between resistance, territory 
and autonomy by stating that they had already led  
…several resistances […] to prevent displacement, because after the massive displacement that took 
place in the month between… the months of November and December 2001, we did another civil 
resistance, and when it… when the peasant centre in the hamlet of La Pedregosa was created, it was 
with this objective in mind.  No to violence but yes to civil resistance.  And there we did it several times.  
We gathered as communities, from different hamlets, from different municipalities, when it was 
necessary to do it.  Because resistance is one of the basic principles linked to the exercise of autonomy 
within the territory, right to autonomy within the territory.  Defense of the territory.  This is the 
fundamental basis.  The word “to resist” has as… as objective the defense [of the territory].646 
The use of the plural to characterise their resistance is interesting in that it conveys the fact 
that the struggle of peace communities is not a linear process, neither in time nor in space.  
This process is associated with different moments in time, and different places in space.  Many 
different places fill and define the territory and the resistance associated to it at different 
times.   
This link between memory of the resistance and place is quite striking in all three 
cases, and leads to an appropriation of the territory through memory-building initiatives.  In 
all three peasant communities under study, memorials in honour of members of the 
communities who have been killed can be seen spread over their territories.  On 27 January 
                                                        







2008, 23-year-old Miguel Ángel González Gutiérrez, an active member of Cahucopana and 
son of Miguel Ángel González Huepa, one of the governing members of the ACVC, was 
assassinated by the Colombian army.  This occurred in the hamlet of La Cooperativa in the 
Magdalena Medio region (ACVC, 2007: 29).  His name appears on the memorial built by the 
community to remember the names and lives of those who died by the hand of the army and 
illegal armed groups.  Located in the centre of the hamlet, this memorial reminds to the 
settlers of La Cooperativa of the reasons why they have been resisting and fighting to stay on 
their land.  It places memory at the centre of the peasants’ struggle, both geographically and 
symbolically.  Similarly, the CdPSJA frequently organises processions to commemorate 
symbolic events such as the anniversary of its creation or the massacre of eight of its members 
in February 2005.  I attended one of these commemorations carried out on Easter Sunday.  
Every year, the community’s members walk from the town of Apartadó to the community’s 
main settlement, a good 10 kilometres away.  On this road, many peasants were killed or 
disappeared before and after the creation of the CdPSJA.  Father Giraldo usually leads the 
procession, a religious cross in his hand, stopping at every place where a violation was 
committed.  He told events as they happened and reminded everybody who those killed were.  
Then, one person within the participants read a passage from the bible, after which everybody 
carried on walking till the next stop.  The procession ended at the main settlement of the 
CdPSJA, where a mass was celebrated.  I attended another, shorter, of these processions in 
La Union, where peasants walked around the settlement and stopped where peasants had 
been assassinated.  In both cases, peasants left an object in memory of those who had been 
killed or had disappeared. These initiatives to celebrate and keep alive the memory of victims 
are then closely linked to the territory.  They assign meanings to places and strengthen the 
feeling of belonging between peasants and their territory.  Resettlement to the hamlet of La 
Resbalosa also illustrates the link between memory and place, and the appropriation, or re-
appropriation, of the territory by the CdPSJA.  Thanks to these resettlements, the CdPSJA had 
in 2015 11 settlements.647  Another of these settlements, the Alde de Paz Luis Eduardo Guerra, 
also known as Mulatos-medio, was created in memory of the 2005 massacre five years after 
it occurred.  
                                                        




The cohesion of peasant communities and their organic relation to the territory and 
land, although based on material needs, is not spontaneous.  Structures change and logically 
influence the consciousness of peace communities’ members. This ultimately has an impact 
on their appropriation of the territory.  Although still very present, violence does not reach 
the level it used to in the 1980s in the case of the ATCC, and in the 1990s and 2000s in the 
case of the CdPSJA and the ATCC.  Younger generations did not have to go through the 
atrocities the older generations suffered.  State policies based on gaining consent, often 
through the reward of material compensation, pushed some members to leave their 
communities.  This is why memory and education are so important in ensuring the cohesion 
of peace communities and the appropriation of their territory as the context changes.  In this 
regard, the ATCC has developed a textbook to be used in all schools within its sphere of 
influence.648  The CdPSJA has written the names of several of its members who were killed or 
disappeared on stones and has built a memorial around them in the centre of the main 
settlement.  It has also developed its own schools and recruited its own professors in several 
hamlets.  The ACVC frequently delivers workshops about culture, education, human rights, or 
even the economy, with the help of regional NGOs.  
What is striking is that all these strategies of appropriation are also almost always 
accompanied by strategies of production.  This production can be related to meanings, as the 
processions organised by the CdPSJA and the memorials located within all three communities 
show.  But it is also closely linked to strategies of economic production.  The next section deals 
with these strategies of production.  
Production 
The strategies of production developed and implemented by peasant communities not only 
aim to fulfil the needs of peasants, but also to strengthen the tie between peasants and the 
land.  In this regard, they are also strategies of appropriation of the territory through the 
development of a peasant economy based on a specific mode of production.  This search for 
a new mode of production is based on a use of space according to peasants’ social and 
economic needs.  As I have hinted in this chapter, it is also a mode of cooperation which places 
human dignity and solidarity at its centre.  It aims at countering the state-led neoliberal 
                                                        




economic policies and the illegal economic activities promoted by illegal armed groups, which 
are at the origins of peasants uprooting from the territory.  In two of the communities under 
study, the CdPSJA and the ACVC, this search for a collective mode of production and the 
development of a peasant-based economy is at the core of their political practices.  As many 
of them told me, the territory is the basis of their ‘life plan’.  In the case of the ATCC, the 
association’s ability to assert its control over its territory was weakened due to the failure of 
its strategies of appropriation and production from the beginning of 2000 until today.  
The ATCC sought to find a remedy for its lack of social cohesion and control over its 
territory through strategies of production and the elaboration of a new development plan.  
But this last plan also failed to generate an organic relationship between the association’s 
members and the territory.  In El orden desarmado, the authors explain this lack of internal 
cohesion by the failure of existing leaders to ‘develop and consolidate harmonious and 
supportive internal relationships between leaders of the ATCC, between themselves and the 
community they represent, and between those who make up the grassroots community’.649  
The early leaders of the ATCC were ‘constitutive elements’ of the community, and that 
explains their ability to forge the internal cohesion of the organisation.  Due to this lack of 
internal cohesion in the 2000s, the authors also argue that  
…while the 1988 development plan was designed and elaborated in a direct, free and autonomous 
manner by the very peasant leaders of the CWPA, in the elaboration of the [2004-2014 plan] the 
participation of external agents had a decisive and important interference.650   
In other words, the early leaders were organic intellectuals and the last development plan 
was not organic enough to be supported at the grassroots level and for community members 
to take ownership of.  By contrast, the economic projects implemented by the ACVC and the 
CdPSJA have clearly managed to give substance to the organic connection between peasants 
and the land.  The ACVC has implemented several economic projects over the years which 
have produced clear rewards and benefits for peasants of the Cimitarra River Valley.  One of 
these projects illustrates the success of the ACVC’s strategies, combining the mobilisation of 
resources at the international scale; the local needs of peasants; and a political economy 
based on solidarity, sustainability, and the respect of natural resources.  Started in 2002, the 
farming and breeding of buffalos has benefited around 46 families and has grown into a 
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community-run business selling milk, meat. or cheese.651  The ACVC has benefited from the 
support of the regional Magdalena Medio Peace and Development Program, and has raised 
funds from the World Bank.  It has also managed to get the support of several state entities 
for the technical training of employees of Ecobufalo Campesino, a company especially created 
for the commercialisation of buffalo-based products.  Such initiatives seek to ‘strengthen rural 
development in zones affected by violence, through the direct association of peasants within 
the productive chain as partners’.  Ultimately, this project fulfils the goal of the ACVC to 
defend ‘peasant territoriality through productive initiatives that ensure the sustainable 
settlement on the territory, contribute to guarantee food sovereignty and an equilibrium with 
the environment’652.  These elements are, according to the ACVC, ‘necessary conditions for 
the achievement of peace with social justice within these territories which have been terribly 
affected by war’653.  In this regard, the ACVC is convinced that the ‘political recognition of 
peasants and the strengthening of a peasant-based economy are the path to reach peace.’654  
While the ACVC has formulated an extensive development plan with clear strategies of 
production, the strategies of the CdPSJA are embodied within what Burnyeat terms the 
‘organic narrative’ of the community.655  At the centre of this organic narrative lies the 
production and commercialisation of cocoa, which symbolises the mode of production 
promoted by the CdPSJA and its relationship with the territory.  Burnyeat shows how the 
production strategies of the CdPSJA are intimately linked to its perception and representation 
of the state, multinational companies, and its neoliberal policies.  This leads to an insistence 
on food sovereignty and the implementation of production strategies based on autonomy 
and subsistence.  It also leads to the will to produce food in an organic way, in contrast to the 
methods used by multinational companies and intensive agriculture which use chemicals and 
pesticides.  Such a narrative helps the CdPSJA to establish connections and alliances with 
economic initiatives based on solidarity at the international scale.  In this regard, according to 
Burnyeat, the trade relationship established with the British-based company Lush contributes 
to the strengthening of the organic narrative within the CdPSJA, by emphasising concepts of 
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autonomy, the opportunity to get a fairer price, and the preference for alliances at the 
international scale.656   
A key element of peasant communities’ strategies of production is labour.  It is clearly 
linked to the ability of peasants to appropriate and remain on the land, and to their capacity 
to legally ground their rights to own the land.  When asked what resisting meant for them, 
some of my interviewees answered that it meant staying on the land.  And when asked how 
they resisted, they answered that they work on the land.  Labour symbolises the peasant’s 
view and conception of the land, against the state and market idea of the land as a 
commodity.  Labour (1) occupies a crucial place within the relationship between land and the 
autonomy of peasant communities, and plays a material role as the means through which 
members of the community subsist.  But labour (2) also has an important place within the 
discourse of the peasant communities about their right to own the land.  Finally, labour (3) 
has an organisational function in the sense that the peasant communities are organised 
around the search for an autonomous mode of production which is instrumental to the 
sustainability and growth of their resistance.  Again, we see how strategies of protection, 
appropriation, and production are intermingled.  This is what one of my interviewees termed 
‘practicing the territory’.657   
Labour provides the means of subsistence to be able to live in the midst of armed 
conflict.  In this regard, it takes on the form of a ‘productive activity of a definite kind, carried 
on with a definite aim’,658 as a producer of use-values.  Marx, in his analysis of the commodity, 
identifies labour in the latter sense as a ‘condition of human existence which is independent 
of all forms of society; it is an eternal natural necessity which mediates the metabolism 
between man and nature, and therefore human life itself’.659  Labour understood as such has 
a universal function in any context.  In fact, the extent to which the daily activities of the 
peasant community’s members are focused on subsistence and, as such, do not seem to be 
related to their resistance, is striking.  Picking up cocoa, growing manioc or potatoes, chopping 
wood, taking care of the cattle – all these activities are part of the daily work of the 
community.  At first sight, none seem to be directly related to the communities’ resistance.  
These everyday tasks are actually crucial for the autonomy and the development of peasant 
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communities.  But they also seem to be directly related to how the communities’ members 
conceive their resistance.  They work on the land to affirm their rights to the land.  They grow 
enough crops to be able to feed their families.  They harvest enough cocoa to be able to 
generate income for the community as a whole.  In this regard, it is hard to classify these 
activities within the two categories used by De Certeau to analyse the everyday life of 
common people in western societies (France in particular), namely strategies and tactics.660  
Is it because they managed to some extent to isolate the territory of the community from the 
impact of neoliberal policies and the armed groups’ activities?  It does not look like what 
James C. Scott described in his analysis of everyday peasant resistance in Malaysia, either.661  
This resistance was individual and was being carried on without consciousness.  For peasant 
communities in Colombia, it is both collective and conscious. 
Within the contexts of armed conflict, being able to grow and produce food is a way 
of reducing the conditions imposed by the armed actors, be they illegal or legal, on the civil 
population.  For instance, peasants from the three communities mention the troubles caused 
by food blockades or controls imposed by the army: ‘(…) here we resist in many different 
ways.  For instance, by having all our cultivated fields and seeding, our food crops.  We resist 
in such a way that in case of blockade we have where to find support.’662  Aparicio, in his 
ethnographic account of the creation of the CdPSJA, recalls the collective working days in 
which all members of the community participate.  One of the oldest men working this day, 
carrying a huge bag full of maize seeds, looked at him and said: ‘This is my weapon against 
war.  There is no time to play or rest, we need to produce our own food’.663  In this regard, 
labour is directly and materially linked to the community’s autonomy,664 as a member of the 
CdPSJA clearly expresses: 
The land is the most fundamental thing for any human being.  Without land, we would be nobody.  
Because this is the one we cultivate and the one which gives us our daily food. And this is why, from 
2005 onward, we have begun to work heavily toward growing food crops. And this is why this is about 
looking for new settlements for the community, spaces, sugar cane sowing, good rice supply, and the 
working groups are being strengthened every day. As we always have in mind the fact that we don’t 
believe in the quality of the legal system, we know that tomorrow, the same excessive events that 
occurred in 1996 might happen again, that we might go through economic blockades, we need to be 
able to take us out of this violence on our own territory.  And assuming that means working and 
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labouring the land, sowing our own production, our own food.  And this is why in some of the 
settlements we have sugar mills and rice mills.665  
The relationship between autonomy and labour is also reflected in the social relationships 
that develop around labour:  
(…) the autonomy we have is grounded in our everyday practices, the practice of a communal life, in a 
life based on solidarity, and with regard to the economic aspect, well, this is about work as well, right. 
The working groups of women, men, eh, working in order to build or rebuild, more specifically, all this 
social fabric, right, in order to build schools, the house of every family, to get back to work on the fields 
to be self-sufficient in food, and this will always be complicated (…).666 
In fact, collective labour is mentioned as one of the most important aspects of what the 
community represents for its members.  In all three communities, collective economic 
projects have been implemented, alongside the individual plots cultivated for the subsistence 
of each family.  
For instance, the CdPSJA is organised in working groups.  Every member of the 
community is part of one of these working groups.  One day a week, usually Thursday, all 
members of the community leave aside their individual commitments and work for the 
collective projects of the community.  This day is called a communal day.  This communal day 
is one of the elements that holds the CdPSJA together, one that constitutes in a way its 
backbone.  The structure and number of the working groups change over time, between 50 
and 100.  One of the members of the community’s internal council is in charge of coordinating 
all economic issues and matters.667  The importance of the working groups is mentioned by 
one of the members of the CdPSJA: 
The day that I stop fighting will be the end of it all.  So this is why the response is collective, and this is 
why as a community we act in a collective way with the working groups, with the communal work, with 
all the movement that we do, always in groups, to demand respect, to sometimes save the members of 
the community when they are detained by any of the armed actors. Eh… to demand and make our 
presence concrete.  So there is no other way to… as a strategy, because one inside of the situation we 
live in, one cannot resist on its own. Or you would have to conform to the armed actors, but one alone 
cannot resist.668 
Labour is also one of the three principles that sustain the resistance of the ATCC.  The 
slogan of the association is ‘for the right to life, peace, and work’.  Ensuring the right to work 
is therefore one of the main aims of the association.  This objective is clearly stated in the 
second article of its charter.669  This principle is grounded in a particular vision of what peace 
                                                        








means.  Peace is not only the absence of violence.  Peace would be nothing without economic 
development.  This is how Josué Vargas, the most prominent of the early leaders of the 
association until he was killed in February 1990, expressed this point of view: ‘Peace does not 
only consist in avoiding deaths: it also requires constant progress and development’.670  But 
this development has to be understood in different terms than those promoted by the 
capitalist mode of production.  Development should not be based on a paternalistic 
conception that supposes the assistance and aid of the state, but must be grounded on local 
peasant labour.  Before the creation of the ATCC, the structural violence imposed on the 
peasant population by the armed actors made working the land almost impossible in practice.  
When they were not deprived of the main productive element to sustain a rural economy 
based on smallholder farming, peasants could not properly use their own labour to produce 
enough food crops for their subsistence, due to the violence caused by the presence of armed 
actors.671  The testimonies of the peasants of the Carare region are full of stories about 
displacement, torture, or harassment.  Whole families used to leave their homes when armed 
groups occupied their settlements, and spend several nights in a row gathered in the 
mountains waiting until the armed actors had gone before returning to their land.  The army 
also caused its own share of violence.  All peasants recall the carnetisation.  Those who would 
not renew their ID card were considered members of the guerrillas.  But even those who used 
to go were sometimes kept for hours or days and tortured, until the army decided to release 
them.  These conditions of violence and uncertainty made it very difficult to cultivate and 
grow their own food crops: 
People used to sow very few seeds, and would pick up what they could and was available, nobody could 
think of planting a shrub of cocoa, or any long-term product, maybe they would plant corn and weed 
the plantain, but nobody used to make a good home or anything similar because they only thought of 
leaving; the majority of people was working in wood exploitation, and once they had secured timber, 
they would leave’ (Comisión Nacional de Reparación y Reconciliación & Grupo de Memoria Histórica, 
2011: 328).  
The same relationship between labour, land, and resistance is found in the case of the 
ACVC.  Resistance is both associated with labour and land:  
The majority of people who live here are poor.  But well, we… we survive doing what we know how to 
do, work, eh… and thus… that is to say the State has attempted many times to get us out of here. It has 
even killed some of our people… I mean that they have killed family members, they have killed one of 
my brothers (…).  And there are some of us… some of us stayed, around four or five persons who have 
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been direct victims of the State, which have killed some of our relatives (…).  But despite of all, we have 
not left here.  We are not willing to leave our land anymore.672 
Resisting therefore means defending the territory673 and the creation of the ZRC specifically 
aims at that.  The objective of the ZRC is to put a hold to the land-grabbing that was pushing 
thousands of peasants to leave their land and displace, and create conditions which allow 
peasants to stay on their land:  
The idea was that by creating the peasant reserve zone, they would at least respect the position that 
we have here in the region as peasants. That is to say, they would respect our resources, because if 
not… If we do not look for alternatives ways of… of how to stop, they will displace us (…).  At the same 
time, it was important to implement several… several… programs or projects inside the one which would 
benefit us as peasants who are resisting here for the land.674  
Labour is also attached to the right to land that peasants have developed over the years.  The 
argument is that peasants have a right to own a piece of land insofar as they work and 
cultivate the land.  The argument assumes that the very fact that they work on the land gives 
them the right to claim ownership of the land.  In the case of the ATCC, the widespread and 
systematic violence imposed on peasants before the creation of the association led to a 
situation in which tasks related to smallholder and small-scale agriculture could not be carried 
out anymore, and in which the peasant right to labour was denied.675  The subdivision of land, 
massacres, and scorched earth operations led by the army were the norms before the 
creation of the ATCC.  This right to land claimed by peasants reflects the fact that 
The land is the cornerstone of the settler’s life project turned into peasant after many years of hard 
work to transform its environment and turn a jungle area into an adequate area for agriculture. The 
common denominator of these settlers who have become peasants is a search for dignified life 
conditions and for a life project that, in its collective dimension, involves the establishment of a 
smallholder economy in the Carare region.676 
However, labour not only refers to the production of food or the development of 
economic projects.  It also refers to a certain mode of cooperation between the members of 
the community, which is associated with the mode of production.  This mode of cooperation 
is also a ‘productive force’.677  Remembrance of past events and their collective 
reconstruction by all members of the community, and the creation of alternative modes of 
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teaching or educating the children growing up within the community, can be considered as 
part of this mode of cooperation and as another strategy for the appropriation of territory. 
The fact that strategies of production and strategies of protection are sometimes 
intermingled is well illustrated by a novel form of collaboration between a British cosmetic 
firm, PBI, and the CdPSJA.  In March 2014, the UK-based Lush, which buys cocoa produced by 
the CdPSJA, campaigned in favour of the latter’s struggle for peace and human rights as part 
of its Peace Pioneers Campaign.  Lush is the main buyer of the Community’s cocoa, which it 
ships to Europe to be processed into cocoa butter and powder.  The first 25 tonne shipment 
of cocoa beans left the CdPSJA in 2010.  Lush supported the community’s application to 
become certified Fair Trade and Organic producers.678  With this campaign, Lush hopes 
through collaborating with PBI and sharing the experiences of the CdPSJA members that it 
can help to spread their inspirational message of peace.679  From 10 to 16 March 2014 in the 
UK and Europe, and from 17 to 23 March in the USA and Canada, Lush shops campaigned to 
protect the CdPSJA and to support the work of PBI as well.  Vigils were organised in support 
of the Peace Community and honouring the community members who have lost their lives.  
Two members of the CdPSJA travelled from Colombia to London and Manchester and took 
part in activities organised in Lush’s shops, where they spoke to staff and customers about 
the Peace Community, answering questions about their struggle.  They also joined film 
screenings about the CdPSJA and interacted with the audience afterwards. They spoke at 
University College London, and met with journalists, human rights groups, and lawyers.  
Alongside actions targeting civil society and aiming at raising awareness around the situation 
of the CdPSJA, activities targeting political society were also scheduled.  A special reception 
was organised at the House of Lords in London, chaired by Lord Joel Joffe, PBI patron, where 
Simon Constantine, responsible for buying and sourcing the raw materials used to make 
Lush’s ethical products, addressed the Colombian Ambassador and the Foreign Office.  The 
chair of the Bar Human Rights Committee also spoke, as well as the head of the South America 
desk of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.680  The aim of this campaign was to push the 
Colombian government to implement the Colombian Constitutional Court Order 164 of July 
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2012.  In this collaboration between Lush and the CdPSJA, strategies of protection, 
appropriation, and production meet.  
In this regard, the CdPSJA’s practices represent a fascinating attempt at isolating and 
protecting its members, not only from armed conflict but also from the violence induced by 
the economic system and neoliberal policies of the Colombian government, through the use 
of a mode of production combining scales and using pre-existing economic and political 
networks.  But it could also be considered a compromise within the capitalist system.  Asked 
whether trading with Lush was a way to contribute to the working of the capitalist system, 
and as such contradictory with the community’s ideals, one of the leaders had the following 
answer: 
The trade we have got is the best you can get within the system.  This is why I say that it is very difficult 
to fight against the system, because you cannot escape and that for this reason things will not change 
because no… The power of the system to impose is so strong, right, but, at least, one of the trading 
companies like the English one, well, I believe that this is a fairer way to do business.  To pay a better 
price and to do business without human rights violations.  And reversing a lot of the earnings to 
producers.  So I think that it socially makes sense and for us it has in fact been an experience through 
which we have managed within all the… our quest.  So there are a lot of opportunities for that.  But we 
still do not agree, because it should not be like that.  No?  But as I said, as it is not possible to entirely 
escape from the system, well, it is necessary to get into certain things.  And this is one of them, having 
to export I mean.681 
This quotation points towards the potential for the transformation of peasant communities’ 
strategies, not only of production but also of appropriation and protection, and towards the 
development of social, political, and economic alternatives as well.  This development of 
alternatives through the making of alternative historical blocs will be the subject of the next 
chapter.  
Conclusion 
I have demonstrated in this chapter that the control achieved over their territory through the 
spatial strategies of war of position analysed herein allows peasant communities to build 
social and collective bonds, to develop organisational and productive processes, and to 
protect their members.  Their ability to control their territory, both in representational and 
material ways, determines their place within society.  The possibility to see their human rights 
discourse materialise depends on their ability to protect, appropriate, and produce on the 
territory.  This link between the protection, appropriation, and production of a territory on 





one hand, and peasants’ rights on the other is key in the sense that the latter would not have 
any meaningful content if peasants could not control their territory.  This ability to control 
their territory is also key to their capacity to contribute to peacebuilding at local and national 
scales, as the social, political, and economic alternatives they develop are all grounded in the 
territory.  The current government seems to have understood that, as it now promotes the 
concept of a territorial peace (paz territorial) which places rural communities at the centre of 
the implementation of the peace agreement with FARC.  I come back in more detail to this 
concept and its relations to the alternatives models developed by the CdPSJA, the ACVC, and 
the ATCC in Chapter 5. 
However, for the young Gramsci, control over space is not enough to overcome 
capitalist relations of production and achieve social and political change.  In an article 
published in 1920 entitled ‘Seize power or seize the factory? – Bordiga’,682 Gramsci takes the 
example of the working-class disturbances in Liguria as a symptom of a new level of 
consciousness among the working masses.  The workers seized the factory and took over their 
plants instead of going on strike.  But this is not enough to overcome capitalism.  Gramsci 
argues that ‘the factory will be conquered by the working class […] only after the working 
class as a whole has seized political power’683.  Otherwise, their initiatives would be crushed 
by the coercive apparatus of the State.  Under the leadership of the Communist Party, 
workers’ initiatives have to be ‘channelled, merged and organized into one great, 
comprehensive upsurge aimed directly at the heart of the enemy bourgeoisie’.  For Gramsci, 
the control over the coercive apparatus of the state is ‘the only more or less direct route to 
the take-over of the factory’684.  This reminds us that for Gramsci, the exercise of power relies 
both on consent and on coercion, and that coercion logically precedes consent in that there 
can be no power or hegemony that does not ultimately rely on coercion.  This raises issues as 
to the relevance of Gramsci’s understanding of power for the analysis of peasant 
communities’ non-violent initiatives.  While non-violent in nature, these initiatives must rely 
to a certain extent on some degree of coercion to be successful.  
I have shown in Chapter 2 that peasant communities have had a positive impact on 
the direct violence they faced.  This chapter explored their role in building peace and 
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challenging structural violence through control over space.  This is why a spatial perspective 
on Gramsci’s understanding of power proves useful, as it points to the social basis of power 
and articulates both its material and ideational aspects.  Theories of non-violence might be 
able to explain how non-violent strategies contribute to the taking or overthrow of political 
power, but a spatial perspective on Gramsci’s understanding of power goes further.  It tells 
us that it is not sufficient to withdraw consent in order to bring about social and political 
change.  It is also necessary to establish some kind of control over space, and to rely on 
coercion and exercise a decisive function within the economic structure.  It is also crucial to 
ensure the coherency of structure and superstructures through the formation of an 
alternative historical bloc promoting concrete alternatives.  While the ability to develop a new 
consciousness and refuse the conceptions of the world imposed on them by the state, the 
armed actors, and ultimately neoliberalism was a first step towards their autonomy and 
emancipation, their ability to assert their control over a territory and produce a space that 
conforms to their social relations of productions constitutes  the decisive step towards the 
achievement of their autonomy.  The next step consists of the formulation of coherent 
alternatives for the transformation of social, political, and economic relations and shows their 





Chapter 5: The making of alternative historical blocs: Peasant communities, 
political power, and social change 
Introduction 
The front-page headline of Tierra, a newspaper run by the Prensa Rural news agency which is 
led by the ACVC, makes it clear: ¡La lucha campesina es la lucha por la paz! (the peasant 
struggle is the struggle for peace).  The main body of the article goes on to argue, in a strikingly 
Gramscian vein, that  
…the peasant movement is rising in the whole country in defence of its rights.  The national list of 
demands (pliego nacional de peticiones) that we introduce in this edition of Tierra, capture the most 
important claims made by the agricultural sector right now.  But this has not only to do with the 
corporate demands of the peasantry: its solution is intimately linked to the peace building needed for 
the Colombian people’.685 
This chapter analyses the efforts of the CdPSJA, the ACVC, and the ATCC to develop 
alternatives to the traditional dominant historical bloc in Colombia, constituted by urban and 
industrial elites, rural landowners, and political parties.  After contributing to the emergence 
of a new conception of the world, or critical consciousness, and establishing a control over 
their territories through a war of position, the making of political, social, and economic 
alternatives of a ‘national-popular’ character – thus establishing a link between the popular 
aspirations of peasants and the national issue that peace is – is the last aspect of the struggle 
led by peasant communities I analyse in relation to their contribution to peacebuilding.  At 
first, peasant communities aimed at putting an end to immediate violence and at addressing 
the needs and problems they faced in their everyday lives.  As peasant communities grew, 
their objectives and demands became more ambitious so as to broaden the economic-
corporate goals, in Gramscian terms, that characterised their birth.  They have developed 
broader narratives which place the experience of peasant communities at the centre of an 
eventual peace settlement, not only within their local settings but also at the national level.  
As I have shown in Chapter 2, the initiatives of peasant communities are based on a human 
rights discourse and the principles of neutrality and non-violence on one hand, and a critique 
of the political economy of the Colombian armed conflict on the other.  These two elements 
revealed a particular conception of the world, breaking away from the traditional world views 
                                                        




imposed by political parties and armed actors alike in Colombia.  However, as I have argued 
in Chapter 3, each of the three communities under study eventually developed their very own 
alternative spatial and political projects based on an organic relationship to the land.  The 
extent to which peasant communities gain command over their land determines their ability 
and capacity to bring about change within their local settings and challenge the armed actors.  
Building on the last two chapters, I look here at the efforts made by the CdPSJA, the ACVC, 
and the ATCC to make alternative historical blocs that build on these territorial and political 
projects and conceptions of the world.   
To analyse these efforts, I use Gramsci’s concepts of the historical bloc and the 
‘national-popular’.  For Gramsci, if a counter-hegemonic or anti-passive revolution struggle is 
to be successful, the challenge of social structures must be accompanied by the formation of 
alternative hegemonic blocs supported by political projects and social alliances of a ‘national-
popular’ character.  This is because ‘the capturing of space is linked to the physical 
construction of a hegemonic bloc which can forge together a unity, while also maintaining a 
clear direction’.686  Coalitions and alliances have to emerge and be directed towards the 
contestation and challenge of the very common sense that the traditional historical bloc rests 
upon.  This is also to recognise that the development of alternative hegemonic movements 
by peasant communities has to contribute to the emergence of a new common sense able to 
both challenge civil war dynamics (Chapter 2), and represent a credible alternative to the 
traditional dominant ideas that would spread throughout both civil and political society.  As 
Worth puts it, such a common sense should be ‘distinctive enough to challenge all facets of 
everyday life’, which can only be done through ‘an alternative or counter-hegemonic project 
that would have not just a firm ideological direction, but would need to be combined with a 
series of what Gramsci termed “national-popular’ incentives”’.  Worth adds that these 
national-popular incentives ‘would be formulated through a strong network and a balance of 
traditional and organic intellectuals’.687  The concepts of the historical bloc and the national 
popular help me determine the cohesion, strength, and potential of peasant communities’ 
contest of the dominant structures and actors that fuel the conflict in Colombia.  These 
concepts also help me assess whether the new common sense promoted by peasant 
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communities has the potential to be the basis of an alternative historical bloc that would 
constitute the bedrock of peacebuilding in Colombia.   
The structure of this chapter runs as follows.  I start by introducing the concepts of 
historical bloc and the national-popular and explaining their relevance for the analysis of 
peasant communities’ attempts at developing alternatives.  In the next section I develop a 
close analysis of each of the three peasant communities’ attempts to build such alternatives.  
I use Gramsci’s concept of the historical bloc to draw attention to peasant communities’ 
attempts to elaborate alternative political projects, articulate interests, and construct 
alliances with other social actors.  In other words, peasant communities seek to forge a unity 
between many different actors in order to build credible counter-hegemonic movements 
opposed to the state and neoliberal economic policies.  I also look at these initiatives through 
Gramsci’s concept of the national-popular, examining peasant communities’ claims to 
contribute to peacebuilding at national level thanks to the mobilisation of organic 
intellectuals.  Finally, I analyse the intellectual and moral dimensions of peasant communities’ 
initiatives to build alternatives.  I show that dignity appears as the common material and 
ideational basis of the alternative historical blocs led by the three peasant communities in 
their attempts to build a sustainable peace in Colombia.  In this regard, I also pay attention to 
their economic projects considered as the reflect of this intellectual and moral reform, and 
placing dignity at their core. 
My argument runs as follows.  I contend that each of the communities under study 
illustrates a different model of social transformation, from the self-autonomy of the CdPSJA 
rejecting both the state and capitalism, to the confrontational, power-seeking strategies of 
the ACVC, and the liberal stance of the ATCC seeking to bring the state back in.  While dignity 
appears to be the common ground of all these initiatives, the three peasant communities 
under study have adopted different attitudes and strategies towards the state and capitalism 
in their efforts to resist and build alternatives, which result in the emergence of different 
alternative blocs.  My claim is that these different attitudes, strategies, and historical blocs 




The ‘national popular’, the historical bloc, and peasant communities 
The discourses of all three peasant communities under study establish links between the 
popular aspirations of peasants and the national issue that peace is. To look in more detail at 
the significance of this link between peasant initiatives and peacebuilding, and to shed light 
on its relevance for the making of alternative historical blocs and the role of intellectuals, I 
first explain the relevance of Gramsci’s concept of the national-popular and the historical bloc 
for the analysis of the contribution to peacebuilding by peasant communities.  Peace 
processes and the struggles that are an integral part of their dynamics can be considered as 
attempts to constitute new and alternative historical blocs (Chapter 1).  Through a war of 
position and the work of organic intellectuals, a given social group gains the capacity to shape 
the institutions that dominate political and civil society, and form a historical bloc which 
ensures the cohesion of the social whole. To be able to challenge the hegemonic historical 
bloc, the making of alternative historical blocs is therefore necessary.  In the Colombian 
context, the war system688 is maintained by a dominant historical bloc formed by political 
elites and parties at local and national levels, urban industrial capital, and rural landowners, 
using a mix of coercion – i.e., the army and paramilitary groups, or social, economic, and 
political relations based on domination  – and consent – i.e., the diffusion of an anti-
Communist ideology and the implementation of strategies of co-optation.  Such a historical 
bloc is key to the reproduction of the hegemony of a given social group.  Gramsci’s concept 
of the historical bloc is at the heart of his theory of hegemony.  Through the use of this 
concept, Gramsci seeks to explain the links between base and superstructure, between 
changes in the economy on one hand, and politics, ideology, and law on the other.  The 
concept of historical bloc points to the fact that in order to bring about social and political 
change, be it progressive or conservative, or maintain the status quo, it is necessary to ensure 
coherence between the economy or the economic structure on the one hand, and the 
political, legal, and ideological superstructures on the other.  As a result, it is not enough to 
gain a dominant position within the economy.  Power also has to be maintained or challenged 
within civil society at the level of superstructures, through the building of political alliances, 
the diffusion of ideas and ideologies, and the shaping of social institutions.  Through the 
concept of the historical bloc, Gramsci connects all the ensemble of social relations and 
                                                        




stresses the connection between changes at the individual level (human being), at the social 
level (between human beings or social groups), and at the structural level (between social 
relations, i.e., the economy, politics, and ideology).  This is clear when he refers to the concept 
of the historical bloc as ‘a circle joining the levels of the superstructure’ and the ‘unity 
between nature and spirit (structure and superstructure), unity of opposites and of 
distincts’.689  This also points to the fact that social and political change, or peace in a positive 
sense as far as this thesis is concerned, cannot be achieved by operating changes within the 
structures or superstructures only, as the liberal peace of the 1990s advocated and the 
statebuilding paradigm of the 2000s theorised.690  Peacebuilding entails socio-economic, 
cultural, and political projects combined in order to bring about progressive peace.  It cannot 
be left to the economy alone, neither to the state nor local actors, for that matter.   
Any account of the attempts by peasant communities to form an alternative historical 
bloc must pay attention to the way they base their struggle on practices that aim to transform 
the economy and forge a new common sense of a national-popular character. To challenge 
dominant power relations within civil and political society, a social group not only has to 
create the political, cultural, and ideological conditions that will allow it to become dominant, 
but also create the economic conditions that will guarantee its survival, reproduction, and 
eventually hegemonic position within society, if it manages to overcome the dominant 
historical bloc.  Hegemony is not only ethico-political, but material as well; historical blocs are 
built on material and economic foundations and maintained through both consent and 
coercion.  Neither is hegemony only conjunctural.  It is the exercise of power based on a 
dominant position within the economy and political society (the means of exploitation and 
coercion) backed by an ideology, or common sense, and shaping civil society’s institutions 
(consent).  In this regard, the identification of alternative historical blocs has to stress the 
institutional, ideational, spatial, and economic processes combining to build and shape this 
very same historical bloc. 
Therefore, a historical bloc that has achieved a hegemonic position is more than a 
political alliance between different social forces and the articulation of their interests.  
According to Gramsci, such an alliance would merely end up in reformism as it would only be 
                                                        
689 Gramsci, A. Selections, p. 137. 




concerned with ‘partial questions’.691  Gramsci insists on the importance of overcoming 
corporate particularisms and forging unity and homogeneity within a party by focusing on the 
big questions.  This emphasis on ‘fundamental questions’ corresponds to the ‘decisive 
moments’ when unity will be achieved.  For Gramsci, such unity and ‘global character’ does 
not happen ‘all at once, but only gradually through experience’.  It involves challenging 
common sense and the conditions that sustain it, and creating ‘the necessary preconditions’ 
for the emergence of alternative historical movements and blocs.692  In addition to the need 
for unity and homogeneity,693 Gramsci stresses the necessity to develop concrete historical 
ideologies – the form of historical blocs – reflecting material forces, and the need to build 
material forces – the content of historical bloc - to support ideologies.  Indeed, in the concept 
of historical bloc, 
…material forces are the content and ideologies are the form, though this distinction between form and 
content has purely didactic value, since the material forces would be inconceivable historically without 
form and the ideologies would be individual fancies without the material forces.694 
In this regard, the concept of the national-popular appears closely related to the concept of 
the historical bloc.  As the editor of the Prison Notebooks put it, this notion  
…is perhaps best taken as describing a sort of ‘historic bloc’ between national and popular aspirations 
in the formation of which the intellectuals, in the wide, Gramscian use of the term play an essential 
mediating role. It is important to stress, however, that it is a cultural concept, relating to the position of 
the masses within the culture of the nation, and radically alien to any form of populism or ‘national-
socialism’.695  
In other words, the national-popular, as does the historical bloc, forms the basis on which a 
new state can be founded and grow.  Munck points to that when he says that ‘It is part of a 
nation-building process (…) it is about generating a new common sense, or alternative 
conception of the world, through the development of existing currents within the culture of 
the popular classes, even if these are deemed primitive by “high culture”.’696  In this chapter, 
I look at how peasant communities try to bring about change and peace at national level by 
linking their popular aspirations to the national issue that peace is.  This is a highly cultural 
endeavour which implies confronting the stigmatisation of peasants and bridging the rural-
urban divide.  I show the importance of this cultural dimension in my analysis of peasant 
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communities’ attempts at making alliances with other social groups and forging a new 
common sense.   
To better grasp the significance of the national-popular, it is useful to refer to 
Gramsci’s brief notes on Machiavelli’s politics.697  In these notes, Gramsci enquires into the 
conditions for awakening and developing a national-popular collective will, and analyses the 
failure of the Italian state formation, i.e., ‘the failures of the successive attempts to create a 
national-popular collective will’.698  Gramsci then proceeds to an analysis of class struggle in 
Italy.  Regarding the negative and conservative forces, he stresses the role of conservative 
social groups, in particular the landed aristocracy and the Church, whose influence led to an 
‘economic-corporate’ situation.  He also points to the lack of an effective Jacobin force, in 
reference to the French revolutionary movement which led to the 1789 revolution, that 
would be able to awaken a national-popular collective will.  Regarding the positive forces, he 
argues that the possibility of seeing a national-popular collective will is to be sought in the 
existence of ‘urban social groups which have attained an adequate development in the field 
of industrial production and a certain level of historico-political culture’.  But in a statement 
that strikingly echoes the Colombian situation, Gramsci also makes it clear that ‘any formation 
of a national-popular collective will is impossible, unless the great mass of peasant farmers 
bursts simultaneously into political life’.699  The concept of the national-popular is therefore 
useful to analyse the direction that the alliances formed by the three peasant communities 
under study might take and their strategic relevance for bringing about peace at the national 
level.  
Finally, for Gramsci, the formation of a national-popular collective will goes hand in 
hand with the organisation of a moral and intellectual reform, i.e., ‘to the question of religion 
or world-view’.700  Gramsci ascribes these two tasks to the political party when he says: ‘The 
modern Prince must be and cannot but be the proclaimer and organiser of an intellectual and 
moral reform, which also means creating the terrain for a subsequent development of the 
national-popular collective will towards the realisation of a superior, total form of modern 
civilisation’.701  He carries on to say: ‘These two basic points – the formation of a national-
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popular collective will, of which the modern Prince is at one and the same time the organiser 
and the active, operative expression; and intellectual and moral reform – should structure the 
entire work’.702  In this regard, Peasant communities could be conceived as the modern prince 
that Gramsci envisaged – if only in the countryside  – binding the popular and everyday culture 
of peasants and forging a new common sense within a national-popular lens that would be 
able to reach out to other social minorities and urban populations as well.  To conclude, 
Gramsci stresses the fact that the creation of a national-popular collective will and the 
promotion of an intellectual and moral reform must also be accompanied by changes within 
the economic structure, as ‘the programme of economic reform is precisely the concrete form 
in which every intellectual and moral reform presents itself’.703  Following this line, I argue 
that the economic projects promoted by peasant communities represent a reflection of the 
values they deem necessary in order to build a stable and lasting peace in Colombia, based 
on human dignity. 
The Making of Alternative Historical Blocs 
The peacebuilding efforts and initiatives of peasant communities were the product of the 
interaction with many other groups resisting armed conflict, the state, and neoliberalism, not 
only in Colombia but on an international scale as well (Chapters 2 and 3).  As a result, the 
development of these initiatives cannot be separated from attempts to articulate interests 
and build social alliances with these other groups, such as indigenous and Afro-Colombian 
communities.  These interactions led to the emergence of a collective analysis of the political 
context and the same conception of the territory, and encouraged the search for alternative 
models of society and strategies to challenge the state.  In this section, I also analyse the role 
of intellectuals, both organic and traditional, which was key not only for ensuring leadership 
and cohesion but for the development of a narrative highlighting the relevance of peasants’ 
initiatives for peacebuilding at the national level.  Finally, I found that while the political, 
economic, and cultural interests of these groups might diverge, the notion of dignity is the 
common ground on which these alliances were built.  
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All three peasant communities under study have tried to reach out to other social 
groups, organisations, and communities in order to strengthen their initiatives and build 
alliances.  My contention in this section is that the CdPSJA, the ACVC, and the ACVC have 
developed different models of social transformation, each of which corresponds to a different 
idea of how to challenge state power and bring about peace.  These models become apparent 
when looking at their efforts to build alliances and coalitions with other social groups.  The 
CdPSJA has presented itself as a proof that another way of life and another system are 
possible. It has focused on strengthening its self-autonomy in the midst of armed conflict and 
outside the reach of the state, and has favoured alliances at the international rather than at 
the national scale in order to challenge state power.  Recognising the state as the legitimate 
national overarching authority and the army as its legal coercive branch, the ATCC has always 
committed to collaborate with state entities in order to consolidate its organisation and 
promote economic and social development in the region.  Finally, the ACVC has based its 
actions on a concept of popular power and, sought the unification of peasant, ethnic, Afro-
Colombian groups and other subaltern social sectors of society. It has tried to directly 
challenge state power through a combination of a war of position and war of manoeuvre.  As 
I show, the ACVC is closest to a Gramscian understanding of counter-hegemony.  
The ATCC 
The ATCC emerged as an association in the 1980s, at a time when opportunities for 
international support, human rights discourse, and information technology were not as 
important, or did not even exist.  This, in itself, might explain why the situation faced by the 
peasants of the Carare region and their initiative did not have the same visibility in the 1980s 
that the CdPSJA and the ACVC achieved at the end of the 1990s and even more so in the 
2000s.  The ATCC could not benefit from the infrastructure of the global economy that 
emerged with globalisation, especially the new information and communication technologies.  
Neither has it been enabled to become part of global politics facilitated by what Sassen calls 
the ‘possibility of global imaginaries’, whereby local actors ‘become subjects of adjudication 
in human rights decisions, human rights and environmental activists, and many others are 
increasingly becoming actors in global politics’.704  While this makes the ATCC’s initial 
                                                        




achievements even more remarkable, including the agreements made with illegal armed 
actors and the award of the  Right Livelihood Award in Stockholm in 1990, it does not explain 
their relative failure to build strong alliances with other social actors, become a long-lasting 
mobilising force, and spread their ‘local rationality’ and ‘militant particularism’.705  The ATCC’s 
organic leaders did not manage to create the necessary conditions for the emergence and 
reproduction of a strong alternative bloc.  On one hand, the lack of a strong critical 
consciousness, the form of historical blocs, that would have allowed the ATCC to go beyond 
the mere reduction of violence, prevented the association from becoming a counter-
hegemonic force with national-popular incentives.  On the other hand, its inability to forge 
strong social alliances, shape the content of historical blocs, and overcome corporate 
particularisms did not provide the necessary material basis for the development of such 
critical consciousness.  As a result, the ATCC’s organic leaders could not bind together the 
social, institutional, ideational, spatial, and economic dimensions of the association’s struggle.   
The ATCC was at its strongest as a regional actor at the end of the 1980s; it 
represented a strong social force in 1987.  Its potential to become a hegemonic force and its 
capacity to gather peasants were real.  But it also aimed to reactivate the economy in the 
whole region and guarantee peace through the implementation of development projects.  It 
was developed with the support of two state entities, the National Rehabilitation Plan (PNR) 
and the Colombian Institute for Agrarian Reform (INCORA).706  The aim of the plan was to 
‘contribute to the [formation of the] state through the identification of regional issues so that 
with the help of [the state’s] resources, we, as inhabitants of this martyrized region, can 
guarantee peace and contribute to the production of food’.707  The plan came up with several 
projects related to health, education, housing, infrastructures, and the production and 
marketing of crops in response to the needs of the region.  Interestingly, it also sought the 
support of state entities for the funding and implementation of these projects, for example, 
the army to take charge of the construction of roads and other entities to provide engineers, 
training, or material.   
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Back in 1987, the year of its creation as an association, the ATCC was one of a kind.  By 
1990, it was seen by other peasant organisations in the region as a model they could follow.  
After two years of existence, the ATCC was no longer only trying to stop violence; it began to 
address the root causes of the violence.  In this regard, the ATCC attempted to obtain the 
support of state institutions, such as INCORA, for its development plans.  It also tried to build 
links with other peasant communities in the Carare region.  The ATCC looked as if it could be 
a binding force that would attract other small peasant organisations in the Carare region, the 
Opón region, and the district of Velez.  The ATCC even claimed to be a ‘national workshop for 
peace’708.  As a result, in 1988, peasants from the townships of El Carmen and San Vicente del 
Chucurri showed an interest in the association, and the ATCC got in touch with other 
organisations in the context of the Third Peasant Forum of the Carare-Opón region.  The 
outcomes of this forum, which took place between the 14th and 17th of December 1988, 
were the elaboration of a peace plan on one hand –which I will come back to – and the 
creation of the Federation of Peasant Organisations of the Carare Opón (FOCO) on the 
other.709  The latter was conceived of as a  
…platform dedicated to the struggle for peasant demands from this part of the country, struggle which 
will at all times be pacifist, democratic, participative and critical, acting and permanent and always 
respectful of all human rights.710 
FOCO was meant to gather peasant organisations based in the Carare region, whose aim was 
to fight for ‘a true integral agrarian reform that would solve land-related issues and the social 
problem’.711  Its objective was to coordinate all the organisations, implement programmes for 
the region as a whole, help fulfil the proposals that came out of the 3rd Forum, and act as 
spokesperson of all peasant organisations in the region.712  The fact that the ATCC was at the 
time the more ambitious social actor in the region is illustrated by the programmes developed 
by other organisations present at the Forum.  The ATCC was indeed the only organisation 
trying to build peace and formulate demands that went beyond the economic-corporate 
aspect of peasants’ struggle.  All other organisations had developed programmes of an 
economic-corporate kind only, focusing on the commercialisation of coffee, cocoa, and other 
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food crops; on the improvement of infrastructure for the mobility of people and goods; and 
on the need for more investment and capital.713  This partly explains why FOCO did not 
manage to overcome its corporate particularisms.  It only focused on ‘partial questions’ rather 
than the big questions to achieve unity and homogeneity.714 
Similarly, the Gran foro para la Paz de Cimitarra, organised by the ATCC on 15/16 of 
January 1990, represented the opportunity for the ATCC to both update its initial narrative 
and discourse, and strengthen its social base in order to face illegal armed actors.715  The ATCC 
decided to invite ‘all living forces who exert an influence in the region and governmental high 
dignitaries at the departmental and national levels’,716 including FARC and paramilitary 
groups.  The aim of the meeting was to ‘dialogue in an open way in order to design strategies 
to guarantee peace and progress in the region’.717  In this regard, one of the roundtables 
during the two-day meeting dealt with issues related to community organisation.  Its 
conclusions made clear that 
[…] there [was] the need to legally organise rural and urban communities so that they can start authentic 
and viable development processes which strengthen peace and adequately structure production, the 
market, the appropriation of technologies, political participation, etc…718  
These conclusions also recommended that the ATCC present itself as a model in the region 
that other organisations could follow.  As a result, the ATCC should promote ‘the creation of 
empresas asociativas” within its sectors of influence’719. 
However, these events and forums never led to more cooperation between peasant 
organisations of the Carare region, in the form of concrete political or economic projects.  In 
fact, in 1988, the associations that took part in the Third Peasant Forum of the Carare-Opón 
Region already bemoaned this situation: 
Up to now relationships [between organisations] have been scarce; it is possible to say that peasant 
organisations of the Carare-Opón have been working in isolation and have not developed common tasks 
even though there have not been obstacles amongst themselves either.  There is almost no 
communication and they have only met in order to participate in the peasant forums. All communities 
would benefit from a process of integration which would enable them to work hands in hands.720 
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There had been some collaboration between some of the organisations participating in the 
Forum, in particular between the ATCC, ASONACIS, and AGROBEDAS, but the lack of 
cooperation and communication was still striking.721  Despite this, participants acknowledged 
that the problems they were facing were not isolated.  They were conscious that regional 
issues could only find a solution through the participation of all communities that received 
support from the state at the time.722 
Just when the ATCC seemed to be in a position to become this regional binding actor 
and overcome corporate particularisms, thus further challenging the influence and power of 
local elites and illegal groups, and gain the support of several state institutions, its leaders 
were assassinated in Cimitarra on 26 February 1990.  Years of internal divisions and 
weakening of its social basis followed.  At the time of writing, the ATCC is no longer, nor has 
it been for a long time, the binding actor it used to be.  Although it is active in several networks 
– such as the Network of Initiatives and Communities for Peace from the Grassroots Level 
(Red de iniciativas y comunidades de paz desde la base), funded and steered by the Swiss 
cooperation agency – and is the target of a Collective Reparation Plan in collaboration with 
the state, the ATCC lacks the internal cohesion and unity to be able to build a strong 
alternative historical bloc.  It did manage to attract the support of NGOs at the beginning of 
the 2000s, such as the Magdalena Medio Development and Peace Program (MMDP), the 
UNDP, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Project Counselling 
Service (PCS), or the Red Cross, but this support was technical rather than a political 
alliance.723  The ATCC has also been unable to develop a strong alternative common sense 
which would support both its social and economic development and link its initiative to 
peacebuilding at national level.  As a result, the autonomy of the ATCC became weaker and 
weaker over the years.  In 2001, the ATCC reminds in its development plan that  
The destabilization of the organisation’s social basis by the lack of development alternatives, by state 
neglect, [and] by the excessive progress of coca crops and illegal armed groups, make necessary the 
search for different alternatives that would lead to both the stabilisation of the social basis [of the 
organisation] and the continuity of the autonomy of an organisation which has been recognised for its 
achievements toward the struggle for development and peace in the region.724   
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The 2001 ATCC development plan reflects the challenges faced by the association at the end 
of the twentieth century and the beginning of the years 2000.  Internal divisions, an increase 
in paramilitary activities, and the growing attraction represented by coca crops for the 
inhabitants of the region contributed to the weakening of the association.  In El orden 
desarmado, the authors emphasise this lack of organic cohesion of leadership, members, and 
proposed programmes to explain the difficulties faced by the ATCC and the failure of its 
development plan.725  While I agree with such explanation, I would add that it is not sufficient 
to explain the weakness of the ATCC as an organisation.  Its attitude towards the state and 
the way the organisation addressed the issue of political power is key to understanding why 
the ATCC is not the binding force it was about to become in the late 1980s.  
The cycle that started in 2001, when the association reached the peak of its crisis and 
the solutions put forward to solve it, are quite illustrative in this regard.  The ATCC, more than 
other social actors, has targeted state institutions with the aim of bringing the state back to 
the Carare region.  In this regard, the development plans of the association have served as a 
platform or base from which to mobilise the support of other social actors.  This was true in 
1988 when the association came up with its first development plan, participated in the Third 
Peasant Forum of the Carare-Opón Region and in the ‘Gran dialogo para la paz in 1990’, as I 
mentioned earlier.  In fact, as part of the final recommendations of the Third Carare-Opón 
Forum, it is stated that grassroots peasant organisations should ‘politically and massively 
support the programs of agrarian reforms and the programs of state support to settlers and 
small and medium owners’726.  Members of the Forum should not wear down energy ‘in 
pointless struggles about the total rejection of state programs and laws’727. On the contrary, 
disagreements about the agrarian policy should be communicated to the government ‘in a 
peaceful and democratic manner while also putting permanent pressure through our own 
grassroots peasant organisations, the FOCO, or peasant organisations of a national 
character.’728 
This attitude towards the state persisted by the time of the 2001 project which 
eventually materialised in the 2004–2014 development plan.  Even though the ATCC did 
manage to involve certain state entities and receive help from them in its first years of 
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existence, its 1992 development plan reiterated that ‘the institutional presence has only been 
by the state, and has been short-term, that is to say it was restricted to the search for 
solutions to the consequences of the problems, but not to its causes.’  It goes on to affirm 
that ‘there is no real solution’ to the roots causes of the problems, and ‘no projects looking 
towards a better future for the dweller of the region’.729  In 2001, the ATCC was still facing 
the same problems.  Even though some small-scale economic and development projects had 
been implemented, they had not provided any solution to any of the structural problems 
behind the armed conflict.730  The leaders of the ATCC then came up with the idea to organise 
a regional peasant congress – the First Peasant Congress for Peace – which took place from 
28 to 30 June 2001.  This was the result of a collaboration with the Corporacion de Desarrollo 
y Paz del Magdalena Medio (CDPMM) and the elaboration of a project aimed at 
‘strengthening the ATCC as an organisation representing a perspective of peace and hopes of 
development’.731  The report of this regional peasant congress states that 
The peasant congress is important, because its enables us to find and ratify a place in which we all exist 
through our voice and words, where we strengthen our link with a large network, and construct for our 
country a proposal that enables the nurturing of the social fabric, to which we are called and committed 
in Colombia.732 
Discussions during this congress identified several needs and challenges, including the 
strengthening of the negotiations with armed actors and the design of ‘dignified social, 
economic and environmental alternatives’.733  The development plan conceived in 2001 was 
thus considered a tool to not only address the internal problems of the association, but also 
to negotiate with the armed actors, legal and illegal, offset the production of illicit cocoa 
crops, and ‘enable the management before different entities, NGOs, at the national and 
international scales’.734  This last point is important as it reflects the ATCC’s strategy to 
promote development and peace in the region through the involvement of local, regional and 
national state entities.  As a result, the 2004–2014 plan states in its introduction that it will 
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enable the ATCC to’ stablish new and fruitful relationships of concertation and participation, 
both within and outside the organisation, especially with the administrations of municipalities 
inside the sphere of influence [of the ATCC], and with institutions present in the region’.  The 
plan further argues that these relationships ‘could bring specific programs and projects aiming 
to solve the lack of public and social services, basic sanitation, infrastructure and productive 
projects, thus creating a harmonious working platform and interinstitutional and crosscutting 
coordination’.  Finally,  this should encourage municipal bodies to fulfil the ‘constitutional and 
legal provisions that require territorial bodies to plan and use public resources with efficiency 
and adequacy according to needs and local potential’.735 
This quotation clearly shows that the ATCC seeks to ‘bring the state back in’ within the 
existing liberal constitutional arrangements, rather than challenging the social basis of the 
state and seeking structural reforms.  In the sixth section of the plan, it is stated that ‘the logic 
of local development require the consolidation of the relationship between public and private 
sectors and the participation of the community, both necessary to develop the potential of 
all actors involved’.736  The plan considers that the ATCC should get in touch and agree with 
state entities at the municipal, departmental, and national level about how to manage and 
channel support and funding of the plan.  As such, ‘the development of a permanent 
participative planning will imply the design of procedures which will allow permanent contact 
with different state entities at the governmental level and with NGOs’.737  Arguably, the plan 
lays out a very technical and institutional vision of how social transformation should be 
achieved, more akin to the typical projects implemented by international NGOs and 
cooperation agencies than grassroots organisations.  It emphasises a participative planning 
process which should ‘allow the knowledge of the different actors involved in the […] 
solutions of a problem or need’.738  This can be explained by the fact that the process that led 
to the design of this plan was conducted as part of the Peace Laboratories, the EU 
programmes for cooperation and development in conflict zones in Colombia.739 
Asked about the reasons why they consider the state as a legitimate authority in spite 
of having suffered because of state violence, one of the ATCC members argued that the armed 
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forces were accepted as legitimate because this is what the Constitution says.  As citizens, he 
explains, they could not ignore the state armed forces as they could in turn deny their legal, 
civil, social and political rights, in spite of being the guardians of these rights according to the 
Constitution.740  Since the creation of the association, the ATCC has worked with state entities 
in order to strengthen its organisational process and obtain guarantees, both for the 
implementation of its development plans and for the implementation of a compensation plan 
as victims of the armed conflict.  Its main institutional interlocutor was INCORA.  One of the 
first formal events was organised between 19 and 22 April 1987 with two aims in mind.  First, 
the ATCC wanted to ‘promote the association both within its social basis with the aim of 
achieving total participation of its associates, and outward to seek the effective and 
continuous relationship with state and private entities’.741  The second objective was to 
‘determine strategies that allow for the implementation and execution of the development 
plan of the township of La India’.742  In the meeting report, the state was reaffirmed as the 
sole bearer of legal authority.743  The ATCC was actually quite successful in obtaining 
resources from the state in the few years following its creation.744  However, it lost much of 
its influence throughout the 1990s, to such an extent that it is now perceived as lacking the 
strength to be a powerful hegemonic actor for social change.  The ATCC has not been able to 
overcome corporate particularisms.  Neither has it been able to integrate its demands within 
a narrative including national-popular incentives.  While it has managed to develop social, 
institutional, and ideational processes which enabled its members to overcome the direct 
challenges posed by the armed conflict in the 1980s and 1990s, the ATCC has failed to create 
the material conditions, either social, spatial or economic, that could have led to the 
development of solid alternatives.  Indeed, the ATCC lacked both the form or ideology, and 
the content or social alliances, necessary to make a strong alternative historical bloc.  The 
failure of its economic development plans reflects the fact that it has not managed to lead a 
successful ‘intellectual and moral reform’ of an organic character.  Its attitude towards the 
state and its critical consciousness were not radical enough to truly challenge the 
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reproduction of state power, gather support at the national and international scales, and 
maintain coherence and unity as the context changed.   
The Peace Community of San José de Apartadó 
The current ATCC situation contrasts with the achievements of the CdPSJA.  The struggle led 
by the CdPSJA in spite of all the massacres, harassment, and other human rights violations 
the community’s members had to go through, has come to represent a symbol of resilience 
and moral virtue.  Anrup and Español have even argued that the case of the CdPSJA calls into 
question the legitimacy of the state and its juridical system.  They affirm that  
the autonomy of the Peace Community of San José de Apartadó challenges and questions the 
sovereignty of the state through the actions and strategies of its settlers who, while resisting and 
emancipating themselves from the state-based system, produce new forms of power and participative 
democracy.745 
Autonomy and emancipation from the state and the consequences of neoliberalism are two 
key dimensions of the CdPSJA struggle.  In the previous chapter, I dealt i with the protection 
strategies of the CdPSJA, reaching out to the international community in order to exert 
pressure on the Colombian state, in particular through the development of a narrative that 
Gwen Burnyeat terms ‘victim-drama’.746  Building on Anrup and Español’s argument and using 
Gramsci’s insights, I show in this section that the legal strategies of the CdPSJA have wider 
implications for challenging state power, and are not enough as such to materially challenge 
this power.  Other communities have used such legal strategies but lacked the support of a 
strong bloc of social forces in order to successfully strengthen their autonomy.  But these 
other communities did not decide to break with the state and its legal system.  The CdPSJA 
has accompanied the ethico-political dimension of its struggle with the design of concrete 
economic and social alternatives, which it tries to strengthen through the development of 
alliances at international level and to a lesser extent at a grassroots national level.  Indeed, 
through these alliances with other organisations and social groups, the CdPSJA has developed 
a new common sense which poses a challenge not only to the state’s sovereignty but to the 
very social system on which the state relies.  In this regard, the CdPSJA has come up with 
economic, political, legal, and social alternatives to the ones represented by the capitalist 
system and the state, and seeks to isolate its territory and members from the consequences 
                                                        
745 Anrup, R. and Español, J. 'Una comunidad de paz’, p. 167. 




of the latter.  My contention is that the CdPSJA’s alliance-building efforts have led to the 
development of an alternative historical bloc.  The latter relies on a radical critical 
consciousness with national-popular incentives for its form, and on the mobilisation of 
international actors and institutions on the one hand, and grassroots solidarity at both 
national and international scales on the other, for its content.  As the node of this alternative 
historical bloc, the CdPSJA claims to be proof that another system is possible against the 
capitalist mode of production.  It has concentrated its efforts on the diffusion of its ideals and 
the promotion of its struggle through civil society at international level, while also trying to 
build alliances with other peasant, Afro-Colombian, and indigenous communities at national 
level.   
Ever since its inception in March 1997, the CdPSJA and the ideas on which it relied 
were the product of alliances and coalitions.  I have shown in the previous chapter how 
various actors and discourses converged in order to allow for the creation of the Peace 
Community as a strategy to protect both the territory and the members of the community.  
However, the same principles of neutrality and non-violence, and the withdrawal of consent 
were eventually used as the basis of strategies aimed at strengthening the autonomy of the 
community, building peace, and bringing about social change, to the extent that the initiative 
of the CdPSJA could be characterised as the making of an alternative community.747  For this 
purpose, the networks and alliances that the CdPSJA has managed to establish are key.  At 
first, the Peace Community benefited from the support of the CIJP in order to reach out to 
the international community.  Nowadays, it is one of the best internationally connected 
grassroots communities in Colombia.  Over the past 19 years, it has interacted with many 
different international organisations, including ABColombia, Amnesty International, PBI, FoR, 
the Solidarity Campaign with Colombia, XXI Solidario, the Human Rights Verification 
Commission of Valencia, the Spanish Commission for the Support of Refugees, the Rete 
Italiana di Solidarieta Colombia Vive, Kolko, and the Human Rights International Network.748  
Such a strategy has been characterized by Maria Teresa Uribe as an ‘emancipatory defiance’ 
or ‘rebelliousness’ which requires the development of autonomous forms of social 
organisations and alternative practices leading to the production of power.749  
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I have shown in the previous chapter how support from the international community 
made possible the protection of the CdPSJA, its territory, and its people. However, these 
international connections not only focus on the protection dimension.  Although the links 
between the community and international organisations are based on a human rights 
discourse and aim to protect these rights through the application of the international Human 
Rights legal framework, there is another dimension which keeps these links alive and goes 
further than the mere protection of the community or respect of human rights.  Solidarity, 
dignity, justice, and the will to find alternatives to capitalism and state oppression are the 
ideological binding elements of relationships between the community and other international 
organisations or networks.  They are, in other words, the form of this alternative historical 
bloc.  This solidarity and dignity dimension is manifest during the several peregrinations that 
the CdPSJA organises every year.  International organisations and individuals usually attend 
these peregrinations, during which their role go further than mere observers or partners 
implementing a cooperation project.  Some read a text from the Bible.  Others, like FoR  
members did when I participated in one these walks, read a text out loud in solidarity with 
the community and sang its anthem.  This solidarity dimension is all the more visible in the 
links that the community has established with other grassroots international organisations or 
even European cities.  In this regard, the examples of the Spanish Acompaz network, the Rete 
Colombia Vive!, and the city council of Burgos in Spain are illustrative.  Acompaz was born in 
Madrid in 2005 as a grassroots movement in support of the CdPSJA.  It is composed of several 
groups and individuals who feel a ‘deep appreciation and affection’ for the Peace Community: 
The shared suffering for one of the most horrendous aggression committed against [the] community on 
the 21st of February 2005, have become an extraordinary energy and a will of collective cooperation in 
favour of the heroic and astonishing struggle pursued by the San José Community, from a position of 
nonviolence, in favour of life and dignity.750 
This quotation is interesting in that it makes clear that the link between the Peace Community 
and these groups and individuals goes beyond the protection needs of the CdPSJA and the 
respect for human rights.  The emotional dimension is evident here, through the sharing of 
the suffering of the CdPSJA.  Acompaz has as its objective the promotion of the initiative led 
by the Peace Community, the gathering of support, and participation in the ‘support to the 
set of health, ecological, and productive projects which are truly respectful of nature and 
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human beings, of the memory of the community and the education for autonomy and 
freedom’.  The overarching goal is to fight ‘for a non-violent world and the access to a land 
where peace prevails’.751  Acompaz has realised several activities, including a gathering of 
international grassroots organisations in Madrid in February 2005, a protest in front of the 
Colombian embassy in Madrid in February 2006, and the writing of letters addressed to 
European governments, members of parliament, or UN agencies, urging them to put pressure 
on the Colombian state to protect the CdPSJA.  This example is also illustrative of a tendency 
of foreigners and international grassroots organisations to idealise the initiative of the 
CdPSJA.  Aparicio argues that the CdPSJA has become the main objective of the desires, 
aspirations, and utopias of international groups and individuals who say they cannot find 
other alternatives in their own countries.752  But he also notes that the CdPSJA has used these 
desires, aspirations, and utopias to such an extent that they have become a very important 
part of its efforts to obtain support and funds.  However, in spite of the power dynamics and 
hierarchies which might emerge as part of the relationships between the Peace Community 
and external actors, the CdPSJA has always managed to preserve its autonomy.  Although 
autonomy is always relative, it has been sustained thanks to the community’s internal 
strength and the authority of its internal Council, formed by organic intellectuals.753  I have 
seen how this Council told a South-African visitor to leave after spending a few nights within 
the community.  They were not sure about his intentions and motivations.  
In March 2007, the Rete Italiana and Acompaz organised an international human 
rights delegation which participated in the commemoration of the tenth anniversary of the 
creation of the CdPSJA.754  The press release which followed this delegation reiterates the 
solidarity and friendship of the participating organisations with the CdPSJA.  It also 
emphasises the operate in a dignified way.  Similar motivations were visible during the Fourth 
International Forum ‘Colombia Vive’ in October 2007, also organised by Rete Colombia Vive!, 
and which convened organisations and entities from six European countries and the USA.  The 
final report of this gathering reaffirms the ‘universal value’ of the non-violent struggle led by 
the CdPSJA and other communities resisting the armed conflict.  According to participants, 
                                                        
751 Acompaz, Sembrando paz, Boletin n° 1. 
752 Aparicio, J.R. Rumores, pp. 266-267. 
753 Aparicio, J.R. Rumores, pp. 266-267. 
754 Rete Colombia Vive!, ‘Delegazione Internazionale Solidale con le Comunità di Pace e Comunità in Resistenza Civile 




these communities have ‘defined forms of solidary economies and dignified lives through 
which they contribute in a concrete way to the construction of a different world’.755  Finally, 
the City Council of Burgos, in Spain, signed an agreement of solidary collaboration with the 
CdPSJA and one of the city squares was given the name of the CdPSJA.  As part of this twinning 
agreement, the city of Burgos has carried out several educational, production, and 
infrastructural projects, led initiatives in defence of human rights, and organised actions to 
promote and raise awareness around the situation of the CdPSJA.  More recently, it issued an 
institutional declaration in support of the peace process between the government and 
FARC.756 
While the CdPSJA has always privileged cooperation with the international scale, it has 
also developed alliances at the national scale.  The establishment of solidarity links, the 
sharing of knowledge, and the building of alternatives are the three main dimensions of these 
initiatives.  To illustrate this, I analyse what I consider the most representative and important 
attempts made by the CdPSJA to build alliances at national level.  For example, the RECORRE 
network was born in September 2003 when a group of ten communities from many different 
and diverse Colombian regions and ethnic backgrounds gathered in San José de Apartadó.757  
This encounter is a key step leading to the decision by the CdPSJA to break all relationships 
with the state.758  The RECORRE network was then formally created in December 2003 after 
a follow-up meeting in Bogotá.759  In addition to the CdPSJA, the other nine organisations are 
the Arauca Peasants Association, the Indigenous Cabildos Association of North Cauca, the 
U’wa indigenous community, the Community Council of the Naya River Valley, the 
Community Council of the Nupa Caunapi River, the Agromining Federation of South Bolivar, 
the Community Process of Cartagena del Chairá, and the Black Communities Initiative (PCN).  
Not only have all these organisations been the target of systematic persecutions, forced 
displacements, and massacres from the state, paramilitary groups, or the guerrillas, they have 
also been at the bottom of the racial hierarchy since Spanish colonisation.760  They all live on 
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lands rich in natural resources which have been the subject of huge economic projects aimed 
at extracting these resources, such as oil, palm trees, bananas, or cocoa crops.  One of the 
aims of the gathering and the network is ‘to build bonds of solidarity in the context of the 
lived situations through which the communities are going though’.761  Implicit in the first 
declaration published by the network is the idea that in order to generate autonomous 
alternatives, they have to break all collaboration with the legal system.  In this regard, the aim 
is to design an alternative ‘from the rupture with justice’, implying an ‘international, national, 
and internal labour with communities’.762  The declaration then defines the principles that 
unite together these communities.  A clear position on the Colombian state – a ‘fascist state’, 
‘the main aggressor and responsible (…) of the atrocities committed against communities’, 763 
and the promotor of paramilitary groups – is exposed.  The anti-capitalist and anti-
neoliberalism nature of the network is also explained, as the violence these communities have 
suffered is the ‘product of a system which generates death, as neoliberalism does in its actions 
in favour of multinationals’, 764 which benefit a few and exclude the majority.  But more 
importantly, the organisations have decided to break with the Colombian legal system due to 
the continuous use of terror by the state and widespread impunity.  The declaration explains 
that collaborating with such a legal system would mean being a part of the logic of terror and 
impunity which characterises this very same system.  These principles are meant to generate 
common bonds between communities while respecting their autonomy.  For instance, it is 
stated that ‘the network cannot be the spokesperson of the communities, neither does it 
replace them in their actions of resistance as communities, and as such in their creative and 
autonomous practices’. 765  On the contrary, the network represents a search for help and 
coordination between communities, a space for the sharing of information, the coordination 
of activities, and the design of strategies. It is interesting to note that whilst these 
organisations have broken with the Colombian legal system, they ground their decisions in 
the Constitution of Colombia, in particular the Article 18 which guarantees the right of 
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conscientious objection.  In this case, the conscientious objection is put into practice through 
the ‘no collaboration with a legal system which violates fundamental and universal principles’, 
such as ‘the principle of legality’ and the ‘principle of due process in reason of the lack of an 
independent and impartial court’.766 
The search for economic, legal, and political alternatives outside the institutional 
political channels and the creation of new channels for the political participation of the 
organisations’ members are the other component of the RECORRE network.  These 
dimensions combine with the ideological views expressed in order to shape the making of an 
alternative historical bloc.  The second encounter of the network aimed at designing solidary 
economic alternatives which would enable communities to ground their search in ‘an 
alternative daily life based on the community, solidarity, and on the search for truth and 
justice’.767  But above all, this is the meaning of the Peasant University, which was born out of 
the encounters of the RECORRE network768.  It was conceived as an alternative space where 
communities could receive both theoretical and practical training, opposed to capitalism and 
the current function of formal and official universities.  The words alternative, resistance, 
solidarity, dignity, and diversity repeat throughout the declaration which officialised the 
creation of the Peasant University.  The idea is not only to share knowledge or for the 
‘university [to] live off the resistance of communities’, but also for this joint production of 
knowledge to benefit communities.769  This knowledge would thus serve the communities’ 
resistance and would be produced from the lived reality of the communities in favour of their 
search for alternatives.770  We see here how culture and politics are intermingled, leading to 
the intellectual and moral reform which Gramsci considers key for the formation of a national-
popular will and a new historical bloc.  The CdPSJA and its allies mobilise cultural elements 
coming from peasants’ everyday life as the basis for the design of alternatives.  According to 
the University’s founders, ‘being in the university is a conception of a new reality, an 
alternative world that is trying to generate a new state and society, against consumerism and 
                                                        
766 RECORRE, ‘Justificación del Proceso de Ruptura’, (Undated). Available at: 
http://www.prensarural.org/recorre/ruptura.htm (Accessed 25 May 2017). 
767 RECORRE, ‘Segundo encuentro de comunidades en resistencia civil’, (San José de Apartadó, CdPSJA. 2004). Available at: 
http://prensarural.org/recorre/apartado20041206.htm (Accessed 25 May 2017).  
768 RECORRE, ‘Por una universidad de la vida y la Resistencia’ (RECORRE, 23 May 2005). Available at: 
http://prensarural.org/recorre/universidad.htm (Accessed 25 May 2017) 
769 RECORRE, ‘Por una universidad de la vida y la Resistencia’. 




capitalism, and based in solidarity and the right of the people’.771  This new critical 
consciousness that has emerged from the exchanges between communities is even clearer in 
a passage which is worth quoting at length.  It is argued that this is 
…a university in opposition to that consumption logic [based] on coming in and out to generate capitalist 
exploitation and to be able to maintain that dynamic, it is a university that is fundamentally opposed to 
this; It is the search for a dignified world, with justice, based on clear horizons of truth, memory, 
resistance, full anti-capitalism and as a consequence, it stands up for an alternative solidarity economy, 
[a sense of] community, the search of justice and a legitimate state, alternative laws, and not based on 
lies and a system that does not think for communities but for their exploitation and death, so we think 
about the land, about humanity, about the history that has been creating victims, it is from there that 
this alternative university comes from.772 
The Peasant University first met in August 2004 in the main settlement of the CdPSJA, before 
meeting again in San Vicente del Caguan, in the southern part of Colombia, in March 2005 
(Ruiz, 2005).773  Since then, it has  only met a few times, due to lack of funding.  During these 
sessions, communities discussed legal and political alternatives, and shared and designed 
experiences and strategies of resistance.  Courses on agriculture, health and education were 
also taught.  In particular, this included the sharing and use of original seeds, the production 
of organic compost, and the use of indigenous traditional medicines, with an emphasis on 
food sovereignty and autonomy.  
The Peace Community succeeded in developing strong alliances at international level 
with grassroots international organisations based on solidarity and a critical consciousness 
that transcend both its local setting and international borders.  These alliances support the 
ideological positions of the CdPSJA and enable it to develop alternatives.  Through these 
alliances, the CdPSJA managed to create the political, cultural, and ideological conditions 
necessary for its survival.  Such conditions are also key to the economic projects that reflect 
this intellectual and moral reform and new critical consciousness, such as the organisation of 
collective working groups I mentioned in the previous chapter, or the cultivation and 
commercialisation of cocoa with the British company Lush. This symbolises the success of the 
CdPSJA to develop an organic critical consciousness based on peasants’ everyday life and 
culture, and to connect it with international discourses on human rights, dignity, and food 
production. 
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The CdPSJA has thus managed to locate itself at the centre of an alternative bloc of 
grassroots social forces that challenges the legitimacy of both the state and the capitalist 
system.   These alliances have enabled the CdPSJA to strengthen its autonomy and made 
possible the rupture of any relationships with the state and its legal system.  They have also 
enabled the CdPSJA to position itself as the living proof that another world is possible and 
that alternatives to the current state, economic, and war system are possible as well, in what 
could be termed a radical idealism.  For one of the main leaders of the Peace Community, 
social change is linked to a change in consciousness.  And asked whether the CdPSJA could 
contribute to the making of a progressive consciousness, he had this answer:  ‘We already 
are, aren’t we? We have been for 17 years with difficulty, but we have already contributed 
quite a lot, haven’t we?’774  This quote symbolises the radical idealism practiced by the 
CdPSJA. 
The Cimitarra River Valley Peasant Association 
The radical idealism of the CdPSJA contrasts with the radical pragmatism of the ACVC.  Its 
attitude towards the state can be characterised as one of de facto acceptance of the state 
while denouncing its crimes and aiming to transform its institutions and challenge its social 
basis. ACVC members have revolutionary elements within their political culture, but they also 
come from a political tradition which, although radical, has always accepted the state as a 
legitimate authority.775  This issue generated debates between members of the ACVC, 
revolving around whether the organisation should be a kind of militant of the subversion, or 
adopt ideas on social and political issues which, whilst close to the subversion’s position, 
rejected the use of violence and adopted different strategies of social transformation.776  
This amenable attitude towards the state is clearly visible within the alliance-building 
initiatives led by the ACVC, or in those in which it took a prominent role.  This attitude can 
already be seen before the creation of the ACVC.  The association was born out of a long 
history of protests, strikes, and rallies led by peasants of the Magdalena Medio Region, such 
as the 1996 marcha campesina and the 1998 exodo campesino in Barrancabermeja.777  These 
protests paved the way for the creation of the ACVC in 1996 and characterised its first years 
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of existence.  In this regard, Jerez explains that the efforts of the ACVC aim to  ‘stir all this, all 
this accumulated social and political experience, and turn it into a proposition and a reference 
of regional peacebuilding effort’.778  After 20 years of existence, the ACVC managed to gather 
the thousands of peasants living in the Cimitarra River Valley, receive a prestigious national 
peace award in 2010, and take prominent and leading roles in national social and political 
movements such as ANZORC, the Patriotic March movement, and the National and Agrarian 
Summit: Peasant, ethnic, and popular (Cumbre nacional agraria: campesina, etnica, y 
popular).  It also established links with the Latin American Coordination for Rural 
Organisations (CLOC), and created or organised alternative channels of political participation 
at local level.  It has thus become one of the most prominent grassroots social actors in 
Colombia, with some of its leaders being recognised as amongst the most powerful individuals 
of social mobilisation.779 
The ACVC affirms that the 2010 national peace award, issued by the German and 
French embassies, made it aware of its newly assumed moral and political responsibility in 
order to convene the insurgency, the widest possible sectors within society and the state, and 
the international community to ‘talk about the possibilities of a dignified peace, with a view 
to endow social conflicts in Colombia with a distinct course’.780  This resulted in the 
organisation of the National Meeting of Peasant, Afro-Colombian, and Indigenous 
Communities for the Peace of Colombia, in August 2011. The general objective of the 
gathering is to ‘create a wide space [to promote] the socialization of negotiated political 
proposals for peace in Colombia from the lived experiences of rural communities’.781  As such, 
peasants, indigenous, and Afro-Colombian communities would gather to design alternatives 
‘in dialogue with the government, guilds, and other sectors which are committed to peace 
within local, regional, national and international settings’.782  Here, the aim clearly is for rural 
communities to form the new historical bloc on which peace could grow and the country 
could develop socially and economically.  Further, the ACVC aims to ‘provide to the Colombian 
society as a whole with (…) a stage led by the communities themselves in order to bring all 
                                                        
778 ACVC#1. 
779 Vélez, J. ‘Los Super poderosos de la movilización social – 2016’, La Silla Vacía (Bogotá), 30 May 2016. Available at 
http://lasillavacia.com/historia/los-super-poderosos-de-la-movilizacion-social-55982 (Accessed 25 May 2017). 
780 Tierra, ‘Encuentro Nacional de Comunidades Campesinas, Afrodescendientes e Indígenas pro la Paz de Colombia’, Tierra 
(Barrancabermeja), n° 5, Octubre 2010 - Mayo 2011, p. 2. 
781 Tierra, ‘Encuentro Nacional de Comunidades Campesinas, Afrodescendientes e Indígenas pro la Paz de Colombia’. 




social and political actors together so they can envisage, and build a country on hope, with 
proposals for peace and not war’.783  This gathering, which would later be called the National 
Meeting of Peasant, Afrodescendant and Indigenous Communities for the Land and Peace of 
Colombia, was in fact a symbol of the capacity of the ACVC to mobilise communities from 
diverse ethnic and geographical backgrounds, and its potential to forge an alternative 
historical bloc gathering different sectors and social forces within Colombian society under a 
same critical consciousness.  Indeed, this event gathered more than 24 000 people in 
Barrancabermeja, and was accompanied by the regional archbishop, the governors of the 
Santander Department, and the municipality of Barrancabermeja.  Its motto was ‘dialogue is 
the way to go’.  The ACVC explicitly argued in its presentation in one of the working groups 
set up during the event that ‘[they] need to make reality the idea according to which dialogue 
is the way to go’.  They go on to explain that ‘materialising this implies’:  
…the widest possible social and popular participation.  The political solution cannot be a matter of 
exclusive competence (responsibility) of the parties directly involved in the armed struggle.  “All voices 
all, all hands all” of this country need to be heard and mobilised in order to lay the foundations that will 
allow us to move forward toward peace with social justice.  This entails a hard tasks of organisation, 
politicization, and social mobilisation, that we wish to assume with all those willing to follow it.  The 
presence in this meeting of thousands of peasants, men and women, young people, delegations of 
indigenous and Afro-Colombiancommunities, workers, church delegates, and of diverse expressions of 
social mobilisation, intellectuals, human rights and peace activists, is a wonderful example of what is 
possible and above all that there is grounds for hope.  This space is to be built and widen.784 
The final declaration of the meeting made clear the opposition of participants to the current 
state policies which ‘promote an economic model that favours the intensive exploitation of 
our land and natural resources, benefit transnational companies and economic groups’, and 
‘deepen land related conflicts and the struggle for the territory’.785  According to participants, 
such a model not only destroys peasant economies and intensifies the armed conflict, but 
also ‘encourages new processes of expropriation, dispossession and forced displacement, 
radically damages social processes and jeopardizes our food sovereignty and security’.786  
Against this, the declaration argues that a new economic and political model is required, and 
that a political, negotiated solution to the armed conflict has to be found.  The organisations 
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participating in the meeting made clear that ‘dialogue is the way to go’, and that laying the 
ground for a ‘peace with social justice’ requires the creation of a ‘nation-wide movement with 
international support’ and ‘the widest possible social and popular participation’.787  However, 
the declaration makes clear that while such a movement should be based on the diversity of 
current social and popular collective actions, be they ethnic, popular, rural or even gender-
based, it should also respect social organisations and their autonomy.788  It is clear then that 
the strategies of social transformation promoted by the ACVC involve the popular 
mobilisation of many different sectors of Colombian society through the creation of 
grassroots channels of political participation, and the channelling of their interests towards 
the design of social, economic and political alternatives.  On the other hand, the formation of 
such a bloc of social forces and alternatives is meant to exert pressure on the government.  
Both the initiatives of the ACVC to design alternatives from the bottom up and the role it has 
taken in movements such as the Patriotic March (MP), the Agriculture and Popular 
Roundtable for Dialogue and Agreement (MIA), ANZORC, and the Agricultural National 
Summit: Peasant, Ethnical and Popular (CNACEP), follow this logic.  
Two significant channels developed by the ACVC in order to promote political 
participation at the grassroots level are the Communal Roundtable for the Dignified Life of 
the Region (MCVDR) and the Peace Constituents (CP).  The creation of the former was 
supported by the ACVC in 2005 as an ‘organisational space through which the primary 
constituent’, conceived of as a ‘political subject’, ‘is connected to the construction of a 
popular power in its local and regional setting’.789  The use of the concept of popular power 
plays an important role in the narrative developed by the MP and the CNACEP.  As for the 
MCVDR, it was conceived as a structure through which peasants could ‘politically channel the 
activities related to the assertion of rights and demands of social investment in the region’.790  
It has initially made possible the organisation of peasants under a regional structure, the 
legitimisation of communities, and the strengthening of peasants’ demands and interlocution 
with the state.  More recently, the MCVDR channelled the contribution of peasants to the 
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review and elaboration of the development plan of the Cimitarra River Valley Peasant Reserve 
Zone.791  The other channel promoted by the ACVC was first formulated during the National 
Meeting of Peasant, Afro-Colombian, and Indigenous Communities for the Peace of Colombia 
mentioned earlier.  The Regional Peace Constituents were designed as a space to ‘build a 
social and popular mandate for the political solution [of the armed conflict] and peace with 
social justice’.  Such a process is conceived as the product of a wide organisation and 
mobilisation, which would gather all voices in favour of peace.  Its objectives illustrate the 
ambition of this initiative to develop forums for the political solution of the armed and social 
conflict; reaffirm the key role of popular and grassroots participation to any solution of this 
very same conflict through the mobilisation of social movements; and emphasise the need 
for political, economic and social reforms if any solution to the conflict is to be found.792  
Launched in February 2013 in Bogotá, six months after the beginning of the peace process 
between the FARC and the government, the national initiative of the peace constituents aims 
to move towards the creation of a National Constituent Assembly.  This assembly would 
gather the existing regional constituents and ‘create a setting for the endorsement of the 
agreements that will emerge from the peace dialogues unfolding in La Havana’.793  This 
national initiative was launched as part of the national political movement MP, in which the 
ACVC plays an influential role through the presence of Andres Gil, one of its historical leaders, 
as spokesperson. But the Peace Constituents are also supported by the agrarian constituent 
led by ANZORC, in which the ACVC exerts a key role through Cesar Jerez as spokesperson.  
This shows the connections and confluence between all these movements in an attempt to 
build a powerful popular social force, and the central role of the ACVC within and between all 
these movements and initiatives.  
As I mentioned in Chapter 3, the ACVC first started to use the legal concept of the ZRC 
as a solution to forced displacement and the need to legally ground peasants’ access and right 
to land.  But the ACVC now uses the ZRC, which it characterises as the ‘seed of peasant 
struggle’ that must be ‘cultivated through work, organisation and unity’794 in order to mobilise 
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peasants, exert pressure on the government, and ground its claim for building peace as well.   
This legal form has indeed become linked to the building of peace and now includes national-
popular incentives as a result of the networks established between existing and potential 
ZRCs.  When the Colombian government decided to legally recognise the Cimitarra Valley ZRC 
in 2010, the ACVC argued that this was ‘an important step for the construction of settings 
which provide the possibility of finding a civilised solution to the profound economic, 
humanitarian, and security crisis that peasants of the Cimitarra River Valley have had to face’.  
It also states that the ZRC is ‘a way to contribute to the construction of settings to move 
towards the achievement of peace with social justice’.795  Thanks to the official recognition of 
the Cimitarra River Valley as a ZRC and the legitimacy granted by the National Peace Award, 
the ACVC played a prominent role in the reactivation of ANZORC which was born in 2000 and 
now gathers all the existing ZRCs, be they legally recognised or not, as well as 50 other peasant 
movements and communities.  Gathered in Barrancabermeja, where the ACVC has its 
headquarters, more than 300 peasant leaders created the Peasant Reserve Zones Organising 
Committee (CIZRC - Comite de impulso de las Zonas de Reserva Campesina) and redefined 
ANZORC’s objectives and mission.  In the declaration that followed this encounter, the ZRC is 
described as a tactical tool within the overarching strategy of the agrarian movement for an 
integral agrarian reform.  In particular, it is a ‘tool to keep moving forward in the accumulation 
of [social] forces for a truly inclusive society which recognize the historical and leading role 
fulfilled by the peasantry in our country’.796  ANZORC’s demands go further than the fulfilment 
of corporate interests and needs of the peasantry, and include the recognition of the 
peasantry ‘as a political actor and interlocutor able to build its own proposal of territorial 
regulation and development, to create agrarian alternatives that seek to guarantee a dignified 
life, the demand for peasants’ rights, the preservation of the environment and the 
construction of peace with social justice’.797  Together with the concept of popular power, we 
find here three of the main issues – peasant rights as political subjects, the integral agrarian 
reform, and peace with social justice – that will feed into the creation of the Agriculture and 
Popular Roundtable for Dialogue and Agreement, and the Agricultural National Summit.  
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These movements all seek to gain relevance at national level by building the widest possible 
alliances between progressive social groups within Colombian society. 
Efforts to bind many different sectors of Colombian society together had in fact begun 
in 2010 already with the organisation of the Patriotic March.  What started as a march in 
opposition to state policies in the context of the celebration of the bicentenary of Colombia’s 
independence evolved in the following two years in a formal social and political movement.  
In between, the National Meeting of Peasant, Afro-Colombian, and Indigenous Communities 
for the Peace of Colombia mentioned earlier, organised by the ACVC in 2011, played a key 
role in furthering the thinking and discussions that led to the creation of the Political and 
Social Movement Patriotic March in April 2012.  The fact that Andres Gil, one of the historical 
leaders of the ACVC, is a spokesperson for the MP points to the predominantly agrarian basis 
of the movement, even though it also gathers cultural organisations, student movements, 
trade unions, and indigenous communities.  In addition, it also counts on the active 
participation of two political forces, Izquierda Liberal en Marcha led by the prominent left 
wing activist Piedad Cordoba, and the Communist Party, symbolising the MP’s electoral 
ambitions.  Indeed, the MP is the movement in charge of ‘challenging the political power of 
the government and the state in the hands of dominant classes’.798  Echoing the final 
declaration of the National Meeting of Peasant, Afro-Colombian, and Indigenous 
Communities for the Peace of Colombia, the Patriotic March does not aim to dissolve the 
organisations and movements which take part in it, but to mobilise and connect these 
organisations and movements in order to ‘look toward the strategic struggle for a model of 
country and society’.799  It aims to do so through the creation of grassroots channels of 
political participation, such as the Peace Constituents described earlier.  In its political 
declaration, which remarkably makes use of a Gramscian vocabulary and tone, we find again 
the popular dimension and the claim to represent all subaltern social groups; the call for the 
unity of progressive social organisations and movements in order to challenge the traditional 
hegemonic bloc; the necessity of dialogue to solve the armed conflict; the desire of peace 
with social justice; and the need for a new social, economic, and political model and an 
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integral agrarian reform.800  To these themes, the Patriotic March adds a nationalist tone, 
with references to the prominent figures of Colombian independence, an emphasis on 
sovereignty and self-determination, and a trans-Latin American dimension stressing the 
solidarity between people.801  Stigmatised as being infiltrated by the FARC guerrillas, it has in 
this regard the ambition to represent a ‘true alternative for democratic change’,802 in 
opposition to traditional political parties and elites, and defines itself as a ‘setting where we 
build programmatic proposals leading to deep transformations that our country 
needs’.803Along with the MP, which seeks to achieve political change, the ACVC has taken 
leading roles in two movements which have managed to establish official channels of 
negotiations with the government through the combination of strategies of war of movement 
and war of position.   Both the MIA and the National Agrarian Summit were born out of 
nationwide strikes organised by peasant organisations all around the country in 2013 and 
2014.  While the former is exclusively composed of peasant organisations, the latter has seen 
the convergence of the most important social movements within Colombian society in an 
attempt to achieve unity.  It gathers some of the organisations already mentioned, such as 
the Patriotic March, ANZORC, and the MIA, but also includes the other main peasant 
movement: Congreso de los Pueblos, the PCN, and a national coalition of indigenous 
communities, the Colombian National Indigenous Organisation (ONIC).  In the call for its first 
rally, the National Agrarian Summit claimed to be the ‘meeting point of distinct agrarian and 
popular sectors’ for the ‘construction of a single program through which we will design the 
mandate of our political and social action’.804  Focusing on peasants’ demands, the recognition 
of peasants as political actors, and the transformation of the current economic model, the 
National Agrarian Summit has formulated a list of demands (pliego de peticiones), which 
builds on a list elaborated by the MIA in August 2013.  The origin of these lists can even be 
traced back to the design of an Agrarian Alternative Law in 2011 by a coalition of peasant 
organisations in which the ACVC played a key role.805  More than a mere list of demands, it 
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actually formulates clear and concrete alternatives for the development of rural regions and 
the recognition of peasants’ economic, social, and political rights.  These lists are the main 
tools used by the MIA and the Cumbre in order to negotiate with the government.  Indeed, 
the MIA managed to reach an agreement with the government in September 2013 regarding 
the establishment of a formal dialogue, both at the national level and at the regional level 
with the regional branches of the MIA.  In addition, the Cumbre has also reached an 
agreement with the government for the creation of a single national roundtable of 
interlocution between the Cumbre and the government, thus replacing the regional and 
separate dialogues established with the organisations gathered in the Cumbre.806 
Within these initiatives, organic intellectuals have played a key role in the mobilisation 
of such diverse social movements, the formulation of these lists of demands, and the 
connection of their struggles with the national issue that peace is.  The meaning of the Tierra 
newspaper headline quoted at the beginning of this chapter, which claims that ‘the peasant 
struggle is the struggle for peace’, is developed by ANZORC as follows.  The Peasant Reserve 
Zones National Association argues that  
Organised peasant communities have developed initiatives aiming at the organisation of their 
territories, access to land, alternative development, cohabitation based on cooperation and solidarity, 
and have viable proposals for the regulation of the territory (…). Men and women peasants are full 
political actors, whom the state and other sectors of Colombian society are compelled to recognize, 
take into account and fully include if the structural roots of the armed conflict are not to be 
perpetuated.807 
The link between peasants and peacebuilding could not be expressed more clearly than in 
this quotation.  The key role of the peasant communities is based on their condition as victims 
of the armed conflict, and their central location, both geographical and political, within 
conflicts over land in Colombia.  In this regard, the participation of peasant communities 
within the peace process between FARC and the government has to go much further than a 
‘mere applause or distant view in order for the causes at the origin of the conflict to 
disappear’.808  A deep reform of the economic structure, based on peasant communities 
needs and demands, should pave the way to a true democracy which would incorporate the 
real participation of communities.809  However, this will not happen if no pressure is put on 
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the state.  This is why the ‘formation of a historical bloc based on the popular [social groups] 
is the unavoidable task of the moment’810, task which the initiatives analysed above are trying 
to achieve.  The ACVC, through two of its historical organic leaders, Andres Gil and Cesar Jerez, 
has been at the centre of all these initiatives, in what can be described as an attempt to form 
a new historical bloc with national-popular incentives.  
Conclusion 
I have shown in this chapter how the alliance-building efforts of the CdPSJA, the ACVC, and 
the ATCC represent three different models of social transformation.  Although based on the 
same principles of solidarity and dignity, the concrete forms taken by these principles in 
practice reveals different attitudes towards the state and neoliberalism.  These attitudes are 
in turn reflected in different strategies of social transformation in order to challenge the 
structures supporting the armed conflict and eventually contribute to building peace at local 
and national level.  As the organisers of alliance-building efforts and strategies, organic 
intellectuals have had a strong influence.  Their role was key to explaining the failure of the 
ATCC to establish an alternative historical bloc, and the success of the CdPSJA and the ACVC 
in building two different alternative historical blocs by relying on two different strategies of 
social transformation.  Organic intellectuals had a strong influence on the design of a clear 
and coherent common sense and political project capable of representing an alternative to 
the hegemonic historical bloc and in diffusing this common sense within civil society and 
political society.  They have also been key in connecting many different and diverse struggles, 
and in linking peasant initiatives with peacebuilding at the national level.  
I argue that the attitudes and strategies adopted by all three communities towards 
the state and political power are key to explaining their success.  While the ATCC has used its 
development plans in order to both mobilise its social basis and involve state institutions in 
the implementation of these plans in an attempt to bring the state back to the Carare region, 
the CdPSJA and the ACVC have been much more radical in their attempts to challenge the 
state and neoliberalism.  I have characterised the attitude of the former as a radical idealism, 
and of the latter as a radical pragmatism.  The CdPSJA has prioritised the use and development 
of international networks in support of its project of self-autonomy, based on solidarity, the 
                                                        




rupture of its relationships with the state, and the development of an alternative economy.  
This has enabled it to increase and preserve its autonomy with regard to the state and armed 
actors alike.  But its radicalism has also allowed the CdPSJA to preserve its autonomy with 
regard to the very international actors it has received support from.  The CdPSJA’s leaders 
claim that the existence of their community is the proof that it is possible to build alternatives 
to the state and capitalism, and that the building and promotion of this alternative is their 
main contribution to peace.  However, its radicalism also means that it is considerably isolated 
both in its regional setting and at the national level.  In contrast, the ACVC has managed to 
gather extensive support at national level and build bridges between many different sectors 
of civil society, including non-peasant organisations.  While remaining critical of the state and 
its legitimacy, it has engaged with and put pressure on state institutions by combining 
strategies of war of movement and war of position.  It has finally positioned some of its 
leaders within key national social movements.  This chapters shows that the ACVC has made 
the strongest claim in relation to its contribution to peacebuilding, and has truly managed to 
build an alternative historical bloc with national-popular incentives.  As such, it is closest to a 
Gramscian understanding of counter-hegemony. 
Both the pre-existing political culture and the influence and leadership of organic 
intellectuals help us understand why these three peasant communities adopted such 
different attitudes towards the state and neoliberalism, and designed such diverse strategies. 
However, different and efficient these three communities were in the making of alternative 
historical blocs, they all placed dignity at the centre of their initiatives.  It is possible, however, 
to interrogate the relevance of such strategies in challenging the existing power relations 
which sustain the armed conflict and violence in Colombia.  Whether these peasant initiatives 
will end up in reformism – being integrated within the state’s narrative of ‘territorial peace’, 
which argues that grassroots communities should be the bedrock of the implementation of 
the peace agreement – or will manage to achieve structural change and shape the 
implementation of these agreements is what I discuss in the next chapter.  I not only do so in 
the light of the analysis I carried out in the last three chapters on the new common sense 
developed by peasant communities in the midst of armed conflict, their ability to control their 
territory, and their success in building alternative historical blocs.  I also discuss this question 
in light of the state’s strategy for the implementation of the peace agreement signed with 




Chapter 6: Passive revolution or a new hegemony? 
Introduction 
This chapter aims to answer the main research question of this thesis: How does an analysis 
of civil local peace initiatives that resist power networks and structures responsible for 
prolonging conflict in Colombia contribute to understanding social and political change in war-
torn societies?  My assumption is that bringing about peace in the progressive meaning of the 
term will require a systemic change in Colombia, not just a re-accommodation of social 
relations that would only address direct violence and leave untouched the causes of structural 
violence.  Asking such a question therefore directs attention to the contribution of peasant 
communities to challenging the political, economic, and social structures that are both at the 
origins and sustain the armed conflict.  To conduct this enquiry, I analysed the making of a 
new common sense by peasant communities and how this new common sense allowed them 
to build their resistance in the midst of armed conflict.  I then closely looked at their ability to 
assert their control over a territory.  In particular, I argued that their position within society 
depended on this ability to control their territory.  Finally, I analysed their efforts to build 
alternative historical blocs and link their initiatives to peacebuilding at the national level.  The 
three case-study chapters have in this regard raised three specific questions, which I aim to 
develop in this chapter on the basis of my findings.  Can the new institutions and common 
sense that peasant communities have developed positively influence the ideological context 
of the post-conflict setting in Colombia?  What is the potential of the territorial political 
economy established by peasant communities for contributing to peacebuilding at the 
national level?  Can peasant communities’ attempts at building alternative historical blocs 
grounded in dignity contribute to challenge the social basis of the state and neoliberalism?  
In this chapter, I argue that peasant communities’ contribution to peacebuilding is 
likely to have the highest impact at local level through the diffusion of a new common sense, 
and through the promotion of a political economy addressing peasants’ needs and 
guaranteeing their rights.  This impact will be uneven though, depending on the strength of 
the alternative historical blocs developed by each community under study.  Peasant 
communities are therefore likely to have an important role in supporting the implementation 




contradictions and tensions between the government’s and peasant’s understanding of what 
a territorial peace means.  This is where the models of social transformation promoted by 
each of the community under study come into play, as they are likely to affect the role that 
each community is willing to have in the implementation of the peace agreement.  However, 
my general contention is that we are witnessing what Gramsci called a passive revolution.811  
Systemic change in relation to land ownership will be achieved, in part because of the 
counter-hegemonic forces represented by peasant communities, who might achieve some 
degree of social and political autonomy at local level.  But the overall change at national level 
will still work for the benefit of traditional Colombian elites and the maintenance of 
neoliberalism and capital accumulation.  This holds even if we are witnessing a reorganisation 
of these elites, as the opposition between former President Alvaro Uribe and current 
President Juan Manuel Santos shows.  In this regard, peasant communities’ demands will be 
incorporated and peasants will be granted rights.  These communities will be integrated 
within the new social and economic order that the state is trying to create as a result of the 
peace agreement with FARC, without challenging the power of existing economic and political 
elites and their dominant position within the economy and political society.  For not 
succeeding in playing a decisive role within the latter two spheres at the national scale, 
peasant communities will become subaltern groups with rights within a reorganised and 
consolidated hegemony of the traditional dominant groups.  Again, this process will be 
uneven and will be influenced by the stance adopted by each community under study towards 
the state and the economy.  The ATCC is likely to lose even more influence and face co-
optation by the state.  The CdPSJA will keep preserving its autonomy and resisting the state 
policies and economic model, even though it faces isolation.  Finally, the ACVC will in continue 
to exert a strong influence at the national level, but will also be kept in check by the state 
hegemony.  
In the first section of this chapter, I introduce the contemporary context of the peace 
negotiations and the final agreement reached in August 2016 between FARC and the 
government.  In particular, I pay special attention to the government’s narrative of ‘territorial 
peace’, which argues that rural communities will have to play a crucial role in the 
implementation of the agreements.  With this contextual background in mind, I go back in the 
                                                        




second section to the questions raised in the previous three chapters to provide conclusions 
to my research question about the role in building peace of the three peasant communities.  
In the final section of this chapter, I return to my theoretical framework in order to engage in 
a dialogue about one of the key issues raised throughout this thesis and which has also 
concerned the peacebuilding literature over the past 25 years.  I refer here to the relationship 
between peace on one hand, and the state and the economy on the other.  I do that by 
discussing the relevance of my theoretical framework in light of my research findings, and by 
contrasting Holloway’s ideas about changing the world without taking power with Gramsci’s 
political theory.812 
Hegemony and the Colombian peacebuilding process 
Since September 2012, the Colombian government, led by the president Juan Manuel Santos, 
began a peace dialogue with the FARC.  Ten years after the last attempt made by a Colombian 
government to sign a peace agreement with the FARC, few people believed they would be 
successful.  But four years later, the President of Colombia Juan Manuel Santos, and Farc 
Commandant Timoleón Jiménez signed the final agreement on 26 September 2016.  While 
this is a considerable and positive achievement, the argument I make in this section 
introduces a nuanced view of these agreements.  In spite of clear differences in discourse, 
policies, and values with the former President Alvaro Uribe Velez, Juan Manuel Santos’ efforts 
have to be understood as a different strategy to achieve the same objectives. The latter wants 
to achieve through consent what the former tried to achieve through coercion.  I claim that 
the agreements have to be seen as an attempt to strengthen the hegemony of traditional 
Colombian elites and their neoliberal principles and policies on one hand, and to integrate 
subaltern groups and their demands within the ensemble of social relations.  Juan Manuel 
Santos has understood that a peaceful Colombia is the best way to consolidate neoliberalism 
and strengthen the place of Colombia within the global economy.  He has also understood 
that concessions had to be made in order to achieve that and include subaltern groups.  The 
government’s narrative based on the concept of territorial peace seeks exactly to do that.  
The High Commissioner for Peace, Sergio Jaramillo, explains:   
What we need is to impose a logic of territorial inclusion and integration, based on a new alliance 
between the state and communities in order to build together ‘institutionality’ within the territory. 
                                                        




‘Institutionality’ understood here again not only as the presence of state entities, but as the joint 
establishment of practices and norms which regulates public life and produces wellbeing.813  
What Jaramillo describes here is the development of a new common sense which aims to 
integrate both non-violent and violent resistance to the Colombian government’s 
domination.  What we are witnessing is an attempt to reorganise political, social, and cultural 
relations so that they conform to relations of production.  The state has to be rethought and 
reshaped in order to satisfy the demands of a neoliberal economic order which should 
eventually rely on consent rather than coercion.  I claim that the government’s efforts to bring 
about peace will end up in a process of passive revolution.  
Before exploring this concept of territorial peace in more detail, it is necessary to introduce 
the vision of the Colombian government set out in the 2014–2018 National Development Plan 
(Departamento Nacional de Planeación, 2015).  Indeed, the 2014–2018 development plan is 
closely linked to the peacebuilding efforts and negotiations carried out by the Colombian 
government with the FARC in Cuba.  The plan states:  
Both the materialisation of the eventual peace agreements and the building of foundations for a 
sustainable peace will be based on the policies and strategies that this National Development Plan 
introduce to the country for the next years, which will imply, obviously, efforts from the state but also 
from all Colombians. The National Development Plan is the product of the determination of the 
government to carry out the necessary reforms to consolidate peace and bring modernity to the country 
[…] Peace requires the presence of the state in all its forms, with roads, schools and hospitals, in every 
corner of Colombia, and also requires the consolidation of the social welfare state and the rule of law 
(estado social de derecho) enshrined in the 1991 Political Constitution of Colombia  (Departamento 
Nacional de Planeación 2015: 25).814 
As we can see from this, peacebuilding is closely linked to a statebuilding agenda,  
based on the concept of good governance and its associated principles, such as transparency, 
participation and the service of citizens, the fight against corruption, and effective public 
administration and service vocation.815  By establishing a close connection between 
peacebuilding and statebuilding, the plan lays out a vision according to which peace can be 
brought about through the strengthening of state institutions’ capacities and legitimacy.  It is 
quite clear that the plan assumes that the state has the autonomy to implement the policies 
set out in the plan, and overall reduce peacebuilding to technical measures and policies.  This 
statebuilding agenda in turn depends on policies that would strengthen the presence of the 
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state all over the national territory, and which does not ‘bring the state to the territories’ but 
builds the state and its legitimacy ‘from and for the territories’.816  The four pillars of the 
government’s vision for a Colombia in peace are a rights approach; a territorial approach; a 
participation approach; and the building of trust amongst citizens, and between citizens and 
the state.817  At the centre of the vision of the Colombian government for a peaceful Colombia 
lies the need to put an end to the armed conflict before building peace, to guarantee rights 
and strengthen institutions from a territorial perspective, thus acknowledging that the 
conflict has had a differentiated impact on each region, and had the highest impact in rural 
areas.818 
As part of an attempt to gain wide international support for the peace process, the 
National Development Plan incorporates most of the international norms and standards 
promoted by international institutions such as UN agencies and the World Bank.  It also 
outlines on paper a progressive and holistic vision for a post-conflict Colombia which 
encompasses the most recent literature on peacebuilding and statebuilding.  For instance, 
the plan emphasises the importance of citizen and civil society participation; the collective 
construction of peace from the bottom up; the need for a comprehensive rural development 
based on an integral rural reform; and a spatial and differentiated approach to the design and 
implementation of public policies.819  In particular, the participation approach  
…implies moving from a conception of citizenship as recipient of state actions, and whose participation 
barely limits itself to electoral processes, to a citizenship that prioritises, defines, and implements the 
actions in which it is directly involved, and contributes to the very construction of the state through 
these actions.820 
This points to a collective peacebuilding process based on a rights-based approach 
…that involves guaranteeing fundamental rights of all citizens, especially those who have seen their 
rights restricted by the armed conflict, and transforming the current illegality in several regions of the 
country through institutions that deliver guarantees and opportunities for the effective realization of 
rights.821 
All these concepts have been viewed favourably by peacebuilding scholars and 
practitioners alike. Through the use of this progressive vision and narrative, the Santos 
government has been able to gather wide support from the international community around 
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the peace process with the FARC.  The concept of territorial peace is in a way the bedrock of 
this progressive vision, and is meant to be the overarching strategic concept guiding decision 
making, policies, and strategies for the post-conflict setting.  Jaramillo argues that a territorial 
approach must complement a rights-based approach to peacebuilding.822  This is because the 
conflict has had a differentiated impact on every region, both qualitatively and quantitatively.  
This is also motivated by the need to mobilise the population in rural areas and regions around 
peace.823  The concept of territorial peace developed by the Colombian government relies on 
three main components.  First of all, a new playing field with institutions that will guarantee 
the rights of all Colombians all over the country.  Second, civil and social dynamics putting 
emphasis on participation.  And finally, a new alliance between the state and communities 
that avoids both the centralist state model and the logic of fragmentation.824  Institutions, 
participation, and decentralisation are thus the three pillars of the concept of territorial 
peace.  These three pillars are to be fulfilled through ‘bottom-up participatory planning 
processes in each region’, and a ‘participatory planning campaign in which both public 
authorities and local communities map the characteristics and needs of each territory, 
identify an adequate response, and jointly and methodically build plans that will lead to the 
transformation of those regions’.825  For Jaramillo, these processes must lead to a ‘new and 
inclusive model of institutional strengthening in the regions’ and the establishment of ‘a logic 
of inclusion and regional integration, based on a new alliance between the state and 
communities’.  Within this new alliance, communities must be ‘active designers and not only 
recipients of state programmes’, so that state legitimacy is strengthened and the mistrust 
between state and communities overcome.826  According to an official of the office of the 
High Commissioner for Peace, the government has to recognise that there are highly valuable 
experiences of peacebuilding and resistance in the midst of armed conflict in Colombia.  The 
official argued that state policies have to start from their initiatives, but that the state has to 
give coherence to community initiatives.  These cannot be entirely autonomous because 
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otherwise what we will get is a fragmented state.827  Finally, territorial peace is intimately 
linked to the resolution of rural problems and issues.828  
The territorial peace approach has been integrated into the final agreements signed 
with the FARC on 28 August 2016 in Havana, in particular within the first point of the 
agreements about the integral rural reform (Reforma Rural Integral in Spanish – RRI).829  It is 
argued that the latter conceives of the rural territory as  
…a socio-historical setting with social and cultural diversity, within which communities – men and 
women – have a prominent role in the definition of the improvement of their life conditions and in the 
definition of the development of the country within a vision of rural-urban integration.830 
The agreements about the integral rural reform also recognise the ‘fundamental role 
played by peasant, family-based, and community-based economy in the development of rural 
areas’ (el campo).  They also highlight the contribution of this economy to ‘the eradication of 
hunger, the creation of employments and incomes, the dignification and formalisation of 
labour, the production of food, and in general, the development of the nation, in coexistence 
and complementary articulation with other forms of rural production’.831  The participation 
of rural communities is therefore instrumental to the structural transformation of rural areas 
that the National Development Plan and these agreements seek to achieve.  In this regard, 
the agreement about the integral rural reform outlines the main elements of Development 
Programs with a Territorial Approach (Programas de Desarrollo con Enfoque Territorial – 
PDET) and National Plans for the Integral Rural Reform.832 
As I have shown throughout this thesis, the everyday encounters between the state 
and peasant communities are far from reflecting this narrative, even since it was first 
formulated in 2013.  Above all, the interviews I conducted with local state and army officials 
in 2014 show that the ‘territorial peace’ narrative has not yet reached local municipalities and 
institutions833.  The relationship between the peasant communities under study on one hand, 
and local authorities on the other still very much remain one of over confrontation or soft 
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opposition to say the least.  In addition, their attitudes and perceptions toward the peace 
process are filled with scepticism.834  The existing mistrust between communities and the 
state will in fact be one of the main challenges faced by national and local authorities once 
the time has come to implement and materialise the ‘territorial peace’ narrative.  The main 
contacts with the state happen through the army.  The presence of paramilitary groups and 
the environmental threats posed by economic projects aimed at extracting natural resources 
do not help to increase trust in the state.  However, some differences exist between the three 
peasant communities under study.  While the CdPSJA is highly sceptical and does not believe 
that the peace agreement will change anything on the ground,835 the ACVC and the ATCC have 
been supportive of the peace dialogues between the state and the FARC.  The news agency 
Prensa Rural, run by the ACVC, calls the peace agreement signed in September a ‘political 
success’, and add that they might be the most important agreements in the recent political 
history of Colombia.836  It goes on to say that the peace agreement ‘represent a decisive 
moment for the aim to boost from below a peace movement that gather the legacy of 
resistance to war’.837  These are the reasons why the ACVC supported the ‘yes’ answer to the 
referendum held by the government on 2 October 2016.  Similarly, ANZORC, whose director 
is a member of the ACVC, argues that the peace agreement represents an opportunity to ‘lay 
the foundations of a political, economic and social base to start the peacebuilding process’.838  
The question I explore in the rest of this chapter deals with the role of peasant communities 
within this post-conflict setting and their contribution to peacebuilding.  To do so, I base my 
analysis on the preliminary findings exposed in the three previous chapters of this thesis.  I 
first reflect on the common sense promoted by the three peasant communities under study 
and its role in the construction of a new political subject entitled with rights.  I then deal with 
the extent to which the peasant-based political economy developed by peasant communities 
is able to have an impact within the post-conflict setting and vision laid out by the state.  
Finally, I ask whether the alternative historical blocs and the three different attitudes 
identified in Chapter 4 will be able to challenge the social basis of the state and the neoliberal 
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economic interests it promotes.  Using Gramsci’s political theory, I argue that a passive 
revolution is the most likely outcome of the peacebuilding process initiated by the 
government. 
Peasant communities, territorial peace, and the post-conflict setting 
Common sense and the construction of a new political subject entitled with rights 
for the post-conflict setting 
In Chapter 2 of this thesis, I argued that the critical consciousness developed by members of 
peasant communities represents a break from both the traditional dominant ideologies, and 
the ideologies imposed by armed actors, be they paramilitary groups or guerrillas.  I found 
that the process through which peasant communities’ members lost fear was instrumental in 
their capacity to translate their new critical consciousness into practice.  The emergence of a 
particular political consciousness, linked to a conception of the world that goes beyond the 
common sense imposed upon subaltern groups by ruling elites, and the loss of fear interact 
with each other from the birth of peasant communities until today.  While this new common 
sense has been successful in organising resistance in the midst of armed conflict, it is 
legitimate to ask whether it can prove a useful tool for the post-conflict setting and the 
peacebuilding process that will follow the peace agreement between the Colombian 
government and the FARC-EP.   
The principles underlying peasant communities’ critical consciousness have proved 
useful to manage the identification problem in civil wars (Kalyvas, 2006).  Peasant 
communities have managed to establish a clear distinction between civilians and armed 
actors based on the principles of non-violence, neutrality, and human rights.  They have also 
managed to keep civilians out of the conflict by offering an alternative to either joining one 
of the armed actors or creating a new armed group.  One of the main challenges that peasant 
communities face is to maintain these norms and the collective support they receive within a 
post-conflict setting.  Indeed, the development of these norms and the collective dynamics 
they reflect were intimately tied to a context of extreme violence.  It is already possible to 
observe how respect for these norms is changing as the context evolves.  For instance, in the 
case of the ATCC, adhesion to the principles of the association has become looser and looser 




the CdPSJA, an old member of the community finally decided to accept the government’s 
financial compensation as part of the 2011 Victim Law.  This led him to leave the community, 
as one of its principles is the refusal of any government initiative to compensate victims of 
the conflict on an individual basis.  They insist on the fact that the compensation of victims 
should be collective rather than individual.  This short example also illustrates that the state’s 
strategies are changing.  As the intensity of the armed conflict decreases, these strategies 
tend to rely more on consent rather than coercion.  This poses a clear risk for the social fabric 
of peasant communities.  The CdPSJA has answered these changes by issuing new collective 
norms, as one of the leaders of the community explains.  Asked how the community was 
dealing with the new laws passed by the Santos Government, such as the Victim and Land 
Law, he argued: 
[…] yes, there has been some changes that maybe since 2005 we had to issue new rules, as the one 
[related to] coca crops, the one [related to] victims, land compensation. I think that as all these 
damaging investments arise, toward this region, above all toward this community, well I think that as 
community we have created very different strategies as well in order to be able to face these 
investments that are taking place.839 
However, other members of the CdPSJA insisted that these laws are not real changes but only 
‘words’840 or ‘surface’ changes.841  For one of them, the law for the compensation of victims 
seeks to ‘mercantilise victims, to convert them in merchandise’.  It aims to ’to give a few 
millions to families in order to silence them and clear up the memories of victims’.  He added 
that these are ‘solutions that are clearly understood as such by the community, that they are 
not solutions and that (…) it does not have to adapt to new situations because there is no real 
new situation.842  Although I did not explicitly ask what the members of the CdPSJA thought 
about the concept of territorial peace, I believe the answer would have followed the same 
line of argument.  This shows that trust between the state and communities will be a very 
important issue in the post-conflict setting. 
What is interesting in this discussion is that the autonomy of peasant communities 
and the collective political subject they are trying to develop will be at stake in the post-
conflict setting.  Whilst the principle of non-violence can easily be transformed into a norm 
for the post-conflict setting and the reintegration of illegal combatants for instance, the 








principle of neutrality is likely to be challenged by state authorities and institutions.  The same 
official of the office of the High Commissioner for Peace already mentioned argued that 
neutrality can be understood in a context of armed conflict, but that in a post-conflict setting 
there has to be trust between the state and the communities.  For the peacebuilding process, 
an alliance between state and communities has to be created.843  Implicit in what the official 
said is that trust in the state and the neutrality principle are opposed to each other.  The 
concept of territorial peace does not contemplate the possibility of peasant communities to 
remain as autonomous as they have been so far by default.  The new alliance between state 
and communities promoted by the concept of territorial peace implies ‘a logic of inclusion 
and regional integration’ and ‘the joint development of practices and standards that regulate 
public life and produce wellbeing’.844  It remains unclear what these practices and standards 
should be according to the government though.  
Another example that gives a good idea of the debate surrounding the autonomy of 
peasant communities during the post-conflict setting comes from the peace negotiations 
between the government and the FARC in Havana.  The first agreement, about Integral Rural 
Reform, makes explicit reference to ZRCs and their potential for building peace.845  It is argued 
that the ‘recognition and support of Peasant Reserve Zones and other forms of supportive 
community involvement’ are key elements to facilitate the role of peasants in structural 
transformation of rural areas and the closure of the agricultural frontier.846  However, before 
the inclusion of the ZRC in the final agreements, a polemic debate took place not only 
between the FARC and the government but in civil society as well.  While the FARC wanted to 
include the creation of 59 ZRCs as part of the agreements and grant them the right to political 
autonomy, self-management and administrative justice, the government argued it could not 
accept the creation of an independent republic, reference to the peasant community created 
in Marquetalia at the beginning of the 1960s, and which led to the creation of the FARC in the 
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1960s.847  As to peasants themselves, they tried not to be assimilated with the FARC’s 
proposal or the stigmatisation spread by public statements from state officials.848  
One of the main challenges facing Colombian society in the post-conflict setting is the 
necessity to reinstate or establish peaceful social relationships and citizen coexistence, and 
to strengthen institutions of a democratic character in war-torn regions. Pearce has argued 
that initiatives led by social organisations, communities, and NGOs in both urban and rural 
spaces in Colombia suggest that they are more than mere resistance.849  She affirms that we 
could recognise them ‘as an exercise in citizenship building given that they also claim 
rights’.850 Pearce goes on to explain that ‘this emergence of subjects of rights’ can be 
assimilated to what citizenship is, ‘especially if we emphasise the fact that these type of 
activities are carried out in the midst of violence’.  In this regard, ‘they open spaces, make 
visible hidden violence and delegitimise illegal violence’.851  While I agree with Pearce’s 
argument in principle, more work is required for this potential to lead to systematic change.  
This resistance has to be unified by a (counter-)hegemonic actor in order not to end being co-
opted by the state.  It remains to be seen whether peasant communities can be the binding 
actor that would gather and cohere the many resistances led by different social groups in 
Colombia in the post-conflict setting.  Peasant communities have to win positions within both 
civil society and political society to spread their new critical consciousness to these other 
groups, especially in urban settings.  This implies that peasant communities also adapt their 
new critical consciousness so that it can represent the interests of other social groups that 
resist the state and the impact of neoliberalism.  Gramsci reminds us throughout his notes 
that this is not only a political or economic task.  It is also a deeply cultural endeavour, as it 
implies making connections between different conceptions of the world and challenging pre-
conceived ideas about peasants and the roots of the conflict.852  In this regard, the critical 
consciousness born out of peasant communities’ resistance is closely tied to a peasant 
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identity and culture.  In addition, as my analysis shows, under the same principles adopted by 
peasant communities lie very different attitudes to the state, the economy, and social change.  
But above all, peasant communities also have to appeal to urban middle class populations to 
further spread their critical consciousness within civil society.  This middle class has always 
lived on the periphery of armed conflict, even though it has also been the victim of violence 
caused by guerrillas, paramilitary groups, or the state.  It has also supported the state and the 
traditional political parties.  My analysis, backed by Gramsci’s political theory, suggests that 
organic intellectuals will be key to such an endeavour, as they will also be in adapting peasant 
communities’ critical consciousness to the government’s narrative of territorial peace and the 
new context that is emerging after the peace agreement.  So far, while peasant communities 
have been quite successful at spreading their critical consciousness throughout civil society 
at the regional and international levels, their initiatives have been less successful at the 
national level.  Neither have they managed to spread this critical consciousness throughout 
mainstream political society.  Only a handful of members of parliament, such as Ivan Cepeda 
or Alirio Uribe from the Polo Democratico political party, have tried to represent their 
interests.  As a result, their initiatives have not been translated into political representation.  
This is above all true in the case of the CdPSJA and the ATCC, as the ACVC has managed to tie 
its initiatives to national political movements and gain key positions within these movements, 
as I have shown in Chapter 4. 
Finally, the human rights discourse adopted by peasant communities as part of their 
critical consciousness could be considered as a universal basis to spread this very same 
consciousness.  But it does not provide the necessary ground to allow peasant communities 
to achieve structural change within the post-conflict setting.  In many other post-conflicts 
settings, a human rights discourse has merely created empty rights and the shell of state 
institutions.853  A human rights discourse might achieve surface changes and light reforms, 
but does not challenge the social basis of state power and its neoliberal policies.  In fact, any 
attempt that merely asks the state to protect rights will end up in reformism.  For Gramsci, 
subaltern groups have to go beyond their local settings and identify as subaltern groups to 
gain dominant positions within society and eventually become state.  Most human rights are 
already enshrined in the Colombian Constitution of 1991, which is considered progressive.  In 
                                                        




this regard, dignity proves a more radical and solid ground on which to develop counter-
hegemonic alternatives and promote a political economy based on control over a territory.  
Peasant rights and their dignity need to be anchored in the land in order not to be empty 
rights.   
I now turn to the role of space within the political economy promoted by peasant 
communities in the post-conflict setting.  
Space, a peasant-based political economy, and the post-conflict setting 
In the third chapter of this thesis, I showed how peasant communities managed to establish 
a certain control over their territory and developed a political economy based on this very 
territory.  I argued that this control over a territory was key to their ability to challenge the 
power of illegal armed actors, the state, and neoliberal economic projects.  I showed that such 
control depends on how well peasant communities move between scales, mobilise networks, 
and fill their territory with places.  This ability to produce autonomous spaces is instrumental 
in their capacity to contribute to peacebuilding and the post-conflict setting in relation to 
challenges at regional and national scale.  In this regard, several authors have already made 
the case that a peasant economy is key to the development of rural areas and represents a 
real alternative to the neoliberal political economy promoted by the state.854  Based on a very 
specific representation of the territory, peasant communities promote a political economy 
that does not contribute to violence; does not fuel the armed conflict; provides concrete and 
viable solutions to problems faced by peasants; and forms the basis of peaceful social 
relations in line with the cultural, economic, and social needs of the population.  My point is 
not to add to this argument.  Rather, what my analysis has demonstrated is how important it 
is for peasant communities to establish some kind of control over space in order to be able to 
develop such a peasant-based political economy and challenge state power.  This control over 
their territory provides them with a material basis on which to deploy and sustain their critical 
consciousness. 
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To illustrate this point, it is first useful to reflect on the reasons why the CdPSJA, the 
ACVC, and the ATCC have not had the same degree of success in controlling their territory.  
How can the difference in success of the initiatives led by the CdPSJA and the ACVC on one 
hand, and the ATCC on the other, be explained?  My analysis suggests that the ATCC, even 
though it did manage to achieve some kind of protection for its members between 1987 and 
2000, has not been successful in protecting its territory, or sphere of influence.  Its control 
was over people’s behaviour and not over a territory.  Even when the ATCC was socially strong 
in the years following its creation, it has never prohibited armed actors from moving around 
or passing through its territory.855  Similarly, the ATCC was not able to prevent new 
populations from migrating to its sphere of influence at the beginning of the 2000s.  These 
new inhabitants were less committed to the principle of non-violence and non-cooperation 
with armed actors than the founding members of the ATCC.  They did not feel the need to 
turn to the ATCC in order to settle conflicts and also began to grow coca.856  Even though it 
remains precarious in some ways, the stronger ‘organic’ connection established with their 
territories by the CdPSJA and the ACVC through the use of scales, networks, and places, and 
their higher capacity to protect these territories, mean that they are less dependent on the 
internal strength and cohesion of their organisations and communities.  In fact, control over 
space reinforces their ability to strengthen their internal cohesion and social fabric, which in 
turn allows them to better protect, appropriate, and produce in their territory.  Social 
relations and spatial dynamics mutually constitute and reinforce each other here.  On the 
contrary, given that the ATCC has not achieved the same level of territorial control, it is highly 
dependent on its internal strength and cohesion for the control of its sphere of influence. 
The use of strategies of war of position by peasant communities in the midst of armed 
conflict appears in contradiction with the conditions that make a war of position possible 
according to Gramsci.  As I have shown in Chapter 1, it is the nature of political power which 
ensures the possibility for a war of position to be successful.  A war of position is possible in 
contexts in which there is a modern state and where the predominance of the realm of politics 
over military dynamics is guaranteed.857  Although the Colombian state is still in formation 
and its presence is uneven,858 it can be considered a modern state.  The state’s authority and, 
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to a lesser extent, its legitimacy are well established in urban areas, where consent prevails.  
In addition, the guerrillas’ struggle has shown that a war of manoeuvre could not work in 
Colombia.  But at the time when the CdPSJA, the ACVC, and the ATCC were born, military 
dynamics and social orders imposed by force were the norm in rural areas, where coercion 
prevailed and still prevails to some extent.  In spite of this, peasant communities managed to 
develop political projects and faced the armed actors’ strategies through non-violent means.  
This shows that they were successful in reinstating the political process in order to conduct a 
counter-hegemonic struggle.  My analysis suggests that it is by establishing a control over 
space that peasant communities succeeded in keeping this political process open and sustain 
it, thanks to the waging of a war of position making use of scales, networks, and places.  This 
also ensured that peasant communities’ struggle was conducted on the very terrain which 
ensures the dominance of armed actors, the ruling class, and the state, namely territorial 
control and the ownership of land.  
It logically follows that organisation and representation alone then do not constitute 
sufficient grounds to transform social relations in the case of peasant communities’ struggle.  
Control over space enables these communities to transform the relationships of 
subordinations that are at the origins of their marginalisation within society, and to ground 
their rights in a material basis.  More importantly, this control over space allows peasant 
communities to exercise a decisive function within the economy, at least at the local and 
regional level.  By regaining control over the mode of production and putting it at the service 
of peasant needs, the CdPSJA and the ACVC lead successful and sustainable economic 
projects, such as those I mentioned in Chapter 3.  The collaboration between the British-based 
company Lush and the CdPSJA and the company created by the ACVC to sell buffalo-based 
products, are representative of these projects.  The CdPSJA and the ACVC managed to position 
these successful projects as real alternatives for the development of rural areas and peasant 
communities that can be replicated.  In this regard, the ACVC donated seven buffalos to 
another peasant-based organisation called ASCAMCAT, which is located in the Norte de 
Santander Department.  These initiatives also contribute to building bridges between rural 
and urban areas, in the case of the ACVC, and between peasants’ struggle for the respect of 
human rights and European citizens, in the case of the CdPSJA.  The cocoa produced by the 
CdPSJA is sold in Lush’s shops throughout Europe, while the buffalo-based products of the 




that these communities have for building peace in Colombia, and they help spread their 
values throughout civil society.  They also reflect and symbolise the intellectual and moral 
reforms led by peasant communities, a reform which Gramsci considers key for the formation 
of a national-popular will and a new historical bloc.  In this regard, these projects establish a 
link between the political and cultural realm of everyday life and the struggles for peace 
within the national-popular realm.  Most importantly, they provide a vision of how space 
should be organised according to a peasant-based mode of production that is coherent with 
the social, cultural, and political needs of peasants.  The territory is the basis of this political 
economy, and the strategies of protection, appropriation, and production employed by the 
CdPSJA and the ACVC enabled its development.  
The logical conclusion of my analysis is that the degree to which peasant communities 
managed to establish some kind of control over space will be key in dealing with the territorial 
peace discourse developed by the state as the basis of the implementation of the peace 
agreement with the FARC.  Only if peasant communities manage to preserve this control over 
space will they be able to avoid co-optation by the state within the new alliance between the 
state and communities that the concept of territorial peace envisages.  Otherwise, the 
concept of territorial peace will only serve as a tool for the discursive inclusion of subaltern 
groups within society.  It will add to the previous technical development initiatives that failed 
to bring about real changes in the everyday lives of communities and granted them with 
empty rights.  Although Jaramillo, the Colombian High Commissioner for Peace, affirms that 
the territorial peace concept will put an end to what he calls the ‘incredulity’ problem,859 
symbolising the failure of the state to implement development programmes in rural areas.  
But his discourse and the concept of territorial peace still present a very liberal vision of a 
society that emphasises political and constitutional rights to the detriment of social, 
economic, and cultural rights.  In my view, this discourse does not question the economic 
model, which is at the root of Colombia’s conflict,860 but aims to establish state-society 
relations in line with this model.  In addition, the mission of the newly created Agency for the 
Renovation of the Territory861 (Agencia de Renovacion del Territorio – ART) gives rise to 
concerns that its programmes will only repeat the failure of previous development 
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programmes such as the PNR, the Funds for the Reconstruction and Social Development of 
the Coffee Axis (Fondo para la Reconstruccion y el Desarrollo Social del Eje Cafetero – FOREC), 
or Colombia Humanitaria. ART is supposed to design and implement the measures and 
programmes that were broadly sketched out in the Peace agreement as part of the 
Development Plans with a Territorial Approach (Programas de Desarrollo con Enfoque 
Territorial (PDET)), whose objective is to bring about the structural transformation of rural 
areas already mentioned above.862  The rather technical discourse used in the decree creating 
ART defines the mission of an entity that will bring development to rural areas from above, 
instead of strengthening local capacities, be they part of civil society of regional authorities.863  
This is why the spatial and territorial dimension of peasant communities’ struggle is so 
important, with its potential to challenge the assumptions of the government’s vision of a 
territorial peace and question the government’s development model.  In addition to being 
critical in facing post-conflict violence, which is already targeting community leaders and left-
wing activists,864 establishing control over space is the only way for peasant communities to 
challenge the state’s development model at its roots, which are the use and exploitation of 
the territory.  
However, my analysis suggests that this control over space needs to be backed by a 
solid alternative historical bloc representing the interests of peasant communities and other 
progressive sectors of society, if it is to challenge state power at national level.  Otherwise, 
these alternatives are likely to be absorbed by neoliberal policies and incorporated within a 
capitalist system favouring individual rights, international investments, and the extraction of 
natural resources.  The capacity of capitalism and neoliberalism to accommodate different 
spaces linked to a peasant-based economy and different modes of production is not to be 
underestimated.  Peasants’ contribution to peacebuilding will therefore very likely be limited 
to the local or regional levels at best.  To overcome this localism and particularism, the three 
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peasant communities under study have extended their control over space and built 
alternative historical blocs.    
Alternative historical blocs and the challenge of state power: sustainable counter-
hegemonic forces or passive revolution? 
In the previous chapter, I analysed peasant communities’ attempts at developing alternative 
historical blocs.  However different and efficient these three communities were in the making 
of alternative historical blocs, they all placed dignity at the centre of their initiatives.  Dignity 
appears as the common material and ideational basis of the alternative historical blocs led by 
the three peasant communities in their attempts to build a sustainable peace in Colombia.  
This, in my view, is one of the key dimensions of these peasant communities’ narrative about 
their contribution to peacebuilding at national level in relation to the implementation of the 
agreements between the FARC and the government.  I have shown how, despite this common 
ground, the efforts led by the CdPSJA, the ACVC, and the ATCC represented three different 
models of social transformation.  Whilst the CdPSJA promotes a model of self-autonomy that 
rejects both the State and capitalism, the ACVC favours confrontational, power-seeking 
strategies, and the ATCC adopted a liberal stance seeking to bring the state back in.  I argued 
that the success of these initiatives was not only related to their internal cohesion and 
strengths but also to the attitudes adopted by peasant communities towards the state, 
political power, and the market.  My claim is that these different attitudes, strategies, and 
historical blocs have implications regarding their potential to bring about social change at 
national level.  That said, I conclude by arguing that the most likely outcome of the peace 
communities’ attempts to make alternative historical blocs is that they will be absorbed 
within existing political structures.   In not managing to be the basis of a new national-popular 
common sense and historical bloc, transform its struggles into political representation, and 
exert key positions in the economy, peasant communities’ initiatives run the risk of being co-
opted and integrated within the government’s post-conflict strategy of territorial peace.  
While the ATCC has used its development plans to both mobilise its social basis and 
involve state institutions in the implementation of these plans in an attempt to bring the state 
back in the Carare region, the CdPSJA and the ACVC have been much more radical in their 
attempts to challenge the state and neoliberalism.  I have characterised the attitude of the 




has focused on the use and development of international networks in support of its project 
of self-autonomy, based on solidarity, the rupture of its relationships with the state, and the 
development of an alternative economy in rupture with the capitalist system.  This has 
enabled it to strengthen and preserve its autonomy regarding the state and armed actors.  
But its radicalism has also allowed it to preserve its autonomy with regard to the very 
international actors it has received support from.  The CdPSJA’s leaders claim that the 
existence of their community is proof that it is possible to build alternatives to the state and 
capitalism, and that the building and promotion of this alternative within their local setting is 
their main contribution to peace.  However, the community’s radicalism also means that it is 
considerably isolated both in its regional setting and at national level.  In contrast, my analysis 
showed that within the three peasant communities under study, the better placed to 
challenge the state and its neoliberal policies is the ACVC.  By relying on the legal framework 
of the peasant reserve zone, which removes the land from the economic market and 
guarantees peasants’ individual rights to the land through the Family Farming Unit (Unidad 
Agricola Familiar – UAF), the ACVC is able to develop sustainable alternatives to neoliberal 
policies.  It has managed to gather extensive support at national level within many different 
sectors of civil society, including non-peasant organisations.  While remaining critical of the 
state and its legitimacy, it has engaged with and put pressure on its institutions by combining 
strategies of war of movement and war of position.  Finally, the ACVC has positioned some of 
its leaders within key national social movements.  In my opinion, the ACVC has made the 
strongest claim in relation to its contribution to peacebuilding, and has truly managed to build 
an alternative historical bloc with a national-popular dimension.  As such, it is closest to a 
Gramscian understanding of counter-hegemony.   
The possibility for peasant communities to mould the government’s territorial peace 
discourse to their needs depends on their capacity to form such a coherent alternative 
historical bloc with national-popular incentives.  That implies the development of a new 
common sense that would go beyond peasants’ corporate needs and attract other sectors of 
society.  It also implies the gaining of positions within political society and the acquisition of 
a dominant role within the economy.  This does not go without challenges.  For instance, if 
the emphasis on rights and multiculturalism in Colombia has proven useful to guarantee the 
rights of each ethnic group in a separate way, it poses a risk to the relationship between 




is protected by the existence of reserves, and the collective rights of Afro-Colombian people 
over their territories are guaranteed by the Law 70 of 1993, the collective rights of peasants 
over the land is not guaranteed in any way.  Indeed, although the concept of ZRCs favours 
peasants’ individual rights to own a piece of land and regulate the size of rural ownership, it 
does not provide peasants with the same collective rights over the land as indigenous and 
Afro-Colombian people have.  This is partly because peasants are not recognised as an ethnic 
group as such.  But most importantly, many communities are competing for the recognition 
of their territorial claims over land in several Colombian departments.  These territorial 
claims, added to the agrarian sectors’ need for land, to rural poverty, and to unequal access 
to land between indigenous, Afro-Colombian, and peasant communities, are producing 
breeding grounds for conflicts and tensions in rural areas.865  In this regard, of the three 
peasant communities under study, I argue that the ACVC has made the most convincing 
attempt to reconcile communities’ interests and develop the common ground of an 
alternative historical bloc with national-popular incentives.  This was well illustrated by the 
organisation in August 2011 at the National Meeting of Peasant, Afro-Colombian, and 
Indigenous Communities for the Peace of Colombia.  The role played by the ACVC in the 
National Agrarian Summit also demonstrates its capacity to gather and cohere many different 
sectors of society (Chapter 4).  The ACVC is clearly in a position to reach out to other ethnic 
communities and social groups.  
In my view, the ACVC was encouraged to launch these initiatives thanks to its attitude 
towards political power, the state, and how to bring about social change.  Its radical 
pragmatism led the ACVC to challenge the state while still engaging with its institutions.  It 
also pushed the Barrancabermeja-based association to create and participate in political 
movements that aim to transform subaltern groups’ struggles into political representation at 
national level, and develop an alternative historical bloc with national-popular incentives.  
Finally, this attitude also enabled the ACVC to develop economic projects which could serve 
as models for other communities, be they rural, indigenous, or Afro-Colombian.  These are 
the three elements that need to be strengthened to bring about change and counter the 
state’s efforts to strengthen its hegemony.  Ultimately, as Gramsci argued, the transformation 
of subaltern groups’ positions ‘requires a transformation of the state and its oppressive social 
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relations, since subaltern groups can only cease being “subaltern” once they have 
transformed the relations of subordination that cause their marginalization’.866  The ATCC and 
the CdPSJA are not, in my view, able to bring about such a transformation of the state, and 
their initiatives, although valuable as such, can only have a limited, local impact.  The ATCC 
has not been a binding social force for many years, and the CdPSJA finds itself both 
geographically and politically isolated at national level.  The CdPSJA’s strategy for the 
consolidation of its self-autonomy, favouring alliances at international level rather than at 
national level to challenge state power, can only have a wider impact if it is accompanied by 
the development of a social force at the national level.  My aim here is not to question the 
legitimacy of the community’s attitude towards the state and political power.  The situation 
of the CdPSJA is profoundly unjust, and the state and the armed conflict are the only cause of 
its oppression.  However, the CdPSJA’s attitude towards political change and the state has 
contributed to its isolation and lack of impact at the national level.  For Gramsci, only the 
waging of a political struggle, a self-aware and historically informed conscious leadership 
combined with the spontaneous political activity of subaltern groups, and the development 
of an alternative historical bloc grounded in social alliances and a new common sense can 
enable subaltern groups to bring about political and social change.  Out of the three 
communities under study, only the ACVC fulfils these conditions.    
However, it is not clear yet whether the ACVC will be successful in posing a real 
challenge for the state’s political power and constitute a real counter-hegemonic force in the 
post-conflict setting.  A likely outcome of the peace process is a passive revolution.  Gramsci 
uses this concept to refer to situations in which the state incorporates subaltern groups’ 
progressive or even revolutionary demands into a conservative project of restoration.  As 
argued in Chapter 1, for Gramsci, the passive aspect of revolutions consists in co-opting, 
cutting, or channelling the revolutionary potential of subaltern groups and popular initiatives.  
It also refers to a ‘molecular’ reorganisation of old ruling elites.  The revolution consists of 
‘the establishment of a new state, or a political superstructure generally suited to the 
eventual dominance of the capitalist mode of production’.867  In this sense, passive revolution 
is a technique employed by the ruling class when its hegemony is threatened or in contexts 
where there was no hegemonic domination.  I argue that the peacebuilding process in 
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Colombia is part of such a conservative project combining elements of reform and restoration 
together, introducing relatively far-reaching modifications, and envisaging systemic changes 
regarding land ownership.  The text of the peace agreement between the FARC and the 
government contains such modifications and proposes progressive changes regarding land 
ownership and agrarian reform, transitional justice, and political participation.  The national 
development model, however, is not questioned and will still be characterised by the 
prominent role played by mining industries.  In addition, the political struggle within 
traditional political parties and elites that has surrounded the peace process symbolises the 
fact that we are witnessing a reorganisation of these elites.  This struggle opposes the recently 
created Democratic Centre political party, led by former President Alvaro Uribe Velez, and the 
Partido de la U., led by current President Juan Manuel Santos.  This political struggle has 
divided Colombian society since the beginning of the peace process, as the presidential 
elections in 2014 and the referendum about the peace agreement in October 2016 
demonstrated.  Together with the gap between cities and countryside, this deep division 
within Colombian society is one of the main challenges and shows the limits of peasant 
communities’ efforts to render visible the impact of the armed conflict and its victims at 
national level, occupy space beyond rural areas, and build alliances that challenge these 
divisions and the anti-peasant bias as well.  If peasant communities do not manage to spread 
their critical consciousness to other sectors of society, transform their initiatives into political 
representation, and acquire key positions within the economy, the outcome of the 
implementation of the peace agreement will very likely be what Gramsci called a passive 
revolution.  In this regard, the concept of territorial peace might end up consolidating the 
rights of peasant and other rural communities, strengthening their local autonomy, and 
integrating them within a capitalist economy while keeping their most progressive demands 
in check and preserving the economic model which is at the basis of the ruling elites’ political 
power.  
Conclusion: Power, social change, and peacebuilding 
While different solutions for building peace and solving internal armed-conflicts have been 
put forward over the past 25 years, no magic answers have been found thus far.  This is 




technical solution.  Rather, it is a political process within which the interests of different forces 
in contention face each other and whose outcome is determined by both the struggles 
between these very same forces and the structures in which they occur.  This is the reason I 
opted for a Gramscian framework of analysis that places both a very specific conception of 
power and political struggle at the centre of the analysis.  Peace is not built through the 
economy, neither through the state or the everyday, but through political struggle and 
arrangements led by social forces. This thesis links peacebuilding studies to insights from 
resistance studies and theories of non-violence with the idea that if peasant communities aim 
to contribute to peacebuilding in Colombia, they must build strong counter-hegemonic 
alternatives.  However, my findings and conclusions point to the fact that their initiatives are 
more likely to be absorbed by state power and the capitalist economic system rather than 
lead to systemic and structural social change.  I am then still left with the question of how to 
achieve such change, and maybe with the illusionary hope to achieve change based on a 
Gramscian conception of power and strategies of war of position in order to ‘become’ state.  
Faced with the apparent impossibility to achieve structural change and progressive 
social change, should not we rather move away from power, or rather redefine the concept 
of power and change the world without taking power, as Holloway puts it?868  Recent 
literature on resistance to neoliberalism and how to bring about social change is especially 
critical towards Gramsci’s thinking about how to achieve social and political change.869  This 
is not the place to carry out a detailed analysis of this literature.  Nevertheless, it is interesting 
to briefly reflect on the main arguments of this literature in the light of my findings, so as to 
point towards new areas for research.  Beasley-Murray contests the use of hegemony as a 
theory in the context of Latin America.870  He argues that the exercise of power in Latin 
America since the Spanish Conquests has nothing to do with hegemony.  Consent was never 
at stake.  For him, ‘social order is secured through habit and affect’.871 Similarly, ‘social change 
is never achieved through any putative counterhegemony’.872 Arditi analyses these ‘ways of 
doing politics that bypass the neo-Gramscian logic of hegemony and counter-hegemony’, 
                                                        
868 Holloway, J. Change the World. 
869 Arditi, B. ‘Post-hegemony: politics outside the usual post-Marxist paradigm’, Contemporary Politics, 13:3 (2007) pp. 205-
226; Beasley-Murray, J. Posthegemony: Political Theory and Latin America (Minneapolis, M.N., University of Minnesota Press, 
2011); Day, R.J.F. Gramsci is Dead: Anarchist Currents in the Newest Social Movements (London, Pluto Press, 2005); Holloway, 
J. Change the World. 
870 Beasley-Murray, J. Posthegemony, pp. 1-11. 
871 Beasley-Murray, J. Posthegemony, pp. 1-11. 




which characterise ‘most of what is usually inventoried under the name ‘politics’ today’.873  
These ways of doing politics do not try to form a consensus around a collective counter-
hegemonic project that coalesce different identities, needs and interests in order to ‘become 
state’.874  Similarly, Day argues that to establish a counter-hegemonic movement is to ‘remain 
within the logic of neoliberalism’ and accept the ‘hegemony of hegemony’.875  The latter 
refers to ‘the assumption that effective social change can only be achieved simultaneously 
and en masse, across an entire national or supranational space’.  Day argues that it is possible 
to operate ‘non-hegemonically’ and to escape the ‘logic of hegemony’.  Some groups are 
already challenging this logic and exploring ‘the possibilities of non-statist, non-capitalist, 
egalitarian modes of social organisation’.876  They are ‘working to reverse the colonization of 
everyday life by taking control over – and responsibility for – the conduct of their own 
affairs’.877  They aim to bring about radical social and political change, but without seeking to 
take state power or influence its operations.878  Day forges the concept of ‘affinity for affinity’ 
to represent how these groups operate, a ‘non-universalizing, non-hierarchical, non-coercive 
relationships based on mutual aid and shared ethical commitments’.879  This logic is guided 
by a groundless solidarity that does not postulate any form of inequality as the central axis of 
struggle, and an infinite responsibility to respect ‘another Other’.880  According to Day, such a 
logic is better equipped to face neoliberalism and bring about radical social change. We do 
not need to go through the state and its mediating institutions to bring about change.   
Finally, Holloway argues for ‘changing the world without taking power’.881  His theory 
aims to undermine the logics of capital at its roots and reorganise work and social relations 
outside capital.  For Holloway, we should not focus on seizing state power if we want to 
change the world, be it through revolutionary means or political elections.  Rather, 
[…] what is at issue in the revolutionary transformation of the world is not whose power but the very 
existence of power.  What is at issue is not who exercises power, but how to create a world based on 
the mutual recognition of human dignity, on the formation of social relations which are not power 
relations.882  
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In other words, we need to get out of the capitalist logic of power and transform power-over 
into power-to.  The initiative led by the CdPSJA is the one that most resembles Holloway’s 
theory, which itself puts the Zapatista’s resistance in Mexico at the centre of its reflections.  
The idea is that by developing social relations based on human solidarity and dignity rather 
than capital, social change from below can gain sufficient impulse to challenge social relations 
as a whole.  My analysis suggests, however, that whilst this might have a strong impact at 
community level through isolation from the direct impact of state violence and policies, it will 
fail to achieve change at regional and national level.  Although the CdPSJA managed to survive 
and grow amid very adverse conditions, to say the least, it has not been successful in 
spreading its new critical consciousness at national level.  Similarly, the Zapatista experience 
has not been successful in influencing Mexican state policies and political realities.883  The 
problem lies in how to establish a link between the transforming of everyday social relations 
and the challenging of political power at higher levels.  Although providing an answer to this 
question is beyond the scope of this thesis, my analysis suggests that Gramsci’s theory of 
hegemony contains more promising insights.  In the context of this thesis, the ACVC’s 
experience shows how it is possible to mobilise and build on peasants’ everyday culture and 
ideologies to develop alternative social, political, and economic projects.   Even though it 
might be kept in check by state power, the ACVC has indeed built an alternative historical bloc 
that has the potential to challenge state power and capitalism, and be a credible counter-
hegemonic alternative in the post-conflict setting.  
  
                                                        





Upon embarking on this thesis, my concern was with the contribution of human rights 
defenders to peacebuilding in Colombia.  Such a concern was born out of four years working 
for the international non-governmental organisation Peace Brigades International in 
Colombia, which provides protective accompaniment to human rights defenders and 
communities of internally displaced people.  This thesis is the result of reflections on my 
experience working with lawyers and activists, indigenous, Afro-Colombian, and peasant 
communities, and victims of the conflict altogether.  This thesis therefore illustrates the 
evolution of my thinking on how to bring about peaceful social and political change in 
Colombia.   
Many Colombian civil society organisations and activists use a human rights discourse 
in their efforts to make Colombia a better place.  While I was at first concerned with human 
rights, such a focus lost importance through the process of identifying and defining a specific 
empirical subject, and then designing a theoretical framework suitable for the analysis of 
peasant communities’ contribution to peacebuilding.  I quickly realised that a sole focus on 
human rights, and especially on protecting rights, could only lead to the reproduction of 
power and would never bring about systemic change.  Furthermore, my own interest in 
nonviolence, also a result of my involvement with PBI, led me to take an interest in resistance 
studies, which in turn pointed me toward the insights of Gramsci’s political theory.  As a sole 
focus on human rights would not have allowed me to understand how peasant communities 
could challenge the power networks and structures at the origin of their alienation, I felt the 
potential for change had to be found in the resistance and construction of alternatives led by 
peasant communities against armed conflict, the state and neoliberalism. My experience as a 
practitioner, working alongside human rights defenders, peace activists and victims of the 
conflict also convinced me that peace processes are first and foremost social and political 
struggles.  It is the outcome of these struggles that determines the nature of the peace 
achieved, - more than any economic plan, disarmament, demobilisation and reinsertion 
program, or post-conflict legislation.  This is not to underestimate the importance of those 
aspects of any peacebuilding process.  Rather, this is to acknowledge that at the heart of 




Gramsci’s political theory, and his specific concept of power as both consent and coercion, as 
a useful tool to understand peasant communities’ political struggles against armed actors, the 
state, and neoliberalism.  As a result, this thesis contributes to knowledge on peacebuilding 
processes by engaging in a dialogue between nonviolence and resistance studies, Gramsci’s 
political theory, and, of course, peacebuilding studies. 
The fact that I place my thesis at the crossroad between these three literatures 
explains why, at times, there appears to be a tension between peacebuilding and hegemony. 
I criticise current peacebuilding theories for neglecting material factors and structural power 
relations. However, Gramsci’s interest was in struggles over hegemony, understood as the 
dominance of a particular class or social group over other social groups. This might not 
intuitively seem to be the same as peace. By making such a parallel between peacebuilding 
and struggles for hegemony, I might be accused of adopting a clearly subjective and biased 
perspective where the outcome of peasant communities’ struggles would not result in peace 
but merely in the replacement of old social and political values with new ones. However, this 
is precisely the supposedly neutral nature of peacebuilding and conflict management theories 
that I criticise in this thesis. Peace and peacebuilding are often seen, and practiced, as 
technocratic and apolitical solutions to conflicts. While it is true that some challenges arise 
when trying to import Gramsci’s concepts into peacebuilding studies, my claim is that 
peacebuilding studies rather benefit from it. By doing that, my aim is to revitalise 
peacebuilding studies, which are trapped by theories favouring the maintenance of dominant 
systems and the status-quo.  
The central research question of this thesis is therefore concerned with how an 
analysis of civil local peace initiatives resisting power-networks and structures responsible for 
the prolongation of conflict in Colombia, contributes to understanding social and political 
change in war-torn societies.  The empirical answer to this question, in the form of an analysis 
of the struggle led by the Carare Workers and Peasants Association (ATCC), the Peace 
Community of San Jose de Apartadó (CdPSJA), and the Cimitarra River Valley Peasant 
Association (ACVC), is the first contribution to knowledge that my thesis offers.  These three 
communities are located in regions colonised only relatively recently, and where the state has 
historically been absent.  These regions have also been amongst the most affected by the 
dynamics of the armed conflicts, with rebel and paramilitary groups, forced displacement, 




themselves at the heart of the conflict in all its dimensions; geographical, economic, social 
and political.  But the location of these communities in these strategic regions is not the only 
reason they have to be considered as key to any post-conflict settlement in Colombia, as is 
reflected in the concept of territorial peace put forward by the government.  The ATCC, the 
CdPSJA, and the ACVC are three of the most symbolic and prominent initiatives led by rural 
communities to resist the armed conflict and eventually build peace.  The ATCC, founded in 
1987, is a pioneer in this regard, and was awarded the Alternative Nobel Prize in 1991.  The 
ACVC was born in 1996, a result of state and paramilitary abuses against peasants in the 
Magdalena Medio region.  Finally, the CdPSJA has demonstrated since its creation in 1997 the 
possibility of developing alternatives amid armed conflict.  It has also received a widespread 
international support. 
My analysis of the initiatives of these three communities answers recent calls to not 
only ‘appreciate the extraordinary contribution [Latin American social movements] make to 
our understanding of grass roots social change’, but also to reflect ‘critically on its limitations 
and unfulfilled potentialities’.884  For that purpose, I developed a theoretical framework based 
on the political theory of the Italian thinker and activist Antonio Gramsci.  I identified three 
key elements, which I used to assess the role of the ATCC, the CdPSJA, and the ACVC in 
peacebuilding.  The transformation of common sense into a critical consciousness, control 
over space through strategies of war of position, and the building of alternative historical 
blocs all helped me explain the dynamics and logics of peasant communities’ peacebuilding 
initiatives.  I therefore assumed in this thesis that the struggle between peasant communities 
on one hand, and armed actors, the state and neoliberalism on the other, is a struggle for 
hegemony in which all these actors fight over norms and values, space, political power, and 
peace.  The argument I developed throughout this thesis is that peasant communities have 
managed to develop alternatives, and have the potential to challenge the structures of the 
war system885 in Colombia.  In claiming that peasant communities have strong capacities to 
bring about social and political change and address the roots causes of the conflict, I do not 
wish to assimilate them into a kind of Gramscian modern prince that could guide the counter-
hegemonic initiatives of subaltern groups. Rather, my point is that the resistance they have 
demonstrated so far against state domination, armed conflict, and the impact of 
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neoliberalism represents a strong challenge to the war system, the development model 
promoted by the government, and the continuation of Colombian ruling elites’ domination in 
the post-conflict setting.  
To begin with, as I argue in chapter 3, their ability to go beyond the common sense 
imposed upon them by armed actors, the state, and traditional political parties alike created 
opportunities in a context that did not seem to offer any.  Peasant communities managed to 
reinstate the political process over the military dynamics of the armed conflict and state 
coercion at a time when violence had reached its peak in intensity.  Where there seemed to 
be no choice, they were able to overcome the fatalism and determinism that, together with 
coercion, was at the origin of peasant’s passivity.  The emergence of a particular political 
consciousness, linked to a conception of the world that challenges the common sense 
imposed upon subaltern groups by ruling elites, and the loss of fear interacted with each other 
from the birth of these peasant communities until the present day.  I demonstrate in chapter 
2 that the latter aspect- the loss of fear, was instrumental to the decision to break the law of 
silence and overtly resist armed actors and the state.  It was also key to building the collective 
strength required to sustain such initiatives in time.  Finally, the loss of fear made possible the 
unity of thought and practice, symbolised by the adoption of the guiding principles of 
neutrality, nonviolence, and human rights.  These principles informed the normative 
framework that enabled peasant communities’ members to resist in the midst of armed 
conflict.  They also represent a rupture with past peasant-led movements and protests, from 
the peasant leagues of the 1930s to the peasant republics of the 1960s which led to the 
creation of the FARC.   
However, a material basis was required onto which this new critical consciousness 
could be enacted and materialised.  I demonstrated in chapter 4 that the territory provided 
such a material basis, not only for the subsistence and everyday lives of peasant communities, 
but also for their memory-building efforts and for the development of alternative modes of 
production based on solidarity and dignity.  Phrased in a Gramscian terminology, this means 
that the autonomy of peasant communities is determined by the degree to which they 
manage to establish an ‘organic’ connection with the spaces they inhabit.  The war of position 
waged by the ATCC, the CdPSJA, and the ACVC was therefore aimed at establishing a control 
over their territory through strategies of protection, appropriation and production.  I argued 




determined their place within society, as expressed in terms of individual and collective rights, 
location with the economy, and political power.  In this regard, a capacity to control space is 
key to challenging the impact of neoliberal economic policies promoted by the state.   
Finally, I argued in chapter 5 that the ATCC, the CdPSJA and the ACVC represented 
three different models of social and political transformation.  Beginning with the self-
autonomy of the CdPSJA with their rejection of both the State and capitalism, to the 
confrontational, power-seeking strategies of the ACVC, and finally the liberal stance of the 
ATCC and their efforts to bring the state back in.  All three peasant communities under study 
have then adopted different approaches and strategies toward the state and capitalism in 
their efforts to resist and build alternatives, resulting in the emergence of alternative blocs.  
In my view, these approaches help explain the extent to which each one of these peasant 
communities succeeded in challenging the power structures at the roots of the armed 
conflict.   
On the basis on these findings, I conclude in chapter 6 that the struggle between 
peasant communities on one hand, and the state and neoliberalism on the other, is likely to 
end up in a process of passive revolution; meaning that some of the peasant communities’ 
demands will be integrated into the government’s vision for the post-conflict setting, 
symbolised by the concept of territorial peace.  It also means that peasant communities will 
maintain a strong impact at the local level, depending on the extent to which they have 
managed to develop alternative historical blocs, and that Colombia’s ruling elites will make 
concessions, to a certain extent.  But my findings and conclusion also point to the fact that 
peasant communities’ initiatives are likely to be absorbed by state power and the capitalist 
economic system, rather than lead to systemic and structural social change.  Even through 
relative structural change regarding land ownership and rural reform might be achieved - 
thanks to the control over space established by peasant communities, and strengthened by 
the inclusion of structural reforms to land ownership within the Peace Agreements - the 
basics of the economic model will be preserved, thereby maintaining the power of Colombian 
ruling elites.  My contention is that, for peasant communities to have a wider impact, they 
would need to spread their critical consciousness to other sectors of society, such as the urban 
middle classes.  They would also have to extend their control over space and develop 
alternative economic models that reflect their critical consciousness, placing their values of 




bloc that could transform peasant communities’ vision for peace into political representation 
is the final aspect highlighted in my findings.  So far, only the ACVC has managed to gain 
political influence at the national level, but this has not yet materialised into political 
representation within political society. 
I also argued in chapter 6 that while the ACVC is closest to a Gramscian understanding 
of counter-hegemony, the ATCC can be characterised as a case of what Day calls a ‘politics of 
demands’ (Day, 2005: 14), and the CdPSJA as illustrating the logic of ‘affinity for affinity’ (Day, 
2005: 8), or even as an attempt to change the world without taking power following 
Holloway’s argument (Holloway, 2010).  Contrary to the arguments made by post-hegemony 
theories though, my findings suggest that the most successful initiative so far, and the most 
capable of bringing about social and political change, is the one led by the ACVC.  The ATCC 
now lacks the internal strength and cohesion to represent a credible alternative, and the 
CdPSJA is isolated both at the regional and national level.  It is hard to see how they will avoid 
being integrated and dissolved within the new social order promoted by the state.  Even one 
of my interviewees, a member of the CdPSJA, affirmed that, without a doubt, that the system 
was going to break the initiative of the community.886   And while I honestly don’t believe that 
the CdPSJA will disappear anytime soon, it is hard to see how it could extend the impact it has 
had at the local level to a regional or national scale.  This echoes Owen Worth’s analysis of 
the Zapatista’s relative achievements (Worth, 2013: 55), the Zapatistas being another peasant 
movement upon whose experience much of Holloway’s theorizing relies.  In contrast, the 
ACVC has created strong networks and alliances, has developed a sustainable political 
economy based on control over space, and has built on peasants’ everyday lives, culture, and 
identity to develop credible alternatives for peace.  In addition, it has started to reach out to 
an urban middle class population through the commercialisation of its products in Colombian 
cities.  Ultimately, it has become a national counter-hegemonic force which succeeds in 
linking peasants’ concerns with the national peace agenda.  My findings therefore coincide 
with Worth’s argument that counter-hegemony is ‘the most useful departure point for us to 
understand and locate the strength of contestation to dominant forms of hegemony’.  Worth 
adds that it also ‘gives us some idea of the limits and potential of a specific form of resistance’ 
(Worth, 2013: 36).  In this regard, it would be interesting to explore whether my findings were 





skewed or not by the theoretical framework I used by conducting a kind of counter-analysis 
using insights from post-hegemony theories.  In any case, I believe that engaging with post-
hegemony theories in the context of peacebuilding processes could bring new and fruitful 
insights to the field of peacebuilding studies and the role of local actors in bringing about 
social and political change.  
This summary of my thesis’ main argument highlights the interaction between the 
empirical context of peasant communities and Gramsci’s political theory.  While the use of 
Gramsci’s concepts enabled me to shed new light on the roles and initiatives of peasant 
communities in peacebuilding, the communities’ experiences also led me to challenge 
Gramsci’s reflections on power and political struggles.  This was done firstly by applying his 
ideas to a peripheral society where traditional forms of power coexist with a democratic 
constitution.  Secondly, by applying the concept of hegemony to a state which has been going 
through an organic crisis for the past five decades, whose authority is contested and whose 
presence over the territory can be characterised as uneven.  Thirdly, in contrast to Gramsci’s 
reflections on the potential of rural and peasant-based movements, I analysed peasant 
communities and demonstrated that they have managed to develop clear and coherent 
alternatives to the state and its neoliberal policies.  Whilst Gramsci was first and foremost 
concerned with organising workers in the context of rising fascism and capitalism, a struggle 
over land and natural resources is at the centre of the Colombian conflict.  It logically follows 
that peasants are therefore key actors in its resolution and cannot be considered as powerless 
as Gramsci implied.  Finally, the territorial dimension of peasant communities’ struggles 
pushed me to spatialize Gramsci’s political theory, focusing on his concept of war of position.  
In this regard, my contention is that positions gained within the territory lead to the gaining 
of positions within society.  In the Colombian context, any strategy aiming to counter the 
impact of violence and neoliberal policies has not only to be political, cultural, or economic, 
but also spatial.  
This theoretical framework based on Gramsci’s political theory enabled me to offer 
new insights to peacebuilding studies. These insights are rooted in a critique of the 
peacebuilding literature.  My first approach to the analysis of peasant communities was 
indeed to look at what peacebuilding studies had to say about local actors.  I found that the 
concepts put forward by the critical strand of the peacebuilding literature, such as hybridity 




could challenge the power structures that condition their everyday lives.  Neither do they 
allow us to understand how the everyday can be mobilised to challenge these very same 
structures.  My thesis therefore not only contributes to knowledge in relation to the 
peacebuilding literature but also develops a new theoretical framework for the study of 
peacebuilding by engaging with Gramscian, resistance and nonviolence studies.  Such an 
engagement has the potential to find a way out of the impasse that has characterised 
peacebuilding studies for the past few years.  This thesis shows the relevance of drawing upon 
on resistance studies, and especially on the political theory of Antonio Gramsci, for the study 
of peacebuilding processes.  Insights gained from the literature on civil resistance and 
nonviolence drew my attention to a different concept of power, emphasising both coercion 
and consent, which proved useful to understand local actor’s autonomy, agency, and 
capacities to bring about social and political change.  I also found that Gramsci’s concept of 
power was similar to Gene Sharp’s theorization of power. However, Gramsci’s theory of 
hegemony goes further than theories of nonviolence as it points to the need to develop 
political alternatives to the hegemony of the ruling elites.  My thesis went on to make original 
use of Gramsci’s political theory to assess peasant communities’ role in peacebuilding.   
Following this line of argument, the best way to bring about a peace that addresses 
the roots causes of conflict is through the development of credible political alternatives - 
based on local resistance - that aim to replace the system which sustains these roots causes.  
Institutional or functional approaches to peacebuilding that aim to build states or strengthen 
local actors’ capacities within a liberal framework have failed so far to bring about such a 
progressive peace.  Hybrid solutions or interventions targeting the everyday will also end up 
in mere reformism or passive revolution, due to the power of international actors and the 
national, local elites they support.  The development of strong political alternatives that also 
manage to exert a key function within the economy would therefore go a long way in 
addressing roots causes of conflicts.  My thesis shows that in Colombia, peasant communities 
have managed to build such a political alternative and develop a political economy fit for the 
post-conflict setting because they have developed an organic relationship with the territory.  
With the concept of territorial peace, the government has acknowledged the key role that 
this territorial dimension will play during the implementation of the Peace Agreements.  This 
provides opportunities for rural communities to influence the post-conflict setting, although 




in my thesis that the different models of social transformation and the attitudes towards the 
state and the economy adopted by the ATCC, the CdPSJA, and the ACVC have had an impact 
on their ability to resist co-optation and challenge the power structures that are at the origins 
of the conflict.   
I also need to acknowledge the limitations to my findings.  The findings apply only to 
the struggle led by peasant communities against the state, armed conflict, and neoliberalism.  
Even though I justified my choice to only focus on rural, peasant communities, this choice 
unavoidably limits the scope of my findings.  There are numerous other struggles and 
examples of resistance in Colombia, led by indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities, 
trade unions, women’s movements, LGBT associations, and organisations representing 
victims of the armed conflict.  Nevertheless, although the contents of an analysis of these 
struggles would be different, I believe the conclusions would be the same.  A process of 
passive revolution is at work in Colombia through the implementation of the Peace 
Agreements, which will integrate all subaltern groups with a new social and political order. 
My findings might also find their limitations when applied to other contexts.  Although 
the application of my research to different contexts was not a primary objective, my research 
question hinted at that possibility.  I applied Gramsci’s concepts to a context of armed conflict 
which is very different to both the context in which Gramsci developed his theory and those 
to which he applied his concepts.  Although there is a risk of overstretching the meaning of 
Gramsci’s concepts, I showed in the first chapter that Gramsci’s theory of hegemony can be 
applied to peripheral countries based on his reflections on the North/South question.  I also 
demonstrated that contexts of armed conflicts or civil wars can be characterised as organic 
crises.  In this regard, even though the Colombian state hegemony is uneven, it can be 
considered as a modern state against which strategies of war of position can be used.  Finally, 
I argued that peacebuilding processes have to be conceptualised as struggles for hegemony.  
While the state tries to consolidate its hegemony, subaltern groups resist and develop 
alternatives.  I contend therefore that my theoretical framework could be applied to other 
contexts and settings in which peace processes take place, and which fulfil the conditions that 




applied to war-torn societies,887 and so while not new in this sense, is the first to specifically 
use Gramsci to examine the role of local actors within peacebuilding processes. 
These limitations point to further research opportunities.  I will only address here what 
I consider to be the most promising of these new research paths.  First, the logical follow-up 
to my thesis would be to apply my theoretical framework to other resistance movements in 
Colombia and elsewhere, not only rural, such as Afro-Colombian communities, but also urban 
such as the Ruta Pacifica de las Mujeres.  It is very likely that such studies could bring 
additional insights into the potential of local resistance to challenge the roots causes of the 
armed conflict.  Secondly, it would be very interesting to further explore questions related to 
how to bring about social change by engaging in a dialogue between Gramscian studies and 
post-hegemony theories.  Whilst my thesis indicates that the ACVC had the strongest impact 
of the three communities under study, because it is closest to a Gramscian understanding of 
counter-hegemony, I still conclude that the struggle between peasant communities and the 
state is likely to end up in a process of passive revolution.  For this reason, it is necessary to 
continue to engage in a discussion on the role of the state in bringing about social change and 
the strategies that local actors should use to bring about a progressive peace.   
Finally, one of the most critical issues faced by human rights defenders and activists 
all over the world, both in war-torn societies and in countries in which there is no armed 
conflict, is land.  As part of my continued experience as a practitioner working with 
environmental and land activists, I have witnessed the need for the development of effective 
strategies to confront and counter land-grabbing by state-sponsored national and 
multinational companies.  My thesis showed that space plays a key role in the resistance of 
peasant communities in Colombia, and that controlling space is becoming more and more 
important if human rights are not to be empty rights.  It is therefore crucial to explore further 
how space could be integrated within strategies of war of position.  This could be done by 
studying other peasant-based movements defending their rights to stay on their land in the 
face of economic projects aimed at the exploitation of natural resources.  But this could be 
linked to the study of space within the struggles led by urban movements in Western 
societies, such as Occupy or the Spanish indignados, and could provide useful insights into 
how to counter the spatial impact of neoliberalism.  
                                                        




I conclude this research with even more questions than I had upon embarking on it.  
Questions about how to bring about peace, but also concerns about how to challenge the 
hegemony of neoliberalism within peripheral countries such as Colombia.  The model of 
development at the origins of Colombia’s armed conflict still prevails.  One of the risks 
looming large in the context of the implementation of the Peace Agreements is that the 
impact of neoliberalism be much worse than it was during the armed conflict.  Moreover 
violence, as one of the main obstacles to economic growth in Colombia over the past decades, 
will not disappear overnight.  In fact, there are already signs that criminal groups are filling 
the void left by the demobilisation of the FARC888.  The end of the armed conflict is also very 
likely to attract investors and encourage the insertion of Colombia’s national economy within 
global markets along neoliberal lines.  The internal struggles of the Colombian political and 
economic elites that have rumbled on since the end of the 1990s889 place the elites linked to 
the exploitation and ownership of land in opposition to the industrial elites that are closely 
connected to international financial markets and neoliberalism.  The government of Juan 
Manuel Santos represents the interests of the latter, and the ‘locomotora minera’, the motto 
used by the government to symbolise its economic policies based on mining, is at the basis of 
the National Development Plan.  The pressure on rural communities, and on the land they live 
on, will therefore be even higher than during the armed conflict, even though the nature of 
violence will be different.  The development of alternatives based on control over space and 
over their territories will be key for peasant communities in order  to resist and challenge the 
hegemony of neoliberalism and Colombia’s ruling elites in the post-conflict setting. 
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